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Abstract 
This thesis is a study of the emergence of the concept of body wisdom- the idea that 
bodies can have an innate knowledge of what is best and healthiest which has been 
lost but can be restored-in the context of holistic movement re-education techniques 
including Alexander Technique, Pilates, Feldenkrais, Rolfing, and Body-Mind 
Centering. Such techniques propose that changes in the body produce changes in 
mental and emotional states, and are based on the assumption that bodies require 
retraining to regain a state of naturalness. 
The thesis asks how it has become possible to think of bodies as wise and knowing, 
and how these discourses have been embodied by those who use movement re- 
education. Through a combination of participant observation, semi-structured 
interviews with practitioners and pupils of the techniques, and discourse analysis of 
texts written by their founders, this study will show how a shift has come about within 
movement re-education, away from `body awareness' as a knowledge of one's body, 
toward `body wisdom' as the body's knowledge of itself. This is exemplified in these 
techniques' diverse understandings of the body-mind relationship. Theories of the 
natural body and the uses to which it is put in relation to body wisdom will also be 
examined. 
Throughout, Foucault's approach to discourse analysis will be used in tension with 
Merleau-Ponty's work on embodiment in order to show that these approaches need 
not be contradictory and to formulate a theory of embodied discourse as a way of 
overcoming the dualism between these paradigms. The study thus counters tendencies 
within social scientific work on the body towards overtheorisation at the expense of 
empirical research, and towards choosing between embodiment and discourse. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The expression of a wellmade man appears not only in his face, 
It is in his limbs and joints also ... it is curiously in the joints of 
his hips and wrists, 
It is in his wallt.. the carriage of his neck.. the flex of his waist and 
knees .... Dress does not hide him, 
The strong sweet supple quality he has strikes through the cotton 
and flannel 
To see him pass conveys as much as the best poem... perhaps 
more, 
You linger to see his back and the back of his neck and shoulderside. 
Walt Whitman, `I Sing the Body Electric' (1855) 
In its own little way, my body was trying to say that you better stop drinking brandy. 
The Streets, `Too Much Brandy' (2002) 
This research project is a study of the concept of body wisdom through its 
manifestations in movement re-education techniques, including the Alexander 
Technique, Pilates, Rolfmg, Feldenkrais, and Body-Mind Centering. These 
techniques, which I will describe later in this chapter, aim to educate people to use 
their bodies in more efficient ways, which is expected to have both physical and 
mental effects. `Body wisdom' refers to the concept which emerges in the latter three 
techniques that bodies themselves hold an innate wisdom; that they can `know' and 
guide us toward what is healthiest or most true. In this conception, bodies are not 
simply acted upon by the subject but develop a kind of subjectivity of their own. 
Body wisdom, like Western forms of movement re -education, of which those listed 
above constitute examples, is an idea that has come about within the course of the 
twentieth century. By tracing these forms of movement re-education from their 
beginnings in the 1890s (in the case of the Alexander Technique) to more recent 
forms (such as Body-Mind Centering which developed in the 1960s and 1970s), 
changes in the perception of the body become apparent. Whereas the Alexander 
Technique proposes that humanity most needs to develop conscious control over the 
self and body, Body-Mind Centering suggests that bodies are comprised of systems 
which all contain qualities of `mind', and that knowing is scattered throughout the 
body. 
The quotes above encapsulate this historical shift. In the passage from Whitman's `I 
Sing the Body Electric', the body is taken to represent the `wellmade man' who 
moves with ease and grace; his `wellmadeness' is indicated by his comportment. The 
body described is one which F. M. Alexander, founder of the Alexander Technique, 
would have appreciated for its carriage and what he termed `good use of the self . 
However, the body as such is demonstrative of the qualities of the subject; the body 
does not have subjectivity, it only represents it. Alexander also believed that the self 
was represented through the body and should be attended to consciously. 
In the second quote, from UK Garage artist The Streets, the body has come to take a 
role in subjectivity; it `speaks', not out of conscious direction, but in opposition to it. 
It is a moralising force, which instinctively 'knows' what is right and healthy ('you 
better stop drinking brandy'. ) It is, in short, a wise body similar to the kind found in 
Body-Mind Centering. The fact that there is little overlap between the Garage music 
scene and movement re-education serves only to underscore the point that the idea of 
a body that knows, a wise body, exists in a range of fields outside this one. 
Two linked research questions direct my study. First, how does it become possible to 
think of bodies as wise and knowing in movement re -education? This is a 
Foucauldian question about the genealogy of a particular way of understanding bodies 
and selves. Second, how and in what ways is the discourse of body wisdom 
embodied by those involved in these techniques? This question is about embodiment, 
and I have taken Merleau-Ponty (1962) as a guide in researching it. The first question 
is addressed by historicising the wise body, tracing the coming-together of particular 
ideas about bodies and selfhood. The second question attends to how discourse is 
embodied, and how theory and practice relate. I have tried to take embodiment 
seriously, grounding my study through a cultural phenomenology (Csordas, 1994b) of 
Alexander Technique in particular. I have examined embodied practices and how 
practitioners and pupils of movement re-education make sense of them, and the extent 
to which they employ the discourses of body wisdom. Movement re-educators take 
their work to be an embodied practice about which little can be known that is not 
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experienced, so participant observation in movement re-education became a useful 
way of understanding the work in its own terms. Twenty-eight semi-structured 
interviews with practitioners and pupils of all five of these techniques deepened and 
sometimes challenged the insights provided by participant observation and discourse 
analysis. 
The approaches of Foucault and phenomenology are disparate ones and not easily 
synthesised, and indeed it has not been my intention to synthesise them but to use 
them in tension. I will demonstrate how this tension can be a productive one for 
analysis. Crossley (1994; 1996) has argued that Foucault and Merleau-Ponty can be 
used effectively in conjunction with one another to develop an understanding of 
subjectivity, an argument I will develop in Chapter Three. However, this study will 
move beyond his theoretical argument to show that empirically there is much to be 
gained from studying the body in movement re-education in these contrasting ways. 
This study therefore makes two important contributions to knowledge: first, it 
analyses movement re-education and the emergence of the idea of body wisdom, a 
topic that has received little scholarly attention, and second, it develops a 
methodology for analysing movement re-education as embodied discourse, 
demonstrating empirically what Crossley has proposed theoretically. 
However, over the course of my research I have frequently been made aware that 
many people lack any knowledge of movement re-education and what it does or 
proposes to do; further, even those who have heard of one or more of the techniques I 
study do not necessarily have a very clear idea of what is involved in them. The 
obvious question that then emerges is why a study of movement re-education is 
necessary or even useful; the fact that something has never been studied before does 
not give it intrinsic sociological significance. In what follows, I will give a brief 
history and explanation of the five movement re-education techniques I have studied 
and discuss why they are worthy of sociological attention. I will then provide a brief 
outline of how this thesis will develop. 
Movement re-education is sometimes called 'somatic education' (Bolster and 
Dussault, 2001) or bodywork, although the latter includes practices such as massage 
or osteopathy, in which the client is passively worked upon. In contrast, the 
techniques discussed here generally require the active involvement of the pupil or 
client in a process of education or re-education of the body and movement. The 
degree of active involvement varies among the movement re-education techniques 
discussed here; all except Pilates include certain sessions or parts of sessions which 
involve passive manipulation by a practitioner, but they also involve teaching and 
learning to move or carry oneself differently. Movement re-education is seen as 
holistic, affecting both mind and body, although the way the body/mind relationship is 
conceived differs significantly between techniques. The word `re-education' indicates 
that something is being relearned and reclaimed; it is not simply a process of teaching 
the body a new skill, but of restoring it to a state of natural good use which is 
generally perceived to have been lost through the processes of civilisation. In later 
techniques, such as Feldenkrais, Rolfmg, and Body-Mind Centering, restoration of 
this good use is thought to return the body to a natural state of wisdom. Movement 
re-education has traditionally relied on a theory of evolution popular in the first part 
of the twentieth century and was linked to the eugenics movement, which says that 
human beings' physical capacities are degenerating while their intellectual 
capabilities grow. The `natural savage' is seen to have good physical skills but 
impoverished mental abilities, while `civilised Man' is imagined to be physically 
weak but intellectually strong. This theory has racist implications and has long been 
rejected in fields such as anthropology, but within movement re-education it has been 
pervasive, as I shall demonstrate. 
The spectre of the `natural body' haunts any notion of body wisdom. The existence 
(or not) of a natural body also implicitly underlies the work of many of the theorists I 
will discuss, including Foucault and Merleau Ponty. However, my primary interest is 
not in the ontology of the natural body but in the ethics or politics, in the broad sense 
of the term, of such a body. That is, the question is not `is there such a thing as a 
natural body? ' but `what use is a natural body? ' What is a natural body for, and what 
is it used to support or deny? These questions are highly relevant to movement re- 
education, and analysing them may provide insights for social theory as well. 
Movement re-education has been most influential in the performing arts, where 
actors, dancers, singers and to a lesser extent musicians have adopted it as a way of 
training the body. Four interviewees had either studied or taught Alexander 
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Technique at theatre school and indicated that most theatre schools they knew of 
included some Alexander teaching, and Huxley et at (1995) have described their use 
of Alexander Technique as a key aspect of dance training in a UK university dance 
programme. Pilates is common amongst dancers, and is part of training at key 
contemporary dance schools in London as well as the Royal Ballet School. Other 
techniques have also been used by performing artists, but perhaps less frequently. 
Body-Mind Centering, for instance, is almost completely unknown outside the dance 
community, and is relatively unheard of in the UK in general. Athletes have also 
sometimes turned to movement re-education; there are, for example, books on 
running (Balk and Shields, 2000), swimming (Shaw and D'Angour, 2001), and 
horseback riding with the Alexander Technique (Tottle, 1998). However, of these 
techniques, only Pilates has become relatively well-known, in part perhaps because it 
resembles more traditional forms of exercise most closely and because it can be done 
at home, following books or videos. 
The techniques studied here have emerged, as I have said, between the 1890s and 
1960s, but there are some common elements in their histories, organised around what 
I will call a `founding myth'. Such founding myths contain common elements, such 
as the struggle of an injured or ill individual to overcome these difficulties through 
personal exploration, often in opposition to established biomedical beliefs. Coward 
(1989: 37) suggests that such stories are common in alternative health, drawing either 
on a key founder with the status of a guru figure, or on roots in ancient `Eastern' 
disciplines such as yoga and martial arts. These tendencies are apparent in movement 
re-education's histories as well, as the following outlines shall show. 
F. Mathias Alexander, founder of the Alexander Technique, was born in 1869 in 
Tasmania. The story told in his most biographical book, The Use of the Self (1985 
[1932]) is that he was an elocutionist and actor, but began to suffer hoarseness and 
voice loss during recitations in his early twenties. He consulted a physician, who 
prescribed rest. He followed these instructions but it failed to make a difference, so 
he set out to cure himself by studying himself in the mirror while reciting. This led 
him to discover that he was cutting off his voice by pulling his neck back as he spoke, 
and from this discovery he began to develop a technique of alignment and 
`constructive conscious control' over behaviour (Alexander, 1987[1923]). From 
5 
Tasmania, he moved to New Zealand and then to Melbourne, went to London in 
1904, and during World War I he established a practice in New York as well, 
travelling between the two cities (Gelb, 1987: 17). Alexander eventually set up a 
school to train teachers in his technique on a three-year course in Holland Park, 
London, where he continued to work until his death in 1955. Lessons in Alexander 
Technique generally involve activities such as sitting and standing from a chair, with 
hands -on guidance from an Alexander teacher, and usually end with `table work', in 
which the pupil lies on a table and is passively manipulated by the teacher. 
Joseph Pilates was born in Germany in 1880 and died in New York in 1967. During 
his childhood he suffered asthma, rickets, and rheumatic fever. In order to overcome 
these ailments he began a number of forms of `physical culture' exercise, including 
gymnastics and body building (Kelly, 2001), as well as yoga, martial arts and Zen. In 
1912 he moved to England where he taught self-defence to English detectives. He 
was interned during the war at a camp in Lancaster, where he trained other internees. 
After World War I he returned to Germany, but in 1926 when the German army 
requested he apply his training for them, he refused and emigrated to the United 
States, where he set up a studio in New York with his wife, Clara, to teach the 
practice he termed `Contrology'. Later this became known as the Pilates method, 
involving matwork, a set of strengthening exercises performed on the floor and taught 
in classes, or individual work on `the machines', which are intended to strengthen and 
balance the body. 
Ida Rolf was born in New York in 1896 and died in 1979. She grew up in the Bronx 
and in 1916 she graduated from Barnard College, having been given the opportunity 
study due to a shortage of qualified male technical personnel as a result of the war. 
She was hired by the Rockefeller Institute, continued to study and received her PhD in 
biological chemistry from Columbia University's College of Physicians and 
Surgeons. Throughout the 1920s, she studied and experimented with osteopathy, 
homeopathy, and yoga, experiments initially brought on by her attempts to cure an 
illness she developed after being kicked by a horse as a young woman. Gradually, 
she synthesised a method she called `Structural Integration', involving a technique 
like deep massage intended to affect the fascial envelopes around muscles, which she 
practised on friends, acquaintances, and family members who had been unable to 
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receive help elsewhere. The method eventually received wider recognition when she 
demonstrated it at the Esalen Institute (the California home of a wide variety of 
alternative therapies and self-help practices) in 1968 (Rolf, 1978). It was also at 
Esalen that her method was nicknamed 'Rolfing'. 
Moshe Feldenkrais was born in 1904 in Russia and died in 1984. He went to 
Palestine at the age of fourteen, studied mathematics, and saved enough money to go 
to Paris, where he studied engineering and eventually went on to receive a doctorate 
in physics. While in Paris, he met the creator of Judo and studied for a black belt in 
the martial art. He suffered a serious knee injury in his early twenties, and used Judo, 
supplemented by a knowledge of bodily mechanics from his physics background, to 
effect a cure. After Germany invaded France in World War II, he went to England, 
where he worked in technical and scientific fields until the end of the war when he 
eventually returned to Israel/Palestine. Gradually, he became involved in movement 
re-education and developed a method termed `Functional Integration', practised in 
one-to-one lessons involving minor adjustments of a client, who lies on a table, by the 
practitioner, and `Awareness Through Movement', practised in groups and aimed at 
exploring a variety of possible ways of moving. Colloquially these are referred to as 
the Feldenkrais method. Feldenkrais published a number of books during his lifetime, 
one of which, Body and Mature Behavior(1949) was taken as a serious contribution 
to the field of psychology and the understanding of motor behaviour. 
Finally, Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen was born in 1943 and is still living and working in 
Massachusetts. She started by teaching dance to children with cerebral palsy when 
she was sixteen, and later received a degree in occupational therapy from Ohio State 
University. She went on to study various movement-related techniques including 
dance, dance therapy, martial arts, voice, yoga, cranio-sacral therapy, Zero Balancing, 
and Zen Buddhist practice (Cohen, 1991: 172). She founded the School for Body- 
Mind Centering in 1973, bringing together her movement experience in these areas 
and combining it with a theory of `experiential anatomy' and evolutionary movement 
patterns. Body-Mind Centering can be taught in groups, asking individuals to explore 
the `systems' of the body (such as the nervous system, fluid system, or endocrine 
system), or the evolutionary movement patterns (including, for example, cellular 
breathing, navel radiation, and homolateral and contralateral crawling, walking and 
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leaping). It can also be taught individually, where similar patterns are explored, 
although practitioners may also use gentle manipulation of the client's body. 
Despite the individualism of most of the accounts above, these techniques have not 
emerged in isolation or without input from others. F. M. Alexander, for example, had 
a number of famous pupils and friends, including Aldous Huxley and George Bernard 
Shawl. American educator and pragmatist John Dewey was also a devoted student, 
and wrote prefaces to two of Alexander's books. Pilates worked with Martha 
Graham's dance company as well as ballet choreographer George Ballanchine and his 
dancers. Ida Rolf worked on Fritz Perls, the founder of Gestalt therapy, at Esalen. 
Its association with the performing arts on one hand and alternative health on the 
other have contributed to movement re-education's relative neglect as a topic of 
serious study. A few publications have dealt with movement re-education in relation 
to philosophy and/or dance studies (Fraleigh, 2000; Green, 1999; Hamera, 2001; 
Maitland, 1995) but these have tended to essentialise and celebrate the work as 
restoring a true body wisdom or awareness, rather than treating it as a subject worth 
critical examination. Within the social sciences, only Coward's (1989) critique of the 
discourses of alternative health takes these techniques into account, although she 
lumps them together with other bodywork and alternative health practices, thereby 
losing the specificity of the techniques as a kind of re-education. 
Despite this lack of attention, movement re-education has been influential in dance 
training, where from the emergence of postmodern dance in the 1960s, the work of 
Alexander, Feldenkrais, and others has been increasingly adopted as a way of 
exploring `the experience and "truth" of the body' in movement training (Novack, 
1991: 51-2). Among the general public, complementary and alternative medicine has 
become increasingly popular in the last twenty-five years; Mike Saks' survey (1991) 
has suggested that one in seven people in the UK now consult complementary or 
alternative practitioners, and Stillerman (1996) notes that a 1990 study by Harvard 
I Apparently tired of his friends' devotion to Alexander (Staring, 1997), H. G. Wells satirised him in his 
book Apropos of Dolores, in which a minor character who worked as a healer is said to have 'had quite 
a lot of distinguished men, artists and writers and that sort of man doing his neck exercises. He taught 
them to swan... Some of them swan now quite beautifully' (2002 [1938]: 252). He goes on to refer to 
this man's realisation that the health of body and mind are 'Man's Supreme Inheritance' (254), not 
coincidentally the title of Alexander's first book. 
Medical School indicated one quarter of the American population was using some 
form of complementary or alternative medicine. 2 Yet studies in this area have 
overwhelmingly tried to determine efficacy, and have done so from a biomedical or 
natural scientific point of view; very few studies have examined its popularity in 
terms of the ideas it puts forward or the rise of personal responsibility for health as a 
social phenomenon (Coward, 1989). This study will attempt to redress this imbalance 
through an analysis of both discourse and embodied practice, on the basis that these 
may be quite different. 
On a theoretical level, movement re -education techniques also provide some useful 
insights. Social scientists writing about the body have sought to challenge Cartesian 
dualism and to find new ways of thinking about the relationship between mind and 
body. Movement re-education does this on a practical level, attempting to overcome 
traditional dualistic conceptions of the body-mind relationship. Some techniques are 
more successful at this than others, but in those that are unsuccessful there are also 
potential lessons for social science. For instance, the theory that the body is culturally 
inscribed, common in academic work on the body and often attributed to Foucault 
(1984), is similar to the view of many movement re-educators. These theories imply a 
pre-social body prior to inscription (Butler, 1990; Grosz, 1994), which is equally 
problematic in its implications for both. An analysis of movement re-education can 
provide insights into why this is problematic and how it may be overcome, which may 
be useful in both arenas. 
Finally, studying movement re-education provides an opportunity to `flesh out' some 
of the analyses in the field of sociology of the body, which, as Bryan Turner (1996: 
31-2) has noted in a new preface to Body and Society, have overwhelmingly 
privileged theory over empirical research. Conducting an empirical study of 
movement re-education is a corrective to overly theoretical work on the body, which 
has to a large extent been curiously disembodied. I will further demonstrate how a 
2 While studies of the use of bodywork on its own are unusual, a USA Today reporter claimed in 
October 2001 that there had been a dramatic increase in people seeking massage and other bodywork in 
relation to stress relief from terrorism; this was based in part on a study by the American Massage 
Therapy Association indicating that in 2000, seventeen percent of Americans had been for a massage, 
compared to only eight percent in 1997 (M. Elias, 2001). The actual link to increased stress from 
terrorism is tenuous, but does demonstrate that bodywork practitioners are successful at mobilising 
popular discourses in the service of promoting their work. 
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theory of embodied discourse can help to overcome the dualistic tendency within 
much writing on the body to privilege either discourse or embodiment. The 
implications of a study of movement re-education are thus much wider than 
movement re-education itself. 
Chapter Two provides a historical overview of the emergence of body wisdom to 
construct a basis for understanding how a `body that knows' becomes possible to 
think about. This is accomplished through an examination of writings about dance 
and physical culture, eugenics, posture, and alternative health, fields with which 
movement re-education shares broad commonalities. This chapter will contextualise 
the concept of body wisdom and provide a basis for understanding its emergence in 
movement re-education. 
Chapter Tbree reviews theoretical literature on discourse and embodiment, through an 
examination of the work of Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and their interpreters. In this 
chapter I will put forward the theoretical basis for the argument that embodiment and 
discourse need not be mutually exclusive approaches, following Crossley (1994; 
1996). Theory and method are not separate in this thesis, as each implies and informs 
the other, but for the sake of clarity I will begin by setting out the theoretical 
framework which will then be operationalised in method and practice. 
Embodied discourse is central to theoretical and methodological approach this thesis 
develops. Chapter Four will outline how I have used this concept in relation to 
studying movement re-education. Specifically, I will discuss my use of Foucault's 
method of discourse analysis, ethnography as an embodied research method, and the 
possibilities of interviewing in relation to both embodiment and discourse. I will also 
address ethical issues the study raises in relation to researching participants' use of 
racialist and racist models of evolution in interviews. Throughout this and the 
previous chapters, empirical material will be referred to where it is relevant to the 
issues raised. 
Chapter Five takes the texts of movement re-education's founders as a starting point 
for analysing the discourse of movement re -education as a technique of ethical self- 
formation, following Foucault. Certain themes become apparent, particularly in 
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relation to nature and evolution as `modes of subjection' (Foucault, 1985) and body 
wisdom and body awareness as the telos behind all these techniques. Chapter Six 
contrasts with this discursive analysis of movement re-education by providing an 
embodied account of participant observation in the Alexander Technique, organised 
around Merleau-Ponty's (1962) discussions of habit, Csordas' (2002) concept of 
somatic modes of attention, and Bourdieu's (1977) theories of habitus and bodily 
hexfs. 
Chapters 7 and 8 use interview data, as well as recent texts in movement re-education 
and data from participant observation, to discuss particular themes emerging in this 
field. In Chapter Seven, the issues around naturalness raised in Chapter Five are 
revisited, with an accompanying examination of the shift in contemporary movement 
re-education away from a fixed vertical posture as the ideal. Chapter Eight employs 
recent social theories involving the somatic, such as Csordas' `somatic modes of 
attention' and Nikolas Rose's (2000; 2001) `somatic individuality', to show how the 
contrast between embodied and discursive approaches can be productive in analysing 
the same topic, namely, the rise of the somatic in contemporary society. Through 
Csordas, we can understand the modes of embodiment and conceptions of the body- 
mind relationship in movement re-education; through Rose, the discourse of 
movement re-educators in relation to the eugenic pasts of their founders can be 
understood as part of the rise of somatic individuality as a new way of understanding 
the self. This chapter concludes by linking both theories to Turner's (1992) concept 
of the somatic society. 
There are, obviously, other possible stories about body wisdom to be told. One other 
possibility would be in tracing it through psychological and psychotherapeutic visions 
of the body, particularly in relation to the role of the nervous system. However, such 
a project would then take the form of analysing shifts in official discourse, an area 
that has already had a great deal of attention. I have been much more interested in 
analysing the marginal commentaries on bodies and health which have traditionally 
received less consideration, yet have also been influential. This thesis also says little 
about the interaction between `Eastern' and `Western' discourses around the body and 
the flow of ideas between cultures, brought on by colonialism and Orientalism in the 
nineteenth century. The importation and adaptation of yoga, Buddhism, and martial 
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arts to Western European and Anglo-American contexts has certainly been influential 
for the development of the concept of body wisdom (Novack, 1990). Work in this 
area is both necessary and important, but it has not been within the scope of my study 
to take up these issues, and I have consciously chosen to limit my study to the 
development of Western movement re -education techniques in Western conte xts. 
This is partly due to the lengthy history which Eastern techniques often claim, 
although Chan (2000) has pointed out that in the case of Judo at least this is somewhat 
mythical, reconstructed after the fact in order to give it weight as an ancient practice, 
just as has occurred in movement re-education. Further, although both dance and 
health-related practices have tended to be dominated by women, issues of gender in 
relation to movement re-education are addressed here only marginally. This is 
because movement re-educators do not discuss women in the same terms that they 
discuss `savages' and children; here, at least, the long tradition of associating women 
with nature seems to have largely been broken. Although my study of body wisdom 
through movement re-education may touch on some of the issues discussed above, 
they will not form its focus, and would require quite a different study. 
Instead, it is my intention to show that studying movement re-education in itself is 
useful, for the reasons described above. It is not simply an empirical project, but a 
way of developing the concept of embodied discourse both theoretically and 
empirically. Although I have mobilised this concept in relation to movement re- 
education as a case study, it has wider implications for theoretical work on the body. 
Studying movement re-education, I will argue, provides insights not only into the 
practices and theories of movement re-education and the context in which they 
emerged, but also into new possibilities for ways of thinking, researching, and writing 
about the body in sociology and social theory. 
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Chapter 2 
Toward a Body That Knows: Body Wisdom in Context 
Introduction 
This chapter will outline key factors that influenced the development of the concept of 
body wisdom in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is not to say that the 
emergence of body wisdom can be traced to a particular moment in time; indeed, it is 
impossible to know where the concept of body wisdom, as an aspect of body 
education or re-education, began. Within disciplines such as yoga, for example, it has 
a long history (Worthington, 1982). However, the notion that movement re-education 
in general might have a history has tended to be minimised by founders and 
practitioners of such disciplines, often for the purposes of universalising these 
practices and giving them weight and grounding, as I will discuss in Chapter Five. 
Thus there is no way to construct an exhaustive history of `body wisdom' in relation 
to movement training. There are, however, indicative texts and subjects which taken 
together begin to indicate the assemblage of something like `body wisdom' in the 
twentieth century. The purpose of this chapter is to explore these areas in order to 
ground this study in a socio-historical context. The coming together of ideas about 
bodies and health does not follow one linear path, and the chapter is not about 
searching for the origins of body wisdom as such. It is best understood as a series of 
histories, all of them partial. 
Dance history, as I shall show, provides a way of understanding major trends in 
movement studies as they relate to the performing arts. I have also drawn on a 
relatively recent body of literature around movement studies and race to show how 
physical education was linked with ideas about racial health and hygiene. This is then 
developed further through a survey of the eugenics movement. In examining 
developments around physical education, health, and the notion of race, it becomes 
apparent that the eugenic ideas around degeneration had wide currency. Moreover, as 
the history of posture campaigns demonstrates, there has long been a theory that how 
we comport our bodies is indicative of what kinds of people we are. These issues, 
too, are important in the development of `body wisdom' and its use in movement re- 
education. 
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This chapter concludes with an examination of alternative and complementary health 
in historical and contemporary contexts. As I have indicated, movement re-education 
has tended to be categorised as a form of complementary or alternative medicine, 
although a number of practitioners interviewed tended to distance themselves from 
this label. I shall discuss arguments for and against this classification, but in any case 
it is apparent that techniques of movement re-education share certain commonalities 
with alternative health and therefore some background on it is useful. 
Dance 
Movement re-education techniques are caught in a nexus between `trained' and 
`natural' bodies, in as much as they may seek to return their participants to a body 
which is `natural'-meaning flexible, freely moving, healthy and without physical or 
psychosomatic issues- yet contradictorily, the `natural body' is to be gained through 
training or re-training the body. A social technology or technique of the self 
(Foucault, 1985) is required in order to return the body to this `natural' state. The 
tension in this relationship is one on which dance writing can provide illumination 
and insight. Western theatre dance, particularly in its modern and postmodern forms, 
locates itself in this same space between trained and natural bodies. To perform 
dance requires training, yet there has been a reaction against what has been perceived 
as the `artificial' and unhealthy training of the ballet dancer's body. The rebellion 
against ballet-the primary form of Western theatre dance between the 1600s and 
early 1900s-began in the work of modem dance pioneers such as Isadora Duncan, 
Ruth St. Denis, and later Martha Graham. Franko (1995: 5) comments that Duncan 
criticised ballet, claiming it made poor use of body mechanics and lacked fluidity. 
Ballet has also been seen as unhealthy and dangerous to the body, particularly the 
developing bodies of children. In this section I will provide a historical overview of 
this shift in dance, which is in many respects parallel to the rise of movement re- 
education techniques. 
The relationship between Western theatre dance and movement re-education is more 
than simply a parallel, however, and there are a number of points at which their recent 
histories intersect. Contemporary and modern dancers have frequently sought 
14 
movement re-education techniques as part of their training, as Bolster and Dussault 
(2001), Fraleigh (2000) and Green (1999) indicate. Huxleyet at (1995) have 
discussed the use of Alexander Technique as part of a university contemporary dance 
degree. As early as the 1920s, Martha Graham's company were apparently among the 
early devotees of Pilates (Siler, 2000: 3). 
Dance is obviously not the only field in which movement re-education has been 
adopted; my research indicated that Alexander Technique was taught in most acting 
schools in London, and a number of my interviewees were musicians. I shall deal 
here only with literature on dance, however, on the premise that dance is uniquely 
placed to comment upon bodily awareness and training. While theatre and music are 
embodied disciplines, developing skills that are specifically bodily is not their sole 
raison d'etre, whereas for dancers bodily skill constitutes the central core of their art. 
Athletic pursuits are perhaps the only area in which the body is equally central, yet 
rarely are they concerned with working `organically', `holistically', or indeed 
`naturally' in the way that contemporary dance and movement re-education seek to 
do, 3 
Prior to the late 1800s, Western theatre dance was comprised mainly of ballet, a dance 
form with very formal rules of expression and gesture, and one which required a high 
degree of training in order to be performed. Around the turn of the century, however, 
a new form called modern dance emerged, spurred on by such diverse influences as 
dress reform movements, American vaudeville and minstrel shows, Orientalism, 
romanticism, and physical training systems such as the work of Francois Delsarte, 
which originated in France but gained most of its popularity in America. Modern 
dance challenged the balletic ideal: dancer as sylph, ethereal and unattainable (Jowitt, 
1988). Isadora Duncan and Ruth St. Denis were two early American modern dancers 
who are often credited as the primary founders of the discipline. There are many 
3 As I noted in the Introduction, movement re-education has sometimes been adopted by athletes as 
well, however, so athletic endeavours do not preclude this kind of work; it is simply that they are less 
frequently involved in it. 
4 The distinctions between modem/contemporary (the terms are often used interchangeably) and New/ 
postmodern (or post modem, see Banes, 1987) dance are rather complex and I have simplified them for 
the purposes of this discussion. Modem dance tends to focus on expressive movement and was 
initially concerned with uncodified gesture, although the work of Martha Graham did develop a very 
codified dance vocabulary. Postmodem dance rejected this codification and the star image. New 
Dance is a term which has been used in the UK to refer to postmodern work. 
15 
other early modern dancers who deserve recognition for their roles in moving the 
discipline forward, but my purpose here is to give a sketch of the influences on 
Duncan and St. Denis only, in order to show how these influenced later generations of 
modern-and, ultimately, postmodern-dancers. This in turn will demonstrate the 
concern of these schools of dance with naturalness in movement and gesture, a 
concern which was not present in ballet. 
Isadora Duncan, an American dance artist, became one of the major expressionist 
dancers of the early twentieth century. Although she claimed to have no formal dance 
training, there are indications (Jowitt, 1988) that she had some background in 
ballroom dance (she taught dancing in San Francisco in the 1890s), Swedish 
gymnastics, and Delsarte's `system of expression', to which I shall devote further 
explanation in a moment. Duncan `believed that the body was the prime reality, the 
template of life, the source of all knowledge. The body was inseparable from the 
mind; when she talked about the body, she was talking also about the soul, about the 
"self"(Daly, 1995: 4). Her dancing was never strictly about the body. She 
challenged norms of the day by dancing barefoot, in flowing, Grecian-inspired tunics, 
and her movements-waltz steps, runs, walks, skips and leaps-were meant to imitate 
natural phenomena. She also drew very heavily on images of the ancient Greeks, 
images she gathered from museums and books. She abhorred many forms of social 
regulation upon women, and insisted on her own right to have children outside of 
marriage, even-scandalously-dancing while visibly pregnant (Jowitt, 1988: 72). 
Duncan admired Darwin's theories of evolution and sought to develop naturally 
evolving gestures and movements in her work. However, as Ann Daly points out 
This "Natural" body was an artistic invention as well as a rhetorical strategy-a 
conceptual cipher for an ideal of harmony that embraced the Greeks and rejected 
"African savages. " "Nature" was Duncan's metaphorical shorthand for a loose package 
of aesthetic and social ideals: nudity, childhood, the idyllic past, flowing lines, health, 
nobility, ease, freedom, simpliciy, order, and harmony. (1995: 89) 
This natural body was `civilized' rather than `primitive', and its origins could be 
traced back to ancient Greece, thus being tied into what are traditionally cited as the 
beginnings of Western civilisation (1995: 941). The idealisation of ancient Greek 
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culture as an exemplar of the natural is also evident in the writings of Joseph Pilates, 
as I shall show in Chapter Five. 
While Duncan's dance style did not survive as a method, in part due to its lack of a 
formal movement vocabulary, it did influence the development of modern dance and 
also ballet, rather ironically given her criticisms of the latter (Jowitt, 1988: 100). The 
work of Ruth St. Denis, on the other hand, had a much more direct influence on the 
development of American modem dance. St. Denis and her partner, Ted Shawn, 
established the Denishawn school and company where they trained later modern 
dancer/choreographers Martha Graham, and Doris Humphrey and Charles Weidman. 
St. Denis was also American, and like Duncan had apparently little formal dance 
training. She was influenced by Delsartism, and her mother was a staunch 
campaigner in the dress reform movement (Kendall, 1979). St. Denis joined 
Vaudeville, but her real success came when, inspired by the popularity of Orientalism 
and romanticised images from India, China, Japan and Egypt, she invented herself as 
an Indian dancer. She was certainly not the only dancer working with `Oriental' 
themes; they had been present in turn of the century ballet (Jow itt, 1988) and were 
common among other dancers of the period. She was, however, one of the most 
successful; Kendall suggests that this was due to her emphasis on personality in her 
dances (1979: 82). Like many other dancers in the Orientalist tradition, St. Denis had 
never visited `the Orient'; she had, apparently, been inspired to do these dances by 
seeing an image of the goddess Isis on a poster advertising Egyptian Deities 
cigarettes, in a drugstore in Buffalo, New York (Jowitt, 1988: 130). As her 
biographer Suzanne Shelton notes, the image St. Denis held of the Orient was vague, 
as it was for most Americans and Europeans who had been so inspired by Eastern 
ideas and images around that time: 
The longitudinal boundaries of this idealized Orient were hazy at best In the 
popular imagination the Orient stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, 
encompassing the Near and Far East from Africa to Japan. Indistinguishable in 
their exoticism, all oriental cultures were synonymous with sensuality, latent 
cruelty, and the bizarre. The peoples were "pagan, not Christian; amoral not 
ethical; lazy rather than labouring; languid and never strenuous. " This mythical 
Orient represented an inversion of American values, but it reflected a central 
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preoccupation of the America of Robber Barons and great industrial fortunes: the 
Orient, above all, was a land of barbaric riches. (Shelton, 1981: 90). 
St. Denis played on these images of the foreign and the exotic, and continued to 
choreograph in this style for the Denishawn company. Her Orientalism also had 
echoes of the `natural body' about it, although it may be argued that this natural body 
was intended to be `exotic', as opposed to the `civilised' Greek body that Duncan 
strove to present. Orientalist dances also used bare feet, clothing that suggested 
sensuality and partial nudity, and contained less formalised movement than Western 
theatrical dance forms such as ballet. Orientalism was fuelled in part by wide -scale 
European colonialism of the 1800s, and although `Orientalist' dances tended to be 
imagined rather than based on actual dance styles from non-Western cultures, 
physical practices were among the goods imported from the colonies. Yoga was 
brought to Britain from India around 1830 and to America around 1893 (Worthington, 
1982). In common with Swedish Ling Gymnastics and Delsartism, yoga promoted a 
view of body and mind as holistically interrelated, and opposed more abstracted forms 
of physical training which did not take the body-mind relationship into account. 
The modern dance tradition was carried on by several of Denishawn's protegees, 
including Doris Humphrey, Charles Weidman, and Martha Graham. Graham's 
dances formalised gesture to some extent, in as much as she developed a clearly 
defined and identifiable `Graham technique', which is still taught today. This was 
more `natural' than ballet in the sense that it relied upon feet that were not turned out, 
and thus resembled `natural' movements such as walking. Graham used Greek myths 
and Jungian psychoanalysis as a choreographic source in her later work. She claimed 
that her inspiration came `mostly from the excitement of living. I get it from the 
diversity of a tree or the ripple of the sea, a bit of poetry, the sighting of a dolphin 
breaking the still water and moving toward me... anything that quickens you to the 
instant' (Graham, 1998: 68). Again the reference to nature as a source of inspiration is 
apparent, although here `natural bodies' are not human ones, as they were for St. 
Denis and Dune an. These issues around which bodies are represented as natural is 
one which will be taken up in more detail in Chapter Five. 
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Choreographers began to break away from the traditions of American modem dance 
in the late 1950s, when Merce Cunningham, a former Graham student, rebelled 
against the expressivity of her choreography and used chance procedures to 
choreograph his own work. By the early 1970s, however, a new dance form was 
taking shape: postmodern dance. Banes (1987: xv) notes that the term `post modern' 
initially meant simply that it came after modem dance, and that it in fact aligned itself 
to (modernist) minimalist sculpture and thus did not necessarily share in the 
characteristics of `postmodernism' more broadly. However there are certain 
elements, such as a lessening of hierarchical relationships (dancer/choreographer and 
dancer/non-dancer), which do appear distinctly postmodern in the usual academic 
sense. In common with other postmodern arts, Banes notes, it incorporated `pastiche, 
irony, playfulness, historical reference, the use of vernacular materials, the continuity 
of cultures, an interest in process over product, breakdowns of boundaries between art 
forms and between art and life, and new relationships between artist and audience' 
(1987: xv). Postmodern dance was a full-fledged reaction against formalisation of 
gesture and dance technique. In postmodern dance, 
The body itself became the subject of the dance, rather than serving as an instrument for 
expressive metaphors. An unabashed examination of the body and its functions and 
powers threaded through the early post modern dances. One form it took was 
relaxation, a loosening of the control that has characterized Western dance technique. 
Choreographers deliberately used untrained performers in their search for the "natural" 
body. (Banes, 1987: xviii) 
One of the leading figures in the postmodern dance movement, Yvonne Rainer, 
produced a `No Manifesto' that summed up the aims of the postmodern era in dance: 
No to spectacle no to virtuosity no to transformations and magic and make-believe 
no to the glamour and transcendency of the star image no to the heroic no to the 
antiheroic no to trash imagery no to involvement of performer or spectator no to 
style no to camp no to seduction of spectator by the wiles of the performer no to 
eccentricity no to moving or being moved. (Rainer, 1998: 35) 
In practice what this meant was dance without a teachable and definable technique, as 
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technique was considered elitist and outside the interests and abilities of everyday 
people. Any body could dance; one no longer had to have a technical background or a 
`dancer's body'. What one needed instead was the ability to `release' the body, and 
this was where movement re-education techniques became critical. These techniques 
were to restore the original body of the dancer, the pro-social (in the sense that life 
experience was seen to have damaged the body and repressed its natural instincts in a 
myriad of ways) body, which would then be freed to move naturally. A formalised 
technique would have hindered rather than helped such a process by teaching the 
body still more unnatural ways of being. Novack's descriptions of late modem and 
postmodern dance point to the way that `the natural' became crucial and movement 
re-education became a key element in obtaining the natural body, emerging in the 
therapeutic developments of the 1960s, including the work of Feldenkrais and 
Alexander. `The qualities of free -flowing movement and focus on the inner 
experience of moving, so characteristic of social dance, were joined with interest in 
"natural" movement training, central to studies of body therapies and martial arts' 
(Novack, 1990: 52). 
While the `natural body' has haunted dance training since the advent of modem 
dance, it is through postmodern dance (and contemporary articulations of it) that the 
idea of the natural body is most fully developed. This in turn is where movement re- 
education intersects with dance most powerfully, becoming a technique and form of 
training in its own right used by dancers to return to the natural body. 
American Delsartism 
Delsartism was an important influence on both Isadora Duncan and Ruth St. Denis. 
Delsarte was a French opera singer who, in the mid-1800s, developed a `system of 
expression' which divided things into trinities of the body and of motion, as a way of 
understanding and codifying gesture and thereby training actors and elocutionists in 
`natural' movement. He observed the gestures of `ordinary people' and established a 
method of training actors which he believed would appear less false, less concerned 
with `taking a pose' than previous methods of training (Shawn, 1963: 11). Gestures 
were given particular types of significance in his method, yet the associations made 
with these were considered to be universal and natural; as one of his followers 
remarked, "`The only way Delsarte sought is Nature's way. Man can no more 
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make natural things than he can create truth. He can create unnatural ways and 
falsehoods, at best he can discover Nature's way, and live and express correctly the 
truth"' (in Shawn, 1963: 26). 
Delsartism was taken up in a particular way by Americans, through the efforts of 
Genevieve Stebbins in particular, who blended it with yoga and `other non-Western 
disciplines' as well as Swedish Ling gymnastics (Ruyter, 1999: 68). Stebbins' 
interpretation of Delsartism was particularly influential. Almost all her students were 
female, and her work fit with a growing trend in the late 1800s and early 1900s 
toward educating the female body. The idea that women needed exercise was perhaps 
not new in itself, but it took on a particular force from the late 1800s onward, in line 
with the advent of physical culture movements more generally. It was, however, tied 
to dress reform movements, with which it formed a link (Thomas, 1995: 52). 
The influence of American Delsartism may be seen on the work of both St. Denis and 
Duncan. American Delsartism was opposed to the idea of `meaningless gesture', 
something which modem dancers had observed, and criticised, in ballet. Gestures in 
the ballet were thought to demonstrate physical ability only, but to be devoid of 
psychological or emotional attachment. St. Denis' partner Ted Shawn wrote a key 
book on the subject of Delsarte, in which he observed that: 
Whereas, for some generations previous to 1900, the dancing in the theatre and in 
the ballet was almost exclusively acrobatic and meaningless, with the advent of 
Ruth St. Denis and Isadora Duncan, a whole new approach to movement had come 
into the dance world - that at all times, dance should express something. (Shawn, 
1963: 10) 
As Schmitt (1989) points out, gesture has always had a strong ethical component. He 
notes that in the long tradition of gestural models in Western culture, gesture is often 
linked to God and religion (as it was for Delsarte, who was strongly influenced by the 
ideal of the Holy Trinity and systematically described his work in terms of triads by 
dividing the body into head, torso and limbs, each corresponding to a particular type 
of attitude). Further, gesture is regarded as an outward expression of the interior soul, 
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sealing the body/soul relationship (Schmitt, 1989: 130). Delsarte himself claimed, 
according to Shawn, that 
It is not what we say that persuades, but the manner of saying it Speech is inferior to 
gesture because it corresponds to the phenomena of mind. Gesture is the agent of the 
heart, the persuasive agent.. Mind speculates and reckons, while gesture grasps 
everything by intuition and sentiment, as well as through contemplation. (in Shawn, 
1963: 25) 
In movement re -education techniques, posture and gesture are also attached to 
expression of the psyche. This takes the form of an assertion that they can restore 
naturalness of expression and personality by returning participants to their natural 
selves. Movement re-education techniques also incorporated the same kinds of 
elements into their development as modem dance did; Ida Rolf and Joseph Pilates 
both studied yoga, and there is evidence that F. M. Alexander studied Delsarte's work, 
and in fact briefly called himself a teacher of the Delsarte system (see Staring, 1996: 
50). 
As in movement re-education, one can see in Delsartism the seeds of a particular kind 
of `body wisdom' emerging, with the emphasis placed on `nature's way' of 
performing movements and the body apparently freed from artificial restriction. In 
the next section, I shall expand on the parallels between the physical culture 
movement of the late 1800s and early 1900s and movement re-education. 
Dance, Race and Physical Culture 
This chapter has thus far focussed largely on the American tradition of dance and 
physical culture, yet there are alternative traditions worth considering. The rise of 
physical culture in Germany is particularly instructive. The presence of a richly- 
developed tradition of physical culture (and the eugenic theories of degeneration that 
attended it) in Germany from the 1870s onward has come in retrospect to seem to 
some writers to have sown the seeds for fascism-the German theorist Kracauer 
suggested as early as 1947 that all forms of `Mass Ornament', by which he meant 
group gymnastics and body culture displays, contributed to the German people's 
acceptance of Fascism (in Burt, 1998: 100). The relationship between physical 
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culture, Fascism, and eugenics, however, is not a simple one. The writings of Toepfer 
(1997) and Segel (1998) are useful in untangling these relationships in the German 
context. 
German body culture and modem dance paralleled de'elopments in England and 
America in many ways. Versions of Delsartism caught on through the work of 
American physician Bess Mensendieck, although her work, and thus Delsarte's, was 
taken more as inspiration than as prescription (Toepfer, 1997: 45). Various schools of 
gymnastics also held sway, such as Dalcroze's eurythmics, and in Germany a modem 
dance tradition evolved which was quite separate from the American one, through 
Rudolf Laban, Mary Wigman, and Hanya Holm. Laban in particular was critical in 
the development of mass choreographies because of his work on systematic ways of 
describing and notating movement, exemplified by the movement choirs he was asked 
to develop for the 1936 Olympics in Berlin. Manning (1993) notes that Wigman 
stayed on in Germany throughout the Nazi period, producing dances which adhered to 
fascist guidelines and aesthetics by glorifying `the display of beautiful women's 
bodies', although they also implicitly commented upon the dominant masculine ethos 
(1993: 4). 
The specificity of German body culture is partly made clear in relation to the idea of 
Lebensphilosophie (life-philosophy) which emerged through the work of Nietzsche, 
among others. `Life' in German philosophy between the 1880s and 1930s came to 
represent a desire for authenticity and `authentic experiences, ' as well as `dynamism, 
creatively, immediacy, youth... everything traditional was summoned before "the 
tribunal of life" and examined to see whether it represented authentic life, whether it 
"served life", in Nietzsche's words, or inhibited and opposed it' (Schnädelbach, 1984: 
139). As such, Lebensphilosophie was opposed to rationalism and reason, 
`compelling it to prove its legitimacy' (1984: 142). The value it put on the irrational 
has traditionally led Lebensphilosophie to be seen as a precursor to National 
Socialism. As Schnädelbach puts it, `life-philosophy tendentiously abolished the 
traditional difference between nature and culture and thus facilitated the success of the 
general biologism in the theory of culture, which culminated in National Socialist 
racism' (1984: 149). However, this was not its only application; it also influenced 
phenomenologists (via Heidegger) who emphasised knowledge as lived experience as 
23 
a way of intuiting access to the world, and appeared in the sociology of Max Weber in 
his discussions of rationality and science. While it influenced the general background 
against which German body culture, as an expression of `life' against rationality and 
tradition, emerged, it should not be interpreted from this that this body culture was 
inevitably linked to fascism. 
Karl Toepfer (1997) suggests that those who embraced National Socialism from 
traditions of body culture did so for personal reasons and not because their 
involvement in body culture predisposed them to it (1997: 9). In his work on German 
body culture between 1910 and 1930, he suggests that while the aims of German body 
culture were fairly consistent in this period, it began to decline in the 1930s, largely 
due to theoretical stagnation. There was, in fact, more continuity between 
Wilhelmine and Weimar Republic body culture than between Weimar and Nazi body 
cultures (1997: 20). German body culture of the period included a strong nudist 
movement which assigned deep metaphysical significance to the body; `Nacktkultur 
projected an ambiguous political identity because it treated the body as a double sign: 
on the one hand, it presented nudity as a return to an eternal primeval; on the other 
hand, it regarded modem identity as an unprecedented condition of nakedness' (1997: 
32). Toepfer points to different ways in which nudity was interpreted: Emile 
Jacques-Dalcroze, founder of a popular school of rhythmic gymnastics, felt that 
nudity freed the body from inhibition of movement, while Bess Mensendieck believed 
it that it was particularly important in `enhancing a woman's body consciousness' 
making women's bodies strong, healthy, and beautiful (1997: 39). 
There were alternative interpretations which saw nudity as a sign of racial purity. 
Hans Suren, author of the `hugely popular' Der Mensch und die Sonne (1924) and 
Deutsche Gymnastik (1925) is one example. Suren became a Nazi in the 1930s and 
changed the first book to fit his new views, but the original edition referred 
extensively to nudity as a sign of health, strength and beauty as well as liberation from 
cities, which he felt were damaging. `The profound freedom offered by the 
conjunction of nudity, sunlight, and open space depended on the perfection of self- 
discipline resulting from gymnastic training' (Toepfer, 1997: 34). Suren's second 
book, which also complained about the disappearance of self-discipline in German 
culture, `showed Suren himself, lavishly bronzed and nearly nude (wearing only a tiny 
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jock strap), before a totally uncontextualized white background' performing a series 
of exercises (1997: 35). 
Toepfer's descriptions of these books should be compared with the work of Joseph 
Pilates (1998 [1934]; 2000 [1945]), who also put forward similar views, indicating 
that `experience has taught us that it is wise to practice very early in life exposing the 
young child's nude body to the air and sun as much as possible' (1998 [1934]: 46). 
His 1945 book is also filled with pictures of himself performing the exercises which 
form the basis of Pilates `mat work', in which he was bronzed and clad only in his 
underwear, photographed against an uncontextualised background. Pilates was 
German and it is possible that he was familiar with Surdn's work. These descriptions 
indicate at least that Pilates' ideas had a history and currency at the time when he was 
working. 
Toepfer argues that 
The complex and very seductive body culture that emerged in early-twentieth-century 
Germany questioned, though it did not entirely dissolve, this tension between innocence 
and modernity. The relation between innocence and modernity was more complex (and 
ambiguous) in Germany than elsewhere because of German tendencies to link 
innocence with conditions of maturity and evolution rather than to a "lost, " childlike 
state of perception. This ambition to present modernity as a condition of innocence 
depended on the situating of the body within elaborate philosophical frameworks, a 
persuasive metaphysical rhetoric. (1997: 4) 
While German body culture of the first part of the 1900s referred to a `natural body' 
(through nudity and exercise), this was not a childlike body, nor was modernity 
necessarily seen as responsible for the disappearance of this type of body. This is in 
stark contrast to the work of many eugenicists and others writing in Britain at the 
same time, as I shall discuss below. 
Harold Segel (1998), too, is interested in the relationship between modernism and 
physical culture, although in a more Anglo -American and also more literary tradition. 
Contrary to Toepfer, he interprets the rise of what he calls the `physical imperative' to 
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the rising distrust of intellectualism around the turn of the century, even within 
philosophy. He suggests that `beginning with Nietzsche... philosophical thought 
became increasingly more oriented toward spontaneity, intuition, and action' (1998: 
173). Nietzsche's work was interpreted and applied in a variety of ways, one of 
which, whether or not it was faithful to his intent, was in eugenics and the politics of 
race preservation (see also Stone, 2002). 
Segel concludes his book by examining, as Toepfer does, the influence of modernism 
and physical culture on Nazi ideologies, but sees more parallels between them. He 
points to the presence in Hitler's Mein Kampf of physical culture references; `Mein 
Kampfadvances the view that many of the social evils from which contemporary 
German society was suffering were attributable to the imbalance in the educational 
system between mental instruction and physical culture.... 'nu intelligentsia was 
weak because it was "degenerate physically, " the result not of poverty but of 
education' (1998: 246) of the intellectual rather than the physical type. Segel 
concludes that body culture under the Nazis had entirely supplanted mental culture 
and that this made it easy for Jews, who they associated with intellectualism and 
physical weakness, to be shunned and ultimately to become the victims of genocide. 
However, Segel's argument lacks the complexity of Toepfer's; where Toepfer sees 
Nazi physical culture as a decisive break with the majority of the physical culture of 
the Weimar Republic, Segel ignores the specificity of the German condition and 
assumes that European body culture was almost entirely uniform in the way it was 
interpreted. There is no doubt that the physical culture of different countries 
influenced one another, one only needs look at the introduction of Swedish Ling 
gymnastics to Britain in the 1840s, which Segel himself (1998: 207) mentions. Yet 
Toepfer makes a case for seeing German body culture as rather separate. His more 
nuanced account of the development of physical culture in the German context make 
his conclusions more convincing than Segel's, or those of Burt (1998) on the same 
topic. There were obviously some reactionary interpreters of German body culture, 
such as Suren, but there were also those with more radical views. It is therefore not 
sufficient to suggest that all physical culture was anti-intellectual and that this anti- 
intellectualism set the stage for Nazism; rather, there were a variety of articulations of 
physical culture, many of which were in opposition to Nazi beliefs. 
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This discussion is relevant to movement re-education because as I shall show in 
Chapter Five, many of the techniques I have researched linked themselves to eugenic 
ideals. Severing the link between physical culture as a whole and Nazism or Fascism 
is therefore critical to understanding how a number of movement re-education 
techniques have dealt with the eugenic aspects of their founders' writings. Movement 
re-education was certainly part of a larger trend towards the development of physical 
culture, and physical culture itself was clearly part of the Nazi project. While 
movement re-educators were not involved in organising mass choreographies, they 
were involved in promoting physical culture. Chapters 7 and 8 will address how ideas 
about physical culture and eugenics have shifted in contemporary movement re- 
education. 
What is important to note here is that there is no simple correspondence between 
physical culture and Nazism or even eugenics, although certainly many aspects of 
physical culture were incorporated within (and justified through) `positive eugenics'. 
As I shall discuss in the next section, the eugenics movement itself was much broader 
than the use to which it was put in Nazi Germany, although this is of course its most 
notorious application and also proved to be its demise. Certain aspects of the 
eugenics movement, which called themselves positive (health promotional) eugenics, 
persisted in the form of health education and health promotion around what Foucault 
refers to as a bio-politics of the population (1978: 139). It is important to understand, 
then, the extent of the eugenics movement and the applications it was given. 
Eugenics 
Eugenics is of interest in a study of movement re-education because of the use that 
founders of movement re -education techniques made of eugenic discourses. F. M. 
Alexander's first book, Man's Supreme Inheritance (1910), explicitly described his 
work's relation to the emerging `science of race culture' and eugenics, a fact which 
caused one recent biographer to condemn the Alexander Technique in its entirety as 
riddled with racism and eugenic thinking (see Staring, 1996; 1997). The claims 
Alexander makes about eugenics and race culture, and the concern with the 
degeneration of the human race, are echoed in the works of Joseph Pilates (1934; 
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1945), Ida Rolf (1977) and Moshe Feldenkrais (1949). These are issues I will 
examine in detail in Chapter Five. 
The eugenics movement, which developed in the late 1800s, was influenced by 
developments in theories of heredity such as those of Darwin on one hand, and 
questions about the effects of urban life on the other. Searle (1976: 20) points out that 
fear of racial degeneration was part of `a deep-seated anxiety about whether Britain 
may not have taken a wholly wrong turning in becoming a predominantly urban, 
industrial society. Was there not, perhaps, a heavy price to be paid for this 
abandonment of a way of life more natural, more in tune with the rhythm of the 
seasons? ' 
Evidence of degeneration was seen everywhere. Like the larger `quest for National 
Efficiency' in Britain (Searle, 1971), eugenics was tied to concerns about the 
inadequacy of the population for military service, as demonstrated by the large 
numbers of men and boys who volunteered for service in the Boer War and had to be 
turned away because they were not in adequate physical shape. It was also linked 
with fears about the apparent decline in birth rates for the upper and middle classes. 
This gave rise to fears that society was being colonised by the working classes and the 
poor, who were considered to be a major source of degeneracy: `on the (fallacious) 
assumption that the working classes were made up of people of weak physique and 
low intelligence, it logically followed that Britain was breeding a race of degenerates' 
(Searle, 1971: 61). This was strengthened by the mass of social statistics which began 
to be collected, nuking problems such as poverty seem bigger, although there was no 
previous data with which to compare it (Searle, 1976: 21). 
There were two aspects to eugenics, sometimes designated as positive and negative, 
because the former was designed to promote the health of the population while the 
latter intended to eliminate those considered unfit. Eugenics advocates generally did 
not restrict themselves to one aspect, and while movement re-education (as a form of 
health promotion) would clearly be allying itself with positive eugenics, both 
Alexander (1910: 6) and Feldenkrais (1949: 11) made passing comments to indicate 
their support for eliminating the unfit from the gene pool. Practices that allied 
themselves with positive eugenics were wide-ranging. Eugenics was `part of dozens 
28 
of local projects, including better-baby contests, improved parenthood programs, 
control of race poisons, conservation of resources, women's temperance movements, 
and even military preparation for war' (Hasian, 1996: 30). 
While the term `eugenics' emerged in the 1880s in the work of Francis Galton, a 
cousin of Charles Darwin, the eugenics movement itself drew on earlier ideas about 
evolution. It is important to contrast Darwinian and Lamarckian ideas about heredity 
in order to understand the foundations upon which eugenics stood. Prior to Darwin's 
discovery of the inheritance of physical traits, Lamarck suggested that evolutionary 
change might occur because of the adaptations of particular individuals to their 
environments. The difference between his work and Darwin's was that Lamarck 
believed social characteristics could be inherited; to use his example, an early 
ancestor of the giraffe who stretched to reach the leaves of trees, thereby lengthening 
its neck very slightly, would transmit this minute lengthening to the next generation, 
who would stretch their necks slightly again, eventually resulting in the long-necked 
giraffe familiar to us today (in S. Rose, 1997: 179). Darwin's explanation would have 
been that those giraffe ancestors born with longer necks would be more likely to 
survive and reproduce, often with other long-necked giraffe ancestors, leading to the 
same conclusion. 
While Lamarck's theory was ultimately discredited, the idea that social characteristics 
were hereditary was popular with social commentators of the Victorian era, including 
Herbert Spencer. Movement re-educators clearly drew upon these ideas when they 
suggested that their work could improve the gene pool and prevent further 
degeneration; if one acquired the habit of standing upright, they felt, one would 
necessarily pass it on to one's children. Stone (2002: 54) notes that at least one 
prominent eugenicist was `always an advocate of correct body control' and in the 
1930s even gave a lecture on the Alexander Technique, suggesting its applications in 
staving off racial degeneration. 
The idea that bodies were physically degenerating was linked with the idea that 
upright posture marked one out as physiologically superior, since after Darwin it 
became possible to claim that uprightness was a defining characteristic in the 
separation between humans and their closest ancestors, the apes. While eugenics 
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`hovered recurrently' around the posture campaigns of the first part of the twentieth 
century, the quest for good posture was wider than this (Yosifon and Stearns, 1998: 
1069). In the next section, I will look at how posture came to be seen as a marker not 
only of social class and status (as in earlier centuries) but of strong genetics and good 
breeding. 
Posture: Moral and Physical Uprightness 
Posture is a relatively neglected issue in contemporary social life. While the 
admonitions of earlier periods that we should `stand/sit up straight! ' are not entirely 
forgotten, increasingly sedentary lives and working days spent in front of the 
computer have appeared to make this more difficult. To be sure, comportment itself 
is not entirely forgotten; it lives in occasional articles and books in the popular press 
about how to read body language (for example Fast, 1970), and some attention has 
been given in educational theory to `kinaesthetic intelligence' as a new type of 
intellectual competency (Gardner, 1983). However, as Yosifon and Stearns (1998) 
suggest in their comprehensive survey of the history of posture promotion in America, 
since the early 1960s posture has ceased to be a systematic concern. Rather, it has 
been marginalized within both the medical and educational discourses in which it was 
previously prominent, and is now treated as an occasional, individual problem rather 
than something warranting broader social attention. 
It is not only that posture ceased to be of interest to physicians and physical educators. 
It has also attracted less interest in the social sciences, despite a long tradition of the 
analysis of posture and gesture within sociology and anthropology (Polhemus, 1978). 
Hewes (1957) developed an analysis of posture in cross-cultural contexts, linking 
posture to culture. In Goffman's work on the Presentation ofSelf in Everyday Life 
(1956) and Elias' writings on The Civilising Process (2000 [1978]), posture and 
comportment underlie their analyses in significant, if not prominent, ways. It is 
somewhat surprising, given the rich history of studies which draw upon posture and 
comportment, that contemporary sociology of the body has done little work in this 
field. Bourdieu's work on hexis and habitus, which I will discuss in the following 
chapter, is an important contribution in terms of ways of understanding posture and 
comportment as social, and parts of Foucault's Discipline and Punish (1977) address 
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the comportment and posture of the soldier's body. However, systematic 
examinations of posture and comportment in socio -historical contexts are relatively 
rare. 
It is through the work of Yosifon and Steams (1998) and Georges Vigarello 
(2001; 1989) that I will attempt to construct a history of posture in a Western 
European and North American context that will provide a basis for understanding 
the theories behind movement re-education. Vigarello's work on the history of 
postural education, Le corps redresse (2001 [1979]), remains untranslated from 
the original French, with the exception of one introductory chapter (1989). I draw 
here on this chapter as well as an unpublished, non-professional translation of a 
chapter on the transition between `hygiene' and `psychology' in posture 
promotion in the twentieth century. Because the latter chapter is not a formal and 
published translation, I have included the French text for reference in footnotes 
below. 
Posture from 1600 
Vigarello (1989) traces the history of `upward training of the body' through etiquette 
manuals and courtesy poems published in the Middle Ages through to the end of the 
eighteenth century. He argues that during this time, the detailing of bodily 
comportment took on a particular specificity and exactitude which it had previously 
lacked. Beginning in the sixteenth century, he argues, 
A new court nobility was being established as the world of chivalry faded, and the 
emergence of a formal etiquette and a courtier class seemed to generate rules of 
deportment for the body. Whereas until then the straight back never went beyond a 
mere suggestion, a new awareness of it arose. This does not imply, of course, that 
the Middle Ages had no concerns about posture. It is simply that they appear 
generalized and imprecise compared with equivalent texts in later periods. 
(Vigarello, 1989: 151) 
By the sixteenth century, courtly etiquette manuals had begun to detail particular 
ways of standing, sitting, and acting which they had not specified before, putting these 
into language for the first time. In part this was codified in manuals on court dance, 
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but it also took on a more serious slant, indicating not only moral uprightness or 
correct social presentation of the self, but also possible medical issues. Health and 
hygiene began to enter into the discourse about erect posture, and poor posture and 
comportment were considered to be unhealthy in the long term, particularly in 
children. 
The sixteenth century was also the beginning of corsetry and whalebone stays, 
particularly in women's dress, which made slouching difficult if not impossible. Yet 
this, as well as the medical discourse around children's posture, shows the body to be 
passively rather than actively involved in good comportment. The child's body is 
moulded by the physician and by its parents: 
The rules of physical appearance are directly applied by the physician's hands. 
Molding is a prerequisite for social recognition. The child enters an environment that 
appears to need to impress on him very concretely a predetermined model... 
Straightening the body also means shaping it. Here again the body passively receives 
the "sign" of uprightness. (Vigarello, 1989: 171) 
This moulding is accomplished through physical manipulation and swaddling clothes 
and other physical devices intended to direct the child's body as one would a young 
tree. Such moulding of the body fell from favour to some extent in the seventeenth 
century, when posture began to be controlled more formally and began also to require 
more active involvement. An emphasis on the moving body, particularly in relation 
to social dance, appeared as a component of posture. Such movement was 
simultaneously to be controlled and moderated: `the teaching of posture had as its 
goal the control of movement, rather than any benefit from it. It tends to control and 
contain movement, rather than developing and encouraging it... What prevails is the 
body's enactment of conventional images' (1989: 181). 
Vigarello goes on to note that `by the 18th century, the moral injunction behind 
this codification of posture is explicitly prescribed although not explained; court 
society requires good posture and comportment, lest the bearer be subject to 
ridicule and shame' (1989: 183). Court dance was similarly codified, for the same 
purpose and with the same result. As Elias (2000 [1978]) notes, it was critical for 
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the court society to be able to distinguish itself from the middle classes, and this 
led to ever more specific codes of conduct. 
There is ample evidence to show that... customs, behaviour and fashions from the 
court were continuously penetrating the upper middle classes, where they were 
imitated and more or less altered in accordance with the different social situation. 
They thereby lost, to some extent, their character as a means of distinguishing the 
upper class. They were somewhat devalued. This compelled those above to further 
refinement and elaboration of behaviour. And from this mechanism- the 
development of court customs, their dissemination downwards, their slight social 
deformation, their devaluation as marks of distinction- the perpetual movement in 
behaviour patterns through the upper class received part of its momentum. (Elias, 
2000: 86) 
Elias' writings on the civilising process (2000 [1978]) and court society (1983) 
provide useful accounts of the development of etiquette and manners in a European 
context, with specific reference to France and Germany. Posture is relevant to these 
to the extent that it became part of a broader programme of behaviour control and 
modification. However, I will not deal with this in any detail here. My purpose in 
outlining Vigarello's arguments about the development of posture from the 1600s has 
been to demonstrate the differences between this period and the later period in which 
movement re-education emerges. Movement re-education itself has not been 
predominantly related to etiquette, although the moral injunctions associated with 
commands to stand up straight were persistent; rather it is the medicalisation of 
posture and its attendant defects that most interest me. In this, Vigarello (2001) and 
Yosifon and Steams (1998) are most relevant. 
Posture in the Twentieth Century 
In a chatter on the shift between a basically `hygienic' promotion of posture to a 
justification for good posture in and through psychology, Vigarello (2001) traces the 
changing discourses around posture and bodily comportment from the early to mid- 
twentieth centuries. Much of the work he examines here was directed at the bodies of 
children, and in fact children's bodies were the subjects of most postural concerns in 
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the twentieth century, as Yosifon and Steams (1998) confirm. However, the medical 
and educational aspects of posture prevailed in this period over social concerns. No 
more was good posture merely a marker of social class; it came instead to indicate 
health and, under the eugenics movement, good heredity. This had implications for 
social class but it was not driven by it. Posture in the twentieth century can be said to 
have made a decisive epistemological shift away from the theory and pedagogy of 
earlier periods. 
This is not to say that eugenics was the only justification for the concern with posture. 
Degeneration does however figure prominently in the analyses of both Vigarello and 
Yosifon and Stearns. Vigarello (2001: 180) notes that in the late 1930s, the notion `of 
a progressive degradation returns again to justify and impose re-education, even if the 
concept of degeneracy as a threatening burden loses frequency in these texts '5 around 
posture promotion. In the early 1900s, classifying children for the purposes of bodily 
education and re-education was a primary concern. 
Yosifon and Steams (1998) argue that a number of changes occurred in the nineteenth 
century that transformed the way in which posture was understood. One of these, as 
mentioned above, was the influence of eugenics and social Darwinism. However, 
they also point out that the nineteenth century dress reform movement and the 
increased interest in physical education and exercise for women meant posture could 
no longer be stiff and formal at all times. This was further compounded by the 
development of furniture designed for relaxation rather than stiff upright postures. 
With dress and furniture no longer supporting erect posture, such support had to be 
internalised. 
In the nineteenth century, they claim, medical literature around posture took on 
particular meaning in relation to `race' and ethnicity. 
Doctors and related experts, including the phrenologists, generated a substantial 
literature from the 1820s onward, picking up middle-class standards while adding 
s' L'argumentation d'une eventuelle degradation progressive revient encore pour justifier et imposer la 
rddducation, m@me si le concept de ddgen6rescence, perd un frdquence dans ces texts, comme en 
charge menacante'. 
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health criteria and a belief that common habits demanded redress. Posture became 
a diagnostic cue betraying a number of illnesses and character defects alike. Well 
before Charles Darwin, some American scientists applied posture to racial analysis, 
arguing that Europeans alone had erect spines and straight bones allowing graceful 
deportment- in contrast to "all the less civilized races of Men. " (Yosifon and 
Steams, 1998: 1061) 
The issue of good posture was medicalised, and children were the targets of most 
interventions. Postural defects such as rickets and scoliosis were of particular 
concern. In analysing public health promotion literature, manuals on child rearing, 
and physical education texts from these periods, Yosifon and Steams show how 
doctors became increasingly concerned with posture as a signifier of health in the late 
1800s and early 1900s: `Claims of the frequency of spinal defects, though not new, 
took on novel precision. At least superficially, diagnostic cues became more 
scientific' (1998: 1068). Medical reasons almost entirely overtook etiquette as a 
motivation for good posture, and from the 1890s to the 1950s, medical commentary 
on this area flourished. 
However, by the 1960s, posture dropped out of public discourse. Yosifon and Steams 
relate this to a number of developments, including preventative dietary campaigns 
which largely eliminated rickets and similar conditions. Also, it began to be widely 
assumed that children's posture would normalise itself without a great deal of outside 
intervention. In any case, individual differences in bone structure and body type 
made it difficult to generalise about what `good posture' might look like. 
While doctors had contributed mightily to the posture campaign, the bulk of their 
efforts had always depended on social support, rather than a vital body of medical 
research. When posture no longer measured character or social worth, doctors had 
no reason to claim that a majority of people suffered from posture defects... 
Quietly, other prior beliefs, such as the much-trumpeted notion that poor posture 
forced internal organs to collide and so interfered with somatic efficiency, 
disappeared as well. (1998: 1089) 
The newly developing field of physical education had also contributed 
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significantly to the promotion of posture as a health issue. Schools both in Europe 
(Vigarello, 2001) and America (Yosifon and Steams, 1998) promoted good 
posture, in many cases photographing children or having them stand in front of 
mirrors `as experts assessed their stance' (Yosifon and Steams, 1998: 1075). 
Universities, particularly private East Coast ones in the United States, maintained 
records on the physical health of students, which extended to taking nude 
photographs of freshmen and sending those considered to be posturally deficient 
to remedial classes. Vassar College offered a 
Fundamentals course, required of all freshmen, strongly emphasizing posture 
training, with additional special exercises and individual counseling for students 
identified (through the assessment of the photographs) as having some curvature. 
The course taught not only general posture but also management of the body in 
getting out of cars, picking up luggage, and so on. (1998: 1078) 
Yosifon and Stearns conclude that by the 1960s, posture had largely disappeared 
as a topic of concern to doctors or physical educators, to the extent that 
contemporary orthopaedic practitioners ignore it almost entirely, or at least treat 
severe postural problems on an individual basis rather than as serious social and 
educational issues (1998: 1093). On the basis of the textual evidence showing a 
decline in discussions of posture in medical and educational discourse, they 
conclude that good posture is no longer an issue. Vigarello (2001) is more 
specific about what happens to these discourses. He points to the interiorisation of 
postural norms, where posture became deeply representative of a psychology. In 
posture pedagogy, concentration and focus became increasingly important: no 
longer was if sufficient to mimic an external standard, rather, the pedagogy 
`sought now to invest posture by "penetrating" it' (2001: 194). 6 In the middle of 
the twentieth century, new criteria came about for both teaching and evaluating 
posture. Vigarello traces this through the work of psychologists and neurologists, 
whose studies overlapped. The importance of the nervous system in 
proprioception is key (Vigarello, 2001: 196), as is evidenced by Feldenkrais' 
(1949) Body and Mature Behavior. The development of body awareness becomes 
6 'Avec ]es forumules anciennes, le precept avait ses equivalents faits de moulages tres materialises, ii 
cherche maitenant ä investir l'attitude en la «penetrant»'. 
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the critical element, spurred by the adaptation of the notion of `body image' 
(Vigarello, 2001: 197). 
The work of the performer [subject] no longer consists only of conducting the 
movements and assuring position... It is still necessary that [the student] be guided now 
to a continuous attention, directed toward the proprioceptive clues that a given posture 
is supposed to bring. The exterior forms of the realisation as well as the multiple 
dimensions predicting their order and guaranteeing their reiteration would be 
circumscribed. In the attempts for the corrective norms to invest the body of the 
student, pedagogy has appropriated a psychology. (2001: 20 1)' 
Posture also becomes indicative of specific types of psychological issues, as the 
anatomy of the body is tied ever more precisely to the psyche. This is particularly 
apparent in Ida Rolfs work, where as I shall show, particular physical weaknesses 
come to be universally associated with particular deficiencies of the psyche. Rolf's 
work exemplifies this way of understanding body and posture but it is by no means 
unique to her, Wilhelm Reich's psychoanalytic approach, which formed the basis of 
body psychotherapies, shares similar principles, as does Stanley Keleman's 1975 text 
on bioenergetics, Your Body Speaks Its Mind. As Vigarello concludes, `the norm has 
found a new terrain: that of a carefully elaborated interiority. In that, it interprets 
physiology more than uses it' (2001: 202). 8 
Posture concerns do not completely disappear from the 1950s onward; rather, they are 
tied to work on body image and psychology, an idea I shall develop further in later 
chapters. There is one final development in the history of posture that is worth 
noting, which is the move towards a norm that prioritises flexibility over erectness. 
7 `Le travail de 1'exdcutant ne consistera plus seulement ä conduire les gestes et ä assurer des 
positions... Encore faut-il que celui -ci se guide maintenant sur une attention continue, tendue vers les 
indices proprioceptifs qu'une teile attitude est censde porter. Seraient circonscrites, autant les formes 
extbrieures, de Is realisation que les dimensions multiples president I leur commande et garantissant 
leur rCitdration. Dans les tentatives pour que la norme des rectitudes investisse le corps de 1'616ve, la 
f6dagogie s'est appropride une psychologie'. 
'Les norms ont trouvd un nouveau terrain: celui d'une int6riorite travaillae. En cela elles interpratent 
la physiologie plus qu'elles ne l'utilisent'. 
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Flexibility and Posture 
Yosifon and Steams note that as early as the 1930s, stiffness declined as a postural 
ideal and a more flexible body came to replace it: `nothing should jolt body or spirit 
into a lack of flexibility' (1998: 1067). In contemporary movement re-education, too, 
there las been a shift away from justifications which rely on either eugenic arguments 
or arguments about the social importance of good posture. One development that 
sheds light on how contemporary movement re-education justifies its work is detailed 
in Martin's (1994) work on flexibility and the flexible immune system as a metaphor 
for social organisation. Martin argues that a shift occurred in health literature around 
the 1960s, whereby the body's ability to fight disease began to be attached to an 
`immune system'. Prior to this, she writes, immunity was largely thought to be a 
matter of keeping external surfaces as clean as possible, and resistance to infection 
was not clearly explained. F. M. Alexander, for instance, suggests that inoculation 
will make our bodies `become depressed and enervated sterilities, incapable of action 
on their own account' (1910: xiv). The discovery of the immune system led to a 
different understanding of the internality of the body; suddenly it was perceived to 
have an internal system, and the health of these systems depended on their flexibility 
and adaptability to disease. Martin suggests that this is more than simply a change in 
medical conceptions of health. She refers to the development of an 
immunophilosophy(1994: 95), and shows how this metaphor of the flexible immune 
system is applicable in other fields as well. She writes that `this bundle of ideas about 
flexibility has become central to a substantial movement in contemporary human 
resource management, and, through this route, has had an enormous impact on the 
way in which many manufacturing and service industries are recognizing themselves' 
(Martin, 1994: 144). She details its use in various corporate environments and 
suggests that the popularity of forms of exercise that include stretching and flexibility, 
such as yoga, are part of this development as well (1994: 155). As I shall show, 
movement re-education, too, emphasises flexibility and adaptability in a world which, 
it argues, causes us ever greater degrees of stress and tension. Movement re- 
education techniques, then, are themselves adaptable - they continue to find ways of 
making themselves relevant even when the mainstream discourses around the 
importance of good posture in relation to health and heredity that they drew on 
originally have declined. 
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Martin's research in this area is also not so far removed from movement re-education, 
in that the immune system and the idea that our bodies can learn to successfully 
defend themselves against disease is similar to the idea that bodies can know things 
and can be keepers of a kind of pro-linguistic wisdom. Martin includes a chapter on 
vaccination as a form of `Educating and Training the Body'. Although this is a much 
more passive form of `education' than the techniques studied here, it never the less 
relies upon a conception of bodies as capable of being educated and is almost 
certainly linked to a theory of `body wisdom' where bodies that are educated become 
bodies that `know'. 
The Healthy Victorian Body 
While posture and eugenics were major concerns in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, their relevance is best understood in relation to a broader issue which arose 
in Victorian society: that of health. As Haley (1978) demonstrates convincingly, 
health is something that obsessed Victorian Britain, and Park (1987) suggests that it 
was a critical force in America as well. Foucault's work on bio-power at the end of 
the first volume of History of Sexuality points to the ways in which a politics of 
population deve loped which replaced `the ancient right to take life or let live' with the 
power `to foster life or disallow it to the point of death' (1978: 138). In order to 
manage a population by fostering or disallowing life, however, one needed not only to 
regulate (by promoting or discouraging) sex and sexuality, but also to promote health 
more broadly. Foucault suggests that many changes in the politics of health and 
health promotion came about in the eighteenth century (1980), but it is the changes of 
the nineteenth century which are most interesting for a study of movement re- 
education, for the techniques that have persisted all originate from this time. 
Haley (1978) shows how an emphasis on physical training emerged in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century in Europe and America, which can only be understood in 
light of a perceived relationship between body and mind. The strong body is not an 
ideal in its own right, but is intertwined with the Victorian ideology of mens sana in 
corpore sano, a sane mind in a healthy body. The intertwining of body and mind is 
something that comes across strongly in Victorian health literature, and was certainly 
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evident in non-allopathic medical practices which emerged during this time, such as 
homeopathy and chiropractic. Yet even allopathic medicine did not make the same 
kind of clear mind/body distinction which it is today so often accused of perpetuating: 
`such diseases as hypochondria, hysteria, dyspepsia, and climacteric disease were not 
psychosomatic in the modem sense of the word. They were not disorders of the body 
occasioned by disorders of the mind; they were constitutional complaints with 
physical and mental causes and symptoms, and they required treatment involving both 
the mind and the body' (Haley, 1978: 30). 
Gilman (1995) shows how in the late nineteenth century, beauty was also associated 
with health and sanity: representations of the insane must necessarily make them look 
`mad' by depicting unusual and uncontrolled gestures and facial expressions, for 
example, thereby normalising the look of `madness' so that it was immediately 
recognisable. The external, physical body represented health, sanity and, implicitly, 
genetic superiority; Jewish bodies and black bodies were represented in ways that 
made them appear to be unhealthy and genetically undesirable. The belief in holistic 
causation and treatment is also apparent in the discourses around posture, where, as 
Yosifon and Stearns (1998) indicate, posture (measured by the appearance of 
erectness) is deeply interconnected with character. 
Park (1987) points to the way that in the Victorian era science began to support what 
was already suspected: that the moral and the physical were deeply intertwined and 
that muscle power could become `will' power (1987: 15), through new knowledge 
about the nervous system. William James `saw life as a process of constant 
adjustment wherein repeated actions increased the "plasticity of neural matter"... 
repeated performances made it easier to perform an action on subsequent occasions 
and required less attention on the part of the individual. Such repetition developed 
proper "habits "'(1987: 12). While Park observes that physical educators at the time 
seized this as a way to foster desired behaviour, and such thinking is consistent with 
Feldenkrais' later work on behaviour and the nervous system (1949), F. M. Alexander 
reacted against the inculcation of `habit' in his technique, asserting that physical 
activity and movement should always be conscious. I will discuss the implications of 
this view further in Chapter Five. 
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The Victorian era was also the period that saw the dominance of biomedicine as well 
as the birth of a number of alternatives. Porter (1988) points out that in the eighteenth 
century, the lines between `quackery' and mainstream medicine were harder to draw, 
and that what would today appear to be alternative medical practices were not classed 
as such. 
In the nineteenth century, many irregular medical movements boldly declared their 
root-and-branch opposition to the totemic values of high society (seen as productive of 
disease) and to the corruption of orthodox medicine, and advocated going `back to 
Nature'... Eighteenth century quackery colluded, rather than collided, with regular 
medicine. It did not set itself up as the champion of alternative systems of healing, 
replete with radical medical ontologies and distinctive therapies. Rather, market place 
medicine essentially shared or pirated the ideas and pillaged the practices of the 
establishment. (Porter, 1988: 14) 
It was not until the nineteenth century then that alternative medicine began to emerge 
as specifically alternative. This was no doubt brought about in part because of the 
regulation and consolidation of biomedical power, which effectively marginalized 
contenders such as homeopathy. In Britain, the Medical Act of 1858 put power 
squarely in the hands of orthodox biomedical practitioners by regulating who could be 
called a doctor and what might be defined as medicine. In response to this, people 
supported `heterodox' practices such as homeopathy and hydropathy as reactions 
against this biomedical monopoly: 
Civic authorities in mid-Victorian Manchester, for instance, publicly backed 
homeopathy not necessarily because they thought it was the most cost-effective 
medicine or because they liked it personally, but, rather, because its endorsement 
reinforced laisseafaire economics in the face of orthodox medicine's endeavour to 
secure professional monopoly and to act, as they saw it, in the manner of a trade union. 
(Cooter, 1988: xi) 
`Alternative' came to be defined not so much in terms of an oppositional set of 
beliefs, but as any practice outside the domain of orthodox medicine. Cooter claims 
that most practitioners even in these areas still justified their work through the 
language of science and were `often anxious to appear more scientifically 
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conventional than their competitors in orthodox medicine' (1988: 68). In fact this 
may have been due in part to their shared histories; in America prior to the Civil War, 
homeopaths were trained in regular medical schools alongside allopathic practitioners, 
but when allopaths began to push them out they set up their own training colleges 
whose training was as extensive as that of their competitors (Gevitz, 1988: 158). 
In any case it is apparent that the histories of alternative health practices are not as 
`alternative' as they may first appear. 
Alternative Health 
While complementary and alternative medicine (CAM), as it is now called, existed in 
various forms in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the regulation imposed by 
orthodox or biomedical practitioners and governing bodies in the mid-nineteenth 
century meant that it had a lower profile throughout much of the twentieth. In the 
1960s, however, these }ractices began to enjoy a renewed popularity. In the final part 
of this chapter, I will examine contemporary studies of alternative health and its 
resurgence on the basis that this offers important insights into movement re -education, 
with which it shares common ground. 
As I mentioned in Chapter One, movement re-education techniques are often 
categorised as forms of complementary or alternative medicine, although in academic 
research on the subject this is not always clear. Coward (1989) for example, includes 
Alexander Technique and Rolfmg in her study of `the natural' in alternative health 
because they share similar ideas to other forms of alternative health. Although she 
recognises that the jumble of therapies she refers to under the label of alternative 
health may `make uncomfortable bedmates', she believes that `the same impetus 
underlies the popularity of all the alternative therapies' (1989: 5, italics in original). 
Sharma (1992: 4) on the other hand, excludes Alexander Technique and, by 
extension, other forms of movement re-education, because they do not purport to cure 
disease but only to re-educate people to use their bodies more efficiently. For her, the 
defining characteristics of complementary or alternative medicine are that it claims to 
be curative, has some body of knowledge or theory about health and illness, and 
requires some kind of expert intervention on the part of a practitioner (1992: 4). 
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These are characteristics which movement re-education lacks by virtue of the fact that 
it does not claim to cure specific illnesses. 
I am given more to Sharma's view than to Coward's. While I acknowledge 
commonality around certain issues of the body and nature, there are valid reasons for 
studying methods of bodywork or holistic movement re-education as separate from 
alternative health as a more general category. These reasons involve the central form 
taken by movement re-education techniques; that their basis is both in bodily 
movement and in re-education. In this, they differ from homeopathy or acupuncture, 
but also from therapies of the body such as biodynamics, which seek to address the 
psyche specifically through the body. As I shall show in Chapter Eight, practitioners 
often distance themselves from the labels `alternative' and `therapy'. They do not see 
their work as providing predominantly therapeutic benefits, either on a physical or 
psychological/emotional level, but rather as providing first and foremost a sound 
physical basis from which the body can better function. This may in turn lead to 
better psychic unity and fewer psychological or emotional issues, but it is not the goal. 
Nor have they tended to describe their work as alternative, but rather as a form of 
health promotion or education which is complementary to more traditional forms of 
health care. Personal responsibility for health and learning are extremely important 
aspects of these techniques, probably more so than in other alternative and 
complementary health practices because they are something which is done by the 
client (or pupil), not to her or him. The involvement and education of participants is 
critical; they are not simply treated, but are expected to involve themselves in the 
work. While practitioners see their work as having health benefits, many express 
regret that their work is sought only by those with physical complaints, wishing 
instead that it were seen as a form of education, an ongoing process rather than a 
therapeutic end in itself. 
However, the more general ideas about health, bodies, and nature that are common to 
alternative health and movement re-education make studies of alternative health 
instructive. Coward's work, The Whole Truth (1989) offers an important analysis of 
the concept of `naturalness' as it is used in the alternative health movement. Coward 
argues that what has occurred with the rise of alternative health practices since the 
43 
1960s is nothing less than a fundamental philosophical shift in the ways in which 
health and the body are viewed. She writes, 
I am convinced that these changed views of health are at the spearhead of general 
changes in ideas about the individual's role in society, ideas which will have 
enormous consequences for how much an individual feels he or she should change 
or accept society as it is... the forces which attract many people to alternative 
therapies go way beyond a discontent with conventional medicine. More often than 
not individuals are attracted to the new mythology about nature and health which 
surrounds these practices. (1989: 6) 
Coward's arguments in relation to the use of the concept of naturalness in alternative 
health are strong ones. Her work shows how ideologies of alternative health appeal to 
a version of nature which is pre-social, opposed to technology and any kind of human 
intervention. In this vision it is society that is the cause of mental and physical ills, 
and salvation can only come through reclaiming the natural in ourselves. 
There is a strong sense that the body in its original form, or when restored to its 
original good health, will know instinctively what is right and healthy for it. It is as 
if the body has become the site of all innocence, which for a while was attributed 
by religions to the soul of the child. Now it is the body which innocently aspires 
towards all that is good and wholesome, the body which deeply aspires towards a 
proper relation with nature. (Coward, 1989: 30) 
What she identifies here are many of the characteristics of `body wisdom': a body that 
knows, a body that is innocent, a body that seeks health and naturalness. Coward 
criticises alternative health and its reliance on this vision of the natural for several 
reasons. First, she claims, it is difficult to prove that modern life is more stressful and 
more `unnatural' than life in previous times, given that life expectancy, general health 
and working conditions are so greatly improved. Second, she notes that there is a link 
between these ideas and Western consumerist, materialist values; the `natural self' is 
also usually a good consuming self, a self that can and should have anything it 
desires. The desires of this `natural self' are monetary and not only health-related, 
and further, its health-related desires are also provided for in a market economy by 
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alternative practitioners who are usually not covered by public medical insurance. 
Coward's third criticism, tied to the second, is that alternative health philosophies 
place the burden of wellness on the shoulders of the individual. If health is a state of 
mind, and something toward which we should be constantly working and aspiring, 
then ill-health is seen to be due to the individual's failure to be sufficiently `in touch' 
with her- or himself. Likewise, it undermines any desire or responsibility for social 
change. To be angry at injustice or dissatisfied with one's role is to fail to be `whole', 
`natural' or `enlightened'. 
While these are important points, I would make two general criticisms of the way 
Coward outlines her project. The first is around its lack of historicity. While she 
acknowledges that many contemporary alternative health practices and their 
philosophies originated over a century ago, she dismisses them as having been 
`fringe' practices, perceived as quackery. Aside from the discussion presented above 
through the work of Porter and Cooter, Haley's (1978) research on health in Victorian 
Britain demonstrates that this is clearly not the case. Mens sana in corpore sano, a 
healthy mind in a sound body, was one of the driving principles in Victorian social 
philosophy. Coward's attempt to follow Foucault in tracing a history of the present 
fails in as much as it ignores the earlier histories of alternative medical practices; she 
traces and speculates on current developments but gives little account of how these 
practices and beliefs developed. Certainly, as I have shown in the preceding 
discussion, many of these beliefs are not as recent as she claims. 
Second, Coward's work seems to be aimed at an educated but not scholarly audience, 
and her lack of referencing within the text and her tendency to generalise, exemplified 
by the breadth of her definition of alternative health, make her argument weaker from 
an academic point of view. This is unfortunate, given that when her evidence about 
the use of `naturalness' in alternative health is suitably specific, it is clear that she has 
identified a critical (and vastly under-researched) issue. Sharma's (1992) more 
academic work identifies similar problems around the issue of what is `natural', but 
her analysis is employed with more rigour than Coward's. 
As I indicated above, Sharma has a clear list of criteria for defining `complementary 
medicine. ' Like Coward, she discusses a broad assortment of techniques under this 
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label, but she is much clearer about which techniques are included and why. 
Although Alexander Technique and other forms of movement re-education are not, 
her analysis still identifies a number of issues which are relevant to it, particularly 
regarding the roles and attitudes of practitioners, on which she has done empirical 
research. 
For the purposes of this chapter, Sharma's critique of Coward is the most useful 
aspect of her analysis to draw upon. Although Sharma is also interested in the issue 
of how `naturalness' is used in complementary medicine and how this is incorporated 
in broader cultural shifts in beliefs about health and healing, as an empirical 
researcher she is more cautious about generalising. She agrees that most 
complementary medical techniques share a common set of ideas about what health 
and healing are, but challenges Coward's assertions that there is a set of belief 
systems common to all complementary health practitioners and patients: 
The idea that the individual can choose to be healthy, that some are ill because at some 
deeper level of the self they `need' to be ill, that perfect health is attainable if one but 
overcomes the obstacles, both in oneself and in one's (increasingly unnatural) 
environment - these are certainly very common among practitioners of some 
complementary therapies... But Coward is jumping too far ahead when, without any 
empirical evidence, she attributes these new cultural definitions of the body and health 
to all users of complementary medicine... If their own accounts are anything to go by, 
most patients are simply using complementary medicine as a way of dealing with an 
intractable condition which orthodox medicine cannot cure to their satisfaction. 
(Sharma, 1992: 87) 
Although Sharma concludes that Coward is ultimately correct in asserting that the 
popularity of alternative heath has to do with major social changes, she questions the 
degree to which patients in particular are aware of, and involved in, these changes and 
the beliefs they entail. Her work demonstrates the importance of an integrated 
approach which addresses both theory and practice, examining changes in belief 
systems not only through primarily textual evidence, as Coward does, but through 
ethnography and interviews with practitioners and patients. I will address these issues 
in Chapter Four in relation to my own research. 
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Researchers Schneirov and Geczik (1998) examine alternative health as a technology 
of the self, following Foucault's work. They too identify a `natural body' at work in 
alternative health, which forms a model for the body its participants and practitioners 
desire. Schneirov and Geczik see the natural body as having three major 
characteristics in alternative health: it is part of an original structure that is balanced 
and harmonious; it is an aesthetic source of guidance which can and should be 
recovered; and it operates apart from human invention and intervention- `If recovered 
it provides safety in a technologically driven world that is understood to be 
increasingly losing contact with it' (1998: 440). Fundamentally, in alternative health, 
`The natural body is a perfect body, that exists outside of history and society' (1998: 
440). They recognise that this formulation of the body as natural is problematic. 
Schneirov and Geczik do use empirical data in the form of interviews with 
practitioners of alternative health in order to support their analysis. However, in 
seeing alternative health as a technology of the self they emphasise its aesthetic rather 
than ethical aspects. This description of alternative health as an aesthetic project does 
not sufficiently acknowledge that it is an internal regulation, a `feeling' and not a 
`seeing', that is encouraged, at least in the case of movement re-education. The 
`natural body' that movement re-education techniques seek is not a body that 
conforms to external standards of beauty and rightness but a body that `feels' right 
and healthy, a body that moves with poise and has freedom of expression. Further, 
while Schneirov and Geczik's application of Foucault's theories of technologies of 
the self is useful, they overstate the liberatory and transformational potential of these 
practices, suggesting that they have `the potential to connect the demand for 
recognition in everyday life (recognition of the worth and validity of nonallopathic 
health practices) with the demand for significant changes in economic and political 
structures' (1998: 449). By contrast, Coward suggests that alternative health can be 
seen to be a particularly apolitical form of resistance. She argues that it will not lead 
to social transformation because of its requirement of an acceptance of both self and 
society as well as its emphasis on consumption and consumerism: there is always 
some other practice to be pursued and purchased to return us to our `natural bodies' 
(1988: 117). It is worth considering the possibility that both of these options are 
correct: alternative health may indeed lead to significant changes in health practices, 
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but it may also refocus attention on the individual and attempt to minimise social 
issues. Health care may become more focused on the individual rather than treating 
the body as a collection of symptoms, but it is possible that social context of these 
symptoms will be ignored. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced developments in dance, physical education, posture, eugenics, 
and alternative health through the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While these 
fields vary widely, they share a central concern with health and the body. All bear a 
relationship to movement re-education and can thus be used to begin to trace a history 
of the concept of body wisdom within it. 
As I said at the beginning of this chapter, this is not an exhaustive history of body 
wisdom. Rather, my intention has been to present literature related to the 
development of a number of parallel trends affecting bodies and body movement, and 
to show how these may be implicated in the histories of movement re-education 
techniques and their attendant concerns. 
There are three important themes to be traced through these histories in terms of their 
impact on movement reeducation and their relation to body wisdom. The first is the 
idealisation of the `natural' body that occurs both in dance and in alternative health. 
This can be seen in the late 1800s in the work of Francois Delsarte, and in the early 
1900s in the dances of Isadora Duncan. It is the development of postmodern dance in 
the 1960s and 1970s which ultimately brings a new vision of the dancer's body as 
non-virtuosic and thus natural, however. This body requires movement re-education 
to undo more traditional forms of bodily training and thereby free the body to move in 
apparently more natural ways. Similarly, alternative health had a presence around the 
turn of the century and then regained popularity in the 1960s and 1970s. While dance 
and alternative health are obviously very different ways of working with the body, 
certain common ideals of a natural body are present in both. As I have said earlier, 
body wisdom requires the conception of a natural body that can be returned to. 
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The relationship between health, physical training, and eugenics is a second theme 
that emerges and is necessary to an understanding both of movement re-education and 
of body wisdom as a whole. As I have shown, many aspects of physical culture and 
posture modification drew upon theories that the human race was degenerating, which 
were popular from the late 1800s until as late as the mid-twentieth century. The 
eugenics movement was a major source and outlet for these theories of degeneration, 
which were addressed in a variety of ways. However, there was an increasing 
psychologisation of posture and body movement toward the middle of the century, 
whereby poor posture was no longer seen as needing correction for eugenic reasons 
but rather as being directly representative of the psyche. This shift, which can be seen 
in the work of Rolf and Feldenkrais, is important in the development of a theory of 
body wisdom because it is here that psychological problems begin to be related 
directly to the body and its postures. 
The third development that has been important is the move toward flexibility of the 
body and its internal systems, which can be seen in posture, in postmodern dance, and 
in the bundle of ideas around health and the immune system which Martin (1994) 
calls immunophilosophy. A wise body is one that is not only natural but also flexible 
and adaptable; this, and the accompanying shift toward regulating how the body feels 
inwardly rather than how it appears externally, have been critical in movement re - 
education. 
This chapter has begun to address the aspect of my research question dealing with 
how it becomes possible to think of bodies as wise and knowing. It has provided a 
basis for understanding movement re-education in a particular historical context. In 
the next chapter, I will set out the theoretical framework through which I will address 
the research question on an empirical level, primarily through the work of Foucault 
and Merleau-Ponty. The ties between dance and movement re-education will also 
become evident as I employ dance literature to exemplify the strengths and 
weaknesses of these theoretical traditions in relation to practices of the moving body. 
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Chapter 3 
Bodies, Nature and Culture 
Introduction 
This chapter will explore discourse and embodiment as two theoretical tendencies 
within recent writing on the body. It will discuss the adequacy of each of these and 
the ways in which they can be used to complement each other. I will argue, following 
Crossley (1994; 1996) that rather than privileging discourse or embodiment, we need 
to see both as necessary aspects of a fully formed analysis. 
Recent years have seen an exponential growth in publications about the body. Bryan 
Turner (1996 [1984]) was the first to articulate a `sociology of the body', although the 
body had a history in sociology before this field was established, in the work of 
Douglas (1970), Elias (2000 [1978]), Goffman (1971), and Mauss (1973 [1935]), for 
example. Williams and Bendelow (1998) have argued that there is also a body to be 
recovered in classical sociological theory through `critical re-reading in a new, 
corporeal light' (1998: 9). For example, Marx's work is implicitly about the 
labouring body, while much of Weber's work deals with the rationalisation and 
regulation of bodies. Turner has taken up the latter in his analyses of the body in 
society (1996; 1992), noting too that there are parallels between Weber's work and 
Foucault's in terms of the regulation of bodies (Turner, 1992). 
Although the body has not been as neglected within sociology as it may initially 
appear, it is fair to say that Turner's work inaugurated sociology of the body as a 
subdiscipline, and the recent literature in this field (see for example Falk, 1994; Frank, 
1991; 1995; Featherstone, 1991; Shilling, 1993) is testament to this. Thomas (2003) 
has referred to this as sociology's `body project' .9 
However, as Turner himself has noted (1996), sociology of the body has been heavily 
dominated by theory with little attention given to empirical study. Further, it has 
tended to overemphasise the representationalist aspects of bodies and to underplay 
9 In this she follows Shilling (1993). 
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embodiment and the experience of the lived body (see also Williams and Bendelow, 
1998 for a discussion of this). Anne Witz (2000) has also asked `whose body 
matters? ' in this work, concerned that women are being conflated with the body, 
undermining feminism at a point when feminist theories of gender have sought to 
socialise women and their experiences. Sociology of the body is therefore 
problematic. In essence, it has suffered from being rather too much a study `of the' 
body while paying too little attention to how the social is both bodied and embodied. 
The term `body' has had little specificity. As Thomas Csordas notes, in some work it 
has been used as if it were simply a synonym for self or person. 
This tendency carries the dual dangers of dissipating the force of using the body as a 
methodological starting point, and of objectifying bodies as things devoid of 
intentionality and intersubjectivity. It thus misses the opportunity to add sentience and 
sensibility to our notions of self and person, and to insert an added dimension of 
materiality to our notions of culture and history. (Csordas, 1994a: 4) 
The overly theoretical nature of much of sociology's body project has resulted in 
work that discusses the body yet is itself strangely disembodied. In response to this 
problem, there has been some attempt to reintroduce the lived and experiential body 
to sociological study (Nettleton and Watson, 1998; Williams and Bendelow, 1998). 
However, the majority of sociological writing on the body continues to take a largely 
theoretical approach. Ultimately, too, the approach it takes is of marginal use in 
understanding embodied practice. Therefore, I have focussed the following 
discussion around the work of writers who do provide tools for analysing movement 
re-education as an embodied practice and as a discursive one. 
This chapter will attend to the writings of Merleau-Ponty and others on the lived body 
in a socio-cultural context, and the work of Foucault and his interpreters on 
technologies of the self, power, and the body. The work of these theorists will reflect 
both parts of my research question, around how it becomes possible to think of bodies 
as wise and knowing, and how such discourses are embodied. I draw on feminist uses 
and critiques of both Foucault and Merleau-Ponty specifically, because it is through 
feminism that many of the clearest analyses of the uses of, and problems with, the 
natural body have emerged. I will then take up the issue of how these very different 
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approaches can be made to work together, and discuss reasons for doing this. The 
chapter will conclude with an examination of dance theory, which informs my work 
and which exemplifies the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical approaches I 
discuss here in relation to a bodily practice. 
Phenomenology and the Lived Body 
The work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is central to many studies of human embodiment 
(see for example Bigwood, 1991; Csordas, 1994b; Crossley, 2001; Kontos, 2003; 
Young, 1998). Indeed, his work is unique in the tools it offers social scientists for 
understanding lived experience and what Nettleton and Watson (1998) refer to as `the 
body in everyday life'. MerleauPonty's major work, Phenomenology of Perception 
(1962) offers an examination of the role of the lived body in perceptual processes. 
Perception, he argues, is always an embodied experience, and bodies are always in - 
the-world, never separate from it. Phenomenology ofPerception criticises the 
empiricist and intellectualist theories of perception that have traditionally been 
dominant in psychology and philosophy. Empiricism (through psychology) has 
abstracted perception from experience by reducing it to a stimulus and response 
relationship, treating the body as an object, while intellectualism, particularly through 
Cartesian philosophy, has located perception in a pre-existent consciousness, thus 
overlooking its contingent nature. He argues that 
the image of a constituted world where, with my body, I should be only one object 
among others, and the idea of an absolute constituting consciousness are only 
apparently antithetical; they are a dual expression of a universe perfectly explicit in 
itself. Authentic reflection, instead of turning from one to the other as both true, in the 
manner of a philosophy of the understanding, rejects them as both false. (1962: 41) 
For empiricism, the body is a determinate object, whereas for intellectualism, there is 
a determinate (mental) subject. Merleau-Ponty seeks to overcome the subject-object 
distinction. Instead, he proposes that consciousness should be seen as fundamentally 
embodied; he proposes that it is always `being-towards-the-thing through the 
intermediary of the body' (1962: 137). Fundamentally, he rejects traditional dualisms 
of mind-body and nature-culture; for him, consciousness is always embedded in the 
body, and nature and culture are always intertwined. Having a body is central to our 
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experience: `The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and having a body is, for a 
living creature, to be intervolved in a definite environment' (1962: 82). 
Merleau-Ponty also challenges intellectualist theories by acknowledging that bodily 
knowledge and action is often prereflective. However, this does not mean that it is 
pre -cultural. His work lends itself to the social sciences because of his awareness that 
the body is culturally situated, although, as Grosz (1994) notes and as I shall develop 
below, he was not sufficiently aware of the sexual specificity of its ways of being. 
He rejects any model of culture as layered on top of an essentially natural body, a 
model implied by social constructionist accounts of the body as inscribed surface, 
which I shall discuss below: 
It is impossible to superimpose on man a lower layer of behaviour which one chooses to 
call `natural', followed by a manufactured cultural or spiritual world. Everything is 
both manufactured and natural in man, as it were, in the sense that there is not a word, 
not a form of behaviour which does not owe something to purely biological being-and 
which at the same time does not elude the simplicity of animal life, and cause forms of 
vital behaviour to deviate from their preordained direction, through a sort of leakage 
and through a genius for ambiguity which might serve to define man. (1962: 189) 
Merleau-Ponty's theory of habit is a good example of his embodied approach to 
perception. As habit is an important concept in the Ale xander Technique and to a 
lesser extent in other forms of movement re-education, its analysis is particularly 
relevant to this study, and I will develop this further in Chapter Six. For Merleau- 
Ponty, the acquisition of habit is not controlled by conscious reflection, nor is it 
merely a matter of blind physiological response to stimulus. Rather, the psychic and 
the physiological come together, forming a kind of bodily knowledge: `If habit is 
neither a form of knowledge nor an involuntary action, what then is it? It is 
knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and 
cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort' (1962: 144). He explains: 
it is the body which 'understands' in the acquisition of habit. This way of putting it will 
appear absurd, if understanding is subsuming a sense- datum under an idea, and if the 
body is an object. But the phenomenon of habit is just what prompts us to revise our 
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notion of `understand' and our notion of the body. To understand is to experience the 
harmony between what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the 
performance-and the body is our anchorage in a world. (MerleatrPonty, 1962: 144) 
Once habit has been established, it conditions further responses to similar situations, 
much in the way of Bourdieu's habitus, discussed below. Merleau-Ponty's concept of 
a body which `understands' is somewhat similar to the notion of body wisdom held in 
later movement re-education techniques such as Feldenkrais and Body-Mind 
Centering, as I shall detail in Chapters 5 and 6. Although this `understanding' body 
is a long way from a body which knows innately what is healthy, similar ideas about 
how knowledge is embodied underlie both. For both, the body is part of subjectivity, 
not as an object ruled by the mind/self, but as an embodied subject. 
In Merleau-Ponty's work, subjectivity is always intersubjective (Crossley, 1994: 28) 
in the sense that subjects are always in the world, and the world is shared. The 
subject is thus always culturally situated. Despite this, his work provides little 
analysis of how social and cultural factors may affect embodiment, and most of his 
examples are framed in terms of the individual in interaction with objects or himself 
(sic). Therefore, it is useful to examine how others have used Merleau-Ponty's work 
in relation to social and cultural issues. Below, I will discuss several feminist 
interpretations of his work, and then go on to look at the applications made by 
Csordas (1994a; 1994b; 2002) to the phenomenon of charismatic healing. I will 
suggest how these more cultural interpretations of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology 
have helped to frame my own research, and the insights they can provide for a study 
of how movement re-education techniques are embodied. 
Feminist Responses to Merleau -Ponty 
Feminists have taken up Merleau-Ponty's work in a variety of ways. Elizabeth Grosz 
(1994) points to the strength of MerleauPonty's phenomenology in challenging 
Cartesian dualism. 
Rather than valorize one or the other side of a dichotomous pair, rather than affirm their 
unity and oneness in some kind of global or local holism, (which always entails some 
54 
kind of reductionism) or accept the bifurcation and mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
status of such pairs, Merleau-Ponty's work ... attempts to take up and utilize the space in 
between, the "no-man's land" or gulf separating oppositional terms. This impossible, 
excluded middle predates and makes possible the binary terms insofar as it precedes 
and exceeds them, insofar as it is uncontainable in either term. (Grosz, 1994: 93-4) 
Grosz is interested not only in MerleauPonty's theories of the body, however, but 
also in what use feminists can make of him. She argues that he offers three things 
many feminists can learn from: an acknowledgement that experience is not an 
unquestionable category of given truth, but is always bound up in social and cultural 
forces; a model that takes experience seriously, as something to be explained, not 
explained away; and a location of experience midway between mind and body, 
meaning that experience is always embodied and corporeally constituted (1994: 94-5). 
She is, however, highly critical of his writing on sexuality in Phenomenology of 
Perception, where he fails to acknowledge the sexual specificity of his comments. He 
thereby neglects and is unable to account for sexual difference: 
Never once in his writings does he make any suggestion that his formulations may have 
been derived from the valorization and analysis of the experience of only one kind of 
subject. The question of what other types of human experience, what other modalities 
of perception, what other relations, subjects may have with objects is not, cannot be, 
raised in the terms he develops. (1994: 110) 
It is this conclision that such questions cannot be raised which leads her to doubt his 
usefulness for feminist analysis. She concludes that feminists must `seriously 
question whether phenomenological descriptions are appropriate for women's 
experience and, if they are not, whether it is desirable that they should be or whether, 
instead, altogether new and different theoretical terms are necessary' (1994: 111). A 
brief examination of two feminist theorists who have used MerleauPonty will 
demonstrate that some feminist applications of his work are more problematic than 
others. 
Carol Bigwood (1991) adopts Merleau-Ponty in order to argue for a re-naturalization 
of the body. For Bigwood, re-naturalization is a reaction to overly-cultural 
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approaches like those of Butler (1999 [1990]), whose work, she claims, `leaves us 
with a disembodied body and a free-floating gender artifice in a sea of cultural 
meaning production' (1991: 59). This `poststructuralist body' is `so fluid it can take 
on almost limitless embodiments. It has no real terrestrial weight' (1991: 59). This 
not only undermines embodiment, but also reinforces the alienation of human beings 
from nature and the devaluation of the environment in contemporary culture, she 
argues. Bigwood's project, then, is to `re-naturalize' the body by working out `a new 
"natural cultural" model of the body that goes beyond both the fixed, biological body 
and the poststructuralist culturally inscribed body' (1991: 60). While she 
acknowledges that there is no pure natural body, she is equally critical of the pure 
cultural body posited by Butler. 
While I share many of Bigwood's criticisms of Butler and her model of the body as 
discursively determined, something I shall take up later in the chapter, the 're- 
naturalization' Bigwood undertakes is problematic for several reasons. First, to 
borrow Grosz's (1994) critique discussed above, despite an acknowledgement that 
Merleau-Ponty's "neutral" human body is prejudiced in favour of the male body 
(1991: 61), Bigwood in fact uses his work rather uncritically and thus takes on many 
of his implicitly masculine, universalist ways of describing the lived body. She refers 
regularly to `our' (phenomenological, perceptual) bodies. Her examples of `our' 
bodies, however, are unique and specific, hardly generalisable, contrary to her claim 
to `recover a noncultural non-linguistic body that accompanies and is intertwined with 
our cultural existence' (1991: 57). They rarely give a sense that she is aware of the 
cultural aspects of bodily experience at all. In one example, borrowed from Merleau 
Ponty, she describes `attending to the sky', wherein `my eyes and my whole body 
slowly yield, relax, enter into a sensuous rhythm of existence that is already there and 
that is peculiar to the sky in its blue delths... My living situation becomes one of 
blue' (1991: 62). 
While `sky' is theoretically something all humans share access to, there is no reason 
to argue that this particular experience of sky-gazing is universal and therefore 
natural. There are cultural reasons as well as physiological reasons (for example, 
blindness) which keep humans from experiencing the sky universally in the same 
way. Even if Bigwood herself is not implying that such an experience of sky-gazing 
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is shared, she still neglects to acknowledge that her own bodily experience of sky- 
gazing is also culturally shaped by her perceptions of `sky' and, presumably, the 
association of leisure time which may be attached to sky-gazing. 
Second, it is important to examine whose interest the `natural body' serves. In 're- 
naturalizing' the body in the service of understanding gendered embodiment, as 
Bigwood does, she risks allying herself with those who have consistently connected 
women with nature and opposed them to men and culture. Bigwood argues for an 
anti-essentialist theory of the body that re-values nature and connects it to culture 
rather than seeing it as ontologically prior. However, in her attempt to value both 
women and nature she links the two and implicitly opposes them to culture. 
Ultimately, her case for a 'naturalcultural' body is not borne out either by her 
tendency to universalise experience or her final example of `female bodily wisdom' 
(1991: 68) exemplified in pregnancy, where, when culture seeks to encourage hiding 
and repressing the pregnant body, 
there is a need to recall the wisdom of the mothering body that has already sided with, 
and is already sensitively attuned to, a phusical [sic, from Greek `phusig, translated as 
nature] current entwining her flesh with that of the unborn before any of her efforts. It 
is especially in labor that a mother needs to trust the "intelligence" of her "connatural" 
body. (1991: 68) 
The force of Bigwood's argument that the purely cultural body described by Butler 
needs to be 're-naturalized' and given a counterbalance through phenomenology thus 
disintegrates into an uncritical celebration of body wisdom which conflates women's 
experience with their bodies and nature in a way that is both essentialist and 
unconvincing. 
Moreover, I am not persuaded by Bigwood's attempts to write her own (pregnant) 
body into the text of her article by including reference to her bodily states as she 
wrote it. When it does not simply distract from the thrust of her argument, this 
writing in appears at best artificial, a juxtaposition of the personal and the academic 
which fails to tell us anything substantial about the former and contributes nothing 
analytically to the latter. Simply to write about one's body is not sufficient to make 
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academic work embodied. The text about her body receives little discussion in the 
rest of her article, which serves to isolate it and make it appear out of place. This has 
the effect of neutralising a potentially strong critique about the lack of a `body' or 
embodied voice in much academic writing. Since the academic and the personal do 
not `speak' to each other in the article, do not challenge and engage with one another, 
embodied experience once again appears as something pre-analytical and outside of 
academic concern. 
In this project, I have also used my own body as a research tool in undertaking an 
ethnography of the Alexander Technique. In Chapter Six, which provides an account 
of this ethnography, I have therefore written my body/experience into the text by way 
of example. However, I am conscious that these accounts do not stand alone, and 
therefore have linked them with my analysis, using them only where they can clearly 
demonstrate analytical points. As I will discuss in the following chapter, I have also 
used discourse analysis and qualitative interviewing to round out this study and 
provide alternative interpretations, rather than assuming my experience to be 
universalisable. 
Iris Marion Young's `Throwing Like a Girl' is more successful at dealing with the 
topic of ge ndered embodiment whilst using a Merleau-Pontian perspective. Young's 
article argues that there are specifically feminine modes of embodiment, ways of 
`throwing like a girl' as well as ways of running, climbing, swinging and hitting like a 
girl (1998a: 263). These ways of being-in-the world can be summarised in terms of 
the fact that `feminine movement exhibits an ambiguous transcendence, an inhibited 
intentionality, and a discontinuous unity with its surroundings' (1998a: 264, italics in 
original). 
In her reflections on this article twenty years later, Young is correct to criticise its 
implicit acceptance of a universal humanist and masculine way of being which seeks 
only to extend masculine rights to everyone without criticising that definition of 
rights, and to note that she only emphasises the oppressive aspects of women's 
embodiment, treating them as victims rather than agents (Young, 1998b: 289). She 
notes also that there is no singular feminine way of using the body, and that age, for 
example, affects the cultural conditioning of body use. Like Bigwood, then, the 
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phenomenological approach has perhaps led her to universalise the bodies about 
which she speaks. 
However unlike Bigwood, Young's model of embodiment at least acknowledges and 
refers to forms of feminine embodiment which are cultural; further, she avoids falling 
back on a model of body wisdom that implies a natural way of being that can 
overcome (cultural) oppression. She thereby exemplifies some of the ways in which 
phenomenology can account for the cultural, lived, body. In this, her analysis is 
useful. It is perhaps because both Bigwood and Young are engaged at the level of 
theory that they have tended to generalise and universalise about the bodies they 
describe. In the next section, I will discuss the work of Thomas Csordas (1994a; 
1994b; 2002) who has read Merleau-Ponty in a way that is both specific and culturally 
grounded. 
Merleau-Ponty and the Lived Body 
Merleau-Ponty has also been taken up in potentially useful ways by those working on 
embodiment from a social scientific perspective. Nick Crossley (1995) suggests that 
Merleau-Ponty provides tools for the development of a `carnal sociology' which 
would counterbalance sociology of the body by analysing the body's lived experience 
rather than its representation. For Crossley, neither of these approaches is sufficient 
in itself, but he proposes that it is the analysis of the lived body that has been most 
neglected. He argues that MerleauPonty's work is a key starting point for such an 
approach. However, his own work has tended to explore Merleau-Ponty's work in a 
theoretical rather than empirical way. Below, I will discuss his argument that 
Merleau-Ponty's work should be used in conjunction with more representationalist 
and constructionist accounts of the body; first, however, I want to examine some 
empirical work which has used Merleau-Pontian phenomenology. 
Thomas Csordas' empirical work on Catholic charismatic healing is particularly 
strong in its use of MerleauPonty's work to understand the experiential aspects of 
healing. Csordas claims that too many social scientists have proposed a `black box' 
model wherein the rituals around healing are analysed without any attention being 
paid to the experiences of participants (1994b: 3), thus producing little data about how 
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healing works. In contrast, he proposes an approach which takes participants' 
embodied experience as central. He does this by paying careful attention to the bodily 
aspects of experience and the ways in which participants in a particular cultural 
setting (the prayer groups and church services of the Catholic charismatics) 
understand and make sense of the practices and experiences associated with that 
setting. He terms this approach cultural phenomenology. He argues that such a 
method should take into account that although the body can become objectified for us, 
it is rarely so in daily life; rather, it is important to begin with `the preobjective and 
prereflective experience of the body, showing that the process of self-objectification is 
already cultural prior to the analytic distinction between subject and object' (2002: 
59). In order to flesh out the cultural aspect of Merleau-Ponty's writing, Csordas also 
employs Bourdieu's work, which I shall discuss in more detail below. 
For Csordas, a key aspect of MerleauPonty's work is his statement that human 
existence is characterised by indeterminacy and that this is its transcendent 
characteristic (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 169). Csordas applies this to an understanding 
of selfhood and its constitution. He writes: 
Self is neither a substance nor entity, but an indeterminate capacity to engage or 
become oriented in the world, characterized by effort and reflexivity. In this sense self 
occurs as a conjunction of prereflective bodily experience, culturally constituted world 
or milieu, and situational specificity or habitus. Self processes are orientational 
processes in which aspects of the world are thematized, with the result that the self is 
objectified, most often as a "person" with a cultural identity or set of identities. 
(Csordas, 1994b: 5) 
With this definition of selfhood, he analyses the experiences of participants in 
Catholic Charismatic healing in terms of how they are constitutive of self. Csordas' 
work contributes a key theme for analysis in later chapters through something he 
terms `somatic modes of attention'. The article by the same name suggests that there 
are particular `culturally elaborated ways of attending to and with one's body in 
surroundings that include the embodied presence of others' (2002: 244). These 
somatic modes of attention are culturally constituted rather than biologically given. 
Examples include athletic rehearsals in the mind, health consciousness and attention 
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to diet, and dancing. Csordas suggests that understanding and identifying such modes 
of attention gives new insights into intersubjectivity and embodiment. Clearly, 
movement re-education involves somatic modes of attention, and examining what 
these are and the ways in which they are used provides insight not only into their 
workings and practices, but also into particular theories of body/mind interaction, as 
Chapters 5 and 6 shall elaborate. 
Csordas is not the only social scientist to analyse lived experience in a productive 
way. Pia Kontos (2003), for example, has productively applied MerleauPonty's 
analysis of embodiment and perception to her study of Alzheimer's disease. Her 
work shows that embodied memory of certain activities may persist long after 
intellectual capacities deteriorate, which radically challenges traditional conceptions 
of the disease as resulting in complete loss of self. In a different type of study, 
ethnomethodologist David Sudnow (1978) shows how improvisation is embodied 
through the hands of a jazz pianist. These works as well as Csordas' demonstrate that 
memory and the self are embodied, and that such embodiment can be rendered in 
academic terms through a close attention to the body's activities. In Chapter Six, I 
have applied these principles to the fieldwork data I collected on the Alexander 
Technique. 
However, despite its strengths, the phenomenological approach does not account for 
broader cultural conditions and the discourses which shape embodiment. Further, as 
Crossley (1994) has noted and as I shall discuss below, Merleau-Ponty's work on its 
own does not provide a sufficient grounding in the cultural conditions of embodiment, 
although he acknowledges that these exist. It is for this reason that I have used his 
work in relation to that of Michel Foucault, whose writing on the body focuses on 
ways in which it has been culturally shaped. Foucault's bracketing out of the subject 
in order to understand the cultural and historical conditions of subjectivity thus fills in 
the space left in Merleau-Ponty's analysis. 
Bodies, Power, and Technologies of the Self 
Foucault's work has had a major influence on the ways in which the body is perceived 
in contemporary social thought; it could in fact be argued that it is partially through 
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Foucault that the `body project' has taken shape. While Foucault's writings are wide - 
ranging, there are two aspects of his work that I wish to take up here: the first is his 
late writing about techniques of the self, and the second is his earlier argument around 
genealogy and the body. While the later Foucault is extremely useful in terms of an 
analysis of movement re-education and body wisdom, I shall argue, much care needs 
to be taken with the model of the body in his earlier work, which appears to entail a 
body passively inscribed by society and history. This model of the body is 
problematic because it implies that a pre-social body lurks beneath these inscriptions, 
waiting to be recovered, as Butler (1999) and Grosz (1994) have noted. 
Foucault's later work on the listory of sexuality proposes that a history of subjectivity 
can be undertaken which would analyse the ways human beings act upon themselves 
and shape themselves in particular ways, and that these ways could be interpreted as 
ethical practices (Foucault, 1985). Such practices are ethical in the sense that they are 
`intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of 
conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular 
being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and 
meets certain stylistic criteria' (1985: 10-11). He argues that all such `techniques of 
the self have the following characteristics: an ethical substance or way in which the 
subject relates to him or herself, modes of subjection or authorities who are appealed 
to for validation, forms of ethical work or techniques practised, and telos, or 
objectives and aspirations behind these practices (Foucault, 1985: 26-7). 
Foucault applies these four characteristics of techniques of the self through his 
analysis of the role of sexuality in ancient Greece (1985) and Rome (1986). His 
intention was to continue this type of analysis by applying it to the Christian period, 
something he began to elaborate in the final chapter of The Care of the Self and in 
later interviews and writings about ethics and the self (1988; 1997). He claims that 
analysing techniques of the self in terms of these characteristics would show how 
historical shifts had occurred, in ways that were not immediately apparent from an 
analysis of the moral codes governing each age: 
Some of the prohibitions are much stricter and much more rigorous in Christianity than 
in the Greek period. But the themes are the same. So I think that the great changes that 
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occurred between Greek society, Greek ethics, Greek morality, and how the Christians 
viewed themselves are not in the [moral] code but in what I call the "ethics, " which is 
the relation to oneself. (Foucault, 1997: 266) 
While moral injunctions such as those against sex outside marriage exist in both 
contexts, the reasoning behind them, and the practices associated with attaining them, 
can differ substantially. Dean (1994: 197-9) summarises Foucault's analysis of the 
characteristics of techniques of the self in relation to sexuality thus: In terms of 
ethical substance, in Greek and Graeco-Roman ethics it was the `use of pleasure' 
which was of concern, whereas in Christian ethics the focus was on the flesh as 
impure and sinful. The mode of subjection of the Greeks related to an aesthetics of 
existence or creating for oneself a noble or beautiful life, whereas for the Stoics, what 
was at issue was creating oneself according to universal rational rules. Christian 
modes of subjection, in turn, involved formulating oneself as submissive to the will of 
God. 
In all cases, ethical work can involve such practices as `dialogue, listening, 
meditation, training of memory, examination of conscience and self-examination, 
diary and notebook keeping, letter-writing, and the mortification rituals taken up by 
Christianity including confession, penance, and fasting' (Dean, 1994: 198). All of 
these work to shape and form the self, creating a particular kind of `self in keeping 
with an ethical project. These practices, too, vary historically. Rose(1990)uses 
Foucault's work to show how psychology and therapeutic practices are contemporary 
forms of ethical work. 
In addition to a type of work to be practised, techniques of the self must also have a 
teleology or telos, an end or goal to which they aspire. Within ancient Greek culture, 
the goal was a moderation in the use of pleasure in one's behaviour relating to food, 
sex, or drink, a mastery of the self; for the Stoic philosophers, it became control over 
oneself as a universal and rational being, in relation to other such beings; and in 
Christianity it became a form of salvation, which required renouncing the self (Dean, 
1994: 198-9). However, `none of these possibilities presents a global account of any 
particular societies or sets of social relations, and all are presupposed by various 
strategies, agencies, and practices' (1994: 199). 
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Dean goes on to suggest that in contemporary society various liberation movements 
have become the primary form of ethics, and that within this `contemporary 
movement of sexual and political liberation' the teleology is `the goal of ethical self- 
fulfilment taking the form of an emancipation of the self. (1994: 198). Similarly, 
Davidson argues: 
Ascetic manuals are one excellent source of self-forming activity, but so too are many 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century self-help books. And what Foucault calls the 
Californian cult of the self is almost defined by its elaboration of techniques that permit 
one to liberate the true self, a necessary step, at least in California, in allowing one to 
behave ethically. (1986: 229) 
Such references to the 'Californian cult of the self and `liberation movements' are 
vague, but apparently refer to what has been called the `human potential movement' 
and the broad variety of popular therapeutic and self-help literature that has emerged, 
which often includes forms of bodywork and body therapies. It is crucial, therefore, 
to point out that Dean's suggestion that the goal of self-fulfilment in liberation 
movements is an emancipation ofthe self is misleading, as is Davidson's observation 
about liberating the true self, because the terms `emancipation' and `liberation' lead 
one to think that freedom is the telos behind these movements. This point is also 
unclear in Foucault, who remarks in one interview that telos has to do with `the kind 
of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way... shall we become pure, 
or immortal, or free, or masters of ourselves, and so on? ' (1997: 265). Freedom itself, 
however, is not the teleology behind this `cult of the self because freedom is not a 
goal in and of itself; rather, freedom is but one aspect of a larger project. 
Foucault clarifies this point later in the same interview, where he claims that in the 
`Californian cult of the self, one is supposed to discover one's true self, to separate it 
from that which might obscure or alienate it, to decipher its truth thanks to 
psychological or psychoanalytic science, which is supposed to be able to tell you what 
your true self is' (1997: 271). It is this emphasis on truth rather than freedom that is 
critically important. A `freedom to be one's true self' or a `freedom from psychic 
constraints' is explicitly a freedom which is about obtaining an authentic self, a self 
which one originally had but from which one has been separated; as Rose writes, 
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paraphrasing Marx and Rousseau, `Man, it would appear, is born free but everywhere 
lives in psychic chains' (1990: 243). Rose, too, discusses therapy as a technology of 
freedom, a technique which `obliges us to be free', but he is more precise about the 
ends of this freedom: it is also a freedom to consume and to interpret the world in 
terms of consumer choice; we are, then, obliged to be free, and obliged to define our 
`true selves' in terms of these choices and freedoms. The project of freedom and truth 
is in no way separate from broader forms of societal governance: 
Certainly the psychotherapeutic solutions to the government of subjectivity are 
consonant with the political rationales that are in play in the period of `the crisis of the 
welfare state'. Their espousal of the morality of freedom, autonomy, and fulfilment 
provides for the mutual translatability of the languages of psychic health and individual 
liberty. Their expansion through the market mechanism frees the techniques for self- 
regulation from systems of bureaucratic surveillance, evaluation, and regulation of 
personal conduct. (Rose, 1990: 256) 
However: 
If the new techniques for the care of the self are subjectifying, it is not because experts 
have colluded in the globalization of political power, seeking to dominate and subjugate 
the autonomy of the self through the bureaucratic management of life itself. Rather, it 
is that modern selves have become Mtached to the project of freedom. (Rose, 1990: 
258) 
Freedom is inextricably bound to modes of liberal governance and to late capitalism 
as a whole; as Foucault notes, there has been a shift whereby `the ancient right to take 
life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of 
death' (1990: 138). Freedom, in short, is tied to a `biopolitics' of governing bodies 
through the promotion of self-governance. 
Difficulties and slippages of terminology such as the one I have identified around 
`freedom' occur, I would argue, because Foucault's four lines of analysis are not tidy 
categories; it is sometimes difficult to determine where the ontological `ethical 
substance' ends and telos begins. Chapter Five applies these lines of analysis to 
movement re-education, and for my purposes there I have found Hacking's (1986) 
description of the four aspects of a genealogy of ethics to be the most useful. Ethical 
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substance he describes as `the sheer stuff that you worry about if you are a moral 
agent. It is the part of ourselves and of our behaviour that is relevant for ethical 
judgement' (1986: 237). A mode of subjection is `whatever it is that you use to 
internalise these concerns, and what you take as being the relevant Truth about 
them-Holy Writ, the voice of a drug, the sanction of reason, political conviction, 
personal obsession, anything from outside that we take as an authority' (1986: 237). 
The third element of ethics, the ethical work, `is asceticism because it is cutting off 
some possible ways to be or to behave, in order to serve some immediate end. This 
end serves the teleology' which has to do with the kind of beings we aspire to be 
(Hacking, 1986: 238). 
Written on the Body? 
Foucault's analysis of techniques of the self contrasts somewhat with his earlier 
analyses of the workings of power in that there is a clearer sense of agency in this late 
work; in earlier writings, the body appears as something passive, inscribed by history 
and society. Nowhere is this more clear than in his article, `Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History', where he describes genealogy as attached to the body because 
It inscribes itself in the nervous system, in temperament, in the digestive apparatus; it 
appears in faulty respiration, in improper diets ... Tire body is the inscribed surface of 
events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self 
(adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual distintegration. 
Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body 
and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of 
history's destruction of the body. (Foucault, 1984: 82-3, italics mine) 
Such a task is important because it acknowledg: s that bodies have histories. It is also 
misguided because it reads the body as only inscribed; the body that is inscribed is 
passive, without agency. In Discipline and Punish, one sees the effect of this model 
of the body; `docile bodies' are those which `may be subjected, used, transformed, 
and improved' (Foucault, 1977: 136); through discipline, which is the `political 
anatomy of detail' (1977: 139). In Foucault's descriptions of the ideal soldier's body 
as `something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine 
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required can be constructed' (1977: 135), there is no space for agency or subjectivity. 
Foucault's interest in the formative power of discourse leads him to bracket out 
subjectivity on the basis that he must `reject a priori theories of the subject in order to 
analyze the relationships that may exist between the constitution of the subject or 
different forms of the subject and games of truth, practices of power, and so on' 
(Foucault, 1994: 290). This bracketing leaves him open to charges of essentialism, 
particularly in his early work, where the `inscription' model is most evident. While 
his arguments about `techniques of the self imply a bodied self actively involved in 
shaping and forming this self, the social inscription model hints at a recoverable body 
beneath the inscriptions of history and culture, a body which could, theoretically at 
least, be regained. As I shall demonstrate in Chapter Seven, movement re-education 
holds a parallel view of the body as inscribed but is particularly interested in erasing 
such inscriptions to recover the `healthy' natural body beneath them. 
This model of the body as inscribed surface is not unique to Foucault, nor is he 
entirely responsible for its emergence. Margaret McLaren (2002), for example, 
defends his work against the critiques of Butler (1999), Grosz (1994), McNay (1992) 
and others by noting that in his later writings his theories of the body are more 
complex and that in fact his `complex and elusive model of the body may be best 
thought of as oscillating among a social inscription model, a model of internalization, 
and a model of interpretation' (2002: 83). The model of internalisation is evident in 
Discipline and Punish, she argues, where docile bodies are produced through 
manipulation, shaping, and training of various kinds: here, training does not inscribe 
the body, but is what the body internalises. Although manipulation `conjures up 
images of a passive body, training and responding rely on some sort of active body, 
one that is capable of internalisation' (2002: 106). Interpretation, on the other hand, 
`corresponds to what Foucault calls the intelligible body... the body as an object of 
knowledge interpreted through disciplinary discourses, such as biology, physiology, 
psychiatry, and medicine' (2002: 108). This model of the body is particularly evident, 
she claims, in The Birth of the Clinic and The History of Sexuality Volume One, where 
Foucault pays particular attention to the shaping power of these discourses. 
In essence, McLaren demonstrates that criticisms of Foucault's work on the basis of 
his social inscription model of the body are incomplete and rely too heavily on one 
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piece of work ('Nietzsche, Genealogy, History') whilst paying insufficient attention to 
his other writings about the body. It is certainly true that Butler and Grosz, at least, 
refer primarily to `Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' in their critiques, at the expense of 
other writings. As I have shown above, there is evidence that at least in the latter two 
volumes of The History of Sexuality, Foucault employs a more complex theory of the 
body which, if not resistant, is at least actively engaged with the processes that shape 
it. However, where McLaren acknowledges that Foucault's model of resistance is not 
fully developed (2002: 98) she goes on to suggest that it is still prominent in his work 
and that in fact, contrary to Butler and Grosz's suggestions, there is `no reason to 
interpret Foucault's promotion of bodies and pleasures as utopian, relying on some 
notion of a natural body' (2002: 109). I will demonstrate that quite to the contrary, 
the model of the body as socially inscribed does indeed imply a natural body, and this 
natural body has deeply problematic implications for social theory and practice. 
One example where the relationship between social inscription and the natural body is 
made clear is in Pasi Falk's article, `Written in the Flesh', which describes the body as 
follows: 
The human body and its surface is filled with hieroglyrhs telling one of the stories of 
corporeality in history. Only the raw material, the `natural' body itself, seen as a whole 
or a number of parts, seems to be a simple fact-however, not as an organism with a 
number of specific characteristics but rather as a canvas to be painted or a lump of clay 
to be moulded. (Falk, 1995: 95) 
Falk's explicit reference to the natural body in this is telling: the body has no `specific 
characteristics' but is available to be moulded or painted upon- it is a blank slate 
awaiting inscription. Its surface is then covered with markings which are socio- 
historical. Williams and Bendelow suggest that such a view underpins an entire 
tradition of sociology and social anthropology from Marcel Mauss to Mary Douglas: 
this work privileges symbolism over lived and experiential aspects of the body to the 
extent that bodies `appear relatively inert, tabulae rasae, upon which society stamps 
its indelible symbolic imprint' (1998: 28). 
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The formulation of the body as inscribed surface has been criticised by a number of 
feminist theorists (Butler, 1999; Grosz, 1994; McNay, 1992). They note that 
Foucault's work gives no consideration to gender, and assumes that inscription works 
the same way on every body (Grosz, 1994). The space left open by inscription, the 
tabula rasa beneath, can be co-opted by essentialist discourses about the `natural' 
body, as I shall show. 
Judith Butler argues that Foucault sees 'history as a relentless writing instrument, and 
the body as the medium which must be destroyed and transfigured in order for 
"culture" to emerge' (1999: 166). However, this also indicates that he understands 
the body to have a materiality prior to culture. This is problematic because, as she 
argues, the body `often appears to be a passive medium that is signified by an 
inscription from a cultural source figured as "external" to that body. Any theory of 
the culturally constructed body, however, ought to question "the body" as a construct 
of suspect generality when it is figured as passive and prior to discourse' (1990: 164). 
Bodies are not simply passive, nor is there a universally generalisable 'body'. 
Butler's most influential argument has been that discourse, which she understands 
primarily in terms of speech acts, is performative; it stapes and forms the 
world/body/subject at the same time as it claims to say something about it. She has 
been criticised for taking the view that the body is purely cultural, with no `natural' 
base or indeed any base at all (see for example Bigwood, 1991). In her later book, 
Bodies That Matter, she attempts to acknowledge that the body does have a 
materiality without being forced to say what this materiality is: 
To "concede" the undeniability of "sex" or its "materiality" is always to concede 
some version of "sex", some formation of "materiality". Is the discourse in and 
through which that concession occurs- and, yes, that concession invariably does 
occur- not itself formative of the very phenomenon that it concedes? To claim that 
discourse is formative is not to claim that it originates, causes, or exhaustively 
composes that which it concedes; rather, it is to claim that there is no reference to a 
pure body which is not at the same time a further formation of that body. (Butler, 
1993: 10) 
This may be true, but it is at the same time limiting. Understanding the body as 
constructed simply by discourse (particularly when discourse is understood 
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mainly as speech) brings us no closer to understanding the subject's embodiment. 
Nor does this interpretation ultimately overcome the problem of the pre-inscribed 
body. We are left with a material body about which nothing can be said because 
any saying is a further cultural formation, surely a view not so different from that 
of Foucault, who implies rather than explicates the materiality of the body in his 
inscription model. There is still a categorical remainder and embodiment and 
materiality remain unaccounted for. It is not that we need to posit a natural body, 
as Bigwood does, in order to account for them; rather, as the discussions of 
Csordas' work have shown, it is perfectly possible to discuss the materiality of the 
body and the conditions of embodiment with a recognition that subjectivity does 
not always take the same cultural form. 
Elizabeth Grosz's (1994) critique of the inscription model is more direct: she is 
critical of the lack of gender specificity involved in most such accounts. While she 
believes the inscription model can be useful for feminists as a way of understanding 
how culture marks the body, she argues that 
the specific modes of materiality of the "page"/body must be taken into account: one 
and the same message, inscribed on a male or a female body, does not always or even 
usually mean the same thing or result in the same text. The elision of the question of 
sexual (and racial) specificity of the inscribed surface occurs throughout the history of 
accounts of the body. (Grosz, 1994: 156) 
For Grosz, then, there is a materiality to the body which is crucial to the end result of 
the process of inscription. Reading the material body as blank is problematic because 
it elides the specificity of bodies. This is not to say that sex and race are entirely 
material, but that the neutral, `natural' body which the inscription model implies is 
problematic because sex and race do mark the body prior to inscription. 
The model of the body as inscribed is problematic in terms of an analysis of 
movement re-education as well. Often within movement re-education the body 
appears as inscribed by culture and the processes of civilisation, particularly through 
early upbringing and parental influence. However, movement re-educators then 
specifically seek out the natural body they understand to be beneath these inscriptions, 
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suggesting that it can be restored through `re-education'. This notion of a natural, 
pre-civilised body also gives rise to problematic interpretations which read children 
and `savages' as more natural because less inscribed. While Foucault and others 
using the model of inscription would like] deny the possibility that inscriptions can 
be erased, the model itself leaves this possibility open because it suggests that some 
natural body can be recovered. In Chapter Seven, I will explore this problem in 
relation to movement re-education and the inscription of the body in more detail. 
While Lois McNay does not specifically take issue with what the theory of an 
inscribed body leaves out, she does argue that Foucault's theory of the body in this 
context demonstrates a unidirectional concept of power which works to discipline 
bodies and make them docile, excluding both resistance and experience. Therefore 
she argues that `whereas feminists have recognised the need to show that women are 
more than passive victims of domination through the rediscovery and revaluation of 
their experiences and history, Foucault's understanding of individuals as docile bodies 
has the effect of pushing women back into this position of passivity and silence' 
(McNay, 1992: 47). She goes on to contrast this with Foucault's later work on 
techniques of the self, suggesting that the latter is more useful for feminists because it 
acknowledges the way social agents actively shape their own lives. 
I want to further suggest that in terms of an analysis of movement re-education, 
Foucault's work on ethics of the self is significantly more appropriate than his 
analysis of docile bodies and the body as inscribed surface. Movement reeducation 
does not produce docile bodies, particularly in its contemporary formats; rather, it acts 
both through and upon the body/self to form the self in relation to particular ethical 
ideals, as Chapter Five demonstrates. Increasingly, there is a shift away from posture 
as an externally imposed ideal towards an internal regulation which is intended to 
express and indeed liberate the self from restriction. Moreover, as I shall show in 
Chapter Seven, there are parallels between the natural body left open by the accounts 
of the body as inscribed and the natural body which is sometimes thought to be 
reclaimedin movement re-education. In this latter context, the pro-civilised `natural' 
body can have very racist implications as it draws upon particular theories of 
comparative evolution and degeneration. 
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Such descriptions of the body as inscribed should be contrasted to Back's (2004) 
discussion of tattooing, `Inscriptions of Love'. Tattoos are certainly a clear occasion 
for the use of the social inscription metaphor; here, the social literally inscribes the 
body. Yet Back goes beyond this type of analysis by considering how emotion is 
involved in the process of tattooing bodies. He suggests that tattooing is `a moment 
when boundaries are breached, involving hurt and healing... This involves perforating 
the boundary between the internal and external so that the external becomes internal 
and the internal becomes external' (2004: 29). He also raises questions about how the 
body becomes a canvas `on which belonging and structures of feeling are expressed' 
(2004: 32). Through his ethnography, the analysis of the inscribed (tattooed) body as 
canvas takes on the phenomenological and experiential/emotional aspects of 
experience. The tattooed bodies he analyses are both inscribed and agential: he shows 
how such inscriptions function as `illocutionary love' (2004: 40), marking love in a 
literal way both on and through the body. This is a more productive type of analysis 
which takes into account both subjectivity and the conditions which shape it. 
The Politics of Subjectivity 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological approach, which, as I have shown, grounds much 
contemporary work on embodiment, is often measured in stark contrast to Foucault's 
work, which analyses how the body is bound up in particular discourses. The subject 
is central to Merleau-Ponty's analysis of perception and embodiment, whereas 
Foucault sought to bracket out subjectivity in order to understand the conditions that 
shape it in various ways. Nick Crossley suggests that: 
Foucault's archaeological departure from existentiafphenomenology (or Merleau- 
Ponty at least) was not ontological. It was methodological. Displacing the subject in 
terms of a consideration of rules of formation, at least in the manner that Foucault 
adopts, amounts to a bracketing of the subject at most. But even this bracketing is not 
complete. The very notion of rules, as Foucault uses it, presupposes a situated subject 
and intersubjectivity. (Crossley, 1994: 159) 
To Crossley, this is one of the indications that Foucault and Merleau-Ponty were 
engaged in a similar project: namely, that of analysing subjectivity. He goes on to 
suggest that `where Merleau-Ponty hit a dead end, Foucault found a fruitful method of 
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historical analysis and critique' (1994: 111) in relation to analysing the cultural and 
historical conditions that shape subjectivity. He suggests, then, that Foucault's work 
is one possible way of extending MerleauPonty's analysis and framing it in a cultural 
way. This is not to suggest that these two very different positions should be merged, 
only that it is possible to move between them in discussion in a cogent way (1994: 
122). 
Crossley goes on to argue that the points of apparent disagreement between Foucault 
and Merleau-Ponty are not irreconcilable: for instance, while Foucault criticised the 
humanist values of phenomenology on the basis that it posited a human essence and 
theory of the `inner man', Merleau-Ponty's version of phenomenology does not do so 
(1994: 130). Meanwhile, the connections between the two are significant. Crossley 
notes that both identify the body as a neglected topic in philosophy and seek to 
overcome this, both oppose the traditional understanding of the body as `a closed, 
object like, physiological system' and seeks to offer an alternative to this, and both 
focus on socio-historical conduct and the body as the bearer of these conducts and 
behaviours (1996: 100). Both accept that the body is both acted and acted upon, 
although they emphasise different poles of this relation (1996: 106). 
Crossley acknowledges a possible objection to this, which is that Foucault seems to 
see power as mediating the relation between the body and self, which challenges 
Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the lived/experiential body which has no mediator. 
For Foucault, the body is invested with power; however, Crossley demonstrates that 
this translates as saying that the body is trained and that there are power and control at 
work within this training. MerleauPPonty agrees that the body is trained, although the 
disadvantage of his work is that it overemphasises the empowering aspects of this 
training rather than the controlling ones. However, this can be overcome by putting 
Merleau-Ponty's work into dialogue with Foucault's. On the other hand, Merleau 
Ponty acknowledges the embodied aspects of training, whereas Foucault implies that 
mastery of activity simply occurs without recourse to the body. Crossley points out 
that `To say that `exercise' and `gymnastics' are forms of power which invest the 
body and afford bodily mastery, for example, is clearly to presuppose a body which is 
capable of the level of co-ordination and control necessary to take on an exercise or 
gymnastics routine' (1996: 110). Foucault's account, therefore, `must presuppose 
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some notion of a body- subject. Without such a notion, his account of investment and 
mastery would not work' (1996: 110). This is one example of how the analyses of 
Foucault and Merleau-Ponty enrich each other when they are used in conjunction with 
one another. 
Crossley therefore suggests a pragmatic approach whereby `if we require an analysis 
of rules of discursive formation, we will use Foucault's archaeological method; if, in 
the course of our analysis (or at any other time) we require to understand the follower 
of those rules then we will introduce the work of Merleau-Ponty. In either case the 
other will enjoy a background presence' (Crossley, 1994: 169). While his own recent 
work on the body (Crossley, 2001) has taken him away from such an approach, 
integrating Bourdieu rather than Foucault with Merleau-Ponty's work, the project he 
suggests is a promising one. 
As I discussed at the beginning of the chapter, most recent attempts to address the 
body through sociology and cultural studies have tended to focus on what is done to 
the body and/or how it is inscribed, following Foucault's method (for example Falk, 
1994; 1995; Featherstone, 1991; 2000). Other literature has addressed the lived 
body, often following Merleau-Ponty (Crossley, 2001; Csordas, 1994a/b; 2002; 
Nettleton and Watson, 1998; Williams and Bendelow, 1998). Few studies, however, 
have attempted to analyse the body as both discursively constructed and as embodied; 
popular perception amongst these authors seems to be that such approaches are 
incommensurable. I want to argue, following Crossley, that they are not. Particularly 
in regard to Foucault's later work on technologies of the self, which as I pointed out 
earlier does begin to open a space for the subject as social actor, there is no necessary 
exclusion of phenomenological accounts. While Foucault does not do this, his work 
does not write out the possibility that it can be accomplished. 
However, while Crossley paves the way for such a study to be done, he provides no 
empirical evidence that such an approach can work. Like many who write about the 
body, he has overemphasised theory at the expense of a demonstration through 
practice. He does discuss the studies of Sandra Lee Bartky (1988) and Iris Marion 
Young (1998a) on the gendered nature of bodily comportment in order to show how 
these two studies, the farmer Foucauldian, the latter Merleau-Pontyian, complement 
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one another. This does not amount to a study in which both are used, however, and 
Crossley's recent empirical work on the body (2004) has employed Bourdieu rather 
than Foucault as a complement to Merleau-Ponty. 
My own study, then, will translate theory into practice by applying Crossley's work to 
the practices of movement re-education. I will demonstrate that Foucault and 
Merleau-Ponty can, in this case at least, accommodate one another. Like Crossley, 
my intention is not to merge these two approaches but to use them in tension with one 
another, as separate aspects which can mutually inform each other and help to develop 
a theory of how discourse is embodied. However, given that both Crossley and 
Csordas use Bourdieu rather than Foucault to give MerleauPonty's work a cultural 
dimension, a consideration of Bourdieu is in order to develop my argument that it is 
Foucault's work that is most useful in analysing movement re-education. 
Bourdieu, Habitus and Bodily Hexis 
Pierre Bourdieu's work is useful for understanding how bodies are not only marked 
and inscribed by society, biography, and culture, but also generate these. Bourdieu's 
theory of the body, articulated in his work on habitus and bodily hens, is of a body 
that could be described as both writing and written upon. In this, he is much stronger 
than Foucault at accounting for social action. He also refrains from making the body 
merely a product of language in the way that Judith Butler tends to do, rather, he 
reverses the relationship, suggesting that `language is a technique of the body' 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 149, italics in original), a view he shares with 
Merleau-Ponty. 
Bourdieu adopts Marcel Mauss' (1973 [1935]) term habitus to refer to: 
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to 
function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize 
practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations 
necessary in order to attain them. (1990: 35) 
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The habitus is shaped by social class and culture but also by biography. It is a largely 
unconscious system of knowledge carried by social actors about how the world is and 
how it works. It structures responses to any given situation, predisposing actors to 
react in certain ways and ultimately circumscribing their lives. While each person's 
habitus is unique, there are `classes' of habitus, and the habitus is itself classed (1993: 
46). Particular class aspects of the habitus (and, one might presume, gender and 
ethnic aspects, although Bourdieu says little about this, ) are passed from generation to 
generation. Bourdieu writes: 
Early experiences have particular weight because the habitus tends to ensure its own 
constancy and its defence against change through the selection it makes within new 
information by rejecting information capable of calling into question its accumulated 
information, if exposed to it accidentally or by force, and especially by avoiding 
exposure to such information. (1990: 61-2) 
While the habitus reproduces itself, it is also generative, producing situations that 
seem `natural'. Further, the habitus is bodily, not simply inscribed on the body but 
also produced through the body. The bodily aspects of habitus are what he terms 
hexis: which is `political mythology realized, em-bodied, turned into a permanent 
disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking and thereby of thinking and 
feeling. The opposition between male and female is realized in posture, in the 
gestures and movements of the body' (1990: 69-70). 
The relationship between ways of thinking and feeling and bodily postures is 
articulated throughout Bourdieu's work. He writes, for example, that the body `takes 
metaphors seriously' (1990: 72), and that thoughts and feelings can be triggered `by 
the simple effect of re-placing the body in an overall posture which recalls the 
associated thoughts and feelings, in one of the inductive states of the body which, as 
actors know, give rise to states of mind' (1990: 69). Further: 
The body believes in what it plays at: it weeps if it mimes grief. It does not represent 
what it performs, it does not memorize the past, it enacts the past, bringing it back to 
life. What is 'learned by the body' is not something that one has, like knowledge that 
can be brandished, but something that one is. (1990: 73) 
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This is an important theory in relation to movement re-education, where states of the 
body are precisely what are worked on, often with the intention that they will give rise 
to new ways of thinking and feeling. Further, as I shall discuss in Chapter Six, it is 
clear that they do seem to accomplish these things. However, in Bourdieu's work it is 
not clear whether he envisions the relationship between mental states and physical 
states to be a precise one-to-one correspondence, where the positioning of bodies in 
particular ways will elicit the same response in every person, or whether there is 
cultural, historical, and personal variation. His assertion that no two habitus are 
identical makes it seem improbable that he would believe bodily states to produce 
identical responses even in two members of the same class or culture, but he does not 
dissect the relationship he asserts between belief and bodily states: it is unclear, for 
example, whether he believes such a response to be physiological, cultural, or due to 
some intervening variable. 
Merleau-Ponty's work is significantly more successful at positioning this relationship, 
because it attends to the specific ways in which bodies are used in particular contexts. 
Through his work it becomes apparent that the relation between comportment and 
feeling is habitual and is located within a cultural framework. Through his analysis of 
the experiences of those who fall down during Charismatic healing, attributed either 
to `resting in the Spirit' or to demonic possession, Csordas (1994b) is able to show 
how states of the body become, because of particular experiences or sensations, pre- 
reflective states of being. This is a phenomenon I will explore in more detail in 
Chapter Six. 
Bourdieu's theory of the habitus has been criticised for being somewhat deterministic, 
giving insufficient attention to the knowledge agents themselves have about their 
social worlds (Jenkins, 1992: 97). Crossley suggests that this is a misreading of 
Bourdieu, and that in fact the circular nature of habitus as both structured and 
structuring structures indicates that there is no `final instance', determinate or 
otherwise' in his work (2001: 112). However, he acknowledges that Bourdieu has not 
fully clarified how habitus offers a path between free will and determinism, and that 
he tends to allow the concept to pre-empt discussion of agency (Crossley, 2001: 115). 
`Habits are sedimented effects of action, indeed of repeated actions, and any account 
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of them therefore presupposes an account of action, such that action cannot be 
reduced to habit in the manner that Bourdieu sometimes suggests' (2001: 115). 
Both Crossley and Csordas incorporate Bourdieu with Merleau-Ponty in their 
analyses, because his work provides the kind of cultural framework which Merleau- 
Ponty's phenomenological approach neglects. Further, MerleauPonty supplements 
Bourdieu's work by providing a way of understanding agency and subjectivity. 
While Bourdieu rejected the phenomenological approach as lacking in reflexivity 
(1977: 3), the two writers complement each other in their analyses of habit and 
habitus (a term which Merleau-Ponty [1962] also uses), and therefore it is useful to 
apply them together. 
However, for the purposes of my study, Bourdieu's implicit neglect of the subject and 
subjectivity mean that his work is of limited use. While it may be arguably more 
problematic to integrate Merleau-Ponty with Foucault than with Bourdieu, given 
Foucault's total rejection of the subject which MerleauPonty takes as central, both 
Merleau-Ponty and Foucault are dedicated to understanding subjectivity, albeit in 
very different ways. As Crossley (1995) suggests, they engage with both subjectivity 
and the body in a complementary manner. On the other hand, the overlapping topics 
of Bourdieu and Merleau-Ponty's interests are those related to the habitu s and habit. 
Therefore, while I do take up Bourdieu's work in Chapter Six in relation to my 
ethnographic study of the Alexander Technique, he is peripheral rather than pivotal to 
the study presented here. 
Dancing Bodies 
Many of the theoretical approaches that inform social theory which I have detailed 
above have also been applied in the theoretical literature on dance. There is also a 
small body of literature where social theorists have used dance as a case study (Wolff, 
1990; Frank, 1991). Below, I will use dancing bodies as examples of ways of 
applying social theory to a living, moving bodily practice, as a way of demonstrating 
in a practical as well as theoretical sense the potential weaknesses and strengths of 
discourse and text versus embodiment and practice as types of analysis. 
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Text and Experience in Dance 
There are two recent approaches within dance scholarship that mirror the broader 
attempts to map the body in social and cultural theory which I have described above, 
approaches which I shall call `dance as discourse' and `dance as experience'. Each of 
these approaches is rather problematic. The first attempts to read dance as a cultural 
text, and thereby to treat it as a predominantly discursive practice. This approach 
reads the body and its practices as cultural, but in a limited way: in this context, 
`discourse' is used in relation only to text, and the dancer's body is read as if written 
upon, employing a similar model of inscription to the one described above. 
Franko (1993) makes a case for dance as text on the basis that early attempts to 
annotate choreography were textual and that bodies can be read as discourse in the 
same way as language because they have meaning, and gesture always refers to 
something outside itself. He writes that inscription works as a metaphor for dance 
because `one can say, without being overly metaphoric, that one of choreography's 
goals was to inscribe dance in theatrical space. The textuality of dance was not 
limited to figural inscription: textuality encompassed the motion with which an act of 
inscription is accomplished' (1993: 26). In other works, dance is a discursive act of 
inscription in itself; the formalisation of dance through choreography makes it a 
process of textual inscription in space and, presumably, on bodies. Franko is not the 
only dance theorist to follow this trend. Goellner and Murphy (1995), in their edited 
collection Bodies of the Text which addresses, as its subtitle suggests, `dance as 
theory, literature as text', also interpret dance in a textual sense, in this case allying it 
with literary studies. One might argue, however, that dance is significantly less 
textual than literature in the sense that it is metaphorically rather than literally a `text'. 
Susan Leigh Foster (1996) in her chapter on `the ballerina's phallic pointe', also treats 
dance as discursive, attempting to analyse the gendered body in ballet, in very general 
terms, by reference to psychoanalytic theory. While she continues to work with 
poststructuralist theories of text and discourse, Foster does note in a 1998 article that 
text can be problematic as a way of analysing dance because `the strategy of claiming 
for dance the status and complexity of a text obscures aspects of dance that are deeply 
resistant to written description' (1998: 20). 
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Treating dance as a text does provide a way of acknowledging the cultural specificity 
of different types of dance, and a way of relating the idea of text to bodily practice. 
However, there are problems with seeing dancing bodies as texts, as I described above 
in reference to social inscription. Foster is correct to note that there are experiential 
and bodily aspects of dance which are not reducible to text. Further, I am concerned 
that reading dance as text overemphasises the aspects of movement which are 
representational and places rather too much stress on dance as a meaning-making 
activity at the expense of dance as a movementmaking activity. Carter (1998: 19) 
notes that `in terms of its scholarship, dance has suffered from an assumption, based 
on contentious notions about the nature of artistic expression, that it is the `outer' 
manifestation of `inner' experience'. This is problematic because it means that dance 
is seen only as representative of inner psychic states, something which certainly does 
not fit well with the aims of postmodern dance, for example, as described in Chapter 
Two. 
Jordan and Thomas (1994) show that dance can be analysed from a number of 
different perspectives, and that approaches such as formalism and semiotics may find 
very different things in the same dance. By contrasting a formalist reading of two 
duets with a semiotic analysis of the same works, they show how gender and power in 
dancing bodies may be perceived very differently. A formalist analysis that examines 
the movements themselves and how they achieve a particular effect can be compared 
with a semiotic approach which looks at meanings in the context of the broader dance 
work. They note that `individual movements in a dance have no meaning in and of 
themselves. Rather, meaning is determined by the relationship of the movement to all 
other aspects that are involved in the dance work' (1994: 6). Both aspects are 
important to a broader understanding of how the dances work technically and 
culturally. This leads the authors to conclude that `a richness emerges when we 
consider the interplay of both the poetic and semiotic perspectives. So often, work is 
examined from one or other of these two perspectives, and analysis is only the poorer 
for this' (1994: 12). Dance needs to be read as more than a textual or semiotic 
practice which is inscribed on the body if it is to be well interpreted. 
The school of theorising against which I contrast the approach to dance as text is that 
of dance as experience. Focusing on the experiential aspects of dance gives a sense of 
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the materiality of the dancing body and the embodied experience of dancing, but 
much of this work invokes experience without any sense of its cultural or historical 
situatedness. Authors in this tradition tend to wax rhapsodic about the experience of 
dancing and to search for fundamental truth in that experience, without any sense that 
this truth might be contingent or historically constituted. Dance writers in this 
tradition draw on phenomenology (see Sheets-Johnstone, 1979 for an early example 
of this) but without a sense of the cultural conditions of embodiment; Sondra Fraleigh 
(1987; 1999; 2000) in fact allies herself not with MerleatPonty, as Sheets-Johnstone 
does, but with Sartre's phenomenology and existentialism which overemphasises the 
individual at the expense of his or her sociality. 
Fraleigh's work offers an attempt to incorporate description into analysis through a 
phenomenological consideration of dance experience. In so doing, however, the 
analysis is subsumed in favour of experience, which she takes as a universal. In an 
article titled `Consciousness Matters', Fraleigh discusses the use of Feldenkrais work 
in training her own body and those of her dance students. She begins by proclaiming 
that she is influenced by phenomenologists `who are opening up new vistas of organic 
being, mapping our way back to our body, our body back into the natural world... my 
work seeks to heal our bodily rupture with nature and revalue the darkness mythically 
associated with nature and woman but through the voices and workings of dancers' 
(Fraleigh, 2000: 54-55). 
Fraleigh describes a kind of bodily wisdom, but she does so without demonstrating 
any interest in critically analysing it. As the quote above shows, she aims to 
overcome the Cartesian bodymind dualism by positing the body as having an 
essential wisdom or truth. She writes that the `moving, living body is intelligent, and 
our thinking arises through material physical sources as surely as it may seem to move 
beyond them. When we trust our innate intelligence, it speaks... This is furthermore a 
healing intelligence' (2000: 57). Fraleigh thus inverts Cartesian dualism by 
championing the body over the mind, but she does not ultimately provide a way of 
seeing the two as deeply interconnected. Fraleigh chronicles the experience of her 
students and their discoveries as they study movement re-education, `healing 
themselves; ' yet nowhere does she interpret these experiences through any kind of 
socio-cultural lens. Her books Dance and the Lived Body (1987) and Dancing Into 
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Darkness (1999) exhibit a similar lack of awareness of socio-cultural influences on 
the body and experience. The former finishes w ith a cursory nod toward these: `As 
our body bears the tensions and schema of the world (of nature and of human 
existence), the world is thus inscribed in our dancing' (1987: 252). Dancing Into 
Darkness, which applies her phenomenological approach to her experience of going 
to Japan and studying a form of contemporary dance called butoh, makes similar 
generalisations about bodily wisdom and its relation to nature: `Butoh ... 
is 
unashamed of nudity as in premodern (pro- Western) Japan. It consciously tends 
nature (the nature of the body in this case), subverting the cultural body' (1999: 23). 
This she contrasts with ballet, where she sees flesh as being denied and subverted, 
dominated by romantic ideals driven by mind and intellect. Setting up this contrast 
between butoh and ballet as one of body and mind, Eastern and Western practices has 
echoes of the very essentialist accounts in movement re-education of exotic cultures 
that value a natural bodily wisdom from which those in `Western culture', although it 
is more `civilised', have been separated. 
Fraleigh's type of `feel-good' dance phenomenology, wherein the sensing, emotive, 
and experiencing body is privileged without any deeper socio-cultural analysis, is 
extremely problematic. Phenomenology should be more than a way of self- 
indulgently proclaiming our personal experiences to be universal truths. As I have 
shown above, good culturally grounded phenomenology such as that of Csordas 
(1994a/b; 2002) can be invaluable in providing a way of understanding and analysing 
embodied experience. In order to avoid treating embodiment as universal and 
unproblematic, my analysis in the following chapters will explore it in conjunction 
with the socio-cultural factors which shape it. 
Jill Green is another writer who explores dance through experientially-based study. 
Unlike Fraleigh, Green makes an attempt to look at `somatic theory and practice 
through a socio-cultural lens' to explore how the `ideal dancer's body' is socially 
constructed (Green, 1999: 80). To this end Green applies Foucault's work on docile, 
disciplined bodies (1977), claiming that surveillance is used in contemporary society 
to produce docile bodies, and that the dance world is a particularly apt example of 
this. Yet she sees movement re-education (in the form of somatics) as a way of 
overcoming this discipline, and she chronicles changes in her students' perceptions of 
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their bodies throughout a term of study as they move from viewing them as objects in 
need of discipline to perceiving them subjectively. Her intention was to `provide 
students with a place where they could reconnect to inner senses and somatic 
impulses while releasing some of the habitual physical strain required from keeping 
constant vigilance and surveillance over their bodies' (1999: 91). Although she 
acknowledges that using these techniques `outside the recognition of a sociocultural 
political context and within an individualistic and micro context alone' (92) may be a 
problem because they are inseparable from this context, she revertheless accepts 
uncritically the idea that bodies can be `liberated' from habit and from the pressure of 
the `ideal body' without realising that the `natural' or `somatically in-tune' body is 
equally an ideal. It may be an ideal driven by internal fee ling rather than external 
appearance, a `technology of the self which requires the regulation of internal 
thoughts and feelings rather than the regulation of external bodily image- but it is no 
less a regulation for that. 
In fact, it may be argued that dance scholarship of the types described above 
exemplifies the worst of each direction within writing about the body, on one hand, 
over-identifying with the body as text, and on the other hand, uncritically celebrating 
lived experience without a sense of cultural situatedness. This is not to say that all 
dance scholarship is of poor quality, as this is clearly not the case. The work of 
Cynthia Novack (1990; 1995; and as Cynthia Bull, 1997) and Helen Thomas (1995; 
2003) is particularly notable here. Novack's analysis of the contemporary dance form 
contact improvisation, through the lens of cultural anthropology, provides an analysis 
that is both culturally and historically situated and takes embodied practice into 
account. Similarly, Thomas' analysis of Martha Graham's dance Appalachian Spring 
(1995) and case studies of dance in relation to cultural theory (2003) attend to the 
embodied aspects of dance whilst grounding it in a rigorous sociology. I will return to 
these in Chapter Seven in relation to how dancers have used movement re-education. 
Conclusion 
As these studies of dance scholarship have shown, dance cannot be understood 
exclusively either as text or experience. As in movement re-education, the dancing 
body is one that both shapes culture and cultural expression and is shaped by it. It is 
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for this reason that it is useful to study movement re-education in a way that takes into 
account both discourse and experience. 
In doing so, discourse must not be read simply as a practice which turns the body into 
text, a blank page to be inscribed. The work of Foucault and others who describe the 
body in this way is inadequate because it leaves open the possibility of a natural body 
which pro-exists these inscriptions. This undertheorisation of the Irediscursive 
aspects of bodies is precisely where essentialist theories about the body can gain 
foothold, resulting, as in the case of movement re-education, in racist and sexist 
interpretations of this natural body as pre-civilised. In contrast to this, Merleau 
Ponty's understanding that the prelinguistic, precognitive aspects of the body and 
experience are never pro-cultural is an important insight for any analysis that seeks to 
overcome dualisms and essentialisms. By employing both Foucauldian (discursive) 
and Merleau-Pontyian (phenomenological) approaches to the body and experience, 
the body's central role in all levels of social life becomes fully apparent. This in turn 
allows for the fleshing out of analysis and a deeper understanding of bodies as 
socially and culturally situated. In the next chapter, I will examine how this 
theoretical framework can be elaborated into a methodology for researching 
movement re-education as embodied discourse. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodological Considerations: Body Wisdom a nd 
Embodied Discourse 
Introduction 
I have suggested that it is necessary to explore the concept of body wisdom in a way 
that takes into account both its embodied nature and the discourses which shape and 
surround it. This chapter will set out the principles through which to develop such a 
project, paying particular attention to the methodological possibilities and problems 
inherent in this approach. 
As I have stated, this research project is focussed around two linked questions: first, 
how does it become possible to think of bodies as wise and knowing in movement re- 
education? Second, how and in what ways is the discourse of body wisdom embodied 
by participants in this field? Approaches which privilege either discourse or 
embodiment have tended by default to neglect the other, with the result that, as I 
showed in the previous chapter, discursive approaches tend to treat the body as 
passively inscribed by culture whilst embodied approaches tend to privilege lived 
experience over cultural context. By researching movement re -education and its 
theories about the body through a methodology of embodied discourse, I hope to 
show that these two approaches are not mutually exclusive and can inform one 
another. 
This chapter will begin by outlining the way in which I have used discourse analysis 
to begin analysing movement re-education. It will proceed to deal with the use of 
ethnography as an embodied research method, and interviewing, which as I shall 
argue can provide useful insights into both discourse and embodiment. The chapter 
will conclude with a discussion of ethical issues in relation to my research project. 
Embodied Discourse 
I use the phrase embodied discourse to refer to the ways in which discourse is both 
bodied, in the sense that it acts on the body as a disciplinary, ethical or productive 
force (Foucault, 1977; 1985) and embodied, in the sense that it is written through or 
with the body. By embodiment I refer to the central role which bodies play in social 
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action and social order (Williams and Bendelow, 1998: 3). By discourse, I refer to 
`systems of knowledge and their associated practices' (Seale, 1998: 326), rather than 
specifically to language. I will elaborate each of these further in the discussion that 
follows. 
Mehta and Bondi (1999) have used the term `embodied discourse' in relation to their 
work on gender and fear of violence. For them, it represents a way of integrating 
poststructuralist theories of gender and subjectivity with recent work on embodiment 
and experience. This, theyargue, `allows us to consider non-linguistic as well as 
linguistic forms of knowledge and practice as `embodied discourse' (1999: 69), 
recognising practical and precognitive knowledge. In this, their research has a 
commonality with my own. However, ultimately their work fails to consider non- 
linguistic forms of knowledge, not because these cannot be represented textually (an 
issue I will return to below), but because their research method does not allow them to 
gain any insight into embodiment as a condtion of the body. The self-administered 
questionnaires with open ended questions they employ for their study constitute a 
particularly disembodied research method, in the sense that the bodily presence of 
both researchers and participants was almost entirely absent from the data collection. 
Their results discuss they ways in which discourses about safety and gender are 
`embodied' by their participants in as much as they are taken on and reproduced by 
them, but there is little reference to how participants' bodies are implicated in these 
discourses. Indeed, there can be no such reference, because the lack of face -to-face 
contact with participants, or embodied involvement in the research setting, precludes 
the possibility of any sense of bodies in this context. Their research provides insights 
into the use of broader societal discourses by individuals and their negotiations with, 
and reproduction of, these discourses, but it does not provide any insights into 
embodiment or even practice. While Mehta and Bondi do note the limitations of their 
research method in providing data on embodiment, they consider this to simply 
indicate the need for further research through in-depth interviewing rather than a 
failure to address embodiment at all. 
While all research is to a certain degree embodied, in that it involves the efforts of a 
researcher or researchers who are embodied by their very nature, some research 
methods allow more access to embodied experience than others. Methods such as 
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ethnography, which involve the continued bodily presence and self-presentation of the 
researcher (Coffey, 1999; Csordas, 1994b) involve embodiment significantly more 
than questionnaires, or most textual and discourse analysis, for example. However, it 
is not sufficient to say, in relation to the research methods I used, that ethnography 
adequately reflects embodiment while discourse analysis provides no data on 
embodiment, and that semi-structured qualitative interviewing, as a practice which 
involves face-to-face contact and self-presentation for a brief period of time, occupies 
a space in between. There may be times when discourse analysis focuses on the 
practices of the body in an embodied way, and equally, ethnography may reflect 
discourse as much as embodiment (see for example the ethnography of Martin, 1994). 
Further, although ethnography has increasingly recognised the importance of the body 
in its production and collection of data, like other methods of social science research, 
it traditionally ignored the body (Coffey, 1999). 
If research is truly to deal with embodiment, then, it must insist on the body as a 
central rather than peripheral focus. Moreover, it should examine the body's lived 
experiences and bodily practices and not simply conceive of the body as passively 
inscribed by discourse. A question which may arise from this is what use discourse 
analysis is at all in relation to such a study, particularly if, as in Foucault's work, 
discourse and history appear as a universal writing instrument inscribing the body 
(Butler, 1999). Yet a study of embodiment in itself would be neither complete nor 
necessarily very sociological. As Nikolas Rose notes, `The notion of the human as, at 
root, embodied is itself part of a certain style of reflection and action upon the human 
being' (1996: 323n). The conditions which shape embodiment are both social and 
historical. It is through the productive tension between embodied experience and the 
socio -historical conditions under which it emerges that we become able to understand 
both aspects more fully. 
In choosing research methods to reflect both embodiment and discourse, I have 
selected a multi-pronged approach incorporating discourse analysis of written texts, 
and ethnography, with semi-structured interviews to supplement the particularly 
individual nature of my participant observation. I see the interviews, therefore, as 
broadly incorporated into the ethnography rather than as separate from it, for reasons I 
shall discuss below. In choosing these methods, I was partly inspired by Emily 
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Martin's (1994) research on the immune system, which takes the form of a multi-site 
ethnography and includes a discourse analysis of public health literature on the 
subject that demonstrates shifts which have occurred within it. Although Martin does 
not address embodiment explicitly, her work does discuss discourses (in the 
Foucauldian sense) about flexibility and immunity as they operate in a variety of sites 
and on a variety of levels, from alternative health practitioners to immunologists to 
workplaces. Her interviews therefore represent discourse on one hand, and the 
engagement with and bodily uses of discourse on the other. She is also explicit about 
the relation of her own body/self to her ethnographic work. 
Using discourse analysis, ethnography and interviewing together also provides a way 
of triangulating data, testing its reliability as well as filling in gaps that may occur 
from one or another method. Discourse analysis and interviewing may or may not 
deal with about embodied practice, for instance, while certain discourses may simply 
not arise in embodied practice and may thus be relatively less accessible through 
ethnography. In part, respondent validation which came about through checking my 
ethnographic interpretations with my Alexander teacher also contributed to 
triangulating the data, ensuring at least that I had represented Alexander Technique in 
a way that was consistent with his interpretations of it. Interviews with other 
Alexander teachers then provided a fuller sense of how the technique might be 
interpreted in a variety of contexts and by teachers with different training. Interviews 
with practitioners proved to be a way of mediating between the embodied data of 
participant observation and the discursive data provided in the texts of the founders, 
because issues arising in both could be addressed and a deeper understanding 
developed. 
Discourse and Text 
Michel Foucault's work has become increasingly fashionable in the social sciences, 
and his methodology been put work in a variety of contexts, as I discussed in the 
previous chapter. Kendall and Wickham, in Using Foucault's Methods, (1999) 
caution that these methods are not `like those do-it-yourself wall-filler products that 
promise certain results if you just `aim and squirt' at whatever you care to pick' (118); 
rather, they should above all `disturb the obviousness' of things (1999: 119). In using 
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Foucauldian discourse analysis to analyse movement re-education, my goal is to 
`disturb the obviousness' of the general sense that these techniques overcome 
regulation of the body, hold no model of an ideal body toward which they work, and 
restore people to their `natural' bodies. I seek to show that the natural body is itself a 
kind of ideal, and that movement re-education constitutes a form of ethical self- 
formation and regulation, which is a way of working and acting on oneself in keeping 
with particular goals. I have further sought to uncover some of the `unpalatable 
origins and functions' (Kendall and Wickham, 1998: 34) of early movement re- 
education in its relation to eugenics and racist theories of evolution which, as I shall 
show, have not entirely disappeared. Discourse analysis provides a basis for 
understanding movement re-education's formal origins which can then be contrasted 
with contemporary discourse and practice, demonstrated in ethnographic data and 
interviews. 
`Discourse analysis' as undertaken by Foucault is rather different than many 
interpretations of the method, such as those of Potter and Wetherell (1987) or van 
Dijk (1997). While for these writers discourse analysis is predominantly about 
language, either through written texts or speech, Foucault's definition is broader. 
Foucault acknowledges this difference himself, commenting: 
The question posed by language analysis of some discursive fact or other is always: 
according to what rules has a particular statement been made, and consequently 
according to what rules could other similar statements be made? The description of 
the events of discourse poses quite a different question: how is it that one particular 
statement appeared rather than another? (Foucault, 1972: 30) 
Foucault does not analyse how one statement appears by searching for a discourse's 
origin; he seeks to avoid the search for origins altogether. He writes that `discourse 
must not be referred to as the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it 
occurs' (1972: 28); this is because there is no innate or natural discourse, and no 
originating point at which discourse emerges fully formed. As I indicated in the 
previous chapter, Foucault avoids traditional kinds of historical accounts that search 
for the origins of things as the point where they are most clearly articulated. For 
Foucault, discourse is often expressed in hnguage, it need not be limited to language. 
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This is not to say that everything is discourse; Kendall and Wickham give the 
example that `bodies are not discourse, they are non-discursive in their materiality. 
But bodies do not exist and operate in a non-discursive vacuum' (1999: 39). This is 
similar to the remark by Rose, quoted above, regarding the historical conditions which 
shape embodiment, pointing to the fact that embodiment is always shaped by 
discourse. 
Perhaps Foucault's best explanation of his use of the term discourse, at least in 
relation to this research project, is in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, 
where he states: 
Indeed, it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. And for this 
very reason, we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose 
tactical function is neither uniform nor stable... We must make an allowance for the 
complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an 
effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a 
starting point for an opening strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it 
reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible 
to thwart it. (Foucault, 1979: 100-1). 
He goes on to acknowledge that `there can exist different and even contradictory 
discourses within the same strategy' (1979: 102), something which certainly occurs in 
contemporary movement re-education in relation to issues such as naturalness and 
verticality, as the discussion in Chapter Seven shall show. Foucault's sense of 
discourse, then, is bound up with both power and knowledge, and may cover not only 
what is said in language but also what it is possible to say and the conditions that 
make it possible to say it. Foucauldian discourse analysis therefore examines the 
socio -historical conditions which produce discourse and the ways in which discourse 
is tied to power and knowledge. It is concerned with discourse's social functions. 
I want to suggest, however, that discourse is expressed not only in spoken and written 
language, but also in physical practice. This is not to make the over -simplistic point 
that `body language' exists and is an alternate form of communication, or more 
particularly a 'true' one, but precisely to problematise 'body language' by do- 
naturalising it. There are, as Marcel Mauss (1973 [1935]) reminds us, techniques of 
90 
the body, ways of using the body which are social and which emerge at particular 
times in relation to particular norms, goals, and ideals. Techniques of the body are 
also made possible at particular times and not others, and are therefore also part of 
discourse. This challenges the commonsensical assumption that there is a `truth' to 
the body and that body language represents a speaker's true intentions (Fast, 1970), or 
that, as dancer Martha Graham put it, `Movement never lies. It is a barometer telling 
the state of the soul's weather to all who can read it' (1998: 66-7). Bodies are not 
only inscribed by discourse, but also embody it. 
A distinction is often made between Foucault's archaeological analyses and his 
genealogical ones; the latter focusing particularly on power and the `history of the 
present. ' It is the genealogical works, in the three volumes of The History of 
Sexuality, which are most relevant to the purposes of my study. In The Use of 
Pleasure, Foucault outlines the basis of what he calls `techniques of the self (1985). 
In my analysis, I will show how movement re-education can be seen as a technique of 
the self. 
There are aspects of Foucault's work which I have rejected or omitted in this analysis; 
one is his model of the body as socially inscribed (1984), for reasons discussed in 
Chapter Three; another is his analysis of docile bodies. Movement re-education does 
not produce docile bodies in the way that Foucault suggests prisons do in Discipline 
and Punish, rather, it is a self-forming activity undertaken by subjects in keeping with 
a particular kind of ethics. It is too easy to apply the `docile bodies' thesis, as Jill 
Green (1999) has done, to look to traditional forms of dance training and say that they 
`discipline' the body in keeping with an external ideal, while movement re-education 
`liberates' the body from this regulation. This is not only weak analysis, drawing as it 
does on the idea that movement re-education and its goals are ahistorical, it also does 
not `disturb the obviousness' of commonsense assumptions. I have selectively used 
Foucault's work to develop the idea that movement re-education is a way of 
regulating bodies (Turner, 1992) and that it comes about in a particular social and 
historical context, not restoring us to a universal bodily truth which we once naturally 
possessed but then lost, but cultivating in us a new way of relating to our bodies and 
selves. 
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Foucault's later work also comes closest to opening a space for the subject and thus 
for providing a link with a study of embodiment, As Mitchell Dean notes, `while 
[Foucault's] earlier writings may haue given the impression of a kind of denial of 
interiority of the subject, there is now an explicit theorisation of this `inside' (1994: 
201). Through techniques of the self, individuals are understood to act upon 
themselves and shape themselves in accordance with certain ethical norms or ideals. 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, Foucault argues that techniques of the self 
have four characteristics, which include an ethical substance, modes of subjection, 
forms of ethical work, and a telos (Foucault, 1985). These characteristics, which 
Foucault identified in relation to the Ancient Greeks and Romans and their ways of 
relating to themselves, are also applicable to movement re-education, and Chapter 
Five uses them to analyse it. 
Foucault's discourse analysis was always conducted on written texts, on what he 
referred to as `entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been 
scratched over and recopied many times' (1984: 76). Such documents were practical 
manuals rather than official documents; The Care of the Self (1986), for example, 
begins with the analysis of a second-century manual on the interpretation of dreams. 
In keeping with this, my discourse analysis also uses practical texts, in this case the 
ones written by the founders of movement re-education. Although discourse is also 
manifested in interviews and even in ethnographic data, formations of discourse in 
these contexts may be more spontaneous and more negotiated. I have analysed 
interview discourse in Chapters 7 and 8; however, it also seemed desirable to compare 
contemporary discourses to those used by the founders of movement re-education 
techniques. Doing so gives a sense of how discourses have shifted, and if they have, 
over the period of time since the establishment of these techniques (up to a century 
has passed in the case of the Alexander Technique). It is for this reason that I have 
conducted a discourse analysis on the texts of movement re-education's founders. 
Discourse analysis on these texts also establishes `movement re-education' as a field 
with some coherence; while there are differences between techniques, particularly in 
the field of practice and the ways they work with the body, there are also substantial 
similarities, especially in the way they invoke nature and evolution as modes of 
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subjection. The founders themselves also act as authorities in these techniques, and 
are generally greatly admired by contemporary practitioners for their apparent 
wisdom and insights. There has been a hesitancy to move away from the ideas of the 
founders which has been particularly strong in Alexander Technique, as demonstrated 
by Ricki Alexander's account of the difficulties of getting the North American 
Association of Teachers of the Alexander Technique (NASTAT) to adopt a formal 
resolution distancing themselves from Alexander's racism (R. Alexander, 2000). 
For these reasons, a Foucauldian discourse analysis which examines how movement 
re-education techniques function as techniques of the self on the basis of the texts 
written by the techniques' founders provides a number of insights. This is not to say 
that the discourses of movement re-education are most authentic in the works of the 
founders, but understanding the founders' theories, intentions, and even sometimes 
practices provides a good basis for understanding how the techniques function today. 
These texts were initially compared and coded according to key discursive themes 
which emerged, including the prevalence of eugenic and evolutionary discourses, 
founding myths, physical practices, origin stories about natural bodies and who 
possessed them, relationships with science and medicine, the relationship between 
mind, body and emotion, and the place (or lack thereof) of women in these texts. 
These themes subsequently directed the interview guide, which was developed to 
determine the extent to which they recurred in discussions with contemporary 
movement re-educators. Subsequently, it became apparent that the majority of these 
themes fit within Foucault's framework of analysis for techniques of the self, and they 
were reworked in order to align them with this. Although the theory of techniques of 
the self had always appeared relevant in relation to movement re-education, the initial 
coding and analysis was data-driven rather than theorydriven. This was the first 
stage of the research and provided significant background knowledge from which to 
develop an interview guide and begin fieldwork. 
Embodiment 
Pure discourse analysis would lack `ecological validity' within the field of movement 
re-education, because movement re-educators see their work as fundamentally 
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concerned with embodiment and note that it is impossible to grasp it textually. This 
has not prevented them from producing a number of texts about their work, ranging 
from theoretical works integrating phenomenology and Rolfing (Maitland, 1993) to 
the practical how-to manuals of the Pilates method (for example, Pilates, 2000 [1945]; 
Kelly, 2001). However, it does mean that in order to be taken seriously by 
practitioners when doing research on these techniques, one is required to have 
embodied experience of doing them. This is not the only reason for undertaking an 
embodied study of movement re-education; it also provides a very different sense of 
the practices the work involves, and is a necessary base for any discussion of 
discourse because the work is inherently physical in nature. 
For Thomas Csordas, writing about embodiment includes acute attention to the ways 
in which bodies are employed in these experiences. However, as an academic he 
acknowledges that he is obliged to represent these in a textual form. He argues that 
this does not in any way diminish them, however, because language is not only about 
itself but is also a form of behaviour and a medium of intersubjectivity, and can 
therefore provide access to experience (1994b: xii). 
This point is particularly relevant to movement re-education, which, as I have noted, 
sometimes suggests that its practices cannot be written about because to do so would 
diminish the embodied experience. One interviewee was particularly concerned that I 
was conducting interviews because, as he put it, This field does not only take place at 
the language -meaning level but also through touch and perception'. It was the 
concern with embodied practice which led me to undertake ethnography, but the 
`language-meaning level' is ultimately the primary tool of academic research. Thus, 
Csordas' acknowledgement that language is a form of behaviour is significant. This 
means that language, too, is an analysable part of embodied experience, an issue I 
shall develop in relation to interviewing, below. 
Traditionally, ethnography has involved anthropologists and sociologists going away 
to live in and study a culture and produce a classical research monograph which 
displayed little awareness of the textual strategies of writing and the production of 
`self' and `other. ' The publication of Clifford and Marcus' Writing Culture (1986) 
signalled a new direction, and ethnography has increasingly been concerned with 
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representational strategies and the construction of texts. The postmodern turn in 
ethnography has also recognised the effect of personal and political positions on 
research, the need to rethink ways of presenting the `other' and the extent to which it 
is possible to do so, which as Wolf (1992: 52) points out have also been key feminist 
criticisms of ethnography, which were often ignored when made by feminists but 
have been taken quite seriously when made by postmodernists (1992: 7). What is 
clear is that ethnography is changing, and the role of the ethnographer in constructing 
and presenting ethnography is becoming more prominent. 
Writing the Body/Self 
One such shift has been in the form of increased writing about the body/self in 
ethnography. Such ethnographic writing from the self is sometimes called 
autoethnography, a term which Deborah Reed-Danahay (1997: 2) writes can signal 
either self ethnography or autobiographical writing with an ethnographic interest, in 
either case breaking down the distinction between autobiography and ethnography. 
Ely et al (1997) for example, observe: `We shape rather than compile our fieldnotes, 
and we aren't apologizing any longer for that. But, we are trying to recognize, to 
value, and to explain how personal views direct our attention' (1997: 17). They 
suggest that this process is critically important to the development of ethnographies, 
and that new textual strategies of representation, including drama and `layered 
writing' will help us to do this. 
However, writing oneself into ethnography is not without problems. ReedDanahay 
notes that it is not necessarily more authentic simply because it uses the voice of the 
insider (1997: 4). Wolf (1992) suggests that experimental textual styles are unlikely 
to replace realist ethnography in part because of the suspicion that `this excessive 
authorial presence just mightmake the text seem a bit self-indulgent' (51). Kleinman 
concurs: 
I expect the qualitative story to tell me about others, not about the author. Yes, we all 
write about ourselves in whatever we do, but when I read the study I want to learn 
about a piece of social organization or members of a social category. I want a tale of 
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the field. If the author is a member of the group, I want her to use herself as data. 
(1999: 27) 
Writing the body into ethnography has also been a way of writing about the self. For 
Coffey (1999: 59) notes that `we concern ourselves with the positioning, visibility and 
performance of our own embodied self as we undertake participant observation. 
Moreover, our observations and fieldnotes are often scattered with implicit and 
explicit references to the body. ' She observes that ethnography is always embodied, 
and discusses issues of self-presentation such as dress and personal appearance as 
aspects of the embodied ethnographic self. Hastrup (1995) observes that the body has 
been largely neglected in ethnographic writing, and uses Bourdieu's notion of habitus 
as a way of discussing the `sedimentation' of embodied experience. Although both 
Coffey and Halstrup also address writing from and about the self, writing bodies into 
ethnography is not necessarily self-oriented. For dance ethnographers, the movement 
of bodies has been the focal point of research. 
Sklar (1991) writes that dance ethnography must incorporate both attention to 
movement and to the meaning of movement; that is, it must include asking dancers 
about the meaning of the dance for them. `The dance needed to be approached via a 
combination of conceptual, kinesthetic, and affective pathways' (Sklar, 1991: 8). She 
also notes that the ethnographic perspective `implicates the researcher in the dance 
event... she is constrained to cast a self-reflexive eye on the assumptions and 
values-her own cultural tools for understanding-that she brings into fieldwork' (8). 
Farnell (1999) goes further, suggesting that studying dance and movement 
ethnographically requires both experience of such movement and attention to 
meaning. She concludes that 
careful observation and personal experience of dancing/moving are necessary, but 
not sufficient, for understanding human movement practices from an 
anthropological theory ... detailed attention to spoken 
discourse must enter the 
research agenda, not because spoken language should act as a model for theories of 
body movement, but because human beings are language users, and the mind that 
uses spoken language does not somehow switch off when it comes to moving. 
(Farnell, 1999: 147) 
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Participant Observation 
Since movement re-education is a practice of movement, ethnography in this field 
undoubtedly shares many characteristics with dance ethnography. Ethnography is an 
ideal research method for studying movement re-education because participant 
observation is its primary tool and because, as I have said, participation in these 
techniques is critical to understanding them. My fieldwork involved regular lessons 
in Alexander Technique and attendance in a body conditioning class for dancers at a 
local dance training institution. Alexander Technique is taught predominantly on an 
individual basis, framed in terms of lessons between `teachers' and `pupils. ' 
Introductory sessions are sometimes held in small groups of up to ten, and teachers 
who worked at theatre schools told me they generally taught group lessons there as 
well. In the body conditioning class, which I attended for three months, Pilates and 
yoga were incorporated with Alexander Technique and taught to a group of fifteen to 
twenty-five students. I also spent a morning at an Alexander teacher training school. 
Here, too, the technique was taught to a small group of six to ten students, but trainees 
practised on one another a great deal and also had significant input from the two 
teachers who led the training. However, the majority of Alexander teachers work 
one-to-one with pupils. 
Alexander lessons tend to last between thirty and forty-five minutes, although one 
teacher I interviewed was unusual in that he preferred to do much longer sessions of 
up to two hours at a time. Pupils of Alexander Technique are generally told that a 
good grasp of the work can be gained in somewhere between ten and thirty lessons. 
In the early stages, these lessons are taught once or even twice a week, while they 
later become less frequent. For my fieliwork, I attended weekly Alexander lessons 
for approximately six months, with a month's break over the Christmas period. After 
this point my teacher suggested that it was no longer necessary for me to come to 
lessons each week, and my attendance became increasingly infrequent, tapering first 
to fortnightly and then monthly lessons for several months, and then becoming even 
less regular. My final lesson was in April 2003, eighteen months after I began my 
fieldwork, at which time I had had approximately thirty lessons. 
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I chose to take Alexander Technique as my primary focus for ethnographic research 
because I had no prior experience of studying it. As a dancer, I had experienced all 
the other techniques during or as a supplement to dance training, including 
undergoing the standard ten sessions of Rolfing, six months of Body-Mind Centering, 
a Pilates class, and occasional Feldenkrais work. My lack of prior experiential 
knowledge about Alexander Technique made it easier to begin this research without a 
preconceived (and therefore potentially undocumentable) sense of what practices and 
theories the technique involved. My position as a `marginal native' (Walsh, 1998), 
inexperienced with regard to Alexander Technique in particular, yet possessing a 
bodily knowledge through dance and other movement re-education techniques I had 
studied gave me the kinaesthetic skills to adapt relatively easily to the technique as 
presented. It should be noted however that kinaesthetic and bodily skills do not 
necessarily translate into the ability to write about such skill in a convincing manner, 
and representing bodily movement and action as text can be very problematic. This is 
partly because it is rarely only one part of the body that is involved in movement, and 
verbal or written descriptions can often seem insufficiently specific. This is not 
simply a problem of writing, however; Farrell (1999: 154) has noted that even formal 
movement notation systems are not always adequate for recording the use of the body 
because they do not account for the movement between positions. Nonetheless, in 
Chapter Six I have attempted to present these experiences in an accessible way with 
detailed descriptions of movement and attention to bodily comportment. 
Negotiating access to a site was relatively uncomplicated; I attended an introductory 
lesson on Alexander Technique given by a teacher at the London Alexander Centre 
and at the end approached him to explain that I was a researcher interested in taking 
lessons as part of a study of Alexander Technique and similar work for a PhD in 
sociology. He readily agreed to take me on as a pupil and said that it would be fine 
for me to tape record lessons. To my second lesson I brought a formal letter 
explaining the purpose of my study and what the data would be used for, as well as 
telling him that he would be anonymised in any reports of the research. Whether I 
was treated differently in lessons because I was a researcher is another issue; my 
teacher occasionally mentioned that he gave longer explanations to me because of 
this. Although the practices employed in these lessons are unlikely to have varied 
substantially, then, I may have received more `theory' than other Alexander pupils. 
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I tape recorded each lesson and produced fieldnotes on the basis of these recordings 
and notes I had made in my field journal after the session. At the time, I believed the 
recordings were extremely useful in helping me to reconstruct what had occurred. 
However, in analysing my fieldnotes, I became aware that contrary to my perceptions 
at the time, the best notes were the ones in which I did not rely too heavily on the tape 
recordings I had made in order to remember what had gone on, but reproduced it from 
memory, because in these accounts the kinaesthetic sense of my own body was most 
prevalent. In using the tape recorder as a mnemonic device, I tended to concentrate 
more strongly on what had been said and how language was used in the lessons than 
on what had been done or what it involved on a kinaesthetic level. This is not to say 
that memory is a perfect recording instrument; there are inevitably some distortions in 
remembered lessons. However, it does indicate that sometimes auditory or even 
visual recordings are not the best way of obtaining a record of corporeal experience. 
Language may give indications of experience, but in recordings it can be too easy to 
focus on the former at the latter's expense. I do not wish to essentialise experience, 
only to take it seriously as a form of data which is critically important in studying 
movement re-education. 
My participant observation is thus fundamentally concerned with my own body and 
experiences, due to the nature of the environment in which I was conducting 
ethnography. Although I conducted interviews as a way ofbroadening my 
understanding and developing a basis for comparing my own experiences with those 
of others, in constructing an account of participant observation it is ultimately through 
my own body/self that I can most coherently present the work; as van Manen (1990: 
54) notes with regard to researching lived experience, `my own life experiences are 
immediately accessible to me in a way that no one else's are. ' In Chapter Six, I 
provide an account of participant observation in Alexander Technique with examples 
from my lessons and experience; my body is at the centre of these examples. I take 
the critiques of self-writing in ethnography which were described above seriously, and 
in invoking my own experience it is neither my intention to generalise on the basis of 
my own experience nor to tell a story that is all about myself. However, embodied 
experience is not only at the heart of movement re -educators' understandings of their 
own work, it is also fundamentally necessary to any understanding of it. As Kleinman 
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(1999) put it in the quote above, I have used myself as data, in a bodily way. For 
readers without experience of Alexander Technique, it is only through an account of 
how its principles are embodied in particular physical practices that the work will 
make sense or appear coherent. Embodied experiences provide a complementary way 
of looking at the work which will provide a very different understanding than 
discourse analysis does, as the contrast of Chapters 5 and 6 will demonstrate. 
Coding and analysing fieldnotes from my participant observation was not initially an 
easy task. As so much of the use we make of our bodies may appear `natural' and 
unworthy of study, my fieldnotes initially appeared to me to chronicle nothing but a 
fairly mundane physical practice, which might have been briefly summarised as `Sat. 
Stood. Lay on a table and was adjusted. ' It was not until I had finished fieldwork 
and left these notes unread for several months that, upon returning to them, I began to 
realise that they constituted a record of a relatively peculiar set of practices. General 
themes for codes began to present themselves in relation to the principles of 
Alexander Technique, such as `non-doing', `end-gaining and means -whereby', use of 
the self, and habit. Each of these themes was demonstrated by particular bodily 
practices. These themes began to take on an analytical force through the comparison 
of Alexander's emphasis on conscious control and awareness of habitual reactions 
with Merleau-Ponty's (1962) conception of habit as a kind of somatic knowledge 
which is preconscious. The fact that both Alexander and Merleau-Ponty discuss habit 
extensively provided a basis for applying what Csordas has termed a `cultural 
phenomenology' (1994b) to a study of Alexander Technique. 
Merleau-Ponty's work does not in itself provide a formal analytical framework in the 
way that Foucault's analysis of techniques of the self does. However, the work of 
Csordas (2002) provided supplementary tools, through his analysis of `somatic modes 
of attention', which allowed the exploration of the generic principles of the technique 
described above. End-gaining and means-whereby, good use of the self, and non- 
doing are all aspects of Alexander Technique as a particular somatic mode of 
attention. Finally, data from my attendance at an Alexander teacher-training 
programme provided a link to Bourdieu's notion of habitus as the object of change in 
Alexander Technique. After identifying these analytical links between the theoretical 
literature on embodiment and the embodied experience of participating in Alexander 
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Technique, a formal coding system emerged which linked accounts of practices with 
the Alexander principles they were intended to demonstrate. Each of these was coded 
according to the principle: habit, faulty sensory awareness, perception, inhibition, 
non-doing, end-gaining, means whereby, use of the self, conscious control, and 
finally, implicitly related to conscious control, the role of emotion in the body/mind 
relationship, whichAlexander Technique addresses only indirectly but which 
nevertheless appeared repeatedly in various ways in my data. Coding and analysing 
the data, therefore, involved a relatively complex interaction between data and theory, 
which began from the data, as in `grounded theory' as described by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998), but was not entirely driven by it. Existing theory (through Merleau- 
Ponty and cultural phenomenology) also served to shape and direct the focus of 
coding by providing an analytical basis on which to understand these practices in 
relation to habit, habitue and as part of a somatic mode of attention. This is 
consistent with Coffey and Atkinson's observations that codes may emerge in a 
variety of ways, from the data, from theoretical frameworks, readings in a general 
area, or from research questions (1996: 32). All of these informed my data coding. 
Interviews 
While participant observation can provide extensive data about practices and theories 
which are not available in non-participant research methods, there are occasions when 
it is not the most appropriate method of data gathering. For practical reasons, 
undertaking participant observation in all the movement re-education techniques 
discussed for this study would not only have been time-consuming but also financially 
costly. While movement re-education practitioners were generous with their time and 
attention in providing one or two hours for interviews, most are not in a position to do 
their work free of charge for the sake of a researcher, and I felt it would be unfair to 
ask this of them. Using all these methods consecutively could also lead to confused 
data, or general physical or even emotional changes which could not then be traced to 
a particular method. Further, undertaking all these methods would simply have 
produced too much data for this project, leading to difficulties in analysis. 
There are also theoretical reasons that participant observation may be usefully 
supplemented by other forms of analysis. As was exemplified in my experience with 
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Alexander Technique, certain key issues may not arise in practice but only in the 
direct questioning which an interview provides. The issue of the `natural body' and 
the theories of social evolution behind it simply did not emerge in Alexander lessons. 
Ida Rolf claimed `I don't know why it works, I only know that it works. I invent all 
these explanatory rationalizations later on' (in Rolf, 1990 [1978]: 27). Theory and 
practice in movement re-education may be quite different things, with `explanatory 
rationalizations' pasted to physical practices which seem to produce positive effects. 
The experiential way in which most movement re-educators developed their 
techniques, through work on their own bodies, underscores this point; while Rolf and 
Feldenkrais, with PhDs in biochemistry and engineering, respectively, used their 
backgrounds to explain their work scientifically and thus attempt to give it more 
mainstream biomedical legitimacy, like other movement re-educators they also 
adopted popular discourses in order to explain and justify their work. Such discourses 
included eugenics, in F. M. Alexander's case, and flexibility in Bonnie Bainbridge 
Cohen's. 
Theory and practice may sometimes be rather loosely connected in these techniques, 
and this is an important reason for interviewing practitioners in order to understand 
their theorisations of their work. However, an embodied sense of practice is always 
important grounding for these interviews. Becker and Geer (1969) note that 
participant observation can `provide us with a yardstick against which to measure the 
completeness of data gathered in other ways, a model which can serve to let us know 
what orders of information escape us when we use other methods' (1969: 322). 
Obviously, the reverse is also true: interviews, for example, can provide a measure of 
the completeness of observational material, which may ask different kinds of 
questions. 
One of the key things which escapes the interviewer but is accessible to the 
participant observer, according to Becker and Geer, is change. They write: 
it is precisely in discussing changes in themselves and their surroundings that 
interviewees are least likely or able to give an accurate account of events. Changes 
in the social environment and in the self inevitably produce transformations of 
perspective, and it is characteristic of such transformations that the person fords it 
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difficult or impossible to remember his [sic] former actions, outlook, or feelings... 
Similarly, a person in the midst of such change may find it difficult to describe 
what is happening, for he has not developed a perspective or concepts which would 
allow him to think and talk about these things coherently (1969: 331). 
Through participant observation, I was able to document changes in my own 
body/self, but not in others, due to the individual nature of the work. Participants in 
my study were to some extent able to discuss how their practices had changed over 
time, but these discussions were relatively impoverished compared to what long-term 
observation would have provided. Therefore, this study can only reflect on change 
amongst participants in a relatively limited way. Bodily changes, too, are often 
among the most subtle and least documentable; as I have noted in Chapter Six, 
through the course of Alexander lessons the position of my shoulders changed rather 
dramatically, but I was unable to pinpoint the moments at which the change occurred. 
In documenting my own experiences with Alexander lessons, however, I have tried to 
offer a detailed account which might reflect on the experiences of others, through the 
changes in my own body/self. This is not to say that my experiences are 
universalisable; clearly they are not. However, if they can provide a clear and 
detailed account which makes the experience of doing Alexander Technique 
accessible and understandable to those who have not done it, this can be useful in 
itself. Through interviews, a broader context for these experiences can be provided. 
Conducting Interviews 
Interviewing has also often been a part of ethnography; Spradley (1979) discusses the 
process of ethnographic interviewing in detail. For many ethnographers, interviewing 
`informants' is done repeatedly over a period of time, allowing for the development of 
a rapport and depth of knowledge. This is particularly the case where there is a 
clearly defined `field' in which such informants regularly interact and where the 
ethnographer can encounter them. As Alexander Technique, like most other 
movement re-education techniques, is taught individually, the `field' of movement re- 
educators does not exist as a physical space. Nor was the London Alexander Centre 
particularly a place to liase with other pupils; although I was able to interview two 
other teachers who worked there, no pupils responded to my poster asking for 
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interviewees and I did not regularly encounter other pupils in that space. I therefore 
had no contact with potential interviewees other than my Alexander teacher, outside 
pre-arranged meetings with them. For this reason, it was most useful simply to 
conduct single semi- structured interviews with a variety of practitioners in an attempt 
to get a sense of the broader `field' in which various forms of movement re-education 
participate. 
Participants were reached through an e-mail to the mailing list of the Society of 
Teachers of the Alexander Technique and the Feldenkrais Guild, posters at 
Goldsmiths College and a local dance institution, and individual e-mails to 
practitioners listed on Rolfmg and Body-Mind Centering websites, as these 
practitioners are relatively scarce in the UK. Other potential interviewees were 
reached through snowball sampling, as pupils of practitioners I had interviewed or 
contacts of friends or other interviewees who knew I was seeking others to interview. 
My initial intention was to interview twenty-five practitioners and pupils in a variety 
of techniques; as it turned out, the majority of interviewees were from Alexander 
Technique, although I managed to recruit at least three partic ipants with experience in 
each of the other disciplines. Many participants had experience with more than one 
technique, but most chose to speak about only one. Twenty-eight interviews were 
ultimately conducted, including one Alexander Technique pupil who asked to be 
interviewed by e-mail. The responses I received from this were relatively short and of 
little use in developing the data, however. More detail about the constitution of the 
sample is available in Appendix II. 
Ursula Sharma notes that with her self-selected sample, `people motivated to... submit 
to a fairly lengthy and probing interview would be those whose experience of 
complementary medicine had been substantial and fairly successful, rather than those 
whose experience had been cursory or, from their point of view, a waste of time' 
(1992: 34). Thus, she concludes, we cannot draw any conclusions about efficacy or 
patient satisfaction from such a group. In the case of my interviews, practitioners of 
the techniques were the ones most interested in being interviewed and most 
responsive to my calls for participants. Obviously they have a greater commitment to 
the work and a professional interest in having it publicised, which several indicated 
was the reason they had agreed to be interviewed. Indeed, amongst Alexander 
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teachers particularly, I received so many volunteers that I had to turn some away lest 
the sample be constituted entirely of Alexander teachers. This does not indicate that 
pupils and clients of these techniques felt that they were a waste of time, only that 
they had less interest in spending an hour with an interviewer discussing them. Like 
Sharma, however, I have avoided drawing any conclusions from this small and 
statistically unrepresentative sample as to the efficacy of these techniques. For the 
purposes of this study I have been interested not in whether the techniques 'work'- 
the practitioners I interviewed genuinely believe that they do, and this has been to a 
large extent borne out on a personal level for me during my fie Idwork-but in the 
work they do, in relation to shaping the self and formulating different somatic modes 
of attention. 
Nearly all interviews lasted an hour or more; a few even lasted as long as two hours. 
At the beginning of each interview, I explained to the participant that I was 
conducting research on ideas about the body and health in relation to a number of 
movement re-education techniques as part of a PhD in sociology. The wording of the 
explanation varied according to the participant's perceived interest in the research and 
sometimes included the phrase `body wisdom', while at other times not. This proved 
to be useful as in Alexander Technique I discovered that there was no sense of `body 
wisdom' and to claim to be looking for it would have been detracting and misleading. 
I also explained to participants that I had experience with most of these techniques 
and was taking lessons in Alexander Technique myself, establishing a common 
background for understanding. Teachers of these techniques therefore treated me as 
someone with a little understanding and sympathy, but who could not be expected to 
know very much and was therefore lacking the tacit knowledge they themselves 
possessed. In this initial statement, I also sought and received explicit permssion to 
tape record the interviews, and explained that participants would be anonymised and 
any identifying details removed in the final thesis. In the data chapters, each 
interviewee has been assigned a pseudonym in order to distinguish them from other 
interviewees and so that their narratives may to some extent be followed, however, I 
have avoided including background information about participants except in a very 
general way, lest they be identifiable. The London Alexander Centre, where I 
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undertook my fieldwork, is also a pseudonym; there are in fact a number of Alexander 
centres in London, generally named by region. 
Interviewing and Embodiment 
I have already suggested that interviewing is not simply a way to access discourse, 
although approaches such as those of Silverman (2000), to analysing interviews as 
text and discourse may give this impression. In interviewing movement re-educators, 
bodies were often central not only as topics of discussion, but also in presenting 
material. Some practitioners demonstrated particular techniques or physical 
principles, leaving me in the process of transcription to describe in words the practices 
I remembered from the verbal cues given. When this occurred in interviews, I 
generally tried to comment on the actions in a way that would provide me with data 
from which to later reconstruct it. One interviewee, Eva, suggested in a pilot 
interview that `the more "movement people" people are, you know, the more they'll 
show you with their body rather than telling you in words... that's another problem 
with the whole thing, is you can only say so much, and it comes down to people's 
doing'. Again, practice was critical to understanding. 
One topic that elicited physical demonstration was the difference in ways of standing 
and sitting from a chair in Alexander Technique. Two of Alexander's first pupils, 
Walter Carrington and Patrick Macdonald, developed somewhat different approaches 
to the work, mainly regarding the way in which one should stand up from a chair. 
Their viewpoints have developed into a minor but noticeable split between 
contemporary Alexander teachers, among those who come from a Carrington lineage 
and those who have adopted the Macdonald style. One teacher from each tradition 
spontaneously demonstrated the differences to me, showing me how the leg position 
differed and how in the Carrington tradition, one tended to bend forward at the hips in 
order to come to standing. Yet these two teachers also dismissed the differences as 
unimportant, and the Carrington-trained teacher even quoted an important Macdonald 
disciple as having said of the bent waist, `why go via Brighton if you want to go to 
London? ' Such physical demonstrations provided me with a context for the way my 
own Alexander teacher (who was trained in the Macdonald tradition) presented the 
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work. They could not replace participant observation, but they did provide some 
basis for comparison. 
The issue of physical practices being presented in interviews raises the issue of 
whether a video camera would have been a more appropriate recording device than a 
tape recorder in these interviews. In hindsight, it may be that videotape would have 
provided a clearer record of the bodily self -presentation of participants in interviews. 
However, within the Alexander lessons themselves, I am doubtful as to whether this 
would have helped the final accounts of lessons. Too much emphasis can be put on 
the visual, and the work of Alexander Technique is predominantly about developing 
the kinaesthetic felt sense. 
Interviews were also embodied in the sense that, like fieldwork, they required a 
certain type of self-presentation and interaction with people who were in a very real 
sense embodying the techniques they practised. This was particularly the case with 
Alexander teachers, for whom inhibition of one's initial response to a stimulus (in this 
case, a question) is a key principle. In several interviews, the pause between question 
and answer demonstrated the way the work was being employed by these teachers as 
fully as questions about how they practised it in their daily lives did. I want to 
suggest, however, that embodiment is not only about attending to the body's 
observable presence and practices, but also at times about attending to how bodily 
practice is explained and spoken about. In academic work, as in interviews, bodily 
practices can only be represented through words. The relative neglect of this kind of 
representation has made it appear that embodiment has no part in academic discourse 
or that embodiment is outside of language, but this is not the case. While descriptions 
of practice will never entirely capture the bodily experience of them, because in the 
translation to language the inarticulable `felt sense' of the body may be lost, it is 
nevertheless useful to attempt to capture these in language, and in so doing take 
embodiment seriously. Part of the difficulty in writing or speaking about bodily 
experience, I would argue, comes from the fact that it occurs so infrequently. While 
asking participants about what they do in a session of movement re-education may not 
fully represent what they actually practice, it is at least a guide toward these practices. 
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Structure of Interviews 
Each interview began with an attempt to develop a narrative history of the 
participant's involvement in the technique, the length of time and degree of 
involvement they had, and to establish whether they had experience with other 
techniques such as the ones studied, or tai chi and other martial arts, yoga, or other 
forms of bodywork. These questions established a context and background for each 
participant. I then proceeded to ask questions about what the technique did, in their 
interpretation, and what benefits this would have. While I had imagined that stated 
aims might include improved posture or alignment, most responses centred around 
increased body awareness, an issue I will develop in Chapters 7 and 8. 
The Colliers (Collier and Collier, 1986) have shown how photographs may be used in 
interviews to approach issues which might not otherwise be discussed. In developing 
an interview guide, I struggled with the issue of how to elicit responses from 
participants about Alexander's theory of eugenics and how to broach the issue of 
evolution. The image below (Figure 2.1) provided an opening for this, representing in 
pictorial form, as one Alexander teacher noted, `what Alexander says in his books. ' 
This image became an opening for asking about participants' interpretations of it, 
whether it related to the techniques they were involved with and in what way, if they 
thought there was such a thing as a natural alignment or posture and what this might 
be like, whether they felt culture or background might affect a person's alignment, 
and how it might do this. 
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Figure 2.1: The Evolution and Degeneration of Man, original source unknown, popularly used 
on Alexander Technique websites and presented in Balk and Shields, 2000: 29. 
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Questions then proceeded to cover what the interviewee might do in a session cf the 
technique, with emphasis on specific practices, and whether it was seen as holistic and 
what this might mean. I also enquired about how participants saw their techniques' 
relationships with alternative and complementary health, science and Western 
medicine, and what the gender balance was amongst participants in their experiences. 
Finally, I asked practitioners how their experiences had changed over time, and asked 
pupils or clients whether the technique had stayed with them and if they still used it, 
and in what way. A full version of the interview guide is in Appendix I. 
These questions can be divided into four main themes. One theme was narrative and 
aimed at life history in relation to the study of movement re-education, seeking the 
story of the participant's involvement in the work and the initial reasons that 
motivated this involvement. Key themes from the work of the founders, including 
evolution, eugenics, the relationship between nature and culture, and gender were then 
explored. A third theme involved movement re-education's relationships to other 
discourses, including alternative health, other forms of movement re -education, 
science and biomedicine. The final theme addressed practices: what do the 
techniques aim to do, and how do they do it? What practices are involved? Are they 
continuous, or do they slip when participants cease to be involved with the work on a 
regular basis? While the guide was flexible and not all questions were asked in each 
session, the most likely questions to be omitted were those about the relationship of 
movement re-education to other discourses, partly because these were often implicitly 
covered in other responses. In the course of the interviews, I also attempted to add a 
question about whether and at what point the work became ingrained or intemalised, 
but this was not a successful question, because the nature of the work is that it is 
ongoing and there is no point (particularly in Alexander Technique which emphasises 
constant attention to conscious control) when these techniques become completely 
habitual. 
The interview data were analysed using the data analysis software NVivo, which 
provided the advantage of rapid searching and coding through relatively lengthy 
passages of text and multiple documents. Fieldnotes from participant observation 
were not coded using this software due to their relatively unproblematic length in 
terms of searching and fmding key passages, and the fact that the codes used for them 
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did not significantly overlap with the interview data because of broad differences in 
this data. Interview data were analysed partly in relation to themes emerging from the 
discourse analysis, such as naturalness and evolution, which needed further 
elaboration in the context of contemporary movement re-education practitioners, and 
issues such as embodied practice which required comparison to the ethnographic data 
on Alexander Technique. Certain other issues, such as the relationship between 
movement re-education and alternative health, emerged only in the interviews. 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996) note that data are often initially coded according to 
interview questions, and this was the case with my interviews, particularly on issues 
such as naturalness, relationship to biomedicine, aims of techniques, benefits of 
techniques, and practices. Other themes emerged from careful readings of the 
interviews and from observations made during transcriptions. These included the 
relevance of posture being organised along the plumb line, the role of the nervous 
system, and criticisms of modem civilisation and working practices, an issue which 
generated repeated comment because the image above shows `man' slumped 
ultimately in front of the computer. Upon closer analysis, however, this theme merely 
reflected broader issues about the natural and evolution and was not a point for 
development in itself. Some of these themes then led to the creation of `tree nodes' 
for analysis, which impose a hierarchical structure on the codes so that they can be 
further broken down and analysed. For example, the code related to `the natural' was 
analysed and broken down in terms of specific understandings of the term `natural', 
including the natural as original (later more accurately described as `pre-civilised'); 
the natural as normal, the natural as unknown, and the natural as ideal. Another tree 
node involved the practical uses to which movement re-education was put by 
participants, specifically musicians and dancers. In part, the use made of the themes 
indicated by these codes, in Chapters 7 and 8, derived from the topics previously 
addressed in Chapters 5 and 6 through the analysis of fieldnotes and founding texts, 
which left questions open that needed further exploration in relation to contemporary 
movement re-education practice. The natural, for instance, proved to be a major issue 
requiring detailed analysis, but it also linked to the plumb line and the rejection of 
vertical posture as the goal of movement re-education. The analysis of naturalness 
also involved coding data which fit with my initial findings (that a sense of the natural 
as pre-civilised was important to movement re-educators) and that which did not, 
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from participants who understood the `natural body' to be a normal one, or said that it 
was not a term they would use in relation to their work. Coding thus took account of 
divergent interpretations and data which did not fit the initial pattern. 
Ethics 
My background in dance and prior experience with many of these techniques has 
shaped and influenced the way I have approached this research and the way I have 
been understood by my participants. I have never been a `neutral observer' in relation 
to these techniques, although this need not be problematic in itself; as Bourdieu has 
observed, `If the sociologist manages to produce any truth, he [sic] does so not despite 
the interest he has in producing that truth but because he has an interest in doing so- 
which is the exact opposite of the usual somewhat fatuous discourse about 
"neutrality"' (1993: 11). However, my acknowledgement of a shared background 
with many of those involved in movement re-education has led many to assume that 
we share the same values and beliefs. This has not always been the case; as a 
sociologist, I have questioned the value of the natural and the status of body wisdom 
as an innate truth in a way that many movement re-educators would find challenging. 
Further, I have suggested that some models of evolution used by movement re- 
educators have racist connotations and should be abandoned, a suggestion which 
would make some movement re-educators uncomfortable. However, while on the 
basis of a discourse analysis of texts, it seemed to me that I should position myself 
against movement re-education, fieldwork and the involvement with real people, 
many of whom did share similar backgrounds and even occasionally similar 
discomfort with the racism of the founders, aligned me more strongly with movement 
re-educators themselves. 
Becker (1967) has asked `whose side are we on? ' in relation to our research, and this 
question has returned to me throughout this project. Unprompted, one answer arrived 
from my Alexander teacher who, upon reading Chapter Six, commented `you are on 
our side! Maybe a bit too much? ' Ethnographers have acknowledged the problem of 
`going native', over-identifying with the participants in one's research (see Gubrium 
and Holstein, 1997: 36). While I have remained committed to challenging certain 
aspects of the theories many movement re-educators hold, my ethnographic 
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involvement with it did moderate this desire and make me more conscious of my 
responsibility to represent my participants fairly. 
Judith Stacey (1988) has noted that the deep involvement of ethnographers in their 
research environments often leads to tensions and thorny ethical issues in relation to 
what can be said about the people one is researching. Naheed Islam (2000), who 
researched race amongst a Bangladeshi community in Los Angeles, describes how 
research can be `an act of betrayal. ' Her status as an insider to this community put her 
in a position to routinely encounter racist views her participants held about other 
minority groups. She writes: 
The price of my inclusion in the community was to leave racist discourses 
uncontested. Should I reveal this "dirty laundry" once I had completed my 
research? By doing so, will I be distancing myself from and claiming to be better 
than the rest of "my community"? The history and experiences of the Bangladeshi 
community in the United States are yet undocumented. Should its introduction be 
"overshadowed" by the racist discourse the community reproduces? How should I 
represent a marginalized community within and through my work? (2000: 58) 
Although my research environment is quite different from hers, I have confronted 
some similar issues with regard to the representation of movement re-educators. As 
participants in a complementary health field outside the mainstream and struggling for 
recognition, movement re-educators are in some senses a marginal group. Several 
indicabd they had agreed to be interviewed in the hope that research such as mine 
would promote their work. In exposing an underlying racist ideology in the histories 
and sometimes contemporary discourses of movement re-education, then, I risked 
damaging their chances of recognition, betraying the hopes they placed in me as a 
researcher. Further, as a marginal member of their community because of my previous 
experiences, I was generally treated (and behaved) as sympathetic toward their work. 
Movement re-education is also virtually undocumented in academia, and it has not 
been my intention to dismiss or discredit it simply because it stands outside the 
mainstream. However, the few scholarly attempts to discuss movement re-education 
(Fraleigh, 2000; Green, 1999; Huxley, 1995) are deeply troubling in their attempts to 
write it as a discovery of the `true nature' of the body without a sense of its historicity 
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or the highly suspect discourses upon which its founders often drew. Ultimately, I 
have hoped to position myself as sympathetic but critical, increasing recognition of 
these techniques whilst demonstrating to movement re educators that the evolutionary 
theories of their founders had strong racist overtones, and that these are not actually 
necessary to their work. 
For a very few participants, this will be an issue they are already aware of; for others, 
it may provide a new and useful direction in which to develop their work. However, I 
accept that for some, the evolutionary theories of the founders are beguiling, and any 
criticism of the founders themselves will be seen as an attempt to detract from the 
work (see Holt, 2000 for an example of this). For these participants and others in the 
movement re-education community, my work may be threatening, even dangerous. 
Staring (1997), who produced a damning biography of F. M. Alexander, complained 
that upon publishing an article in a major professional journal for Alexander teachers, 
he received no comments on his contention that Alexander was a racist who espoused 
eugenics. Judging from the reactions chronicled in the transcript of a presentation he 
gave to the American Center for the Alexander Technique (Staring and Bouchard, 
2002), many Alexander teachers remain rather hostile to any criticism of Alexander. 
Such criticisms may also be entirely ignored; it may be that my attempt to provide 
alternative understandings of these techniques falls, as it were, upon deaf ears. 
However, as Islam concludes, silences about issues of racism `subvert an analysis and 
understanding of how racism operates and how racialized systems of domination and 
inequality are maintained. Therefore, such silences are a betrayal of antiracist 
politics' (2000: 59). These issues cannot, therefore, be overlooked. 
As I have discussed elsewhere (Tarr, 2004), the impressions of practitioners that I 
might promote their work were not wrong; after presentations, people sometimes 
approached me, not to ask for clarification on a point I had made, but to inquire as to 
where they could find an Alexander teacher to work with. This even occurred when I 
had been critical of Alexander Technique. Even amongst academics, it seemed, my 
work might have a promotional rather than critical function for movement re- 
education. 
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The issue of ethics is not simply one of taking sides, but also of how to respond when 
confronted with racism. Back (2002), in his account about researching white 
nationalists, demonstrates how being open about one's political commitments with 
respondents who hold very different commitments can produce useful dialogue. He 
also notes that there can be a degree of identification with respondents whose 
backgrounds are similar but whose views one may abhor, and that this can cause 
discomfort and disorientation, which can in fact be a useful starting point for 
conducting an ethnography of whiteness such as the one he undertook. Becker (2000) 
comments that the tension between whether to confront participants and respondents 
and speak out against racism when it appears, thus clearing one's moralconscience, 
or on the other hand to be silent in the face of racism in order to gather data upon it, 
thus fulfilling the requirements of social scientific research, cannot be resolved. 
Hammersley (1992) also indicates that exploitation and ethics in the research process 
are a matter of context. 
There were five instances in interviews where respondents indicated they held 
implicitly racist models of evolution, and in only two of these was this racist view of 
`others' as savage and less evolved fully articulated. My response to these remarks 
was always to keep quiet, making noncommittal noises to encourage the interviewee 
to continue speaking. This was less a considered reaction than an instinctual one, 
strengthened by the fact that the views expressed were unlikely to have been seen as 
racist by their purveyors. Judging from the Alexander Technique journal Direction's 
`multicultural' issue (2000), many Alexander teachers are entirely unaware that the 
models of evolution upon which Alexander relied are at least half a century out of 
date and are today readily acknowledged in other circles to be racist. While it is 
important to bring this to their attention, suggesting this to individuals in interview 
settings would likely have brought the interviews to anabrupt close. In this case, I 
felt that developing a broader picture of the ways in which this model of evolution 
was mobilised by contemporary practitioners in order to analyse and critique it, 
offering this analysis back to them, was more important than confronting individual 
practitioners to tell them their views invoked racist models of the `natural savage. ' To 
this end, it is my intention to publish summaries about my research in a format which 
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is accessible and available to those involved in movement re-education in addition to 
publishing more academic works on the topic 10 
Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, I have tried to show how a theory of embodied discourse 
may be developed through the contrast of data about discourses with data about 
embodiment. It is through researching embodiment that we can understand what 
occurs in movement re-education and how it accomplishes its aims, or tries to do so. 
In analysing discourse, the broader socio-cultural forces which shape movement re- 
education and the way it explains and justifies itself become apparent. I have 
suggested that neither of these would be sufficient in isolation, and it is only through 
developing an analysis that contrasts these two approaches that we get a full sense of 
what movement re-education does and is about. 
I have argued that while analysing texts can be an appropriate way of gaining 
information about discourses, knowledge of embodiment is best gained through 
embodied experience, which a research method such as participant observation can 
provide. I have further argued that interviews can provide some information about 
both embodiment and discourse, depending on the kinds of questions that are asked. 
Finally, I have suggested that ethical concerns differ between text -based discourse 
analysis and research methods that involve live human participants, and obviously our 
responsibilities to texts are not the same as our responsibilities to people. 
Researching embodied discourse in this way requires attention to both embodied and 
discursive data, and the interplay between them. It does not simplify either, nor hold 
that they can be elided, that discourse and embodiment are the same. To the contrary, 
there are often marked differences between discourses and embodied practice. I will 
demonstrate this in the following two chapters on the basis of a discourse analysis of 
the writings of these techniques' founders and ethnographic data on studying 
Alexander Technique. 
10 This practice was pioneered by feminist researchers, and includes Coward's (1989) text on 
alternative health, discussed in the previous chapter, which seems to be a contribution in this vein. 
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Chapter 5 
Movement Re-education as Ethical Self-Formation: A 
Discourse Analysis 
Introduction 
As I suggested in Chapters 3 and 4, Foucault's analysis of `techniques of the self' 
(1985; 1986) can be productively applied to movement re-education. In this chapter, I 
will show how such an analysis can be undertaken. In doing so, I will demonstrate 
that the aspects of techniques of the self used by Foucault in his work on sexuality in 
ancient Greece and Rome, which, as I described in Chapter Three, include ethical 
substance, modes of subjection, ethical practices, and telo s, are equally relevant to 
movement re-education. The purpose of this chapter is ultimately to show how 
movement re-education functions as a type of ethical self-formation, fashioning the 
self in particular ways. Through this analysis, the development of a theory of body 
wisdom in movement re-education will be traced. 
The chapter draws upon the writings of the founders of the movement re-education 
techniques studied here, as set out in Chapter One: Alexander's books Man's Supreme 
Inheritance (1910); Constructive Conscious Control of the Individual (1987 [1923]); 
The Use of the Self (1985 [1932]); and The Universal Constant in Living (2000 
[1941]); Pilates' Your Health (1998 [1934]) and Return to Life Through Contrology 
(2000 (1945]), Feldenkrais' Body and Mature Behavior (1949); Body Awareness as 
Healing Therapy (1993 [1977]), and the introduction to The Elusive Obvious (in 
Johnson, 1995); Rolf's Rolling: The Integration of Human Structures (1977) and 
Rolfing and Physical Reality (1990 [1978]), and Bonnie B ainbridge Cohen's Sensing, 
Feeling, andAction (1993). While I have occasionally used texts on these techniques 
which are written by others to illuminate particular points, or for more contemporary 
interpretations, I have made no systematic attempt to study this literature. This is not 
because I believe the founders are the only authentic interpreters of the techniques, 
but because I am interested the broader socio-historical context, and the majority of 
secondary literature available is published too recently to give a sense how the 
techniques originally explained themselves. A sense of the `official' discourse 
surrounding the techniques is also useful. Reading these texts is often an important 
part of becoming a teacher of one of these techniques, and most interviewees who 
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were teachers indicated a strong familiarity with them. A third, pragmatic, reason for 
focussing on the texts of the founders is the limitation of space, as discourse analysis 
is only one component of my research project. 
This chapter will build on the histories set out in Chapter Two, where I discussed 
aspects of body wisdom in relation to dance and physical culture, posture, eugenics, 
and alternative health. Parallels with these fields will be apparent in the ways in 
which these techniques approach the relation between the body and nature and rely 
upon particular theories of degeneration. Later techniques such as Feldenkrais and 
Rolfing move toward psychologising bodily comportment, as Vigarello (2001) 
suggested in relation to postural pedagogy in the mid-twentieth century. Parallels are 
also apparent between Body Mind Centering's focus on adaptability and body 
systems, and Martin's (1994) work on the flexible immune system. 
To demonstrate the differences between the five forms cf movement re-education 
studied here, I will begin by outlining their practices and how these become a form of 
ethical work on the self. It is in these predominantly physical practices that the 
techniques are most different from one another. For example, in Alexander 
Technique, the work involves standing in front of a mirror, sitting, walking, and doing 
`table work' with the guidance of a teacher, whereas in Pilates, it is a series of set 
exercises on mats or machines. In Rolfing, on the other hand, it is a set of ten or more 
lessons with a `Rolfer' who does something similar to deep massage, intended to 
stretch muscular fascia. The forms of ethical work Foucault identifies, including self- 
evaluation through writing and confession, are nowhere to be found. This is not to 
indicate that the physical work done in movement re-education lacks an ethical, self- 
forming component, for as I stated earlier, the techniques rely upon a conception of 
body and mind as inextricably linked. Further, movement re-education is a kind of 
work aimed at self-knowledge, and `knowing oneself is a maxim that appears 
repeatedly in these texts. As such it is a kind of ethical quest. 
The holism that makes these physical practices into ethical work is a key component 
of their ethical substance. The ethical substance involved in movement re-education 
is the comportment of the body, although only in so far as the maxim mens sana in 
corpore sano, translated as `a sane mind in a healthy body' or `a sound mind in a 
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sound body' is uphe ld. In other words, it is only because mind and body are 
perceived as intimately connected that movement re-education can work with the 
body as an ethical substance. In fact, in the work of Alexander (1910; 1985 [1923]; 
1932; 2000 [1941]) and Pilates (1998 [1934]; 1945), the word `body' is generally 
avoided. Alexander preferred to refer to the `use of the self (1985 [1932]), and more 
recently, Cohen has suggested the term `body/mind' (1993: 1) to indicate that the two 
are inseparable. Throughout this text I have used `body/self to indicate that the self 
being written about is an embodied one. 
The mode of subjection and relevant truth of all these techniques is ultimately nature, 
particularly in relation to evolution. Evolution is taken as a self-evident truth, but it is 
also given a moral weight, and this weight is associated with its naturalness, which is 
idealised as pure and uncorrupted. However, this very appeal to `naturalness' calls 
the natural into question, implying that nature can be interfered with, and is not a 
given but something to be worked upon. In Alexander Technique, Pilates, and 
Rolfing, authority is also drawn from the eugenics movement and early to mid- 
twentieth century theories of racial degeneration. This also appears as a minor theme 
in Feldenkrais but is eliminated entirely in Body-Mind Centering, which relies instead 
on evolution and nature as authorities. Founders of these techniques themselves also 
become modes of subjection, authorities whose interpretations are given particular 
weight because they appear to have independently discovered certain universal bodily 
truths. 
The telos of movement re-education techniques is body awareness, which in later 
techniques develops into body wisdom. Developing an awareness of body/self in the 
former case, or a body that is itself aware in the latter, is seen as promoting health and 
well-being. However, this takes different forms. In Alexander Technique, body/self 
awareness is developed through conscious control of the self, whereas in Feldenkrais, 
Rolfing, and Body-Mind Centering, the education of the nervous system (and in the 
latter case, other systems of the body) overtakes the need to make awareness 
permanently conscious. While some notion of a natural body underlies all these 
techniques, what the natural body is and does varies between them. 
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This chapter will not only develop a genealogy of movement re-education as a 
particular kind of ethical self-formation, but will also show how various shifts have 
occurred, shifts which indicate social and historical influences on the developments of 
these techniques which are not simply a function of the biographies of their founders. 
These biographies are certainly relevant to the practices of movement re-education, as 
discussed in Chapter One, but this chapter will be particularly concerned to relate 
movement re-education to its socio-historical context, developed in Chapter Two. 
Physical Practices as Ethical Work: Holism and Knowing Oneself 
The physical practices involved in movement re-education form the ethical work 
undertaken, in the sense that these practices shape the selves of clients or pupils and 
not simply their bodies. However, the nature of these practices is difficult to glean 
from reading the founder's texts on the subject Alexander's The Use of the Self 
(1932) and Feldenkrais' Body Awareness as Healing Therapy (1993 [1977]) give case 
studies of clients, as does Cohen's book Sensing Feeling and A ction (1993). Pilates' 
second book, Return to Life through Contrology, is unusual in that it contains how-to 
instructions for all thirty-four of his mat exercises, and is made more unusual by the 
fact the photographs which accompany them are of Pilates himself at the age of sixty, 
performing these exercises in his underwear. Elsewhere, Rolf and her writing 
assistant Rosemary Feitis comment that they have avoided giving `hints to those who 
would enjoy a little home experimentation' because 
The technique of Structural Integration is powerful, and the resultant changes are far - 
reaching. As practitioners, we do not aim for change alone; we wish to induce change 
toward balance. Change without balance can be destructive. Experience has taught us 
that recognition of balance and understanding its many ramifications are subtle arts and 
long-term disciplines. Balance in the body does not reveal itself to the dilettante; it is a 
matter of intuition, experience, knowledge, and study. (1977: 11-12) 
This is echoed by Alexander, (1987 [1923]: 77), who also notes the difficulty of 
expressing these practices in words, and suggests that sometimes the aid of a teacher 
is necessary: 
Some... have rated me quite severely because, as they put it, they are not able to teach 
themselves from what I have written in all my books. Yet they must be well aware that, 
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in spite of all the textbooks on the subjects, many people are unable to teach themselves 
to drive a car, play golf, ski, or even to master such comparatively simple subjects as 
geography, history and arithmetic, without the aid of a teacher. (1985 [1932]: 17) 
As a result of this lack of textual evidence about physical practices, this section will 
summarise what little is written about each practice, and will then go on to examine 
the ethical injunction `know oneself in the context of movement re-education, as a 
key aspect of what these practices seek to develop. More detailed descriptions of the 
contemporary practices of Alexander Technique and Pilates will be put forward in 
Chapter Six. 
Alexander's writings make it clear that the development of `conscious control' over 
psycho-physical functions is a key aspect of the ethical work to be done. The 
practical intentions of Alexander Technique are the development of conscious control, 
which is formed by `inhibiting' the initial response to performing an action, and 
giving considered attention to how to do it with proper `Use' of the self. Alexander 
developed this into a five step process which he outlines as: 1) inhibiting the initial 
urge to act, 2) projecting the best directions for how to do so, 3) continuing to project 
them until he believed he was sufficiently ready to do so in practice, 4) while still 
doing this, reconsidering whether he still wanted to act, and from there making a new 
decision, 5) either to do so, to change and perform another action, or to discontinue 
the action completely (Alexander, 1985: 36). 
A 1919 article in Atlantic Monthly described early lessons with F. M. Alexander as 
follows: 
You are first shown your general incompetence to disassociate and control your 
movements; then you are given certain fundamental orders in regard to the relaxing 
of the neck, the position of the head, the lengthening of the body and broadening of 
the back... Mr Alexander then proceeds literally to remodel the patient, first sitting 
and then in a standing posture. He devotes his chief attention to the neck, lower 
thorax, and abdomen, but sees to it that one's legs are properly relaxed. By 
pressing, pushing, pulling, stretching, and readjusting- all quite gently and 
persuasively- he brings you back into shape, rising now and then to take a look at 
you from a distance, as a sculptor might view the progress of his work. (Robinson, 
1919: 7) 
120 
Pilates' practical work is very different from Alexander's method. The Pilates 
method may be learned as a set of matwork exercises or through work on 
strengthening machines, which he discovered, apparently, when building similar 
makeshift equipment from springs and beds whilst working as a hospital orderly with 
non-ambulatory patients during the latter part of World War I (Siler, 2000: 2). His 
matwork exercises, of which there are thirty-four, are most commonly practised by 
students of Pilates because they can be learned in larger classes, whereas the use of 
the machines requires individual supervision. As I mentioned earlier, Pilates sets out 
these thirty-four exercises in his book Return to Life Through Contrology (2000 
[1945]). The exercises are carried out on the floor, and target the abdominal muscles 
and spine. Breath is used as a guide, with certain movements performed on an 
inhalation, and others on an exhalation. The book sets out these exercises in steps, 
with four photographs accompanying each exercise to guide the reader through the 
process. Many contemporary Pilates books use a similar format, although it should be 
noted that they often modify these exercises somewhat for beginners, or show varying 
levels of difficulty, something Pilates does not do (see Siler, 2000; Kelly, 2001, 
among others). This is indicative of a relaxation in the bodily movement involved in 
Pilates and also suggests his own work has been reinterpreted for a contemporary 
context 11, as I will discuss in the next chapters. 
As indicated in the quote above, Rolfs writings give little indication of what is 
involved in the practice of Structural Integration, or Rolling, as it is commonly called. 
Rolling is unique in the sphere of movement re-education techniques (although not 
among bodywork techniques more generally, which often include massage-based 
therapies) in that it involves a great deal of hands-on manipulation of muscles and 
joints by the Rolfer. Rolf believed that the myofascia- fibres which join muscle to 
bone- develop tensions and get `stuck', leading to muscles with persistent knots or 
stiffness. Her goal was to improve the tone of the fascia, which would then release 
the muscles and improve the body's ability to hold itself well. She describes Rolfers 
11 Pilates method has also had the most difficulty with establishing heirs to the tradition, and there was 
a court case in 2000 over the trademarking of the name Pilates, in which it was ruled that it referred to 
a form of exercise and could not be owned. See www. pilates cancel. com for a more detailed account 
of this. 
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as removing pins from clothing (Rolf, 1990 [1978]: 194), indicating that once the 
`pins' (blocks in the fascia) are removed, the body will `hang' normally. This is 
achieved by what she refers to as `processing'. Rolf never describes this process 
itself, although it is clear that it consists of ten basic sessions of hands-on bodywork, 
with careful examination of posture and photographs taken before and after the ten 
sessions. Many of these photos are printed in Rolfing; The Integration of Human 
Structures (1977). 
According to the website of the Rolf Institute (www. rolf. org), one of the major sites 
for training in Rolfmg, the `ten series' can be divided into three units, all of which 
work with soft tissue in an unspecified way which clearly involves hands-on 
manipulation. The first three `sleeve' sessions loosen and balance outer layers of 
connective tissue or fascia, working on the ribs, lower leg and foot, hamstrings and 
side of the body, and are followed by four `core' sessions which work on deep 
postural support and `inner' layers of the fascia, with attention on the inner leg, pelvic 
floor and abdomen, hips, spine, head and neck. Three final `integrative' sessions 
address middle layers of the fascia and might focus on the upper body and lower 
body, movements in major joints, and ways of sitting 
(www. rolf. org/about/faq/g4. html). 
For Rolf, `Structure is behavior' (1977: 31). In other words, `behavior is expressed 
through the musculoskeletal system. All function is an expression of structure and 
form and correlates directly with material structure. A man crying the blues is in 
reality bewailing his structural limitations and failures' (1977: 17). She continues 
poetically: `As fascial tone improves, individual muscles glide over one another and 
the flesh- no longer "too, too solid"-- reminds the searching forgers of layers of silk 
that glide on one another with a suggestion of opulence' (1977: 35). 
Feldenkrais claims to have no set physical programme, but invents practices as he 
goes along. In Body Awareness as Healing Therapy: The Case of Nora, he describes 
one particular case of a woman who had suffered a stroke, whom he helped using 
methods which varied from physical manipulation to exercises involving focussing 
the eyes on a straw held between the teeth, to improve vision. According to his 
follower Mia Segal, his methods tended to involve physical manipulation, as well as a 
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variety of `devices and positions', including beds, chairs, rollers, sitting, and kneeling 
(in Hanna, 1995: 116). Feldenkrais attempted to make changes to the way people 
used their bodies through mild physical manipulation and direction in physical 
activities, with a focus on creating an awareness of physicality. His technique is 
taught either through one -to-one lessons, called Functional Integration, which involve 
work on a table, or in larger classes labelled Awareness Through Movement. 
The practice of Body-Mind Centering involves `identifying, articulating, 
differentiating, and integrating the various tissues within the body, discovering the 
qualities they contribute to one's movement, how they have evolved in one's 
development process, and the role they play in the expression of mind' (Cohen, 1993: 
1). Alignment itself is not the purpose, Cohen claims, but rather a `continual dialogue 
between awareness and action' (1). Practically, this is accomplished in group or 
individual sessions which move participants through various `stages of evolution' 
including cellular breathing, navel radiation (where limbs are perceived as extending 
from the navel or centre as they do for a starfish), and homolateral and contralateral 
push/reach patterns. Imagery is important, sessions may also work through the 
`systems' of the body: the skeletal system, ligamentous system, muscular system, 
organs system, endocrine system, nervous system, fluid system, fascial system, fat, 
and skin (1993: 2-4). Each of these `systems' is associated with particular emotional 
and physical qualities; for example, because the organs carry the functions vital for 
survival, they provide us with a sense of volume, full-bodiedness, and authenticity, 
and are the natural habitats of our emotions and memories of reactions to our personal 
histories (1993: 3). Moving from the organ system would then have a particular `full- 
bodied' style that would be different to movement initiated from the nervous system, 
for example. Particular kinds of movement are related to these various systems, and a 
weakness in embodying or practising a particular kind of movement indicates a 
weakness in the physical and/or emotional area related to that system or that part of 
the system. The goal of BMC work is to open up new possibilities for expression. 
Cohen claims 
I think the problem is that we see the imbalance as a weakness when actually it's a 
strength. What we are strong in we do all the time, so that we over-fatigue that system. 
In doing this kind of work we don't all end up being equal in every system; we each 
end up being, how do you say, more fully ourselves. (1993: 12) 
123 
This desire for a balance in bodily systems is interesting in a socio-historical context 
in relation to the idea of flexibility in systems discussed by Martin (1994). Cohen's 
conception of this balance as bringing us to a state in which we are `more fully 
ourselves' is also significant because it emphasises the contradiction underlying 
movement re-education techniques, namely that we require training to become `more 
fully ourselves; ' more `natural' and authentic. 
Despite some similarities with the physical culture movement described in Chapter 
Two, most of the movement re-educators discussed here disliked traditional physbal 
education and sought to distance themselves from it. Rolf writes disdainfully of the 
muscle-bound body: `A more experienced critic recognizes this type as rigid, limited 
in outlook, preoccupied with himself and his physical beauty, lacking in perception 
and sensitivity, and, even more damning, unable to do a really good day's work in 
either a mental or physical field' (Rolf, 1977: 24). Feldenkrais noted that `Activity 
strictly localised to a small number of motor cells will produce inhibitory phenomem 
and finally loss of reactivity' (1949: 30). This is similar to Cohen's comment about 
over-fatiguing particular systems, which creates imbalances. As early as 1910, 
Alexander argued that physical culture exercises were not desirable because they did 
not help muscles regain their `natural function' and led to strife within the self (1910: 
15). Pilates appears to have been alone in his support for physical culture, if only his 
own brand of it (1998 [1934]: 11). Photographs of movement re-educators confirm 
that he was also alone in sporting the very muscular and toned body derided by Rolf 
above. While Pilates preferred to think of his work as a comprehensive system of 
health promotion, the exercises he sets out in Return to Life Through Contrology 
focus much more on strength training than the work of any of the other movement re- 
educators discussed here. 
The physical practices of movement re-education do ethical work in so far as they are 
tied to holistic conceptions of the self or the body/mind relationship. It is because 
they influence behaviour, in the words of Rolf and Feldenkrais, that they do more 
than physically shape bodies but also shape selves. Part of this shaping of the self 
involves knowing oneself, something Foucault (1988) calls the `Delphic maxim' 
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because it was used in consulting the Greek oracle. Discussing how knowing oneself 
has overtaken another Greek principle, the care of the self, he comments: 
Without doubt, our philosophical tradition has overemphasized the latter [know 
yourself] and forgotten the former [take care of yourself. ] The Delphic principle was 
not an abstract one concerning life; it was technical advice, a rule to be observed for the 
consultation of the oracle... In Greek and Roman texts, the injunction of having to 
know oneself was always associated with the other principle of care of the self, and it 
was that need to care for oneself that brought the Delphic maxim into operation. 
(Foucault, 1997: 226) 
There are a number of specific references to the maxim of knowing oneself in the 
writings of the movement re-educators. Pilates decries the state of present civilisation 
based on its lack of knowledge of the self. `Millions upon millions live from the 
cradle to the grave without really knowing themselves and without really knowing 
what it is all about. If they are familiar with the Greek adage, "know thyself', it is not 
practically applied to themselves' (Pilates, 1998 [1934]: 27). 
Cohen phrases it differently, although she too sees self-knowledge as the key to 
enlightenment. She writes that `it seems that any technique or philosophy ultimately 
comes back to the axiom: Know thyself. We all come to a common ground, whatever 
our path, if we follow it far enough'. (Cohen, 1993: 11) 
Alexander has a slightly different interpretation: 
"Man, know thyself' is an old axiom, but in my opinion the more fundamental one is 
"Man, know thy needs. " Of course, it may be contended that he who knows himself 
knows his needs, and that to know one's needs implies knowing oneself, but th e 
contention does not apply to that great majority of human beings whose sensory 
appreciation is unreliable. (Alexander, 1987 [1923]: 150) 
Feldenkrais and Rolf are less direct about the importance of knowing oneself, but 
their writings too indicate the need for self-awareness. Rolf explains how her book 
will help people to gain knowledge about the body/self and its function, claiming in 
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Rolling: The Integration of Human Structures that `the purpose of this book is to 
unveil, for those who wish to see, the pattern underlying the random human body, to 
help them understand that the random body is deviant, how it became aberrated, and 
why more joyous function can result from more appropriate form' (1977: 16). 
Feldenkrais argues that we seem to know so much but are unable to apply it (1949: 
10) and that this is due to ignorance and abstractions that are `generalised and 
temporarily exaggerated... We know, in fact, very little about what life is, what is 
important and what is not' (1949: 12). 
However, what does it mean to know oneself in the context of movement re-education 
techniques? What kind of self is to be known, and what benefits will self-knowledge 
bring? In order to understand these elements, other aspects of movement re-education 
need to be examined. In the next section, I will discuss the body/self as a substance to 
be worked upon in movement re-education, and further develop the theory that holism 
is required in order for movement re-education to be a form of ethical self-formation. 
Ethical Substance: Body/Self and Mens Sana In Corpore Sano 
Movement re-education treats the body as an ethical substance to be worked upon. 
However, the body that is worked upon is what we might term a 'body/self' n the 
sense that it is integrally bound up with the mind and psyche, although in different 
ways for different techniques. While for Alexander, working in the early 1900s, 
`constructive conscious control' of the self and body at all times seemed desirable, for 
Rolf, Feldenkrais, and Cohen who were writing from the 1950s onward, the nervous 
system and the cultivation of a muscular memory took over the need for conscious 
awareness. 
As I showed in Chapter Two, Vigarello (2001) argues that postural concerns became 
attached to a psychology of the body by the middle of the twentieth century, and this 
is clear in these latter forms of movement re-education. Rolf, for example, admires 
psychosomatics as an area where holism or `monism', as she calls it, has its modem 
incarnation (1977: 21), and Feldenkrais (1949) refers to Pavlov's work in 
behaviourism repeatedly, supporting his theories of conditioning the nervous system. 
He does, however, qualify that Pavlov's research cannot be extended from animals to 
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humans easily `because the nervous system of man is, in respect of learning, a more 
perfect and more varied instrument' (Feldenkrais, 1949: 42). In his first book, 
Alexander refers to psychology as a science from which `we hope so much', but 
which is `still in its infancy' and so cannot provide the answers he seeks (1910: 29). 
However, it was specifically through the body (and thus the self) that movement re- 
educators sought to change the psyche. 
Rolf, for example, suggests that many patients of psychotherapy have basically 
physical problems. She outlines the case of `Johnny', a hypothetical boy who roller- 
skates down the stairs and falls, breaking no bones but twisting his pelvis. As doctors 
cannot locate a problem physiologically, they call the problem psychosomatic and 
Johnny is sent to a therapist: `The psychiatrist will call him insecure, and that's 
precisely what he is. For when your two legs are not properly under your body, you 
are insecure, and you'll act like it and feel like it' (1977: 23). 
Feldenkrais too is relatively behaviourist in his orientation: 
With a proper technique it is possible to analyse a personality solely by a study of his 
muscular behaviour, in the same way, and with the same results as by an analysis of his 
mental processes alone... By dropping the arbitrary assumption that mental processes 
alone are sufficient to give a full account of the personality, and by taking somatic 
processes into account, many difficulties are removed. (Feldenkrais, 1949: 35) 
However, it is not my intention to provide an exhaustive history of movement re- 
education's relationship to psychology, despite its recurrence as a marginal theme in 
these discourses. I seek to avoid psychologising the techniques themselves, which are 
not `body therapies' in the way of bioenergetics or biodynamics. I refer to 
psychology here to demonstrate the differences between techniques in the conception 
of the mind-body relationship. 
Movement re-educators oppose Cartesian dualism, albeit with different ideas of how 
the mind-body relationship should be reconceived. All, however, are convinced that 
this relationship is lacking in contemporary Western societies. Rolf laments: 
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What, then, has become of the elegant wholeness of monism, originated by the Aryans 
and stated in its most superficial terms by the Romans: as "a sound mind in a sound 
body"? The true dimension and harmony of monism, as well as its apparent 
boundaries, can be explored as the more orderly physical body offered by Structural 
Integration emerges. (Rolf, 1977: 287) 
Rolf attributes mens sana in corpore sano to a vague Indo-European `Aryan' group. 
She attempts here to indicate that monism or holism is an ancient wisdom which has 
been lost and could be regained, much like body wisdom itself. She further suggests 
that relinquishing monism has caused us to forfeit responsibility for our actions. Her 
conception of personal responsibility for health does suggest a link with Coward's 
(1989) concerns that such theories fit into neo-liberal governance strategies which 
increasingly shift responsibility to the individual and ignore the broader social causes 
of poor health, as I discussed in Chapter Two. 
Monistic ideas have come to the forefront repeatedly in many cultures, but invariably 
have receded again in deference to dualistic concepts of body and soul. Since it locates 
the origin of the problem outside its victim, the logic of dualism is much simple and 
more appealing, in that it implies diminished personal responsibility. In dualistic 
thinking, the ills and accidents of our bodies may be blamed on circumstance, on a god 
(vengeful or otherwise), or at least on a deus ex machina (colds are the result of germs). 
Monism permits us no such escape; here, the cause of the problem lies within the 
problem itself. (Rolf, 1977: 23) 
Holism in regard to mens sana in corpore sano is a theme in the writings of the other 
movement re-educators as well. Pilates appeals to the authority of the ancients by 
claiming that `Many in the ancient world wisely adopted as their own the Latin motto, 
mens sana in corpore sano'(Pilates, 2000 [1945]: 63), and Alexander writes: `In the 
mind of man lies the secret of his ability to resist, to conquer and finally to govern the 
circumstances of his life, and only by the discovery of that secret will he ever be able 
to realize completely the perfect condition of mens sana in corpore sano' (Alexander, 
1910: 11). 
Cohen conceptualises the body-mind relationship thus: 
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There is something in nature that forms patterns. We, as part of nature, also form 
patterns. The mind is like the wind and the body like the sand; if you want to know 
how the wind is blowing, you can look at the sand. Our body moves as our mind 
moves. The qualities of any movement are a manifestation of how mind is expressing 
itself through the body at that moment. (Cohen, 1993: 1) 
Despite the appeal by writers such as Rolf, Alexander and Pilates to the wisdom and 
authority of the ancient world, something which Rolf argues has `come to the 
forefront repeatedly' and then been lost, there is no clear point at which holism 
disappeared in Western culture. Haley's (1978) work, as I mentioned above, can 
provide a context for the discussions of mens sana in corpore sano in Pilates' and 
Alexander's writings. Well before the Victorian era, too, John Locke's Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education began with the following passage: 
A Sound mind in a sound Body, is a short, but full Description of a happy State in this 
World. He that has these two, has little more to wish for, and he that wants either of 
them, will be but little the better for anything else. Men's Happiness or Misery is most 
part of their own making. He, whose Mind directs not wisely, will never take the right 
Way; and he, whose Body is crazy and feeble, will never be able to advance in it. 
(Locke, 1898 [1692]: 1) 
However, while all the movement re-education techniques discussed here have some 
vision of holism and the body/mind relationship, the relationship does differ, 
particularly in relation to the degree of conscious control required. While Pilates 
makes mention of conscious control (1998 [1934]: 20), he says little about what it 
would involve. The physical practices of Pilates do however require mental 
application because of the focus on timing in relation to the inhalation and exhalation 
of breath. It is not clear in Pilates' writings whether he intended that this should 
always be at the forefront of consciousness. It is however a somewhat different 
application of the idea of conscious control from Alexander, for whom it was so 
central that his second book was titled Constructive Conscious Control of the 
Individual. For Alexander, everyday movements must always be conscious. His 
image of evolution, which I shall discuss in the next section, is one in which there was 
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a prehistoric `Man' 12 who had instincts which suited his needs and were adapted to 
his environment. However, Man's consciousness developed out of step with his 
environment, which became increasingly complex. Accordingly, Alexander feels that 
people must be taught how to apply their conscious awareness to the use of 
themselves in order for psycho-physical unity to truly be obtained and to prevent 
degeneration of the human race (Alexander, 1987 [1923]). Thus, he feels that all 
movement of the body should be a result of the series of conscious choices described 
above. 
Rolf, as I have already said, is convinced that bodily structure leads to behaviour. 
Feldenkrais, also referring to behaviour rather than consciousness, seeks to work on 
developing maturity and mature behaviour in his method. He also reacts against 
Alexander's theory of conscious control, stating that its constant maintenance is 
abnormal (1949: 126). Rolf conceives of the body/self as something that can learn 
proper alignment through manipulation of the muscular fascia, and as I have said, is 
the least movement-oriented of the five. Feldenkrais' emphasis on the nervous 
system in his writings also emphasises his belief that the body can be educated 
without making conscious awareness a permanent facet of existence. While Cohen 
mentions the nervous system, she also moves beyond it by envisioning the body as 
made up of a variety of systems, all of which are capable of learning and expressing 
qualities of `mind'. 
In the next three chapters, I will explore the implications these theories have for the 
practices of movement re -education. What is important for my discussion here is to 
note that for these latter three movement re-educators, the body is not something to be 
consciously controlled, but something which it is itself expected to learn and to know. 
While all five movement re-education techniques are united in working on the 
body/self as an ethical substance through a theory of holism, their visions of the 
body/mind relationship differ markedly. This can be traced to the rise of psychology 
in posture and movement education, as I discussed in Chapter Two through the work 
of Vigarello (2001). As the body is psychologised, it becomes representative in itself 
of particular states of mind and ways of thinking or feeling. This relationship is in no 
12 Throughout I have used 'Man' and 'his' in a manner consistent with that of the founders themselves, 
rather than attempting to make them gender-neutral. 
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way metaphorical; for Rolf, Feldenkrais, and Cohen, the body is quite literally what 
its shape represents. The seat of the soul, as Rolf suggests (1977), is physiological. 
However, the reasons for movement re-education's desire to re-educate the body/self 
are not clear simply from an analysis of how the mind/body relationship is conceived. 
In the next section, I will address the types of authority which are appealed to by the 
founders of movement re-education to give their practices weight. 
Nature and Evolution as Modes of Subjection 
Techniques of the self require an authority to give them truth-value. Foucault calls 
this the mode ofsubjection. There are several modes of subjection at work within 
movement re-education techniques: the appeal to nature, the role of evolution, and to 
a lesser extent the place of the founders themselves as authorities. Together, these 
modes of subjection support the `truth' of the need for re-education of the body/self. 
Against the background of the discussions of the natural body and eugenics in 
Chapter Two, I will show how movement re-educators have drawn on these concepts 
to support their work. 
Movement `re-education' implies a re-learning, and the claims that these techniques 
can restore the body to some way of being in which we are `more fully ourselves' 
(Cohen, 1993) indicates that an origin story is at work in these discourses, where 
something that was once possessed has been lost. Alexander, for example, makes it 
very clear that his goal is re-education, and that his technique is helping to reinstate 
something: 
Re-education means a gradual restoration of something that has been previously 
experienced, something which we have been educated in, but for some reason have lost, 
as for instance when a person whose use of self has been gradually interfered with over 
a period of years manifests, as time goes on, more and more harmful effects of this 
interference with his general use and functioning. Re-education is not a process of 
adding something, but of restoring something. It was to meet the need of restoring 
actual conditions of use and functioning which had been previously experienced and 
afterwards lost that my technique for the re-education of the use of the self was 
evolved. (Alexander, 2000 [1941]: 144-5, italics in original) 
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Underlying the idea of re-education in the founders' writings is a theory of the natural 
body. This natural body relies heavily upon a conception of nature and society as 
separable, with socialisation processes layered on top of an essentially natural body. 
Yet as I argued in Chapter One, it is important to look at the kinds of arguments being 
made around the natural body and the characteristics attributed to it. The examples of 
apparently `natural' bodies which are used as examples by the founders of movement 
re-education are thus instructive. 
These examples can be divided into four general categories, which I have termed 
`beasts, babes, savages, and Greeks'. As these terms indicate, they include a) animals 
in the wild that have not been corrupted by civilisation, b) very young children who 
are as yet unformed by society, c) `savages' or `primitive' people at a lower level of 
evolution than `Western man', and, less frequently, d) the Ancient Greeks, who are 
seen to represent a pinnacle of civilisation. Below, I shall examine each of these 
examples in detail and show how they contribute to a theory of a natural, pre-civilised 
body which is at work in movement re-education. 
Beasts, Babes, Savages, Greeks 
Movement re-education's founders frequently appeal to animal behaviour as an 
example of how humans should live. Pilates in particular admired animals' freedom 
of movement, claiming that they display `perfection of physical form, strength, grace, 
agility, endurance, health and longevity' (1934: 30), despite, or perhaps because of, 
the fact that they do not do `exercise' in the way that humans do. He felt that this was 
due to instinct: `Is it not true that animals in their natural state and in their natural 
habitat exercise naturally as a matter of course? Do animals understand natural laws 
and govern themselves accordingly? The answer is "yes" because instinct unerringly 
guides all living creatures including man himself' (Pilates, 1998 [1934]: 30). Further, 
he suggests, animal mothers are also guided by this `unerring instinct' and treat their 
babies much better and more naturally than do human mothers (31). Cohen also looks 
to animals for models of the natural, but in her work they embody developmental 
movement patterns. For example, she refers to amoebas, which exemplify `cellular 
breathing', the most basic form of movement; starfish, which demonstrate 'navel 
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radiation; ' and frogs, which show homologous movement (moving both arms or both 
legs together). In her work, attempting to embody the qualities of animals by 
imagining oneself as that animal can help participants understand these developmental 
movement patterns. Cohen is also interested in the evolutionary complexity of these 
animals, and the movement patterns wih which they are associated, in relation to 
human movement patterns. She makes a link between a foetus and an amoeba, who 
do `cellular breathing', while a very young baby may only reach with its arms and 
legs, like a starfish, with limb movement organised around a central `navel'. 
On the relation between humans and animals, Feldenkrais comments that `at birth the 
differences of response of the human child are on the whole comparable with those of 
other animals. Gradually differentiation takes place eben in what seem to be quite 
similar conditions' (1949: 1). In all of these models of animals as examples of the 
natural, they are seen to be so because they are outside civilisation and society. 
However, some animals have been adopted by humans for domestic use, which raises 
questions about their naturalness. Some contemporary Alexander Technique teachers 
have raised the issue of giving lessons to domesticated animals: in an online article, 
Alexander teacher Robert Rickover claims `I have given what I consider a very good 
lesson to a frightened puppy and I've done some work with domestic cats. I once tried 
to help a cow lengthen and widen but she immediately sat down, nearly crushing my 
legs' (Rickover, 2002). There is however a general sense amongst move merit re- 
education's founders that animals have natural bodies, and that these possess qualities 
which are desirable in humans. Below, I shall discuss how and why these qualities 
are sought. 
Babies and small children are also perceived to be models of the natural body. 
Cohen's Sensing, Feeling and Action, which has many images of nature in the form of 
trees and lightning storms, also includes drawings and photographs of babies, on 
whom she does something called `patterning' (as opposed to the `re-patterning' work 
done on adults in which they explore unfamiliar movement patterns). She even 
claims to be able to work with a foetus in utero by getting a pregnant woman to 
`initiate movement from the womb' (1993: 12). Her work on babies indicates a belief 
that difficulties with `natural' movement patterns can arise at any time, although the 
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images in Sensing, Feeling and Action are primarily of babies with good body use, as 
a demonstration of what such movements `should' look like. 
Alexander (1910: 102-4) and Pilates (1934: 27-31) also discuss children's inclinations 
with regard to food and behaviour to demonstrate their naturalness. Pilates writes with 
regard to the most desirable sitting position, `it is suggested that one look around and 
watch the position that children naturally assume when they are left alone. Does one 
naturally assume uncomfortable positions? Assuredly not' (1934: 35). It is worth 
noting that he also identifies this squatting position as `savage'. 
Children are contrasted with thos e who apparently corrupt their natural state: their 
mothers. Alexander writes of `unthinking mothers' who teach their children to eat by 
sweetening milk, thereby making their children slaves to the sense of taste and 
instating the development of bad habits. `Women are not trained for the sphere of 
motherhood, do not give these matters the thought and attention they deserve, and 
hence they do not understand the most elementary principles concerning the future 
welfare of their offspring in such matters as feeding and sense guidance' (1910: 104). 
Pilates is equally critical of mothers, again comparing them unfavourably with 
animals. Animal mothers, he claims, encourage their offspring to play and force the 
lazy ones to move, which is necessary for their health. On the other hand, among 
humans 
The fond mothers literally stuff their offsprings' stomachs with food to overflowing 
capacity, and then "pack" their tender bodies in bandages after first (wholly 
unintentionally and solely through ignorance or misinformation on the subject) cruelly 
locking the joints of their hips and knees. In order to pacify their resulting crying 
protests against this rather inhuman treatment, the mother next proceeds to rock the 
child to sleep. Is it a natural sleep they thus get? No, the little innocents are either 
nauseated or half unconscious or both when they finally fall asleep from mere 
exhaustion. (1998 [1934]: 31) 
Both Rolf and Feldenkrais also suggest that children have natural bodies, although 
their theories tend to focus on psychology and habit. Children may exhibit better 
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form and function, but this is because they have not yet developed the psycho- 
physical hang-ups which adults exhibit. Parental influence is again crucial; Rolf 
(1977) shows numerous photographs cf similar physical structure and deficiency in 
parent and child, and Feldenkrais points out that `We cannot ignore the fact that some 
adult guides our early steps. We are dependent on the adult for longer than any 
animal and more absolutely so. Dependence is the main weapon or instrument of 
teaching' (1949: 150). 
Unlike classical dualistic distinctions that associated women with nature, both Pilates 
and Alexander see women as permeated by civilisation, lacking the skills to 
`naturally' know what is good for their children. Rolf and Feldenkrais have 
somewhat different concerns about the nature of women, and each devotes a chapter 
to the study of women's sexual difficulties with the assertion that they can help them 
overcome frigidity and similar problems. They write little about women's roles as 
mothers and their references to the influences of parenting are less gendered. What is 
critical here, however, is the assumption that women are not natural, whereas children 
are. In Chapter Seven I will show through an analysis of interview data that models 
of children as natural are still in common use among contemporary movement re - 
educators. That chapter will also explore some of the difficulties with viewing 
children as natural. 
A third model of the natural in these texts, although one used only by Pilates and 
Alexander, is that of the `savage'. For them, the term refers to people of non-Western 
cultures, but it is not necessarily clear, for example, whether they consider people 
from `the Orient' to be savage or whether this is mainly a designation referring to 
tribal peoples from Africa, From their writings it appears that savages are, at least, 
people who lack traditional Western practices of civilisation. 
According to both writers, savages are more physically able: `What the savage lacks 
in mental development, the civilized man lacks in physical development... Relatively 
speaking, the savage is physically on a par with the beasts, while civilized man is 
below par, physically, but exceedingly above par, mentally' (Pilates, 1998 [1934]: 
25). Alexander (1987 [1923]: 5) has a similar discussion of how people are 
improperly physically adapted to contemporary society, while for `savage man', 
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instinct was sufficient. Rousseau's image of the `Noble Savage' is relevant here: the 
savage is someone idealised because unlike Westerners, `he' is still in touch with 
natural instincts and behaviours. Jahoda (1999: 49) points out that this was common 
to Enlightenment thinkers until the latter part of the eighteenth century, and that some 
held up `savage' society as a model against which to judge the corruption of 
`civilised' society. Further, he shows, images of the savage as incompletely 
developed and child-like persisted into mid-twentieth century psychology. This 
stance was predominantly abandoned as a reaction against Nazi race doctrines of the 
Second World War (1999: 240). The theory that Western civilisation and 
industrialisation have brought about the degeneration of humanity in physical terms is 
one that I will develop below. 
The savage was often compared to both children and apes, making the continuity 
between these models of the natural body apparent. Pilates, however, idealised the 
society of the ancient Greeks as a time when intellectual and physical life were 
perfectly balanced. While other movement re-educators made reference to the Greeks 
only in relation to the motto mens sana in corpore sano, as discussed previously, for 
Pilates classical Greece was the ultimate embodiment of this. 
The ancient Greeks understood the importance of "balance of body and mind"... 
They fully understood that the nearer one's physique approached the state of 
physical perfection, the nearer one's mind approached the state of mental 
perfection... the Greeks religiously practised what they preached, as witness the 
marvellous state of their achieved physical perfection as reflected in their 
wonderful statues' (Pilates, 1998 [1934]: 37). 
The possibility that these Greek statues were artistic representations rather than 
reflections of common bodies does not enter into Pilates' discussion. Pilates shares 
this interest in the Greeks with others involved in physical training, such as dancer 
Isadora Duncan, whose work I discussed in Chapter Two. Whereas Daly (1995: 89) 
argues that Duncan rejected `savages' in favour of Greeks, Pilates used both models 
of the natural in his work. The Greeks, however, were admired for both intellectual 
and physical abilities, whereas Pilates believed that savages possessed only physical 
prowess. Pilates' glorification of the Greeks suggests a belief that civilisation has 
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since degenerated. While Alexander, Rolf, and Feldenkrais do not look to Greek 
culture as a pinnacle of civilisation, they do share Pilates' concern with degeneration. 
The discourse of degeneration draws on eugenical concerns and particular beliefs 
about evolution, as I discussed in Chapter Two. These beliefs form the basis of the 
theory of nature and evolution acting as the mode of subjection that underlies the 
belief that certain bodies are more natural than others. 
Evolved Bodies 
The ways in which discourses of evolution and nature are mobilised to give authority 
to the practices of movement re-education have shifted over time, yet they are still as 
much a part of Body-Mind Centering in the 1990s as they were of the Alexander 
Technique in the early part of the century. Below, I will show how different 
movement re-educators have used these discourses to position their work. 
However, it must be made clear that the appeal to mture as an authority is not simply 
a condemnation of industrial civilisation and desire to revert to an apparently simpler 
way of life. Although Pilates scorns cities (2000 [1945]: 52) and idealises a time 
when `man lived mostly outdoors with little sheker from the elements.... he had to be 
physically fit to survive and be able to successfully withstand the daily strains and 
stresses imposed upon him' (2000: 51), he is unique in this. Alexander stresses that 
going `back to nature' is not desirable (1987 [1923]), and Feldenkrais argues that it is 
wrong to suggest that the complexity of modem life is unnatural: `in what sense is this 
complexity a human creation? Thinking is assuredly a natural and properly human 
function. We cannot stop ourselves from thinking any more than from breathing' 
(1949: 9). 
Alexander further suggests that nature itself cannot be relied upon to guide the way to 
good alignment and use of the self. He suggest that there is no reason `why Nature 
should prevent us from going wrong. seeing that in the process of the creature's 
development in civilization even the simplest fundamentals of nature have been 
ignored' (Alexander, 1987 [1923]: 24). The relationship to nature, then, must be 
actively developed. 
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For the founders of these movement re-education techniques, evolution is a critical 
part of the human the relationship to nature. Evolution guides the process by which 
humans have become distinguishable from apes, and the perfectly upright human 
body takes on a mythical quality ä being most perfectly evolved. Further, the 
discourses of evolution draw heavily on theories of eugenics, although they are not 
inseparable. Cohen, who does not use eugenic theories, continues to use the discourse 
of evolution in her work. The concern which early movement re-educators had with 
eugenics was quite in keeping with the broad popularity of such issues in the first part 
of the twentieth century, which I discussed in Chapter Two. The theory that 
civilisation is degenerating and that there is a natural course of evolution that has been 
lost was a key component of the eugenics movement. 
If movement re-education is intended to reverse degeneration simply by re-training 
our bodies to move differently, it should, theoretically, be open to everyone. 
Therefore, within the framework of eugenics movement re-education may be seen as 
a potentially egalitarian solution to the problem of the `degeneration of the species' 
outlined by the eugenicists. There are problems with this, however. Lessons in 
movement re-education have never been within everyone's financial reach. 
Alexander Technique lessons cost about four guineas in the early 1900s (Staring, 
1996: 82), and lessons today can cost between twenty and fifty pounds, depending on 
the teacher, with other techniques similarly priced. Rolf acknowledged that the 
financial cost of her work might be a barrier: `We do admit that total attainment of 
this goal is probably not feasible for the average individual. It involves too much time 
and, therefore, is too costly' (1977: 209). In his early work, Alexander suggests that 
the poor are responsible for their own poverty and apparent degeneracy because they 
`do not really want to be cured' (1910: 88). 
Alexander is the most explicitly eugenic of the movement ie-educators discussed 
here. His 1910 Man's Supreme Inheritance was, he later writes, the cornerstone of 
his thinking in the later Constructive Conscious Control of the Individual and The Use 
of the Self. Thus, although these latter two books never explicitly mention eugenics or 
`race culture', it is apparent that they still work similar premises; in The Use of the 
Self Alexander writes that `unsatisfactory reactions manifest themselves as symptoms 
of defect, of socalled "mental" or "moral" failing, disorder and disease, and their 
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presence may therefore be taken as an indication of the presence of wrong use and 
functioning throughout the organism' (1985 [1932]: 44-5). The first several chapters 
of Constructive Conscious Control of the Individual (1987 [1923]) outline the 
contemporary degeneration of humanity and how evolution has brought us to this 
stage. Man's Supreme Inheritance is more direct. In his statement of the purposes of 
the Alexander Technique he writes: 
I do not propose in this place, for many reasons, to consider my own methods in any 
other connexion but that of their application to physical defects, to the eradication of 
diseases, distortions, and lack of control, and progressively, to the science of race- 
culture and the improvement of the physique of the generations to come. (1910: 54) 
Race-culture here is a synonym for eugenics: 
"What of the children? " Are you content to rob them of their inheritance, as, perhaps, 
you were robbed by your parents? Are you willing to send them out into the world ill- 
equipped; dependent on precepts and incipient habits; unable to control their own 
desires, and already well on the way to physical degeneration? Happily, I believe that 
the means of stirring the inert is being provided. The question of Eugenics- or the 
science of race culture- is being debated by earnest men and women; and the whole 
problem of contemporary physical degeneration is one which looms ever larger in the 
public mind (1910: 96-97). 
The chapter following the above quotation is titled `Race Culture and the Training of 
the Children'. Another indication of Alexander's support for eugenics is a footnote in 
the first pages that details his views on the regulation of marriages: 
The attraction which a certain type of woman has for a certain type of man, and vice 
versa is, in my opinion, a fundamental law, and any attempt to regulate it would be 
harmful to the race. This, however, is no argument against the regulation or prevention 
of marriages between the physically and mentally unft. (1910: 6n) 
Feldenkrais holds similar views on the desirability of certain eugenic measures, 
although he rejects the idea that humanity is degenerating as `nothing more than an 
admission of ignorance of how to bring about the desired changes in our mind that 
will satisfy our urge for happiness' (Feldenkrais, 1949: 10). He writes: 
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The number of those unfit to live at large in modem society is certainly greater than 
in primitive societies. The reason for this is not that the number of idiots or 
otherwise degenerate offspring per thousand births of normal parentage is now 
greater than before, but because we preserve piously everything that is born. We 
could, and some nations do, take measures to prevent the unfit from reproducing; 
we do not know of any means of preventing normal parents from giving birth to 
degenerates. There is little evidence that the genetic inheritance of healthy human 
stock is deteriorated (Feldenkrais, 1949: 11, italics in original). 
He further suggests that such `idiots' `breed more extensively than average' (1949: 
12), which is another reason for eliminating them from the gene pool. His later work 
makes little mention of these issues, and even acknowledges that 
evolution is a good guide to historic development, but a poor one for prediction.... The 
real difficulty in finding working theories for action in evolution is the tremendous 
amount of time that must elapse before you can make even the simplest prediction. 
You can never tell who, or what, is the fittest for survival before survival takes place' 
(Feldenkrais, 1977: 18) 
Pilates does not use the word `degeneration' either, but makes it clear that he 
believes it is occurring: 
ARE we treading a downward path? No, we are not "treading" the downward 
path- rather we are ` rac ing" helter-skelter downward. We are slipping down a path 
that will lead to the ultimate destruction of the human race, so far as ever realizing 
the desirable goal of "Balance of Body and Mind" is concerned (Pilates, 1998 
[1934]: 23, capitals in original. ) 
Rolf, too, invokes evolution as a process with higher goals and condemns what she 
calls `random' bodies (those that have not been `processed', or undergone Rolfing 
treatment) as 'less human' and ape-like. She writes: 
In the apo-man (and in random bodies), the spine is placed like a slightly leaning, 
off-balance tent pole... During the long evolution of the human body, from the 
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semierect stance of the ape to the potentially light, erect balance possible in the 
structure of modern Homo sapiens, the spine has undergone many functional 
experiments. Obviously it is structurally more efficient to have the tent pole 
vertical, and man's evolution has moved in this direction. Most random bodies are 
still to be found at some point along the road from the ape-man to the truly erect 
human. (Rolf, 1977: 182) 
She also compares humans to plants, which do not grow properly without light or the 
`opportunity for upright stance; ' humans, she says, become less human when deprived 
of these things (1977: 287). Social Darwinist tendencies are evident too in her view 
that `evolution is matter moving toward more effective order' (Rolf, 1977: 285). She 
suggests that evolution is not an `unconscious group process' but rather is `the result 
of individual action, susceptible to conscious direction' to encourage `desirable order 
in an individual' (1977: 290). 
Rosemary Feitis' description of Rolf's goals and desires in formulating Rolfing are 
telling: `[Ida Rolf] was not interested in curing symptoms, she was after bigger game. 
She wanted nothing less than to create new, better human beings (in Rolf, 1990 
[1978]: 14). In light of the previous discussion, it is difficult not to read Rolf's desire 
to `create new, better human beings' as eugenic. 
In addition to re-education of adult bodies, movement re-educators put particular 
stress on the importance of properly educating children so they would not go astray. 
Both Pilates and Alexander devoted chapters in their first books (1998 [1934] and 
1910 respectively) to the role of educating children. Rolf and Feldenkrais similarly 
concurred on the importance of children's education. Feldenkrais in particular had 
ideas on how movement evolves naturally in children. From raising the head and 
hyperextensions of the limbs, 'sitting up, twisting of the body, crawling, then walking 
and finally, unsupported standing are learned. Running and jumping follow normally' 
(1949: 113). 
As mentioned above, Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen takes a particular interest in the 
training of babies. Unlike earlier movement re-educators, she does not discuss the 
heredity of bad posture or movement habits, yet she refers to a natural evolutionary 
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pattern of development and implies that where the stages of this pattern are not 
followed, problems will result. A chart in Hartley's Wisdom of the Body Moving 
(1995) is instructive as it lists the `developmental patterns' in the order in which they 
should occur in humans: cellular breathing, navel radiation, mouthing, pre-spinal, 
spinal push from head, push from the tail, spinal reach and pull from head, spinal 
reach and pull from tail, homologous push from upper extremities, homologous push 
from lower extremities, homologous reach and pull from upper extremities, the same 
from lower extremities, homolateral push from upper extremities, and lower, and 
finally, the contralateral reach and pull from both upper and lower extremities. 
These patterns are associated with particular stages of development and types of 
animal movement; cellular breathing with the ovum and one -celled organisms, navel 
radiation in utero and in starfish, the homologous push occurring from birth to five 
months in humans, and visible in amphibians as well as rabbits, kangaroos, and 
mammals when running at a great speed. The contralateral reach and pull, `cross- 
crawling' on hands and knees, or walking and running with the opposite arm as leg 
forward, is exhibited by many apes when walking, and begins in humans from seven 
months to one year of age (Hartley, 1995: 84-85). Although Cohen would avoid the 
suggestion that certain movement patterns are more highly evolved because she 
wishes to explore them all, there is a definite implication that this latter contralateral 
walking pattern is most highly developed because it is the last stage to be reached. 
Cohen exhibits little awareness that such movement patterns may be culturally 
influenced, and Hartley in fact writes that `the natural order of the unfolding of the 
sequence of patterns appears to be universal' (1995: 86). However, in a 1951 study 
Margaret Mead compared the movement patterns of Balinese infants with those of 
American infants and wrote: 
Where the American children go from frogging to creeping on all fours, then to 
standing and walking, with squatting coming after standing, the Balinese children, 
who do much less creeping (and spend most of the period when American children 
are moving actively about either sitting or being carried) combine frogging... 
creeping-and all-fours behaviours... simultaneously in a flexible, interchangeable 
state, from which they go from sitting to squatting to standing. (Mead in Polhemus, 
1978: 39) 
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The holistic nature of Body-Mind Centering dictates that `our body moves as our 
mind moves', and further, that this relates to the efficiency with which we accomplish 
our intentions (Cohen, 1993: 1). Cohen suggests that individuals should experience 
all the movement patterns she has observed and that if one is missed- if, for 
example, a child should go from creeping to walking without an intermediary 
crawling stage-problems will later result. Cohen's ethnocentrism with regard to the 
evolution of movement patterns is problematic. While she goes further toward 
valuing a variety of ways of moving than the other founders, she still works with a 
model of nature and evolution which implicitly regulates `right' and `wrong' ways of 
moving. The emphasis on individual ways of feeling and the exploration of 
movement patterns make it an internal regulation, but as I suggested in Chapter Three, 
this does not make it any less a form of discipline. Rather, it distinguishes Body- 
Mind Centering as truly a `technique of the self' where discipline comes from within, 
rather than without. 
It is apparent that movement reeducation techniques use ideas around evolution and 
eugenics as modes of subjection. They promise a greater degree of humanness and 
stronger genetic inheritance to those willing and able to pursue them. These 
discourses around evolution and eugenics rely on a particular theory of the natural 
world as an authority that dictabs how we live our lives. Movement re-educators also 
extrapolate from the scientific theory of evolution to an ethical injunction: evolution 
shapes our lives, and yet the civilising process has taken us away from nature, 
therefore we oughtto find ways of regaining our rightful evolutionary heritage. In 
contemporary movement re-education, as I shall show in Chapter Seven, evolution 
continues to play a role, although it the body it most admires is usually that of the 
child rather than the `savage'. Children are the `natural savages' of contemporary 
movement re-education because they are seen to be pre-civilised. Further, the original 
model of the `savage' has not died out entirely. However, there is another mode of 
subjection or authority at work in movement re-education too: the founders 
themselves. In the next section I will show how the founders of these techniques seek 
to give themselves the authority to make potential interpretations as to the will of 
nature or evolution. 
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The Founding Myths 
`Founding myths', or stories about how the techniques themselves began, are 
important parts of the authority of movement re -education and the founders' claims to 
knowledge. These stories may be told by the founders themselves, or may be passed 
down as colloquial knowledge, given as brief background in secondary, `how-to' 
texts, their original source somewhat obscure (See for example Gelb, 1987; Siler, 
2000; Hartley, 1995). A typical founding myth follows a recognisable format: 
As a child or young adult, X had health difficulties (including asthma, rickets, 
hoarseness, or a knee injury). Receiving no useful advice from the medical 
profession, s/he began an exploration of other possible solutions to the problem. 
Drawing on an academic background, (physics, biology, occupational therapy) 
and/or studies of Eastern bodywork practices (judo, yoga, Zen Buddhism and 
meditation), he/she developed [insert founder's surname here] method/technique. 
Having great personal success with this method of training, s/he began to treat 
others. Eventually the technique was so successful that s/he opened a training 
school (usually in America or England) in order to pass on the teachings. 
These founding myths lend a powerful sense of truth to these techniques; they speak 
of a strong, independent figure, failed by modem medicine, whose brilliance in self- 
experimentation and whose internal knowledge of his or her own body leads him or 
her to develop a technique to restore health. Coward also notes the importance of the 
founder and the founding myth in alternative health: 
For those therapies which do not come from the `ancient' East, there is a slightly 
different version of the attempt to claim a heritage... there is a push to establish the 
therapy as deriving from a founding master, usually in the previous century. These 
founding figures then acquire the same sort of status as the guru of oriental 
religions, the status of one who understands and interprets natural truths (Coward, 
1989: 36). 
There are certainly elements of the founding myths of the techniques studied here 
which fit Coward's description. I use the term `myth' in this context not because I 
144 
believe these elements of the founder's story are necessarily untrue, but because these 
stories have come to take on a legendary quality, particularly in the discourses of 
second or thirdgeneration practitioners of the techniques. 
It should be noted that the prevalence of founding myths is not limited to movement 
re-education techniques such as the ones I am discussing here. Within modem dance 
there was also a tendency, for example by Ruth St. Denis and Martha Graham whom I 
discussed in Chapter Two, to legitimate their techniques by breaking with Western 
traditions and declaring themselves new and revolutionary, whilst linking with arcient 
and `Eastern' traditions, styles, and knowledges. Movement re-educators had two 
strategies for asserting the uniqueness of their methods: one was to ignore other 
similar work in the field, and another was to trace their roots in older, `Eastern' 
practices such as Judo and yoga. 
The founding myth of Alexander Technique is a good example of the former. The 
story passed down in the Alexander folklore, as outlined by Alexander in his third 
book, The Use of the Self, tells of his losing his voice in his career as an elocutionist. 
His doctor prescribed a rest cure, but Alexander found this largely unsuccessful and, 
since the doctor had no other suggestions, he set out to fix the problem himself. With 
the aid of mirrors he discovered that he was drawing his head back and stiffening his 
neck as he spoke, depressing his larynx and `gasping' for breath. Gradually, he 
learned to `inhibit' this reaction, which he called `wrong Use' of himself, through 
`conscious control' and reasoned direction (Alexander, 1985 [1932]: 17-45; Gelb, 
1987: 11-13). This discovery took Alexander several years of intensive observation 
and hard work on himself, but was completed without input from others. 
Jeroen Staring, a Dutch anthropologist who produced a two-volume biography of 
Alexander's life and work, casts doubt on Alexander's founding myth. He suggests 
that Alexander in fact borrowed many ideas which he failed to credit. For example, 
he demonstrates that Alexander was aware of the work of Francois Delsarte, 
discussed in Chapter Two, on the basis that `Alexander's professional letterhead at 
that time [the late 1800s] stated in the left upper corner that Alexander taught `The 
Famous Delsarte System as applied to Dramatic Expression, Deportment, Gesture 
and Vocalisation" (quoted in Staring, 1996: 50). Alexander also referred to 
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Delsartism in a newspaper article of 1902 (Staring, 1996: 211). Staring also points to 
textual similarities between Alexander's early work and ideas and the exercises of 
other singing teachers and physical culture experts of his time. His research suggests 
that far from developing his technique in isolation, Alexander knew a great deal about 
the work of others and used this in developing his own technique. 
Pilates is also vague about the origins of his technique and seeks to naturalise them, 
although he does this by making reference to `Eastern' techniques as well. His 
comments on other physical culture programmes are limited to his statement that he 
has `the only course in the world that teaches physical education on a corrective basis 
and brings the results I claim for it' (Pilates, 1998 [1934]: 63). In Return to Life 
Through Contrology (2000 [1945]) he does give a brief background of his studies of 
the Chinese martial art Cong Fou (Kung Fu). This book also appeals to `Eastern' 
cultural wisdom through romanticised explanations of health care in India and 
physical culture training in Ancient Greece and Rome, which he considered to be far 
superior to anything being practised in the twentieth century. 
Others also acknowledged an `Eastern' influence: Moshe Feldenkrais writes about his 
Judo training in the introduction to The Elusive Obvious (Feldenkrais, 1995: 138) in 
addition to his academic background in engineering and physics. Ida Rolf refers to her 
training in yoga, but it is her writing assistant Feitis who explains that throughout the 
1920s Rolf belonged to a group that practised yoga, and that when she first started 
working with clients, she used yoga with them (1990[1978]: 7-8). She later decided 
that yoga was not sufficient: `Although probably the best of the "exercise" systems, 
yoga as taught today does not go far enough. The body organized through yoga 
achieves joint mobility but does not consciously recognize and seek out the gravity 
field as its basic supportive factor' (Rolf, 1977: 289). 
Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen has also acknowledged influences from Zen meditation, 
martial arts, and yoga, among other techniques including voice work, dance, and 
bodywork (1993: 172). While Cohen openly admits to training in these fields, the 
book jacket of Linda Hartley's Wisdom of the Body Moving (1995) claims that 
`devoting thirty-five years to a systematic investigation of the relations between 
bodily experience and the anatomical maps of scie nce, Bainbridge Cohen 
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independently discovered many of the principles that underlie Feldenkrais work, 
cranial osteopathy, Rolfmg, dance therapy, and Zero Balancing' (1995, italics mine). 
This statement establishes Body. Mind Centering as part of a larger tradition of 
bodywork and movement re-education, but it also serves to mark Cohen as a 
`founder' of a unique method whose `independent discoveries' led to the realisation of 
what appear to be universal bodily truths. This has the effect of naturalising styles of 
bodily use and movement which have in fact been learned, whether through direct 
personal experience or through cultural saturation. 
Rolf and Feldenkrais acknowledge one another's work, and in fact praise it. 
Feldenkrais' comments about Rolfing are used as promotional material on the book 
jacket of Rolling and Physical Reality (1990 [1978]), and Rolf referred to 
Feldenkrais' books favourably, particularly Body and Mature Behavior. There is also 
evidence that both of them knew of the Alexander Technique. Rolfs assistant Feitis 
says that Rolf worked briefly with an Alexander Teacher in Massachusetts (1990 
[1978]: 11). One of the principal heirs to the Feldenkrais method, Mia Segal, 
remembers that he met Alexander when he lived in the UK: `Moshe used to say that 
Alexander had the best hands he had ever felt. If I remember correctly, Moshe 
showed him Body and Mature Behavior, and Alexander said, "Actually, you copied it 
from my book! " This, I suppose, ended the relationship' (Segal in Hanna, 1995: 114). 
The ways in which movement re -education's founders are presented discursively as 
having invented new disciplines, which in some cases build on `Eastern' techniques 
of the body, indicates a mode of subjection at work wherein certain bodily principles 
are considered to be universally true. These are not simply at the level of physiology, 
but also imply a fundamental `wisdom of the body'. This serves to naturalise 
movement re-education by suggesting that its principles are out there, waiting to be 
discovered, and also establishes movement re-educators as authoritative guides to the 
world of body wisdom, able to interpret this truth of the body and to lead others. 
`Eastern' disciplines with longer histories are drawn upon to naturalise them, positing 
these bodily techniques as universal, not only because they are cross-cultural but also 
because they emerge in cultures assumed to be more in touch with `nature'. This 
further serves to obscure the status of movement re-education as a cultural practice. 
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Telos: Body/Self Awareness 
As the previous discussion has demonstrated, movement re-education techniques seek 
to re-establish humanity's place in an evolutionary framework these founders claim 
has been lost. Ideas about nature and evolution are integral to this; as Linda Hartley 
claims, 'Body-Mind Centering is essentially about following the courses of nature' 
(1995: xvii). The telos or goal of all these techniques is the restoration of a proper 
bodily relationship to nature and evolution, through the cultivation of body awareness 
or body wisdom. However, this does not indicate a desire to return to pre-civilised 
times or societies, as this would be a reversion to a lower level of evolution. Instead, 
it is about claiming a rightful heritage of `true humanness' by developing good 
comportment and erect posture (Rolf, 1977). 
All movement re-education techniques aim for the development of body awareness, 
which these founders suggest will restore humanity to a better relationship with nature 
and evolution. However, there is a significant difference between body awareness 
and body wisdom. As the discussion of physical practices indicated, there are a 
variety of ways in which body awareness can be cultivated, and the mind-body 
relationship is very different between Alexander Technique and Pilates, which 
emphasise conscious control, and Feldenkrais, Rolfing, and Body-Mind Centering, 
which assume that the body itself can `know'. In the first relationship, mind is seen as 
directing action, while in the second, the body is directly representative of mind. This 
parallels the developments in postural pedagogy traced in the previous chapter, which 
showed how the body became intertwined with psychology in the mid-twentieth 
century, around the time when Feldenkrais and Rolf were developing their work. A 
further distinction can be made between these methods and Body-Mind Centering, in 
which the body is the mind, rather than simply being representative of it. 
Therefore, while for some movement re-education techniques the telos behind the 
work is the attainment of body wisdom, for others it is not. For Alexander Technique 
and the Pilates method, at least in the forms outlined by their founders, developing a 
body that would know innately what was healthy is not a goal. Rather, an awareness 
of the body is to be cultivated through the application of conscious control. 
Alexander clearly believed that this was the next stage of human evolution, where the 
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consciousness that civilisation had helped to develop would be applied to the use of 
the body, thereby reversing the degeneration he saw occurring. This in turn would 
bring about improved health. For Rolf, Feldenkrais, and Cohen, awareness of the 
body can be cultivated without consistent conscious control. This is particularly 
evident in Rolfmg, where the body is passively worked on and is expected to learn 
new ways of holding itself through this physical manipulation alone, although as I 
shall discuss in Chapter Eight, this has changed somewhat with the recent 
development of Rolfing movement education as a discipline. The role of the nervous 
system is crucial in learning new ways of being, and in Cohen's work, many other 
`systems' of the body are employed as well. Once learned, the new neural pathways 
which direct the movement need not be maintained consciously. The body can simply 
`know'. In Body-Mind Centering, this receives a further articulation as the body is 
divided into systems, each of which has a `mind' of its own. The mind of the fluid 
system, for instance, is one of liquidity, flow, and transformation, while the mind of 
the muscular system is one of vitality, power, resistance and resolution (Cohen, 1993: 
3). 
In body wisdom, the body literally takes on traditionally metaphorical qualities. It 
comes to have a subjectivity of its own: Rolf says that walking is `shouting the news' 
about the hips and pelvis (1977: 62), and refers to a stable and balanced foot as 
`competent'. Cohen's lengthy passages about the emotional lives of the bodily 
systems and crgans also take metaphorical associations, such as the heart and love, 
and apply them quite literally. A photograph of a young girl in a dress holding 
something between her hands is captioned: `Notice the soft, central feeling of her 
pancreas radiating inward evenly through all her limbs, expressing a quality of 
"sweetness"' (1993: 48). Here, the literal function of the pancreas (processing sugar 
and `sweetness') is applied to the comportment of the girl's body: for Cohen, the girl 
appears `sweet' because her pancreas is radiating energy inward, not because she is 
young and positioned in such a way that she appears demure, fitting cultural 
stereotypes about little girls as `sweet'. 
It is worth contrasting this formulation of body wisdom with a version discussed in 
Wilfred Barlow's influential book on the Alexander Technique published in 1973, 
The Alexander Principle. Barlow was among the first teachers to train with 
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Alexander, and was also married to his niece. I will discuss proximity to the founder 
as a criterion for determining authenticity in Chapter Six; what is important here is to 
note that Barlow speaks with authority because of this. He argues against a certain 
formulation of `body wisdom' articulated in Walter B. Cannon's The Wisdom of the 
Body (1939), which he sees as a `legacy of the last century, with its accent on the 
God-given perfection of the human frame' (Barlow, 1973: 30). Cannon's version of 
body wisdom is somewhat different to the one discussed here, but Barlow's criticisms 
are still relevant. Cannon `suggested that there are certain balanced states of the body 
which are natural and normal and to which, in its wisdom, the body will return after 
disturbance and stress', the body could be restored through medical treatment and 
care `until a more normal resting balance can be maintained-with or without drugs' 
(Barlow, 1973: 31). Barlow suggests that this is not true, and that `Increasing 
dependence on therapeutic drugs.. . 
is proof that most people's body wisdom has gone 
astray' (31). The body wisdom addressed in my research is a rather different 
formulation, which would disavow any association with medication as a way to 
maintain a balanced body. The wise body Barlow describes is not a body that 
`knows' in the way described by Feldenkrais, Rolf, and Cohen. 
Barlow claims ultimately that the body is `stupid' because it seeks 
such and such a familiar sense of muscular equilibrium, such and such a state of mental 
calm, and if its easiest ways of getting them don't work, it bodges around with its other 
systems or muscles to knock something together which will do, until fmally, it runs out 
of alternatives and begins to seize up. (Barlow, 1975 [1973]: 78). 
In Alexander terms, according to Barlow, the body is `end-gaining', seeking a 
particular balance through whatever means will work, rather than considering the 
`means-whereby' it performs actions. In the Alexander Technique, this latter is the 
domain of conscious awareness and is a reason it should be cultivated. Alexander 
distanced his work from the view that results could be obtained by conditioning the 
nervous system, as Rolf and Feldenkrais believed. He wrote: 
The possibility of reconditioning opens up the way to an unlimited development of 
control, but not simply a control which results from a fixed conditioning, as in the case 
of the dog reacting to a prearranged and regularly repeated stimulus along the lines 
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contrived by Pavlov. For, as John Dewey puts it, "the latter, as usually understood, 
renders an individual a passive puppet to be played upon by external manipulations. " 
(Alexander, 2000 [1941]: 74) 
Thus while Alexander seeks to cultivate body/self awareness, the telos which guides 
him is not body wisdom. The awareness his technique cultivates is still situated 
within a particular discourse around nature and evolution common to other 
techniques, but does not share in the goalof obtaining a wise body. Telos, the 
ultimate goal of movement re-education, differs between techniques, although they 
share a goal of regaining a place within a natural evolutionary framework. Whether 
this is through cultivating body awareness or body wisdom, however, varies. 
Conclusion 
In Foucauldian genealogical terms, there is a discrete break between Alexander's 
formulation of `conscious control' and Cohen's articulation of `body wisdom'. While 
both share certain ideas about the natural body and evolution, it would be incorrect to 
say that there is a continuum between them and that Cohen's theories are simply 
further developments of Alexander's ideas. Rather, Alexander actively sought to 
distance himself from the work on the conditioning of the nervous system and the 
psychology of the body, which both Feldenkrais and Rolf drew upon. 
Through the analysis above I have shown how movement re -education functions as a 
technique of the self, shaping selves as well as bodies in particular ways and for 
particular ends. The physical practices of movement re-education form the basis of 
the ethical work on the self, because the ethical substance of the self that is worked 
upon is based on a conception of holism, often articulated as mens sana in corpore 
sano, a sane mind in a healthy body. Work on the body is therefore work on the mind 
and the self. However, this takes different forms depending on the technique: for 
Alexander and to a lesser extent for Pilates, conscious control over the body/self is 
important, and therefore it is'consciousness and the mind that is dominant. For 
Feldenkrais, Rolf and Cohen, the body comes to be representative of certain states of 
mind which can be affected through work on the body with minimal recourse to 
conscious control. Also, for Cohen, bodily states literally are states of mind. 
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Movement re-education appeals to certain authorities for weight and guidance, which 
Foucault calls the modes of subjection. Authority is established through reference to 
a natural body and the process of evolution. Examples of certain types of natural 
bodies appear repeatedly: animals, babies and young children, `savage' peoples, and 
occasionally the ancient Greeks. These examples rely upon a theory of civilisation 
and society as something layered on top of an essentially natural core body/self, and 
as something which has been lost but could be restored. Chapter Seven will examine 
the contemporary models of the natural body that are used by movement re-educators, 
and how the previous discourse, much of which appears racist and eugenic by today's 
standards, is negotiated. 
The founders of movement re-education also play a role as a mode of subjection, 
through founding myths in which they appear to have independently discovered pre- 
existing natural principles about bodies and selves. Nature and evolution as modes of 
subjection also support the ultimate telos of movement re-education, which is the 
restoration of a particular relationship to nature and evolutionary order. In the case of 
Rolfing, Feldenkrais, and Body-Mind Centering, it is clear that body wisdom is also a 
part of the telos, although this is not the case for Alexander or Pilates. 
This chapter has examined the shifts in movement re-education's discourse through a 
framework of techniques of the self, in order to show how body wisdom has come to 
be a guiding principle in more recent forms of contemporary movement re- education. 
In the next three chapters, I will examine how these techniques are embodied by 
contemporary practitioners of movement re-education, to give a clearer sense of how 
the discourses described above have been embodied and what happens to them when 
they are applied in practical contexts. 
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Chapter 6 
Doing and Non-Doing: Habit, Habitus, and Change in 
Alexander Technique 
Alexander's work was and is concerned with the intimate management of our 
moment-to-moment perceptions of ourselves. 
(Wilfred Barlow in Alexander, 1985 [1932]: 9) 
Introduction 
As I discussed in Chapter Three, habit is a key aspect of Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenological analyses. For MerleauPonty, habit is a prereflective but not 
precultural knowledge of the world. This knowledge is literally in the body. There is 
a certain resemblance between Merleai-Ponty's articulation of his phenomenological 
project and the ways in which movement re-education works on the body, particularly 
in relation to habit and perception. Both of these are key themes in Alexander 
Technique as well, and thus a phenomenological analysis of the Alexander Technique 
seems a particularly appropriate way to study it as an embodied practice, as the terms 
of analysis are not unfamiliar to the topic under investigation. 
However, there is not a perfect fit between Merleau. Ponty and Alexander's use of 
these terms, and the theories they hold about the body/self or body/subject are quite 
different. As I noted in the previous chapter, both Alexander and Pilates held the 
view that consciousness directs the body. Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, would 
reject such theories on the basis that they form an artificial distinction between body 
and mind, perpetuating the dualism he sought to overcome. Yet Alexander Technique 
does not suggest that the body is always consciously directed by the mind; rather, it 
only suggests that it should be. This is its ethical component, as elaborated in my 
analysis in Chapter Five. Ultimately, this disjuncture in ways of seeing the body does 
not affect the extent to which Merleau-Ponty's analysis can be applied to movement 
re-education, but rather provides tools for interpreting the perspectives taken on the 
body/mind relationship in movement re-education. 
This chapter approaches movement re-education from the perspective of embodied 
practice, analysing it phenomenologically. It draws upon ethnographic data about 
153 
learning to do the Alexander Technique, which, as shall be explained, is equally a 
process of learning not to `do'. As I discussed in Chapter Four, in presenting 
ethnographic data, I have given first-person descriptions of activities and practices 
carried out in my Alexander lessons, using these to demonstrate how particular 
principles of the technique are embodied and how embodiment interacts with and can 
be illuminated by theory. My purpose in doing so is not to imply that my experiences 
are generalisable, but rather to give specific case examples to illustrate my argument. 
My analysis will be undertaken using Merleai-Ponty's (1962) work on embodiment 
in relation to perception and habit, which was examined in Chapter Three. I will also 
employ Csordas' (2002) concept of somatic modes of attention to show how the 
Alexander Technique is a way of attending to the body/self that brings about a 
particular kind of bodily awareness. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion 
of Alexander teacher training in relation to the habitus and bodily hexis, 
demonstrating how Alexander Technique seeks to transform habitus but battles 
against its durability. 
Setting 
There is nothing to distinguish the London Alexander Centre, where I undertook my 
fieldwork, from the outside; its tenancy in an old Victorian building is marked only by 
the words `Alexander Technique' on the buzzer in front of heavy wooden doors. 
Inside, a narrow hallway connects the rooms it occupies on the ground floor, with no 
main reception area. There are several teaching rooms, all of which contain one or 
two chairs, usually wooden, and a long padded table at waist height, designed for 
lying down upon. These rooms also tend to hold books and old issues of magazines, 
and one has a saddle for horseback riding, a frequent application of the Technique. 
The rooms are large enough to walk around in, as lessons sometimes require this. 
A variety of images are hung on the walls of the teaching rooms. In some there are 
artistic prints or photographs, while one has photos of F. M. Alexander and a list of 
some of the main points he emphasised in his teaching, around habit and sensory 
awareness. On another wall is a print of `Animals in Motion', showing various 
mammals walking and running. Its presence implies that animals are models of a 
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desirable, probably `natural' body, as I discussed in the previous chapter. What is not 
on the walls is perhaps just as interesting: there are no anatomical images or models in 
the main treatment rooms, and Alexander Technique makes little use of specific 
anatomical knowledge in its teaching. This probably reflects Alexander's own lack of 
anatomical background, but also differentiates the technique from Rolfing or Body- 
Mind Centering, in which anatomical images play a role. The lack of such images 
among Alexander teachers was confirmed in the majority of teaching venues I visited 
as part of my interviews. My Alexander teacher informed me that in his training 
course, he had spent three hours a week for one term learning about muscles `to get a 
sense of how they look, not as academic anatomy lessons' and on four occasions 
during my course of lessons, he referred to anatomical images or principles in order to 
explain particular points. However, it was clear that anatomy did not play a major 
role in the understanding of the Technique. 
The Alexander Centre has several directors, and a number of teachers mahtain an 
association with it, giving them the opportunity to book the teaching rooms for 
lessons when they wish. Doors separate the main teaching area from the 
complementary therapy centre across the hallway, although sometimes its rooms are 
also used. While there is a relationship between the two centres, this is not because 
Alexander Technique sees itself as closely linked to complementary therapies. 
Indeed, one of the directors suggested to me that the complementary therapy centre 
had come to be there largely by accident and that it was hoped it would one day be 
replaced with a `serious' psychotherapy practice. This indicates a hesitancy to be 
associated with complementary and alternative health, practices which may be 
interpreted as somewhat esoteric. It also suggests that psychotherapy is seen by this 
director as a complement to Alexander Technique, perhaps because it deals with the 
emotional and psychological issues that work with the body often brings up. Other 
Alexander teachers also expressed reticence about being associated with 
complementary and alternative health, although pupils of the technique were less 
likely to see this divide, as I shall discuss in Chapter Eight. 
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Taking Lessons 
There is a recognisable pattern to Alexander lessons, apparent not only in my 
ethnographic experience of the technique but also in the accounts of activities given in 
my interviews with teachers. Lessons tend to start with work on a chair or in front of 
the mirror and finish with fifteen or twenty minutes of `table work', where, in contrast 
to other parts of the lesson, the pupil is mainly passive and simply allows him or 
herself to be worked upon and adjusted by the teacher. Often, pupils are encouraged 
to compare themselves in the mirror before and after the lesson, noting any changes 
that have taken place. This indicates that the visual element has significance, and that 
changes are not simply internal but are expected to be observable. 
My first Alexander session was an introductory workshop lasting two hours. 
Although four students had been expected, only one other woman showed up. The 
teacher, a man who appeared to be in his mid-thirties, began with the story of how the 
Technique started: Alexander was an actor from Tasmania who lost his voice during a 
performance. On the advice of his doctor, he rested his voice for three weeks, but 
although his next performance began well, ultimately his voice deteriorated. His 
doctor once again advised rest, but Alexander realised that he would have to work out 
the problem on his own. He spent two years observing himself in mirrors and realised 
that the relationship between the positions of his head, neck and back was important, 
and if there was tension anywhere or if this relationship was disturbed, it affected his 
recitation. This story strongly resembles the one told by Alexander himself (1985 
[1932]), and is an example of the `founding myth' I discussed in the previous chapter. 
The story of Alexander's founding of the technique is one that most of the pupils I 
interviewed were familiar with, indicating its widespread use by teachers of the 
Technique. Thus Alexander continues to act as a mode of subjection or authority in 
contemporary Alexander Technique environments. 
Following this explanation, the workshop consisted of a series of activities and games 
used to demonstrate how our bodily perceptions affected our ways of using our 
bodies, and teach us to inhibit our initial reactions to stimuli. The first such activity 
involved throwing a ball from person to person First the ball was simply tossed, then 
an extra stage was added where we pointed to the person who was to catch the ball to 
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give them the opportunity to prepare. In the last stage, we were instructed to tell the 
person to `stop' on some occasions as we were throwing, so that they would let it fall 
to the ground rather than catching it. In doing this, we were told, we were playing 
with Alexander's principle of inhibiting habitual reactions to make ourselves 
consciously aware of the process of catching. 
The next stage of the workshop involved a demonstration of the mind/body 
relationship in Alexander Technique. I sat across from the other pupil, and she held 
one hand out in front of her and was asked to concentrate on allowing it to move only 
to the right. I was asked to try to move her arm in each direction, demonstrating how 
much easier it was to move her arm to the right than to the left, although all she had 
done was shift her focus. Then our Alexander teacher demonstrated the same process 
using sight. If the pupil focussed her eyes in one direction, her head turned much 
more easily in that direction. This also occurred even if she was only thinking of 
focussing in that direction, and the teacher could guess which direction she had 
chosen even if he was not told. The process was then reversed, and I was given the 
opportunity to try this focussing activity, with similar results. This activity 
demonstrated the ways in which our bodies responded to the direction of our minds. 
Following this, we were asked to each stand in front of a mirror, while the teacher 
adjusted our 'head-neck-back relationship', a term which was used a great deal. It 
refers to Alexander's idea that there is a particular alignment of the head, neck and 
back that is ideal, and that if this is interfered with, it will cause problems such as the 
loss of voice he himself had experienced. This is also called the `primary control', 
and there is a belief that if this is in order, the rest of the body/self will fall into place. 
A good head-neck-back relationship involves a long neck, with a head which is 
directed to go forward and up, as if reaching over something held under the chin. The 
directions `allow the head to go forward and up' were repeated many times in 
Alexander lessons. Directions to `drop' the chest, knees, and hips often accompanied 
it. In attempting to reproduce these directions with the guidance of the Alexander 
teacher, I found my spine getting very straight, and my neck felt as if it were 
lengthening. Once in this position, we were asked to shift our weight from foot to 
foot, slowly, to get a feeling of all our weight being on one side of the body. Our 
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teacher explained that this would give us a fuller sense of the weight of our bodies, 
which was often not felt when muscles were tense. 
There was a short tea break, and the remainder of the lesson was then spent doing 
work with chairs and the table. Initially, the other pupil was asked to observe me as I 
sat down and stood up from a wooden chair several times in succession. I observed 
that I used my hands to push off from the chair, and she noticed that my head went 
unnecessarily far forward as I went to stand. The teacher then led me through the 
process slowly, focussing again on the headdneck-back relationship and on allowing 
my knees to go forward slowly as the focal point of the movement. This felt quite 
different and much more difficult. The other student then went through the same 
process. 
As mentioned above, table work (sometimes known as the `table turn') is a common 
way for Alexander lessons to end. Lying on a table gives the pupil the opportunity to 
experience a changed vertical alignment without working against gravity. It is also 
relaxing because there is little for the pupil to `do: ' most of the work is done by the 
Alexander teacher, who adjusts the body. As one teacher, Annette, noted in an 
interview: `I think the table work has been developed hugely since Alexander's time. 
People enjoy that. Both teachers and students quite like just... I can see it in their 
eyes, they come in and I'll start working with them and I'll see their eyes just looking 
at that table'. 
In the introductory session, our heights were measured against the wall before and 
after table work. At the end of the workshop it became apparent that each of us stood 
about a centimetre taller. We lay on flat surfaces with books of varying heights 
beneath our heads, as the teacher gradually guided and manipulated us with his hands 
until we were well aligned. Alexander teachers do not believe it is possible for the 
spine to be perfectly straight, because the neck is always slightly forward of the rest of 
the body, although it is desirable that this protrusion be lessened. In table work, the 
neck is therefore supported with books at the base of the skull. The height of the 
books is important; too many or too few at the neck will contract, throwing the head 
neck back relationship out of alignment. 
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We lay in semi-supine position, on our backs with our knees bent. Throughout the 
workshop prior to this exercise, I had noticed tension between my shoulder blades 
when letting my neck go `forward and up'. This was alleviated somewhat if I tried to 
bring my sternum backward, but still noticeable, until I lay down on the floor. In this 
position, our elbows were moved a distance away from our bodies, and our whole 
backs were arranged so that they would touch the floor. Lying with the knees bent 
removes the curve of the lower back, making this flat spine easier. The teacher 
manipulated our legs and hip joints, first stretching out one leg at a time and pulling 
on it and then bending it back at the joint, then placing it back in its original knees- 
bent position, and reaching under our backs to lift our hips from the back of the pelvis 
and pull them up and out, flattening them toward the floor. To stand up, I was 
directed to come forward with the top of my head leading until I reached a sitting 
position, and then rise from there. 
While Alexander lessons do not always contain all of these elements, many of them 
played a recurring role, as I shall discuss below. Also, many of the themes raised in 
this workshop, such as the role of perception in the body/mind relationship and the 
principle of inhibiting habitual responses, are significant currents in the Alexander 
Technique, which can be productively analysed in relation to MerleauPonty's 
discussions on habit. 
Habit 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that the acquisition of habit is always `the motor grasping of 
a motor significance' (1962: 143). In contrast to accounts of perception and habit that 
suggest that these are developed by the mind, Merleau-Ponty posits that habit is 
bodily. He writes that `if I am ordered to touch my ear or my knee, I move my hand 
to my ear or my knee by the shortest route, without having to think of the initial 
position of my hand, or that of my ear, or the path between them' (1962: 144). Habit 
is thus neither conscious nor driven by intellectualisation and thought. 
In Alexander Technique, too, habits of the self are bodily and are addressed through 
the medium of the body. They are `psycho-physical', in Alexander's words, a term 
which sits well with MerleauPonty's observation that being-in-the-world, as a 
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preobjective understanding, demonstrates the unity of the psychic and the 
physiological (1962: 80). Merleau-Ponty also claims that 'relationships between my 
decision and my body are, in movement, magic ones' (1962: 94). By this he means 
that what occurs between decision and action is neither a conscious process nor 
sinply a physiological response to stimulus, but a body consciousness which reacts at 
the same time that it decides. There is no two-step process at work here in which the 
subject decides and the body responds; rather, the body-subject both decides and 
reacts through habit in a non-hierarchical and non-dualistic way. Merleau-Ponty notes 
that the body comes to have a knowledge of typing, for example, which is literally in 
the hands, and that through habit the bodily schema can incorporate extensions which 
are not physically attached, such as being able to judge the height of a feather in a hat 
when getting into a car, or becoming so accustomed to driving that it feels as if a car 
is an extension of oneself. `To get used to a hat, a car or a stick is to be transplanted 
into them, or conversely, to incorporate them into the bulk of our own body. Habit 
expresses our power of dilating our being- in-the-world, or changing our existence by 
appropriating fresh instruments' (1962: 143). 
For Merleau-Ponty, habit is morally neutral, and serves as a demonstration that 
knowledge can be bodily and not simply conscious. There are no ethical injunctions 
associated with this. As elaborated in Chapter Five, however, F. M. Alexander saw 
habit as negative, and developed a particdar type of ethical argument about 
overcoming it. He believed humanity was degenerating, and that habitual action 
should be made conscious in order to take humanity out of the realm of instinct and 
allow it to reach what he considered to be its full potential. For Alexander, the body 
cannot `know': although he is interested in psychophysical unity, his conception of it 
is very different from that of MerleauPonty in that a conscious awareness takes 
priority. Alexander had a five-step process for taking any action, which involved 
inhibiting one's reactions, re-evaluating one's decision to react in a particular manner, 
and making fresh choices as to whether to continue with the initial intention or to 
change and react in a different way. Several key concepts arise in his work in relation 
to habit: the theory that humanity in its present state exhibits faulty sensory 
awareness, the need to cultivate a different kind of perception to overcome this, and 
the importance of inhibiting initial responses to stimulus in order to react more 
appropriately, in a way which is `from the self, as I shall describe in a moment. 
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However, habit can never be entirely overcome, as I shall discuss in the concluding 
sections of this chapter, and Alexander teachers acknowledge this. 
A terminological note is important here: Alexander uses the term `self' to refer to the 
psycho-physical unity he describes. Alexander lessons seek to develop good `use' of 
the self, by which is meant a good headneck back relationship and the appropriate 
alignment of the limbs in relation to this. In fact, as I shall develop below, the use of 
the term `self' to refer to such an alignment gives the sense that the self is resident 
primarily in the head-neck-back relationship. 
Faulty Sensory Awareness 
Faulty sensory awareness is a key concept in Alexander's elaboration of his 
technique. He believed that there was no reason that people should know their use of 
themselves was wrong, and that in fact when they came upon good use for the first 
time, it would feel wrong precisely because it differed from what went before. While 
as I have shown, some notion of a natural body as desirable and achievable through 
re-education is apparent throughout Alexander's work, there is no body/self which 
`naturally' senses when it encounters good or bad use. It is only through the process 
of re-education that the body can come to know what good use of the self is like. 
Work on the self should not, then, appear easy or natural, and if it does it is likely to 
be symptomatic of poor use of the self. While this principle became apparent through 
my fieldwork, the term `faulty sensory awareness' as such was rarely used. However, 
one recurrent theme in my fieldnotes which demonstrates the principle of faulty 
sensory awareness is that of tension. Unnecessary tension held in the muscles is seen 
to interfere with good use of the self by producing movement that is inefficient, and 
tension causes much of the back and neck pain which often leads people to the 
Alexander Technique. The purpose of the Technique in this case is to re-educate 
bodies to move without the tension that has become habitual to them. 
In my first full Alexander Technique lesson following the introductory workshop 
described above, I noted in my field journal that I could not hold my pen with the 
degree of tension I had become accustomed to, and thus that writing was difficult. 
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The lesson left me feeling larger and heavier than when I had come in. This sense of 
heaviness is important, and when in one lesson I noted that my limbs felt heavy my 
Alexander teacher responded `That's good, because that's the weight you have'. He 
noted that muscles which are tense are felt less than those which are not, and that a 
full sense of the weight of the body is only available when habitual tension is 
released. In the process of learning Alexander Technique, then, there are moments 
when the body feels heavy, because a proper sensory awareness of the weight of the 
body is being restored. In the first lesson, this was explained through a demonstration 
related to dance; my Alexander teacher studied tango, and demonstrated that a sense 
of the weight of the legs made turning easier than it was if the body was pulled up 
stiffly and held with tension. Much contemporary dance, it should be noted, also 
works with this sense of the weightedness of the body, and movements are organised 
around a theory that when gravity is defied, as in jumping or reaching, the body will 
then be pulled down toward the floor with greater force. Thus there is significantly 
more use of the floor in contemporary dance than in ballet, in which the emphasis on 
verticality and upwardness means that muscles are pulled up and tensed, so that the 
ballet dancer seems to defy gravity. 
Feeling the weight of the body and the muscles, then, is taken by Alexander 
Technique teachers as a sign that good sensory awareness is being restored. Yet 
tension is also necessary in order for the Technique to be taught successfully. On two 
occasions, my Alexander teacher noted that my habitual tensions were useful because 
they gave us something to work from: in his words, I had `Lots of difficult, funny 
movements which you can observe'. The most difficult pupils, he commented, were 
the ones with no tension whatsoever, who appeared consistently `collapsed' or 
`relaxed'. These pupils presented no immediate problems or `funny movements' 
which could be pointed out, yet this did not apparently mean that they exhibited good 
use of the self. When I enquired as to how he dealt with these pupils, my teacher said 
that he had to induce tension in them artificially by encouraging them to stand in a 
particular way to give them something to work from. He felt that it was difficult to 
`teach them to support themselves if they have no desire to support themselves'. 
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The release of tension is not itself the goal of this work, then. Rather, it is the 
awareness of tension and the degrees of tension necessary to perform particular 
movements. In one of my early lessons my Alexander teacher commented that 
`It's a sixth sense... to sense the tension in the muscles and the pressure in the joints. 
This technique I presume is encouraging people to develop this kinaesthetic sense 
more'. Developing a bodily awareness, a `sixth sense' of perception, allows people to 
overcome the faulty sensory awareness with which they are generally perceived to 
operate. It is this increased perception which builds a new awareness of the body/self 
in keeping with the goals of the Alexander Technique. 
Perception 
Merleau-Ponty writes that `the theory of the bodily schema is, implicitly, a theory of 
perception' (1962: 206). As I have just noted, perception is also a key aspect of the 
Alexander Technique as well. Although perception can be observed in the entire 
body through the development of kinaesthetic awareness, in my fieldwork this was 
particularly noticeable in relation to vision. 
By the third lesson, my Alexander teacher had begun to work on my eyes. He 
encouraged me not to look at him while he was making adjustments to my body or 
speaking to me. The latter was particularly difficult, as it contradicted years of 
cultural training to make eye contact in conversation. However, he insisted that when 
my eyes followed him, my head-neck-back relationship was sure to be disturbed. 
Instead, he encouraged me to develop my peripheral or `panoramic' vision, observing 
him while keeping my eyes focussed forward. `Instead of observing by looking, by 
lengthening and keeping the central core [of the head-neck-back relationship] we 
observe more'. 
This was explained not only as a process of improving one's observational skills, but 
also of becoming less involved with, or caught up in, what one observed. In 
developing panoramic vision, 'we somehow acknowledge [what is going on] but try 
not to judge'. In doing so, my Alexander teacher suggested, we see things `from 
ourselves', without the mind or emotions taking over. In order to develop this kind 
of vision, I was directed to maintain my head-neck-back relationship without tensing 
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up these muscles, while thinking about shifting my vision from the surface to the back 
of the eyeball, and then to the back of the skull. As my teacher demonstrated in the 
first lesson with the exercise in thinking about a particular direction, such `thinking 
about' can dramatically affect resulting action. In this case, vision of course does not 
literally begin to originate in the back of the skull, but the perception of where vision 
occurs is shifted, with a resulting change in the relationship of the head and neck. 
When vision is perceived to come from the front of the eye, one's head is often poked 
slightly forward in order to follow what is going on in one's surroundings. By 
shifting this perception backward, the head-neck-back relationship remains in good 
alignment and more awareness is developed of what is happening at the periphery of 
the visual field. 
One exercise used in lessons to develop this included turning my head slowly to the 
left and then to the right several times, while getting my eyes to `move like a camera' 
without catching sight of any particular object as my head turned. Then, with my 
head facing forward, I was directed to move my eyes in a circle, looking up, to the 
right, down, to the left, and up again, reaching them as far as they could go. I noticed 
pain in my eyes during this latter exercise and my teacher commented that this was 
due to the fact that I rarely used them in this way. In the headturning exercise, it was 
difficult not to let my eyes `catch' on anything as theymoved; this made me aware of 
the ways in which my vision is usually object focussed. By drawing attention to what 
Barlow, in the quote which began this chapter, calls the `intimate management of our 
moment-to-moment perceptions of ourselves', Alexander Technique broadens 
awareness about how one uses one's body, in concrete and detailed ways. 
As the exercise of trying to perceive vision as stemming from the back of the head 
indicates, however, the acute body awareness cultivated through the Technique is not 
always about the literal `truth' of anatomy but about extending perceptual awareness 
or developing a particular alignment. In a perceptual exercise not related to vision, I 
was asked to think of moving my joints from a point several inches below the jo int 
itself. This gives the impression of extension and changes the ways in which arms 
and legs are moved; arms seem longer and further away from the body, for example. 
Again, the purpose is the promotion of straighter alignment and less tension. Yet 
there is also a sense of not `getting caught up in' the movement, both literally and 
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figuratively. Literally, the joints are not `caught' and the arms are not held close to 
the body, so more release can happen; figuratively, less involvement of the self is 
needed in what is occurring. 
This action around perception affects the body and psyche together, although it is 
directed by a conscious awareness. This consciousness is never physically located, 
and raises a question as to whether the body can be `conscious'. Alexander in fact 
posits that consciousness is the self, but since the self is a psycho-physical unity, he is 
not thereby suggesting that consciousness is a mental substance separate from the 
physical substance. Body can conceivably be part of consciousness, and Alexander's 
work may develop consciousness in the body as well as awareness of the body. This 
is a point to which I shall return below. 
Inhibition 
While I have examined Alexander's concepts of faulty sensory awareness and 
perception, I have as yet said little about how one shifts from one to the other. This is 
achieved through what Alexander terms `inhibition'. While inhibition has come to 
have negative implications associated with a person unable to `let go' and appearing 
reserved or even unhappy, in Alexander's work it has no such connotation. Inhibition 
is the middle step between reacting habitually and making choices about one's 
actions: in between these steps, one inhibits one's habitual responses (or tensions), 
stops, and consciously reconsiders one's decisions. 
The process of inhibition leaves many pupils feeling and appearing rather stiff. On 
several occasions toward the end of a lesson my Alexander teacher observed that my 
movement appeared robotic, as I consciously worked through what I had been 
learning. He commented that this stage was very common to those learning the 
Technique. Indeed, one interviewee who had lived with Alexander teacher trainees 
and attended parties with their classmates noted that such parties tended to be very 
slow because so much energy went into inhibition, which `became very awkward for 
somebody who wasn't actually familiar with it, because in conversation as well, they 
wouldn't feel uncomfortable not reacting... there would be these pauses in 
conversation which certainly in an English-speaking culture are very uncomfortable'. 
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However, she observed that this seemed to decrease as their study progressed and the 
work became integrated into their bodily habitus. 
Inhibition refers not only to inhibting one's initial reactions, but also one's reactions 
to correction. From the first lesson, my teacher made it clear that when he adjusted 
me, I was to inhibit my reaction to respond. He said `Just observe. You don't have to 
go with me. My hands are just here to give you a sense of weight'. My background 
as a dancer made this particularly difficult: in dance training, I had learned to 
anticipate the corrections my teachers would make and respond to verbal feedback 
before they felt it necessary to make physical adjustments themselves. In order to 
incorporate the Alexander work, then, I had to learn to stop and be still when 
adjustments were made, rather than to anticipate them and try to contribute by moving 
my neck or shoulders, for example, into what I thought was a more appropriate 
alignment. Because I was considered to have `faulty sensory awareness', such 
adjustments on my part were likely to take me further from the desired alignment, 
causing more work for my teacher. By inserting this step of stopping or inhibiting my 
reaction to these adjustments, I could then `choose' to react differently or simply to 
allow the adjustment to occur without reacting at all. On other occasions, I was asked 
to move my arm or leg `as if it didn't belong to you'. This cultivated disinterest in 
what might be going on around me or with my limbs was intended to encourage me 
again to maintain a good head-neck back relationship and stay within my `self. 
This mode of inhibition has other personal applications. For instance, my teacher 
explained that he was very fond of Pringles crisps, and that eating one established a 
habit which might be difficult to break. The question, then, was whether he really 
wanted to eat the whole packet, which would be quite unhealthy. One possibility was 
to put the packet away out of sight, but with another stimulus, such as a chair, this 
might not be possible. `We don't have choices about our environment', he argued, 
`for example, the climate' or the fact that in daily life we might be invited to sit in 
chairs, tempting us to collapse our necks and sit with poor alignment. Returning to 
the example of the crisps, he suggested that with Alexander Technique he could 
choose to eat a third of the packet and then reconsider his decision, to stop and ask 
himself whether he really needed the rest of the packet or whether eating had simply 
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become a habit. In doing so, he would stop `reacting' and make his decision 
conscious. 
Clearly this is quite a different conception of the mind/body relationship to the one 
put forward in body wisdom: here, the body does not know when it has had enough, 
nor is it innately averse to crisps, which in other forms of alternative and 
complementary health, it would `know' to be unhealthy. There is no wise body to be 
restored in Alexander Technique, merely instinct to be controlled and re-educated. 13 
As the foregoing discussion has shown, disturbances of the headneck back 
relationship in particular are considered to take one away from one's 'self'. It is as if 
the self comes to reside in these body parts and the relationship between them. 
Inhibition is conscious, but it is not simply an inhibition applied by a disembodied 
(mental) consciousness onto a prereflective body. The body/self is involved in this 
conscious control, if only in one primary relationship. Is it possible then to speak of 
the development of a `body consciousness? ' Does the act of inhibition acquire, with 
practice, the status of a consciousness of the body? 
Merleau-Ponty's discussions of bodily knowing tend to demonstrate awareness and 
knowledge at a prereflective level, whereas Alexander Technique's concept of 
inhibition is by definition a conscious and reflected process. However, Alexander 
Technique claims to be holistic, involving both mind and body. This is obviously true 
at one level inasmuch as the Technique cultivates mental, conscious awareness of the 
body and its actions, but this still presupposes a dualistic split between mind and body 
where one is controlled by the other. Whether the body can be said to be part of this 
conscious awareness however is still at issue. In the next section, through an 
examination of Alexander Technique as one of what Csordas (2002) has called 
`somatic modes of attention', I will analyse the ways in which consciousness and the 
mind/body relationship are invoked. 
13 As I shall argue in Chapter Seven, this is not to say that there is no body believed to be restored, only 
that the restored body is never 'wise'. 
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Somatic Modes of Attention 
As I described in Chapter Three, Thomas Csordas develops Merleau-Ponty's work on 
attention, perception and the body into a theory of `somatic modes of attention' which 
are `culturally elaborated ways of attending to and with one's body in surroundings 
that include the embodied presence of others' (2002: 244). Clearly, Alexander 
Technique lessons fit this definition, being a method of attending both to and with 
bodies, in an environment which includes the embodied presence of at least one 
teacher. There are several key concepts in the technique which form its modes of 
attention to the body: these include `doing and non-doing', `means-whereby' as 
versus `end-gaining', and its development of what it terms `good use of the self'. I 
shall discuss each of these as aspects of somatic modes of attention. 
Doing and Non-Doing 
As my discussion of inhibition has shown, Alexander Technique is as much about not 
doing particular things as it is about doing them. Thus the process of learning the 
Technique involves learning not to do what is habitual but also not to `do' at all, but 
rather to inhibit any reaction. `Doing' the Alexander Technique is thus just as much a 
process of learning `not to do'. 14 
For example, in one lesson, my teacher worked on my shoulders with the stated 
intention of helping me to `differentiate them', because some of the very tense 
muscles were not necessary for supporting the head. As he moved my shoulders with 
his hands, sometimes rubbing them, sometimes gently adjusting one bit or another, he 
told me that `Your job at the moment is not to direct. That's very different than doing 
nothing. You have to understand what you've done to yourself by reacting [in this 
way]'. He suggested that this might sound judgemental, but that it was important as 
well for pupils of the technique to understand that it was not simply about developing 
straight but static postures, but about movement and awareness. I was not to `direct' 
myself in any particular way, but to `not direct', becoming aware of and inhibiting 
any reaction I had to stiffen my shoulders and change their position. 
14 Not to Do' is also the title of a book on the Alexander Technique by Fiona Mackenzie Robb, an 
account of her lessons in the technique, published in 1999. 
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On other occasions, I was encouraged to develop a principle of disinterest in what was 
going on around me, whether it be the adjustments he was making to me during table 
work or the `stimulus' provided by the back of a chair which I was to put my hands on 
without grabbing, by directing my arms and shoulders. However, this lack of interest 
is not a lack of attention. It is a deliberate and cultivated disinterest aimed to keep 
reaction and habit from interfering with the `self and misaligning the headneck-back 
relationship. 
Non-doing then is still a somatic mode of attention: attention is paid to and with the 
body by inhibiting reaction and habit. As non-doing is attentive, it is also active. It 
is, as the quote above indicates, `very different than doing nothing'. It is a particular 
kind of work on and through the body/self to promote good alignment. As Alexander 
wrote, `to "try and get it right" by direct "doing" is to try and reproduce what is 
known, and cannot lead to the "right", the as yet "unknown" (1985 [1932]: 20). 
In non-doing, reactions which are perceived to interfere with the `self (through the 
head-neck-back relationship) are inhibited, which is then thought to `allow the right 
thing to do itself. It is here that the idea of the aspect of re-education begins to make 
itself apparent: by non-doing, aspects of the self in its proper alignment assert 
themselves. Alexander's `self is in no way preconscious; he speaks of freeing 
humanity from `the domination of instinctive habit and the slavery of the associated 
automatic manner of reaction' (1985 [1932]: 20). What the work seeks to cultivate is 
a perpetual conscious awareness. 
End-Gaining and Means-Whereby 
In everyday action, Alexander felt that most people's use of self was what he called 
`end-gaining'. End-gaining refers to seeking out an aim or objective without 
considering the process by which it is to be obtained. Careful consideration of the 
process, on the other hand, he refers to as the `means-whereby'. One of the key aims 
of the Alexander Technique, then, is to develop an awareness of the means-whereby 
actions are carried out. It is a privileging of process over result, and as my Alexander 
teacher noted, this is considered to be something of a challenge to the values of 
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contemporary consumerist societies, although this is not a theory that is significantly 
developed in the work. 
In some lessons, when my Alexander teacher felt that he had pushed too hard, he 
commented that he himself was end-gaining by trying to get me to reach a desired 
level of awareness. Rather contrary to Alexander, he suggested that end-gaining was 
not necessarily bad, because `we are always end-gaining. The question is how much'. 
Again, awareness of process is critical. 
In one lesson, he demonstrated the principle of means-whereby with an exercise 
where the first forger of each hand drew a circle, each in opposite directions. With 
elbows bent and extended and these fingers facing each other, he asked me to draw 
opposite circles with each forger so that they would end up back at the top of the 
circle at the same time. This exercise in hand coordination was too difficult, and I 
was unable to reproduce what he had demonstrated. Instead, therefore, he broke the 
exercise down to demonstrate the means -whereby it could be achieved. By splitting 
the circle into quadrants and taking the exercise slowly, with an awareness of where 
the forgers should be after drawing each quadrant, it became easier to reproduce. If 
the fingers start at the top of the circle, they should meet each other at both the top 
and bottom points. At each side, they should be directly opposite one another. This 
could then be sped up or broken down further. My Alexander teacher explained that 
the process did not have to be examined more carefully if the results seemed 
acceptable; `if you're getting what you want i's fore for the time being'. However, 
like any action, it might later require further refining. This points to the ongoing 
nature of the work. 
Good Use of the Self 
If Alexander Technique is `end-gaining' in any way, the end it seeks is what 
Alexander referred to throughout his work as `good use of the self'. This relates to 
the proper alignment of the head-neck-back relationship, which, by virtue of being 
regarded as the `primary control', will bring the rest of the body/self into good 
alignment as wel. However, Alexander teachers are particularly interested in the 
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means whereby good use of the self is achieved. This is because such use is an 
ongoing process and not a state to be definitively reached. 
Throughout the first ten lessons in particular, I noticed a number of gradual changes 
occurring. In the first full lesson after the introductory workshop, I noted in my field 
journal that I left feeling wider, and as if there were lead weights in each of my limbs. 
By the second lesson, however, I felt less wide and less realigned, yet my teacher 
noted that my alignment was better already and that I was arching my mid-back less. 
During the third lesson, I was beginning to notice it was becoming easier to stand up 
straight, and by the fourth lesson felt as if my body had changed so significantly that I 
began to wonder whether I made many of these changes subconsciously on my way to 
the lessons, in preparation. The standard exercise of sitting and standing from a chair, 
trying to maintain a good head-neck-back relationship as I did so, seemed easier, and I 
found that I was seated further back on the chair when I sat, which my teacher 
described as a better position. 
Despite seeming easier, the work also became more tiring. After the sixth, seventh, 
and eighth lessons, I found myself going home to sleep, and my teacher explained that 
`This is very tiring work. It is tiring because it is very new, new things to do and the 
system of the body changes when we accept new things'. Muscles often hurt the day 
after a lesson as well, especially thigh muscles if we had done a lot of sitting and 
standing work with the chair. My teacher told me that this was very normal and that 
he also sometimes experienced it after a lesson with another teacher. 
As lessons progressed, I needed fewer books to support my head during table work, 
indicating changes in how I carried my head and neck, and that I was on some level 
applying the oft-repeated directions to `allow the head to go forward and up'. I also 
noticed a significant change in my shoulders, which became less rounded and sloped. 
Often, however, these changes seemed to take me by surprise, and I could not fully 
chronicle their development. There was no steady process through which I noticed the 
alignment of my shoulders shifting; rather, one morning I looked in the minor and 
noticed that a change I had for years been attempting to effect (realigning my 
shoulders) was something I was now doing, and that doing it seemed effortless. 
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Bodily knowledge is so often unconscious knowledge, and the issue that arises in the 
above discussion is how quickly conscious awareness becomes unconscious. While 
there were moments when I became abruptly aware that something I had been doing 
was now changing, the process was often sosubtle that I seemed to miss it, despite 
trying to constantly attend to and document this process through my feldnotes. 
Bodily habits, once they become habitual, cease to be conscious. In Feldenkrais work 
and Rolfmg, particularly, this is not seen as problematic, because it is the nervous 
system which `learns' new ways of moving or aligning the body, and this is 
understood to be a natural process. In Alexander Technique, however, conscious 
control is always desirable. Since there is no fixed end point when the work is over 
and good use of the self is obtained, it is usually ongoing. Conscious control and the 
awareness of the body become part of one's habitus, as I shall elaborate below. 
It is not that activities do not eventually become habitual in Alexander Technique, but 
that there is a constant drive to have conscious awareness of them. Where Alexander 
Technique differs from other forms of movement re-education is not in habit but in 
the desire for conscious control. The nervous system is not perceived to take over the 
work fully; the knowledge and learning of the body is considered to be largely end- 
gaining and lacking in the awareness needed to consider the means-whereby (Barlow, 
1973). This is not to say that in other movement re-education techniques the work 
done is not ongoing, only that there is little emphasis on conscious control; in fact, as 
I discussed in the previous chapter, Feldenkrais considered it to be unnecessary 
(1949). The `means-whereby' the work is accomplished, then, takes on a very 
different character. This is evident in reference to the body conditioning class I 
attended as part of my fieldwork. 
Despite taking Alexander Technique as one of its influences, this body conditioning 
class, part of a dance training programme, did not emphasise conscious control and 
means whereby in the ways I have described above. Although the tutor had trained as 
an Alexander teacher, she was also certified to teach the Pilates method and Astanga 
yoga, and these styles were dominant in the class. Further, like many dance classes I 
have attended, the class mixed techniques and styles without any explicit statement 
about what source they were derived from. 
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Although there were variations between weeks, the class tended to begin with a 
standing warm-up, involving circling the arms in large figures of eight and turning the 
upper body from side to side, then adding the feet, with the foot just lifting off the 
floor every time the body turned to one side or the other. This was followed by a 
figure of eight with the ribcage, with the arms loosely crossed over the chest in a kind 
of `mummy' position. These exercises were said to be good not only for warming up 
the body, but also for loosening tension. The latter was reported to make people 
cough because it moved the lungs, and was therefore beneficial for people who 
smoked or had breathing difficulties. These exercises were also supposed to warm up 
the shoulders and relax them, as well as releasing tension in the diaphragm and 
ribcage. 
The classes usually continued with rounds of a routine called 'sun salutation' which is 
standard in yoga classes, which was repeated many times, and developed participants' 
aerobic fitness because of the speed at which it was performed and the extensive use 
of the arms to support weight. After this and other yoga exercises which included 
handstands and headstands, the focus turned to strength training and mats were 
brought out for Pilates matwork. One typical exercise included what were called `leg 
scissors', involving rolling the head and neck up slightly with the feet flat on the floor 
and knees bent, then extending one foot, pulling the other toward the chest with the 
arms holding onto the ankle and knee, then changing this so the other foot was 
extended. The exercise was performed in sets of ten, fifteen, then twenty, with a rest 
and roll down so the spine was flat on the floor in between. Another exercise 
involved `rolling like a ball', curling up with head toward knees and arms under the 
knees, and rolling backward and forward along the spine. On only one occasion did 
the class use an exercise from Alexander Technique, by concluding with a variation of 
table work at the end in which participants worked in pairs with one person lying on 
the floor, while the other was led through the process of adjusting the neck, head, and 
arms of the person lying down. 
In Pilates, work is timed in relation to breath, with certain movements performed on 
the inhalation and others on the exhalation. This is a feature it shares with yoga, and 
is the primary way in which the mind is used in this work. As may become apparent 
from the description above, the principles of conscious control emphasised in 
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Alexander Technique were not developed in this class. We were sometimes asked to 
consider the `means-whereby' activities happened in relation to breath and how they 
might be made easier, but little attention was paid to alignment in the exercises 
themselves. The class setting, with a large number of students, also makes it difficult 
for the tutor to pay attention to the means-whereby students are accomplishing 
exercises, and it is often left to the student to determine whether good or bad use is 
occurring. On several occasions, I developed a very stiff neck after the class from 
rolling my head up and holding it unsupported during the Pilates legwork. Clearly I 
was not using my head very well in this exercise, given the pain and tension it caused. 
However, there was little time to receive correction, and eventually I resorted to 
supporting the back of my head with my arms in order to relieve the problem. 
Although breathwork involves conscious control as one aspect of the body-mind 
relationship, there was little work on perception and no effort at inhibition made in 
this body conditioning class. Consciousness was less critical to this work than it was 
in Alexander Technique, and it is conceivable that the coordination required by timing 
the breathwork and the movement could also become habitual. What this class 
demonstrates is the very different ways in which the body-mind relationship may be 
conceptualised in various forms of movement re -education. 
The qualities described above-non-doing, means -whereby, and use of the self, 
through inhibition of reactions and habitual responses- are the characteristics of 
Alexander Technique as a somatic mode of attention. However, while all somatic 
modes of attention require awareness of the embodied self, it is not the case that they 
all require the kind of conscious awareness developed in the Alexander Technique, as 
my discussion of the body-conditioning class has shown. Further, in many of the 
somatic modes of attention mentioned by Csordas, such as athletics or dieting (2002: 
245), the emphasis is largely on what Alexander Technique would call `end-gaining'. 
As Csordas notes, following Marcel Mauss, `there is what we are calling a somatic 
mode of attention associated with the acquisition of any technique of the body, but 
[that] this mode of attention recedes into the horizon once the technique is mastered' 
(245). 
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By examining what is involved in a particular somatic mode of attention, the 
processes by which it works also become evident. For Csordas' studies of religious 
healing, this is an important challenge to traditional accounts of the subject which 
presume a `black box' model, in which nothing is said about the process and practices 
of healing from participants' perspectives and therefore nothing can be understood 
about how healing works. Through the discussion above, the psycho-physical 
practices I have described in relation to the Alexander Technique give a sense of how 
it works and how it achieves the aim of `good use of the self': through practices of 
conscious control and inhibition, and a focus on maintaining a good head-neck-back 
relationship. 
Above, I raised the issue of whether the body could itself be made conscious through 
the process of inhibition, a question with significant implications for Alexander 
Technique's claim to be holistic. If conscious control is exercised by the mind over a 
passive body, then although the Technique incorporates both body and mind, it does 
not challenge dualism's usual assertion of mental supremacy, nor overcome the 
body/mind distinction. Yet what is apparent in these discussions about non-doing, 
means whereby, and use of the self is that the assertion that it is the `self which is 
worked on in an attempt to do away with dualism. Further, as the importance of the 
head-neck-back relationship in `primary control' shows, the self is firmly located in 
the body, through consciousness, and is not separate from it. The technique clearly 
privileges conscious awareness and control over body `knowing' and wisdom, yet this 
consciousness is a hallmark of the `self which is firmly bound up in the body. 
Examining the somatic modes of attention involved in the Alexander Technique is, 
appropriately, a way of examining the `means -whereby' it obtains its goals rather than 
the ends it seeks through telos, which I elaborated in the previous chapter. What the 
discussions both here and in the previous chapter make clear is that Alexander 
Technique is a culturally constituted and elaborated way of changing the self, with a 
set of practices associated with particular principles through which the technique is 
articulated. These practices seek to change not only the habits of an individual, but 
also his or her habitus, resulting in more significant cultural changes. 
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Habitus 
As I discussed in Chapter Three, Bourdieu's theory of habitus provides a way of 
accounting for the unconscious reproduction of social structures and conditions 
through the embodied dispositions of actors. What Alexander Technique seeks 
ultimately to change is not simply bad habitual use of the self, but habitus. However, 
for Bourdieu, as I have said, the habitus is largely unconscious, whereas in Alexander 
Technique, the new habitus is explicitly guided by conscious control. This is a 
tension, but not an insurmountable one: as I have said, actions repeated in the 
Alexander Technique also become habitual, and the emphasis on constant attention 
and awareness to these habits does not in the last instance stop them from becoming 
integrated into the habitus in an unconscious way. However, the new habitus 
cultivated through Alexander Technique certainly differs from the old one inasmuch 
as it is dominated by conscious awareness rather than unconscious behaviour. 
Through developing awareness of the body/self and inhibiting initial reactions (the 
old habitus), choices of behaviour are widened, bringing about the opportunity for 
individuals to react in new ways. Bourdieu, too, notes that in certain situations and 
amongst certain groups of people, habitus may sometimes be a matter of conscious 
maintenance: 
it is likely that those who are `in their rght place' in the social world can abandon or 
entrust themselves more, and more completely, to their dispositions (this is the 'ease' 
of the well-bom) than those who occupy awkward positions, such as the parvenus 
and the declasses, and the latter are more likely to bring to consciousness that which, 
for others, is taken for granted, because they are forced to keep watch on themselves 
and consciously correct the `fast movements' of a habitus that generates 
inappropriate or misplaced behaviours. (2000: 163) 
To a certain extent this holds true for those involved in the Alexander Technique, who 
must keep watch on themselves and consciously inhibit all first movements, 
appropriate or not. In so doing, they are ultimately concerned with providing 
participants with choice rather than simply teaching them to stand up straight, as I 
shall discuss in the following chapter. 
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Bourdieu claims that habitus is largely durable, although he qualifies that it is not 
fate: `Being the product of history, it is an open system of dispositions that is 
constantly subjected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a 
way that either reinforces or modifies its structures. It is durable but not eternal! ' 
(1993: 133, italics in original. ) He later suggests that habitus is constantly being 
revised, although never radically, because this process of revision always works on 
the premises of the previously established state (2000: 161). However, in Alexander 
Technique the processes of inhibition and conscious control, of ceasing to do what 
was done before and then consciously intervening in the action one was planning to 
do, may be a more radical revision of the habitus than Bourdieu imagined possible, 
given that such a state of inhibition and conscious awareness is intended to be 
perpetual. 
In much of his work, Bourdieu's analysis of habitus is somewhat schematic, and he 
tends to highlight its reproductive and productive capacities rather than its adaptive 
ones. More recently however, in a discussion about bodily knowledge in Pascalian 
Meditations, he makes it clear that habitus is not always perfectly adapted and that the 
body itself learns. He rightly notes that this is quite different than intellectual 
learning; pointing to situations `where one understands with an intellectual 
understanding the movement to make or not to make, without being able actually to 
do what one has understood, for lack of comprehension through the body' (2000: 
144). An important part of the habitu , then, is its ability to 
learn. 
Csordas and Merleau-Ponty also offer useful tools for understanding how the habitus 
adapts, and put a somewhat greater emphasis on social actors' lived experience and 
embodiment. As Csordas notes, `Although the habitus bears some of the schematism 
of a fixed text, it can be transcended in embodied existence' (2002: 258, italics in 
original). My analysis of Alexander Technique in relation to the habitus will 
therefore draw on their work as an accompaniment to Bourdieu's. 
Up to this point, I have analysed the practices of the technique which disrupt or 
transcend the habitus. Here, I will examine not only instances of disruption and 
transcendence, but also instances of construction of a new habitus. Although 
Bourdieu is right to suggest that a new habitus is always constructed from the 
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premises of the old one, as I discussed above, by attempting specifically to inhibit the 
old premises Alexander Technique makes a particularly radical attempt to overcome 
these. 
Emotion and the Body/Self 
As Bourdieu points out, (1990: 69-70) ways of standing and sitting are also ways of 
thinking and feeling. Alexander Technique is not simply about re-educating the body, 
but about changing ways of being-in-the -world. It is here that the technique begins to 
shift not only ways of using and perceiving the body, but also the feelings and 
thoughts associated with this way of being. Again, careful attention to the practices it 
employs can help to understand the process by which a new habitus is constructed. 
Throughout my fieldwork, my Alexander teacher indicated that I might find the work 
I was doing emotional, suggesting at one point that I might `feel offended' as he 
adjusted my shoulder, and at another that changes to the head-neck-back relationship 
cause many people to suffer pains or start to cry. He felt that this was `quite awful to 
see' but `part of the process'. I also heard stories from interviewees about the 
dramatic emotional changes that might occur while studying the technique: two 
teachers even knew of cases where it had led to divorce because as one teacher, 
William, put it, `How would you like to be married to a man who thought, you know, 
that this was the way forward? ' 
It is interesting to note, however, that few interviewees spoke about their own 
emotional reactions to work done in this or other techniques, and I did not press this 
issue, feeling that it might be rather intrusive or steer the discussion in psychological 
directions which were neither my strength nor my primary interest. While many 
Alexander teachers acknowledged that the work could be difficult and reported stories 
of how it had been so for others, only one, a teacher-trainee who had recently started 
full-time study of the technique, discussed how it was difficult for her personally. 
This may be partly related to the observation of Becker and Geer (1969: 331) that 
people can rarely adequately account for how they have changed, but it also suggests 
that much of movement re-education sidesteps addressing emotion directly. As I shall 
discuss in Chapter Eight, it is only in Rolfmg that emotion is a key focus of the work; 
as one participant put it, in Alexander Technique, `there isn't really a side that would 
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address all the kind of psychological changes that happen... so you'd be left... things 
would change with you but the psychological effects of that change you would have 
to go somewhere else to deal with'. 
However, despite warnings about the emotional and psychological changes which 
might occur as I took Alexander lessons, none of the work I did seemed to bring on 
any emotional responses or dramatic life-changing experiences. It was not until I 
spent a morning at a training school for Alexander teachers that I understood how the 
technique could elicit these types of reactions. 
Alexander teachers train for three hours per day, five days per week for thirty weeks 
over three years, and therefore the time they devote to study is comparable to studying 
for a degree at most universities. This is a more time-intensive programme and long- 
term commitment than is required by other movement re-education techniques, 
although these also tend to take three years: for example, the Rolf Institute and 
Feldenkrais Guild indicate that they require about eight weeks per year of full-time 
study, and the School for Body Mind Centering requires seven weeks training each 
year. Pilates training is not centralised, but programmes generally take less than a 
year to complete, and one interviewee reported his training took twelve days, with an 
additional fifty supervised hours. 
It is also important to note that Alexander Technique training programmes are based 
on experience and not classroom learning. The training school I attended was held in 
the living room of a private home. The room contained two long mirrors for pupils to 
observe themselves in, a table for table work, and a model of a skeleton. A circle of 
chairs was arranged so that each trainee, of whom there were six present, had a place 
to sit. The teacher-trainees spent the first part of the morning practicing sitting down 
on the chairs and standing up again, slowly and with meticulous attention to 
movement and alignment. Sometimes they stood behind the chairs and put their 
hands on them. The two experienced teachers who ran the school circulated between 
the trainees, guiding them and assisting the process for somewhere between five and 
fifteen minutes each. Trainees were of mixed levels of experience, and those who 
were in their final year of study occasionally worked on one another. At the 
encouragement of one of the teachers, two of them approached me and asked if they 
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could work on me, to which I agreed. They guided me in sitting and standing from 
the chair, an activity I had been trying to reproduce myself as the other trainees were 
doing it. Although I had been attending weekly lessons for six months at this point, I 
was still relatively inexperienced in the technique, and since they usually practised on 
other trainees, I was something of a challenge. They seemed frustrated by my 
inability to respond to the guidance they gave, and I in turn felt frustrated by their 
hesitancy in directing me and the weakness of their hands as they made adjustments, 
which I found confusing. 
This experience was cut short by the announcement of a tea break, held around the 
kitchen table, where two trainees read introductory statements they had been assigned 
to write explaining what the technique was about, and a discussion followed. I was 
told that most of the time, the tea break was used for reading and discussing passages 
of Alexander's books. Following the tea break, the group returned to the circle of 
chairs, working on one another in groups of two or three, taking each other through 
the process of standing, sitting and walking. Several students took turns working on 
me, and one of the teachers assisted them. I was struck by the strength of the 
direction he was able to convey through relatively minor hands -on adjustments, 
particularly in comparison to the students, whose adjustments tended to be hesitant 
and their touch rather light. Finally, one student in his final year did table work with 
me. This was quite similar to the work done by my own Alexander teacher, except 
that the trainee spent a great deal of time adjusting my arms and working on my 
hands, making them lie flat on the table. 
The group broke up at noon, after three hours of training. Sitting in a coffee shop 
near the tube station, writing my fieldnotes, I observed that I felt extremely straight in 
a way that was quite unfamiliar, and that this was associated with feelings of 
discomfort and irritability, and a lingering sense that something of my personality had 
been neutralised or stripped away. The extensive, slow work of the training school, 
which was much longer than any of my lessons, had a significant impact on my bodily 
comportment which took the rest of the day to lose, despite my making an effort to 
return to a posture that felt more `normal'. 
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Theories of the habitus are useful in making sense of this experience: Bourdieu 
suggests that the physical aspects of habitus, exemplified in the bodily hexis, are 
literally what one is. If this is the case, it is not surprising that shifts in ways of 
comportment should be accompanied by feelings of discomfort similar to those I 
experienced. Indeed, of my interviewees, it was the trainee who had most recently 
started the work who was clearest in expressing the difficulties she had in learning it. 
She described how tired she had been during her first term of study, and how now, in 
her second term, she sometimes felt weaker than she had when she began, as muscles 
and patterns of tension shifted. She also mentioned that the adjustments she received 
were not always comfortable, and that sometimes `this thing called gentle 
manipulation gets intrusive, it invades on your old patterns and it's quite difficult to 
have anyone moving you around in that way, and putting you into a new place'. 
These experiences suggest that it is particularly at the beginning of such work that 
change and discomfort is noticed, while as immersion in Alexander Technique (or any 
other method of changing the habitus) progresses, it becomes more comfortable as 
this work itself develops into a new habitus. 
Bourdieu intimates that there is a relationship between existential conditions and the 
body, where to be put in a bodily position conjures up the state associated with that 
position. Merleau-Ponty provides some clarification of this when he writes of sleep: 
I call up the visitation of sleep by imitating the breathing and posture of the sleeper... 
There is a moment when sleep `comes', settling on this imitation of itself which I have 
been offering to it, and I succeed in becoming what I was trying to be: an unseeing and 
almost unthinking mass, riveted to a point in space and in the world henceforth only 
through the anonymous alertness of the senses. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 163) 
Thus, by behaving as if one is asleep, or, in the case of the Alexander trainee, by 
taking on the posture of an Alexander teacher, one eventually becomes that which one 
was trying to be. Yet this becoming through bodily comportment is both cultural and 
habitual: whether or not it is consciously considered, it draws upon a base of cultural 
knowledge and the understanding that habitual behaviour brings about similar results 
each time it is performed. As Bourdieu writes of the waiter: 
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His body, which contains a history, espouses his job, in other words a history, a 
tradition, which he has never seen except incarnated in bodies, or more precisely, in 
the uniforms inhabited by a certain habitus that are called waiters. This does not 
mean he has learned to be a waiter by imitating waiters, constituted as explicit 
models. He enters into the character of the waiter not as an actor playing a part, but 
rather as a child imitates his father and, without even needing to `pretend', adopts a 
way of using the mouth when talking or of swinging his shoulders when walking 
which seems to him constitutive of the social being of the accomplished adult. (2000: 
154) 
Alexander Technique seeks to overcome habit, and in so doing, it obviously 
exemplifies a much more conscious process than sleep or even than becoming a 
waiter. However, it is also obviously cultural, circumscribed by particular behaviours 
and activities that form something called `the Alexander Technique'. Further, even 
the process of applying conscious control to habit by inhibiting reactions and trying 
`not to do' does eventually form habits, which are in turn subjected to conscious 
scrutiny. Through the performance of these activities, one comes to develop a state of 
being-in-the-world which is that of an Alexander pupil, or, in training programmes, 
that of a teacher. 
Alexander Technique is transmitted from teacher to pupil through the hands, and the 
awareness developed by teachers is, as Merleau-Ponty explains, `knowledge in the 
hands' (1962: 144). Yet this knowledge is not localised only in the hands, but 
pervades the teacher's self, which must be constantly maintained in a particular way, 
with good primary control and head-neck-back relationship, in order to transmit the 
work. 
Amongst Alexander teachers, proximity to Alexander himself is often charted and 
taken as a mark of skill. The first generation teachers who trained with Alexander are 
highly sought after and command particular respect because of their relation to the 
founder. To an outsider, this sounds like rather absurd idolatry. Yet when knowledge 
is understood to pass through the hands and to be gained not through abstract learning 
but through experience, this respect begins to make more sense. Through contact 
with those who experienced the founder's direction `first hand', one literally comes 
182 
closer to Alexander himself. However, this still understands the technique as most 
authentic in the hands of its founder. While this desire to hold on to the founder is 
common to many forms of movement re-education, as the next chapters shall show, 
there are significant differences between movement re-education as it was initially 
conceived and as it is practised today. 
Conclusion 
The work of Alexander Technique is never-ending, yet lessons in the technique 
generally draw to a close at some point. As I have said, most teachers believe a good 
grasp of the work can be obtained in thirty lessons or fewer. The pupil of the 
technique can then go about daily life with an awareness of the basic principles of the 
technique, and has at this point developed new patterns of movement and alignment 
which are more comfortable than those previously experienced. For the pupil who 
wishes to continue lessons or develop a very deep understanding of the technique, 
however, it is often thought useful to undergo Alexander teacher training, 
Four of the Alexander teachers and trainees I interviewed indicated that they had 
registered for teacher training not because they expected to make it their primary 
profession, but because it seemed the best way to fully embody the work. Two 
interviewees in particular, both violin and viola players who had experienced 
debilitating upper body pain while playing their instruments, felt that Alexander 
teacher training was the only way to develop a strong enough sense of the work to 
enable them to continue to play their instruments. While both took on a few 
Alexander pupils, neither expected this to be a full-time profession, seeing it instead 
as assisting their musical careers. They described the substantial changes that the 
Technique had enabled them to make by radically altering the way they used their 
bodies/selves during performance. Even after many years, the work still sometimes 
seemed difficult. For one of these teachers, who was fifty when she began Alexander 
lessons, ten years before our interview, the years of habitually poor use continually 
caught up with her: 
Saskia: I'm making a cello for my youngest daughter. And this is really heavy work, 
you know. First of all, how am I going to do it, how am I using myself? And suddenly 
I will realise, what am I doing? And I think oh, stop, do it again. And this will stay 
183 
with me [all] my life. I can't do prophylactic thinking which should be with me all day, 
but it's with me all my life. I am that person and for fifty years I've done it, so fifty 
years is hard to change. 
Alexander Technique is truly a `technique of the self' n that the work it does is all- 
encompassing and continuous. While some of what is learned becomes habitual, it 
will never be entirely so, and the principles of inhibition and non-doing keep the work 
from ever becoming unconscious. The technique is also a cultural way of attending to 
and with the body, or as Csordas has called it, a `somatic mode of attention'. It seeks 
to alter the habitus through conscious awareness of the way the self acts, and brings 
about change by re-educating the body/self. This is developed through the bodily 
learning of new ways of being-in-the-world. 
This chapter has also addressed the body-mind relationship in Alexander Technique 
in relation to its claim to holism. The technique is certainly holistic if this simply 
refers to the involvement of both body and mind. However, it also claims to 
surmount the problem of mind-body dualism, and in this it has some, but not total, 
success. The `self for Alexander is a psycho-physical unity, which both consciously 
directs and is directed. The emphasis placed on cultivating conscious control implies 
that the mind is dominant over an essentially passive body. Further, the ongoing 
nature of the work means that there is no body which is restored to a state of knowing 
or wisdom from which it will at some point be able to direct itself; there is always a 
struggle to gain conscious mastery. As such, the technique merely repeats traditional 
dualistic theories of mental dominance over the body. 
However, this analysis assumes that consciousness is a mental phenomenon and not a 
bodily one; by using the terms `mind' and `body' it also reinscribes the dualist 
distinction. As I have shown through my discussion of the technique in relation to 
habitus, we should take Alexander's claim to work on the `self seriously. States of 
the body often are states of the mind, which draw on habitual and cultural knowledge 
of what it is to feel a particular way or be a particular kind of person in order to 
perpetuate themselves. `Self in the Alexander Technique is clearly located in the 
body and is not a separate mental phenomenon; references to the primary control of 
the head-neck-back relationship as a state of being `in the self demonstrate this. 
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Through conscious control, the act of inhibition can come to take on the status of an 
embodied consciousness; not a consciousness of what the body is doing, but a 
consciousness which is in the body. Therefore, while Alexander denigrates the type 
of bodily knowledge MerleauPonty identifies in his discussion of habit, he does 
acknowledge the body's role in consciousness in a way that does not marginalise it. 
In this, Alexander Technique has the possibility of being more holistic than other 
forms of movement re-education, whose assertion and privileging of `body wisdom' 
can tend to oppose the body/self to a separate mind/self, thereby marginalising the 
latter and idealising the former as the `true' self. While Alexander Technique clearly 
does not subscribe to a theory of body wisdom, through a phenomenological analysis 
of the technique as embodied practice, it becomes apparent that it may provide a 
challenge to mind/body dualism. 
Within this analysis, some of the issues raised in Chapter Five are peripherally 
apparent, such as the image of `Animals in Motion' indicating a model of the natural 
body. However, the discourses of movement re-education's founders are for the most 
part markedly absent in this analysis. This is because for the most part, they simply 
did not arise in participant observation in Alexander Technique. For this reason, it is 
useful to turn to interview data to examine these issues in a contemporary context. 
This also indicates a limitation of participant observation as a form of analysis which 
interviewing helps to correct. In the next chapter, then, I will return to the issue of the 
natural body which underlies much of my analysis in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter 7 
The Natural and the Vertical 
Introduction 
In the process of transcribing interviews, I began to experience pain and aching in my 
wrists and forearms which did not go away. Fearing that I was beginning to develop a 
repetitive strain injury, and being immersed in the accounts of participants with 
similar injuries who had been helped by Alexander Technique, I booked a lesson with 
my Alexander teacher and went out to buy myself an ergonomic keyboard. Arriving 
at my lesson with the keyboard, I asked my teacher to help me find ways of typing 
which would cause less stress on my arms and hands. Putting the keyboard on the 
table at the height of a desk and setting a chair in front of it, he asked me to sit down 
as I would in front of the computer. I sat, making an effort to sit very straight, 
although I rarely did this at home. To my surprise, my teacher pointed out that this 
position was not comfortable fcr a long period of time, and showed me that he 
preferred to sit in what could only be called a slumped position, with his mid-back 
resting on the back of the chair and his hips forward. Rather than sitting upright, he 
encouraged me to lean back. By focussing my attention on letting the chair take my 
weight at the point where my back rested on it, I found my head and neck were less 
tense, and that no tension was transferred to my arms. 
That Alexander Technique might encourage me not to perpetually sit upright was 
something of a revelation, which occurred only toward the end of my fieldwork and 
after I had done a number of interviews with Alexander teachers, acutely conscious of 
adopting a very upright posture which I thought would impress them favourably. 
Often, I noticed they appeared more relaxed than I was, but I was unable to pinpoint 
what made them so. In fact, as I came to realise, the interviewees who demonstrated 
the most erect posture were the ones who were in or had recently completed training, 
or who were pupils and clients rather than practitioners. 
In part, my illusion that movement re-education was primarily concerned with erect 
posture derived from my readings of the texts analysed in Chapter Five. These texts 
give the impression that erectness is a natural human inheritance, and if Ida Rolf 
(1977) is to be believed, that it is in fact the defining characteristic of fully evolved 
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humanity. However, I gradually became aware of divergences between my interview 
data and these texts. There was little talk of verticality and erectness in these 
interviews, and although some of the models of the natural body described in Chapter 
Five persisted, the issue of naturalness was one that provoked debate or at least 
uncertainty among some participants. This also indicates an important reason for 
doing interviews rather than relying solely on discourse analysis; discourses are 
always negotiated according to particular contexts. 
In this chapter, I will analyse the types of bodies described and presented in 
movement re-education in terms of naturalness and verticality. Drawing on data from 
interviews, movement re-education texts, and fieldwork, the chapter will examine 
where and how shifts have occurred in the way ideal kinds of bodies are described 
and presented. The chapter will return to the issue of the natural body, raised in 
Chapter Five, in a contemporary context. It will also raise questions to do with 
verticality and the shift away from the visual in movement re-education, toward what 
can be felt internally but not seen externally. This latter point will be elaborated in 
relation to dance practices which have used movement re-education as part of 
training. Throughout, I will attend not only to the discourses about bodies, but also 
the bodily and embodied aspects of naturalness and verticality. In concluding, I will 
link these issues back to the discussion of body wisdom and show that although a 
wise body is not necessarily a vertical body, it is usually perceived to be a natural one. 
Natural Bodies 
Chapter Five detailed the models of natural bodies presented by movement re- 
education's founders, categorised as `beasts, babes, savages, and Greeks'. Common 
to all these models of the natural body is an understanding of the natural as pro- 
civilised, as something that comes before, and stands outside of, culture and society. 
As was discussed, these models of the natural body often have racist (and sometimes 
sexist) implications and are based on nineteenth and early twentieth century models of 
civilisation as having only one possible evolutionary path. 
In my Alexander lessons there was no mention of a natural body, although as I 
pointed out, images on the wall such as the one of animals in motion did imply use of 
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such a model by at least some teachers at the London Alexander Centre. `Natural', 
however, was not a word used in relation to the work, nor were Alexander's theories 
about children and `savages' having natural bodies referred to. Sometimes cultural 
comparisons were drawn between ways of sitting and standing in the environments 
where my Alexander teacher had worked, but he did not use these to make 
judgements about some cultures being more natural than others. 
This was not the case amongst all Alexander teachers, however. In all twenty-eight of 
my interviews's, I asked participants whether they thought there was such a thing as a 
natural body, what this might look or feel like, who if anyone might possess it, and 
why this was so. In so doing, four categories of responses became distinguishable. 
The majority of participants still held some theory of the natural body as precivilised, 
possessed by children and, in some cases, `savages. ' Other respondents said that the 
natural was a state of ideal performance, that it was the body most people had prior to 
re-education, or that they knew nothing about the `natural body' and that it was a 
phrase they would not use in relation to their work. Below, I will explore these 
understandings and their implications. 
Conceptions of Naturalness 
In their responses, four participants indicated an understanding of naturalness as the 
`normal' state of the body, in the sense of the body prior to re-education; three 
indicated that the natural was an unknown or unattainable state, and six suggested that 
naturalness was an ideal state, dependent on the individual. This latter conception has 
certain parallels with the model of the natural as pro-civilised, and for some 
participants, it overlapped with it. 
Participants who understood naturalness as normal tended to think of movement re- 
education as something additional, indeed, almost unnatural. As with the conception 
of the natural as pro. civilised, this theory suggests that a natural body is something 
that has not been interfered with. However, where the natural is seen as normal, there 
is no state of grace to be recovered and no body to be restored. Rather, the natural 
15 This question was asked of each interviewee, however, while the respondent who answered by e- 
mail indicated 'yes' in response to the question about whether he believed there was such a thing as a 
natural body, he gave no indications of what he thought this might be like, and therefore has been 
excluded from the numbers below. 
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body is one that would benefit from improvement. One Rolfer responded to my 
questioning by replying that he had never considered whether there was such a thing 
as a natural alignment for the body, and that he would not use such a concept in his 
work. He then went on to suggest: 
James: I would say a natural alignment would be what Ida Rolf would call a random 
body, which has not been Rolfed ... Rolfmg is something that adds something that is not 
natural. Well, it is natural, because human beings are doing it to human beings. So it's 
something that's been created by people to give to people to help them. And there's 
nothing wrong with that. But it's not natural in the sense that if you just went through 
life without having it, you wouldn't be as balanced in your body... I don't think we 
should mourn the loss of this natural alignment. I mean when does it start to go? 
Probably as soon as we get upright. Even as we're starting to grow into the alignment, 
we're picking the knocks up and getting the bangs that are going to actually take away 
from that as we get into adulthood. 
For James, Rolfing is natural inasmuch as human beings do it-that is, it is not 
unnatural, but is normal. Although there is a suggestion in this account that children 
may possess a natural alignment, this is perceived to be fleeting, and its dissolution 
natural. This does not imply that the natural way is desirable. One interviewee 
explained that every body was natural because: 
Vivien: It's what it needs to be because of the circumstances, because of how it's 
experienced the world or how... Because of certain influences, be that illnesses or 
accidents or things that were supported, things that were suppressed, you know. Or just 
developed the way they need to be. Not to say that it's the ideal way. 
For these participants, there is no glorification of the natural body: it is an average 
body, probably in need of movement re-education. In models of the natural as 
normal, the conventions of seeing bodies as pure in some pre-social or pre-civilised 
form, as corrupted by civilisation, are overthrown. This was not a very common type 
of response to questions about naturalness, but it was nevertheless an undercurrent. 
Movement re-education in this formulation adds something rather than restoring a 
previous (now lost) state of grace. 
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Three participants refused to use the word `natural' in relation to movement re- 
education or felt that it was not applicable. For these participants, naturalness was 
clearly not part of the goal of their work, and there was no natural body they were 
hoping to restore. As practitioners of Rolfing, Feldenkrais, and Alexander Technique, 
they did not see the their work as re -establishing contact with a natural body. As one 
participant put it: 
Beth: Um... What do we mean by natural? I mean a natural way of being, what is 
natural? I mean I kind of look developmentally, when I'm doing the lessons or when 
I'm working with people I kind of think how could it be easier... how... natural. This 
is a big... 
Jen: it's a strange word 
Beth: It is a strange word and yeah, what do you mean by that in a way, because I think 
it [only] works so much for me. It also kind of invokes a bit of a right and a wrong. 
What's... I think there's an organic way of moving. That's the word that immediately 
comes to mind, maybe. But natural, mm. I don't know. 
Another participant thought that some alignments were more `authentic' than others, 
but was hesitant to consider them more natural (Scott). A third held the position that 
`there is no such thing as a natural body, or that we shouldn't look for one, but that 
there is a dynamic body, which is contextual' (Oliver). Cultural and historical 
context, he felt, shape any `natural' body so that it is never in isolation. This is 
reminiscent of Mary Douglas' analysis of the body as natural symbol, where she 
comments that there is a 
natural tendency to express situations of a certain kind in an appropriate bodily style. In 
so far as it is unconscious, in so far as it is obeyed universally in all cultures, the 
tendency is natural. It is generated in response to a perceived social situation, but the 
latter must always come clothed in its local history and culture. Therefore, the natural 
expression is culturally determined (1970: 97) 
The natural body is therefore always contextual. Two key points emerge from the 
reflections of these participants. One is Beth's suggestion that the `natural' invokes a 
right and wrong; therefore, it is good to be `natural' and bad to be `unnatural'. She is 
therefore closer to seeing the natural as 'ideal' than as `normal'. However, she rejects 
both of these categorisations not only on the basis that they invoke a right and wrong 
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which she wishes to avoid, but because she is unsure what the natural might be. So, 
too, did the others. In part, this may reflect uncertainty in the way the term natural 
has been used: as I have indicated, it can imply a normal state or a pre-civilised state 
and these are very different. However, Oliver implies a more fundamental problem. 
His comment suggests that the natural body may be so intertwined with context that it 
is not identifiable as a separate element. In this there are shades of the contemporary 
social and cultural theory discussed in Chapter Three, through Butler, Foucault, and 
even Merleau-Ponty who reject this category as an isolatable condition. 
This is not to say that movement re -educators are fully-fledged social theorists, only 
that the ideas put forward in theory may not be so distant from practical application as 
might be initially assumed. In any case, three participants do not indicate a large 
proportion of my sample considering these issues, and so I wil not dwell on this 
point. It is worth noting, however, that several participants did have a high degree of 
reflexive awareness about the use of the term `natural' in relation to movement re- 
education. This indicates that the natural is not necessarily critical to movement re- 
education or even to a theory of body wisdom. 
Other participants saw naturalness as an ideal state, believing that some alignments 
were more natural than others, but that this was individually variable. Six participants 
gave responses of this kind. For Carrie, a Feldenkrais practitioner, what could be 
considered a natural alignment varied for structural reasons between individuals, but 
could be identified on the basis of freedom of movement: `if they can do what they 
want to do happily and without injury, and it's free movement and they make it 
progress if they want to, then that's- they're probably achieving their perfect 
alignment for themselves'. 
Carrie conflates natural, ideal, and perfect in this assessment, but suggests that it is 
freedom from pain or restriction which makes an alignment natural. There is no 
visual element attached to the natural; that is, there is no way of identifying a natural 
alignment on the basis of a particular look, contrary to the movement re-educators 
who assumed that verticality was the most natural state for the body to be in. Katja, a 
dancer who studied Pilates, was similarly able to explain the natural in terms of what 
it would feel like rather than what it would look like. This is a particularly significant 
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shift in relation to dance training, where feedback from mirrors has always been 
important: 
Katja: It would feel like I'm standing on my feet, my weight slightly at the front, 
my tailbone dropped and my back lifting up, having the freedom of the head, my 
shoulders coming down and my scapula being just down and kind of relaxed, 
giving me a space in front to breathe. And there's that relaxation on the whole of 
the body.... So that's what I call natural. 
A dancing body has always been a trained body, but postmodern and new dance have 
increasingly sought to undo formal dance training, returning to the `natural' body, 
often through movement re-education. This puts the dancer's body in a peculiar 
relation to the natural-being `trained' for `naturalness'. However, the idea that 
kinaesthetic skill comes naturally to some people is a common one, and athletes are 
sometimes described as being `natural' at a particular sport. For one Alexander 
teacher, the natural alignment of the body was only occasionally attained, although 
some individuals were more likely to achieve it than others: 
Jen: So do you think that there is such a thing as a natural alignment of the body? 
Robert: [pause] For the individual. There is, it's never going to be, I mean you m ight 
actually hit 100%. You know when you've hit 100%, it feels fantastic, great. And it 
might be in a lesson, it might not be in a lesson, it might be while you're playing tennis. 
But it's fleeting. Because we're enormously complex, and we can't help it... the 
average animal, I mean there are some horses that are fantastic, but they don't win 
every race. And there are some horses that are never going to win a race. It's the same 
for human beings. 
Burt (1998) and Gilman (2004) have each written about naturalness in relation to 
dancers and athletes. Burt points out that dancer Josephine Baker's skills were 
labelled `natural', because she was black and therefore, in the 1920s when she danced, 
was associated with the primitive (1998: 59). Gilman argues that amongst athletes, 
there is never any such thing as a natural body, because all sport involves a kind of 
training. This links with Mauss' (1973 [1935]) observation that there are techniques 
of the body associated with swimming and walking as well. Inked, as Gilman points 
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out, the `natural' athlete's body, exemplified by baseball player Lou Gehrig, may be 
at the root of ill-health (a lean, athletic body is often associated with ALS, known 
colloquially as `Lou Gehrig's Disease'. ) Even bodies that appear genetically 
predisposed to athleticism may not in fact be healthy. 
Conceptions of the natural body as ideal are also sometimes elided with the natural as 
pre-civilised, as they have a certain continuity. Seeing some bodies as more natural 
than others immediately begs the question of whose body can be natural. Participants 
who gave responses that indicated that a natural body was an ideal to strive for often 
also saw it as existing amongst the pre-civilised, namely children or `tribespeople'. In 
the case of one Alexander teacher, certain athletes demonstrated natural good use of 
themselves, but some did so because of training: 
Saskia: there are only a very very few people, and I'm thinking of musicians as 
well, and I'm thinking of Mohammed All, or WE Graf, they have a very natural 
use of themselves, everything is right. But I'm sure, I think Mohammed Ali has it 
by himself, I'm sure Steffi Graf had just a good teacher. 
Given the remainder of Saskia's remarks about the natural as pro- civilised `savage', 
detailed below, it is probably not coincidental that Graf, who is white, is interpreted as 
having had good teaching while Ali, who is not, came by his skills `naturally'. 
Therefore the conception of the natural as ideal, where naturalness is an individual 
achievement or an individual best, is not always exempt from the racist implications 
of the natural as pre-civilised; it can in fact be linked to them. 
The natural as ideal presents certain paradoxes which are partially resolved by 
recourse to a theory of the natural as pre-civilised. In interpreting naturalness as a 
state outside culture, the reasons that certain individuals and bodies are marked as 
more natural than others becomes clear. It is in any case strange to say that trained 
bodies, such as those of athletes and dancers, exhibit characteristics of being natural. 
They may make particular activities appear natural or effortless, but it is always an 
ease cultivated through training the body. This is the case even when training takes 
the form of re-educating or `un-training' the body, as with dancers who use movement 
re-education to reclaim the natural body. 
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The Natural as Pre -Civilised 
It would be misleading to conclude from the examples above that the natural body so 
admired by Alexander, Pilates, Rolf, Feldenkrais and Cohen has ceased to be relevant 
or does not translate into the practices or understandings of participants in these 
techniques. Fourteen of twenty-seven respondents who addressed this issue, slightly 
more than half, gave responses to the question of the natural body which indicated a 
continuity with the views of the founders, falling into the general category of `natural 
as pre-civilised'. Two other respondents indicated views consistent with this theory 
elsewhere in thei discussions, although their response to direct questioning about the 
natural body fell into one of the categories above, again suggesting an uncertainty 
about what `natural' meant. 
`Beasts, babes, savages, and Greeks' were not necessarily the models iced by 
contemporary movement re-educators, however. Amongst all interviewees there was 
only one case where animals were held up as models of naturalness to be emulated, 
and no instances of reference to the ancient Greeks. Both of these appear to have 
fallen into disuse. There were five general accounts of the natural body as lost which 
did not specifically refer to children or `savages' but still posited that the development 
of civilisation had led to the denigration of the body and any awareness of its 
workings. For one participant, movement re-education was `a bit like stripping the 
house down to its original features, and then you see the house for what it is... it's 
how your body's meant to function as opposed to the various emotional tics that we 
might put onto it because stress that is actually mental comes out through the body 
(Mark). These accounts implied the pre-civilised body without making explicit 
reference to anyone or anything perceived to still possess it. 
Most frequently among participants who understood natural as pro-civilised, children 
were idealised as pre-civilised, natural bodies with innately good use of the body/self. 
Eight responses fit into this category. Michael's response is typical of these: 
Michael: The technique is a kind of re-education, so the implication there is that we 
have this in us, we have this co-ordination in us. And of course you sec it in kids, in 
very young children, that they have amazing posture and balance and with every 
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movement the head leads and the body follows and all the things you learn in the 
Alexander Technique. It's quite frustrating to see that the little toddler has all that and 
more, and can squat for ages, or sit comfortably in any position with the spine really 
straight and the head sitting lightly on top of the spine and so on. So I think it's in us 
all to have that, it's like we have to peel away the layers of more problematic stuff that 
we've put on top of that for whatever reasons. You know, through imitation, stress, 
illness, whatever it might be. 
It is clear that for Michael, young children possess good body use which is covered by 
layers of `more problematic stuff. His narrative does not specify precisely where 
these problems come from or at what point they begin. Other partic ipants suggested a 
variety of reasons for this, including social conditioning, imitation of parents and 
older children, emotional or physical abuse, and schooling. As one Pilates teacher 
explained: 
Laila: I would say that you start to lose your natural body awareness and your 
natural physicality and your joy of movement and your joy of being yourself and 
within your body when you go to school. That's my interpretation. I mean if you 
look at kids when they are playing, and I don't know whether there is so much 
difference between kids in big cities and in the countryside, there might be, I don't 
know. But I mean if you look at kids, they are so sensitive and they are moving 
constantly, and they are... it's just so great to look at them. 
That children use their bodies well naturally is taken by these participants as fact. Yet 
this is perhaps peculiar given the particular medical and educational attention that has 
historically been given to children's posture. As both Yosifon and Steams (1998) and 
Vigarello (1989; 2001) point out, most posture campaigns were addressed specifically 
at children's bodies as sites of danger and weakness; children were seen as requiring 
moulding. Although this does not necessarily mean that posture campaigners saw 
children's earliest attempts to sit and stand straight as faulty, it does imply that 
children do not `naturally' know how to use themselves. The argument is made more 
problematic in Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen's extensive work with children: on one 
hand, she and other Body-Mind Centering practitioners use children as the model of 
evolution and naturalness, yet on the other hand, the `patterning' work which is 
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addressed to them implies that they need guidance in attaining naturalness. It is 
complicated still further by the fact that children learn sitting and walking with the 
guidance of their parents, who are at the same time demonstrating (according to these 
theories) poor posture. Why then should children's alignment be remarkable when 
the alignment of those from whom they learn, and who apparently later corrupt their 
body use, is poor? In other words, how is this apparent perfection produced from an 
obviously imperfect model? This is an inconsistency in these discourses around 
children as exemplars of the natural. There are other problems with this notion as 
well, which I shall attend to below. 
Notions of the `savage' were evident in five responses to the question, suggesting it 
has not entirely disappeared. In two of these cases, participants also referred to 
children, indicating a continuity between child and `savage'. In three interviews, 
broad references were made to `tribespeople' and `hunter-gatherers' as presenting 
examples of healthy use of the body/self because they lived in societies where daily 
physical activity was still a fundamental part of life. There was a further implication 
that this was a more `natural' way of living and consequently a healthier one, and that 
Western societies had developed `too fast' for their own good. However, in these 
three cases the `savage' remained a vague and ethereal figure, not overtly associated 
with any particular culture or group. In two cases, however, who was `savage' was 
made clear: 
Saskia: development has gone so fast that we can't trust our instincts anymore. I think 
we can't trust our instincts. As children, when we're young and we're kept to doing the 
natural thing, then yes we can, and when we see natural movements as children, when 
we send our children, I don't know where. Look, if you think of black people, 
beautiful, wherever, in Africa, wherever, still in America. And then they come to a 
different way of life, and you see their body change and I see now black people in 
Brixton, the youngsters, you know also, they have lost their beauty. How they're 
standing, hanging around, doing this, so they have totally lost their beauty. Their 
natural beauty. 
Reut: Well there's always examples of people or cultures that have good use, but 
they're very few and far between, mainly people who live really away from Western 
life, more tribal sort of life, maybe Southern America, maybe some African tribes, 
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maybe, I don't know, remote Chinese, Japanese ones. So I don't think it's a rule, but in 
a very general way you can see better use there, on the whole. And that's because they 
still have to survive. So I think that way yes, but I don't think it's a racial thing, because 
if you take the same people starting their education in a more Western way you can sec 
them develop the habits that everyone else will have in this society. 
Maybe it's the price of advance, whatever. 
This final comment about `the price of advance' underscores what these discourses 
suggest- that there is an evolutionary scale against which cultures and individuals 
can be measured, and that some are more developed than others. Body use in each of 
these cases is `not racial' but cultural, not genetic but learned-yet there is an explicit 
equation between non-Western, non-white `others' and good body use. This physical 
prowess is implicitly contrastedto the apparently lower social and intellectual 
development of the `savage', reinforcing the scientific racism of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, a racism displayed in the works of Alexander and Pilates. 
This is not to say that all contemporary movement re -educators accept the outdated 
theories of the founders, and as the preceding discussion has demonstrated, some take 
very different views, refiguring or rejecting 'naturalness' as an ideal toward which 
they strive. One Alexander teacher was particularly clear in his opposition to 
Alexander's theories: 
Dilip: I think [Alexander] sort of seemed to imply that we had much freer lives before, 
and that it was just technological change or living in the twentieth century or whatever 
that's caused these problems... I think that's just, you know, not believable in a way. 
Evolution happens over millions of years, or hundreds of thousands of years, not over a 
century or something like that. At least where human beings are concerned. And I 
think often one of the other things that people go on about is that, native people being 
freer or totally in balance or something like that and I don't agree with that either, 
because I've lived in other cultures, I was brought up in Kenya, I think it's a myth to 
believe everybody else is fine and it's just Western man that's decadent and fallen 
down and all that. 
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Dilip uses personal experience to refute Alexander's evolutionary theory, and 
although he is not a lone voice in this sense, moving beyond Alexander's ileas has 
been extremely difficult for many movement re-education practitioners. 
Race, Childhood, and Representation 
As the previous discussions indicate, it is difficult for some movement re-educators to 
separate themselves from the work of their founders, resulting from the persistence of 
the `founding myth' and the awe in which many practitioners hold these founders. 
Racist and racialist discourses persist not only in the minds of some of movement re- 
education's practitioners, but also in contemporary texts published on these 
techniques. Wilfred Barlow, apparently aware that Alexander's views were out of 
date, indicates that his teacher was `plunged straight into [the] evolutionary argument' 
of Darwin and Huxley and was `inevitably caught up with the notion of a basic 
perfection which is lost by a combination of environmental stress and personal 
stupidity' (1973: 33). Barlow suggests that we no longer understand humanity to 
have only one possible correct way of standing. Further, he writes, `We have no "true 
nature", beset with "ugly contradictions". To know and to be what we "truly" are, we 
have to find out what we are; and we have to construct what we are to be' (1973: 34). 
Alexander Technique, therefore, is about personal evolution, not social evolution; 
moreover, it is about personal (not natural) selection of a way of being. Yet this 
relatively progressive argument about the lack of a `true nature' to be sought through 
the Alexander Technique is undermined by the use on the same page of one of the 
very evolutionary images he appears to be resisting (shown in Figure 7.2 below). 
Moreover, Barlow's revision of Alexander's faulty evolutionary and historical 
argument is overlooked entirely by some later writers, such as Balk and Shields 
(2000) in The Art of Running With the Alexander Technique. They write: 
People from less industrialised nations seem to suffer less interference with the 
natural use of themselves than we do in the west. For example, physiologists have 
found that a Kenyan woman uses no more effort-that is, oxygen consumption- 
walking up a hill with a 10kg jug of water balanced on her head than you or I 
without one. And, as far as I know, they haven't yet figured out why. It is 
probably because Kenyan women already possess excellent ba lance and co. 
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ordination. You don't see Kenyan men walking around with jugs balanced on their 
heads, but you certainly see enough of them in the winners' rostrum at races. (Balk 
and Shields, 2000: 25). 
This passage follows an illustration which is captioned `small children usually 
demonstrate excellent `primary control of use" (2000: 23). Similar comments run 
throughout the book, with a series of references to Kenyans and children as examples 
of people with natural good poise. Balk and Shields are not alone in this; St. Louis 
(2003) notes the same tendency among many sports scientists keen to link athletic 
ability with `race' as a genetic endowment. In one telling comparison, Balk and 
Shields write that `We can observe the effects of a well-organized primary control in 
young children, great athletes (Muhammad Ali, Carl Lewis) and performers (Fred 
Astaire, Margot Fonteyn), and in many tribesmen and women' (2000: 74). In this 
brief summary, both the models of the natural as pre-civilised and the natural as ideal 
are present. Athletes (black) and performers (white) are also invoked. However, 
most notable is how once again, and not accidentally, the savage-child relationship is 
resurrected. 
Michael Gelb, too, in a key contemporary text on the Alexander Technique, refers to 
the natural good use of `animals, infants, and a few outstanding adults' (1987: 44), 
many of whom are athletes. Yet he also describes Alexander's theory that unreliable 
sensory appreciation is the result of civilisation moving too fast for instinctual 
responses to keep up (1987: 60-61). Elsewhere, he tells the reader that `Failure to 
adopt the upright posture represents a failure to explore our potential to be fully 
human' (46). 
That Alexander's evolutionary theories and racism are replicated in contemporary 
Alexander Technique is given further support by the issue on multiculturalism in 
Alexander Technique's Direction journal. Despite raising questions about the cultural 
assumptions implicit in Alexander Technique and the technique's relations with some 
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racist comments in Alexander's first book16, the journal issue ultimately reproduces 
the very cultural and racial biases it seeks to challenge. 
One Alexander teacher discusses the 1994 meeting of the North American Society of 
Teachers of the Alexander Technique where a resolution was put forward denouncing 
the racism of Alexander's first book and distancing contemporary practice of the 
technique from it. This particular teacher expresses her dismay at the way the 
resolution was changed to remove any direct reference to Alexander's racism. She 
comments that `it is a white -skin privilege not to deal with race... I contend that we 
can no longer afford the privilege of not dealing with it' (R. Alexander, 2000: 6). 
Another teacher writes of her experiences of teaching in Ecuador, feeling that the 
technique `offered a source of salvation, functioning as a somatic oasis' yet worrying 
that `it, too, was an import that was another form of homogenisation' (Batson, 2000: 
10). She acknowledges a need for thinking beyond the vertical axis Alexander 
emphasised in relation to posture and being aware of the cultural biases implicit in the 
work. Among those who teach Alexander Technique in non-English speaking 
cultures, translation is often an issue. As Alexander teacher Robin Gilmore 
summarises, `Language plays a key role in learning, and the idiosyncrasies of a 
particular language may at times influence movement and behaviour. When 
presenting the Alexander Technique in a bicultural setting, the translator's 
understanding of the work on an experiential level plays a key role' (2000: 19). 
Despite this growing awareness of cross -cultural issues in teaching Alexander 
Technique and despite seeking to distance the technique from some of Alexander's 
more racist statements, however, no acknowledgement is given to the broader issue of 
Alexander's racist ideas about nature and evolution. The journal's interview with an 
Alexander teacher called Hella Linkmeyer makes this abundantly clear. Linkmeyer 
made several visits to the ! Kung people living in the Kalahari Desert in Namibia, and 
makes it evident that she believes them to have natural good use. She describes them 
as `using themselves in a harmonious, complete way, using their whole self... in a 
way that we as Alexander Teachers think is the optimum. I guess in the evolution of 
16 These comments, which proclaim the savagery, cowardice, and low intellectual development of the 
African -American population in particular, appear to have been specially developed for the 1918 
American publication cf Man's Supreme Inheritance 
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mankind, this is where we come from at one stage, living in a hunter and gatherer 
society' (Linkmeyer 2000: 16). She goes on to claim: 
I would say that they used themselves in a more holistic way. We have lost it to a 
certain degree and need to relearn it consciously. The Bushmen have got it 
naturally, subconsciously .... The Bushmen don't need any technique because they 
still have their natural coordination. In our acculturation we seem to lose it 
somewhere along the line, as we as Alexander teachers know'. (2000: 17) 
Despite admiring their apparently natural good use in a kind of invocation of 
Rousseau's `noble savage', she and the interviewer each state that we cannot turn 
back and live as hunter-gatherers. Reversion to what is seen as an earlier type is out 
of the question. It is clear from these comments that Alexander's theories of 
evolution are still in use amongst some Alexander teachers, even in environments 
such as a journal issue on multiculturalism, where it might be expected that they 
would be more fully considered and re-evaluated. 
Melanie Wiber's analysis of the images used in illustrations of human evolution notes 
that in paleoanthropology, the ! Kung are frequently used as examples of earlier ways 
of life, because they are one of the last remaining hunter-gatherer societies. She states 
that this inevitably has ethnocentric and racist consequences because in comparison to 
`us', who no longer live in this way, the ! Kung appear `primitive time capsules 
lacking the progress that the rest of the world enjoys. Thus, their unique history, their 
colonial past, their relationship with neighbouring peoples are all ignored as 
significant factors in the ! Kung present-day lifestyle' (1998: 110). 
In this light, the concluding remarks of the journal's multicultural issue, made by 
Alexander teacher Michael Holt, appear to have entirely missed the point. Holt 
suggests that it is time `to let sleeping dogmas lie and desist from further post-mortem 
character assassination simply because [Alexander] failed to keep a private opinion to 
himself (2000: 34). He regards Alexander's racism as entirely separate from the 
Technique itself, when the preceding articles make it clear that its not. As Holt 
himself points out, many historical figures have held racial prejudices which have not 
ultimately discredited their ideas. At issue is not Alexander's personal opinion, but its 
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influence on the technique he developed, and whether his racist models of evolution 
persist. The discussion above has shown that in many cases they do. 
Alexander teachers are not unique in this. Participants with involvement in Rolling 
were among the most reflexive practitioners I interviewed about their discipline, is 
well as its relation to issues of culture and racism. I lowever, in a recent book on 
anatomy for bodyworkers, Rolfer Thomas Myers uses an image of a boy named 
'Reginald' who received treatment from Ida Rolf, with the comment that One person, 
viewing only the first two pictures, said, You took away his naturalness and gave him 
a weedy-white-boy posture! What good is that? " (Myers, 2001: 262). This remark 
passes without explanation from Myers. Another illustration of the nerves and 
arteries in the head including facial features suggests that the viewer 'might see it as a 
Nilo-Hamitic 17 person, for instance, but it is, in fact, an infant' (2(X)1: 24). Both these 
examples indicate a persistence of the notion of a 'savage' whose body is both natural 
and child-like. 
A 
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Figure 7.1: Reginald, In Myers, 2001: 262. 
The issues of race and evolution are not central to movement re-education, but they 
hover recurrently in the background. Individual practitioners may not make reference 
to these issues, and may even be aware that they are problematic in relation to the 
work, as some of their discussions indicate. However, contemporary movement re- 
education texts appear in some cases to reproduce the theories of* their founders 
entirely uncritically, as do some practitioners. Further, the shill from savage to child 
17 North African 
202 
as the primary model of the natural body is not necessarily more enlightened. Rather, 
there is a long tradition of equating children with savages and vice versa, a tradition 
that serves to devalue both. Both are part of a broader discourse which views certain 
bodies as more natural than others. As Wiber notes: 
The ! Kung San remain locked, along with women, juveniles and chimpanzees, into 
a category of more "natural' things, a category of things whose essential 
characteristics make them less subject to cultural control and thus a category 
marked as symbolic of the ascendancy of culture through their implicit contrast to 
the Euro-american, white male. (1998: 112) 
It is worth noting that in my interviews, in no instances were women explicitly 
posited as more natural than men, even in response to questions about the gender 
balance in movement re-education and the reasons for it. Most but not all participants 
suggested that movement re-education techniques tend to attract more women than 
men, but the reasons given for this were rarely tied to women's biology or nature. A 
number of participants also commented on the increasing number of men training to 
be movement re-educators and attending sessions of these techniques. Amongst those 
who gave reasons why they thought women might be more involved in this work than 
men, responses tended to fall into two categories: either women traditionally had been 
less involved in the workforce and more able to undertake training in this kind of 
work, perhaps as a second household income, or women were more comfortable with 
and attracted to healing and body work than men. The latter category included three 
female participants who suggested that women were innately closer to their bodies, 
more sensitive, or more instinctively given to healing and helping roles. Even 
amongst these participants, two of three commented that they `hated to use the clichd' 
or that it `may sound sexist'. Other participants who took the view that women were 
more drawn to healing and bodywork interpreted this as the result of cultural factors 
rather than natural inclination. Nor do women appear as models of the natural in texts 
on movement re-education, even the ones written by the founders, where, as I 
discussed in Chapter Five, they have tended to be seen as ignorant corrupters of 
children or possessors of a sexuality in need of discipline. 
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However, `babes, and savages' have indeed persisted as models of the natural; 
Wiber's analysis later notes that the male body represented in Greek statues has also 
been idealised and translated into illustrations of the highest pinnacle on the 
evolutionary ladder. Thus many of the models of the natural body that appeared in 
the work of movement re-education's founders appear also in later contexts and are 
mirrored in popular science discourses. 
Gustav Jahoda (1999) writes extensively about the history of equating savages and 
children, a trend which emerged in the mid -nineteenth century and lasted into the 
twentieth, beginning amongst colonial administrators and developing a scientific 
justification through the theories of social evolutionists such as Herbert Spencer, and 
continuing in the work of child psychologists. Jahoda notes that the parallels between 
savages and children tended to fluctuate between seeing them as the source of original 
sin, in need of discipline, and interpretations that they were the source of all that was 
innocent and pure. Dependency, weak personality, insufficient emotional control, and 
the lack of intelligence or morality were all characteristics commonly attributed to 
both children and savages, he observes. 
In movement re -education, it is clearly the conception of child and savage as pure and 
innocent which predominates over any theory of original sin. While this attribution of 
purity and innocence to both may indicate a nostalgic desire for a lost state of being in 
which things were somehow easier and less complex, it does not indicate a wish to 
return to this state. Nor does it suggest that children and `savages' (for which in 
contemporary discussions we may read `tribespeople' or `hunter-gatherers'), are 
highly valued. This is, at the very least, a rather patronising admiration for an 
evolutionary past which predominantly white, Western, adults imagine they have 
grown beyond. 
As Jahoda and Wiber both suggest, contemporary anthropological theory has made it 
evident that the notions of social evolution whereby there is one evolutionary path 
which all societies will inevitably follow is clearly incorrect. Understanding other 
cultures as primitive and childlike has definite racist overtones. Equally, however, 
understanding children as natural and `savage' is being problematised in education 
and the sociology of childhood, where development stage theory is increasingly seen 
204 
as outdated and inadequate. Gaile Sloane Cannella (1997), in Deconstructing Early 
Childhood, argues that the model of child development that sees children as going 
through particular stages at particular points, put forward by Jean Piaget, for example, 
contains many false assumptions. These include a model of human progress which is 
linear and universal; the privileging of logical thought as the highest stage of 
development, the categorisation of children as backward and the establishment of a 
standard of normalcy where those who do not fit are marked as deficient; and the 
placement of younger human beings at the lowest level of the hierarchy, where they 
are seen as inferior to adults (1997: 63-4). 
Chris Jenks (1996) notes that 
In the same way that the `savage' served as the anthropologist's referent for 
humankind's elementary forms of organization and primitive classifications, thus 
providing a speculative sense of the primal condition of human being within the 
socio-cultural process, so also the child is taken to display for adults their own state 
of once untutored difference, but in a more collapsed form: a spectrum reduced 
from `human history' to one of generations. (1996: 5) 
This can be clearly seen in Body-Mind Centering, in which the seemingly-certain 
developmental movement patterns of babies mirror the apparent evolutionary stages 
of humanity as reflected in animals. Jenks also questions the developmental stage 
theory, noting that it is based on a sense of temporality that interprets children as 
deficient if they do not reach particular points of development at the time set out by 
the stage theorists. There is certainly the implication in Body-Mind Centering that a 
child who does not go through the developmental stages Cohen identifies will be 
unbalanced both physically and emotionally, as discussed in Chapter Five. 
There is, then, no innocent equation between child and savage, and no understanding 
of other cultures or ages as pre -civilised which is not problematic. The use of 
children as contemporary models of the natural as pre-civilised evokes the same kinds 
of false developmental assumptions as earlier theories of the savage did, and the 
history of comparing children and savages indicates that the transition from one to the 
other is not accidental. Rather, the child now stands in place of the savage in many, 
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but not all, cases where a theory of an earlier innocent, primitive stage is seen as 
desirable. 
The notion of an inevitable progression between developmental or evolutionary stages 
is one to which I will return, in relation to the vertical body seen in illustrations of 
evolution and used in Alexander Technique particularly. However, one further issue 
with the model of the natural as pre-civilised needs to be addressed: this is the notion 
that there is a natural body which pre-exists its social inscription. 
Inscribing and Erasing the Social 
As I noted in Chapter Three, following Butler (1999) and Grosz (1994), there are 
problems with any understanding of the body as having a natural, universal base upon 
which society and culture are inscribed. While Foucault and others who have 
suggested the model of the body as inscribed surface would be unlikely to believe 
reversion to the pre-inscribed body was desirable or even possible, there is a certain 
continuity between their views and those of the movement re ucators who see the 
natural as pre-civilised. For them, movement re-education techniques function as a 
kind of universal eraser, re-educating or even un-educating the body with its wrong 
habits of use to return it to a more natural state. 
Those who hold this view and who see regaining the natural body as plausible and 
desirable would probably not employ the inscription metaphor directly. Yet it is clear 
in their understandings of how the natural body has been lost that the inscription 
metaphor is readily applicable. Schooling, imitation, and stress, for instance, are all 
ways in which society shapes and `writes upon' the natural body. The inscription 
metaphor is particularly appropriate here, because movement re-education implies 
that with time, these writings can be removed, erased, sanded away. They are durable 
but not necessarily permanent. While society itself can never be eliminated, if one 
learns to respond from one's `natural body/self', society will do significantly less 
damage. 
This view is peculiar, not least because as other movement re-educators noted, their 
work is itself social. The idea that a social technique could restore a natural body 
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stretches the meanings of both `social' and `natural'. While such techniques are not 
invasive in the way that biomedical treatments such as medication and surgery are, 
learning how and when to touch a client/pupil is something that takes extensive 
training, as I discussed in Chapter Six. When practitioners speak of them as natural, 
or as restoring a natural body, they draw on the notion that contemporary society has 
had damaging physical consequences, something which was a central tenet of the 
eugenics platform many of the techniques' founders supported. It is a critique of 
modernity which invokes a mythical state of premodernity as a lost idyll. This notion 
relies in turn on marking some bodies as more natural, less civilised, than others-and 
a discourse of the `noble savage' is intrinsic to it. 
Interpreting the body as socially inscribed but essentially natural, where the natural is 
seen as desirable and restorable, seems inevitably tied to the racism, eugenics, and 
social Darwinism of the first part of the twentieth century, which many of movement 
re-education's founders subscribed to. However, as the discussion above has 
indicated, this understanding of the natural is not itself essential to movement re- 
education, and it is perfectly possible to see these techniques as useful and beneficial 
without believing they restore something natural. It becomes apparent through a 
comparison between the discourses of movement re-educators and their practices that 
a theory of the natural body is not required in order to justify the work. In this sense, 
practice turns back on theory and offers a critique of it. 
Jahoda and Wiber have both noted a persistence of racist theories of cultural evolution 
in popular culture. Where Jahoda concludes that they have largely been pushed out of 
the public domain and exist mainly at `subterranean levels' (1999: 248), Wiber's 
studies of popular science illustrations and interviews with students about how they 
interpret them have shown that these interpretations persist even in introductory 
academic textbooks. There is not, therefore, any cause for saying that movement re- 
educators `should know better' than to use them, and in any case this would be an 
unproductive line of argument. However, it would seem desirable, at least from the 
point of view of social inclusion, that contemporary movement re-education move 
away from using the natural as a way of promoting their work. Whether such a shift 
would be too radical a revision for many movement re-educators is an open question, 
and one which there is not space to address here. 
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In conclusion, then, as much as the social inscription model is inadequate in social 
and cultural theory because it leaves open an untheorised, presumably `natural' 
essence, it is similarly unhelpful in movement re-education. The difference between 
the two is significant: movement re-education does theorise the `natural essence' of 
the body, and does so in ethnocentric and racist ways. Social theorists who use the 
inscription model would doubtless seek to distance themselves from such 
interpretations. However, the uses to which this undertheorised `natural' body can be 
put are deeply problematic. While they do not inevitably result from any theory of the 
body as socially inscribed, they do at least linger as a possibility. For this reason, any 
theory of the body as inscribed needs to be treated with caution. As I noted in 
Chapter Three, my own use of Foucault has appropriated his analysis of techniques of 
the self rather than that of the body as inscribed surface precisely because of this 
problem. 
Vertical Bodies 
As I stated at the beginning of the chapter, there has historically been a strong link in 
movement re-education between the natural body and the vertical body. Rolf (1977) 
claimed that the failure to stand upright was a failure to reach full human evolutionary 
potential, and as I pointed out in the discussion above, Gelb (1987: 46) seconds this 
opinion. Such a view is based on an understanding of upright stance as the 
distinguishing feature between ape and human, and in fact there is some 
anthropological evidence that bipedalism was one of the first transitions made by 
human ancestors. Wiber (1998: 33) points out that the transformation to bipedalism 
appears to have occurred more than four million years ago, with other changes such as 
increased body and brain size and tool use lagging significantly behind. This does not 
in itself indicate that bipedalism, and with it, erect posture, are the defining 
characteristics of humanity, but it seems to have been interpreted in this manner by 
some movement re-educators. It was assumed that a vertical stance was the most 
natural position for the human spine, and the more vertical the spine was, the better 
and more natural it was. Slight scoliosis or lordosis was not seen to be within the 
normal realm of postural deviation, but as a problem which kept the bearer from 
embodying his or her full humanity. 
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In essence, the vertical is an embodiment of the natural as pre-civilised, and it is not 
surprising that those participants who rejected this theory of the natural also rejected 
verticality as the goal of their work. As I noted in Chapter Two, vertical posture has 
historically been taken as a sign of moral uprightness and was an ideal of the 
Victorian era. It persisted into the mid-twentieth century, when it was replaced by an 
internality and psychologisation of the body. 
Alexander, Pilates, Rolf, and Feldenkrais (although the latter in early work only) all 
saw the vertical body as the goal toward which they aimed. This body was organised 
around a plumb line falling through the back of the ear, shoulder, hip, and anklebone. 
To embody the work, one was generally expected to strive toward the plumb line, 
although it might be acknowedged that not all would meet this ideal. Nevertheless, 
the illustrations used by these and other authors in movement re-education paint a 
clear picture of what was desirable. Alexander Technique books and websites, for 
example, often show the image of the evolution and degeneration of Man pictured in 
Chapter Four. This image plays upon well-known illustrations of `the evolution of 
Man' from ape to human, adding a second stage, where `Man' develops increasingly 
more sophisticated tools which take him further away from the vertical ideal which he 
upholds in the middle of the picture. He is, it appears, most evolved prior to 
discovering the rake, the power drill, and the computer. 
Wiber comments on the image of masculinity and whiteness presented in typical 
evolution of Man illustrations. She notes that verticality is a key aspect of this: 
Beginning at the point at which Australopithecus is portrayed, and intensified at the 
representation of the Homo line, we usually see heads held more erect and rather rigidly 
on top of the shoulders as opposed to hanging ahead of them. The shoulders are laid 
back (as opposed to hunched forward) and increasingly well-muscled. The back grows 
ever more flat, the stomach ever more lean, and the thighs and buttocks ever more 
muscular and powerful looking as the hominid family evolves. Despite the striding 
action of the figures, their posture is rigidly upright; usually the stepping action of the 
right leg modestly hides the male genitals. (1998: 84) 
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She observes also that the message these images portray is that `modern "fully 
evolved" man is Caucasian' (1998: 113). These images of a single line of progress 
are dramatically oversimplified representations of what anthropologists and 
archaeologists now believe about human evolution. Aside from this, however, they 
clearly reproduce gendered and racial stereotypes-the images often become lighter 
in skin tone as they move from left to right across the page. They also produce certain 
understandings about the shape of the `ideal' or `fully evolved' human body. 
Wilfred Barlow (1973) presents the following image in his discussion of Alexander's 
work: 
Figure 4. 
d f 
Figure 7.2: Evolution from Proconsul Man to 'Alexander Man' (in Barlow, 1973: 345). 
He suggests that Figure fin the illustration is `Alexander Man', the most fully 
evolved human. Earlier postures are clearly apelike. While movement re-educators 
outside of Alexander Technique have not generally made use of `evolution of Man' 
images'8, they do present the vertical as desirable through other illustrations. 
Following are some examples from Pilates, Rolf, and Feldenkrais: 
18 lt should also be noted that Alexander did not employ any of these images in his own books; they 
only appear in the work of later interpreters. 
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Figure 7.3: Joseph Pilates demonstrating the correct way to stand (in Pilatcs, 1998 119341: 17). 
Figure 7.4: Registered trademark of Rolling, (cover image of Rolling and Physical Reality Rolf, 
1990). 
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Figure 7.5: Postural gradation chart, adapted from the Harvard University Chart, with vertical 
lines drawn by Feldenkrais (in Feldenkrais, 1949: 104). 
Rolfs extensive use of before and after photographs, such as the one of Reginald, 
above, further reinforces that what she is aiming for is vertical posture organised 
along a plumb line. Feldenkrais' posture gradation chart indicates a desire to classify 
and codify posture; it is notable that he turned away from this, and his 1977 book 
Body Awareness as Healing Therapy shifts the emphasis toward perception and 
awareness rather than an externally measurable verticality. This reflects a more 
general trend in movement re-education-the increasing tendency to look at 
awareness, rather than the plumb line, as the goal of the work. 
Beyond the Plumb Line 
Amongst contemporary movement re-educators, there has been a shift away from the 
vertical as an ideal. This is apparent particularly in Feldenkrais and Body-Mind 
Centering, as well as amongst the Rolfers I interviewed, although Rolfing as a 
practice has certainly traditionally valued the vertical. All practitioners and pupils, 
when asked to describe the goal of movement re-education, talked about it in terms of 
developing awareness rather than restoring a postural plumb line, although this ideal 
was more evident among some participants than others. Specifically, pupils of 
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techniques tended to see posture as something that should be vertical, whereas 
practitioners were less likely to subscribe to this view. 
In Alexander lessons, the exercises-standing and sitting from a chair, doing table 
work, walking-generally focus on preparing the spine for verticality. This is less the 
case for other techniques, as I shall show in Chapter Eight. Further, not all Alexander 
teachers believe that the plumb line is the most desirable alignment. Although 
Alexander Technique practitioners have used images of verticality as ideal even in 
recent publications (Balk and Shields, 2000) two teachers interviewed directly 
challenged the idea that there was a universal ideal posture. One commented that 
`you'd probably break someone's joints trying to align them like that' (Dilip). 
Another (Hiroshi) claimed that he had an impression of the ideal shape, but that it was 
very changeable. On one hand, he said, exaggerated curvature of the spine was a 
clear indication of bad use of the self, but on the other hand, if the spine were too 
straight and tightly held this also qualified as bad use. 
Hiroshi: I think posture is not a good word. We call it poise. So it's very dynamic, 
it's not just one posture which is creating a good use, it's, you know, maybe poise 
should be flexible as well. As I explained with the monkey position, we have to be 
ready to move, ready to do things. I think readiness is all. 
Of all interviewees, those involved in Rolfing happened to be most reflexive about 
their practice in relation to both naturalness and verticality. For instance, without 
prompting on the topic, one Rolfer directly identified Rolfs view that uprightness is a 
sign of higher human evolution, and explicitly rejected it. He felt that for some 
practitioners, the plumb line had become a religion, and this was something he sought 
to avoid: 
James: I don't really get on this thought about the line being as kind of a religion or 
whatnot. To me it's all about getting the best potential out of someone, and that 
potential can come in a lot of different forms. And I don't think we should take it and 
say the more upright you are, the better a human being you are. That seems like 
rubbish, really. That's rubbish. But definitely in terms of structure we're looking for 
this [upright man in Figure 2.1] because this guy is much better... evolved... around, 
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evolved around gravity. I'll go for that one, but not better evolved in the human race, 
M. 
For another Rolfer, the most important aspect of his work was helping people to 
`broaden their potentiality for movement': 
Oliver. And that growth in perception and kinaesthetic sense would be of great 
benefit from them because they can choose to slouch at the computer for five 
minutes but they can also choose to come up in a way that's effortless. So 
broadening potentiality is a new way of talking about line. Which puts line in 
movement rather than line in statue, because statues don't go anywhere, but people 
do. 
What this passage recognises specifically is that there are many occasions when the 
human body is not upright, and is certainly not static. The work becomes about 
choice rather than establishing the vertical body. For another practitioner, this 
equated to a greater degree of authenticity: 
Carol: I remember working with these dance therapists from Russia who thought that 
one had to always be open as a therapist. And one of the main things I wanted to get 
across to them was that that was a ludicrous notion, that the body is meant to contort 
itself in a million different ways, and if you don't feel open, to make yourself be open is 
a lie. And that it was much more important for you to be authentic in where you are in 
your body than to adopt some sort of ideal. 
Encouraging people to express themselves through their bodies in a way that is 
`authentic' and expressive of the way they feel is a clear example of the triumph of 
`body wisdom' over verticality as a regulator of posture. As Carol also noted, she too 
is working within a kind of ideal, although she generally does not think of it as an 
ideal: the new ethical work to be done requires the body to express the self, rather 
than change it. In part, this is an expansion of acceptable ways of standing. 
Verticality has implications for visuality as well. What is being privileged in 
authenticity is not primarily the visual. Although we 'read' people's bodies in daily 
life in an attempt to determine whether they mean what they say, and numerous 
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articles about body language in the popular press give us advice on how to do this, 
`authenticity' is not as instantly observable as verticality. The prevalence of these 
popular texts underscores precisely this problem; if body language were easily 
visually accessible, we would not need such manuals to tell us how to read it. In 
addition, authenticity for movement re-educators may be determined through 
kinaesthetic senses rather than through sight, meaning that 'authenticity'-and with it, 
the `wise body' it connotes-are experientially rather than visually accessible. 
The Vertical and the Visual 
Verticality is a visible characteristic of the body; when movement re-education shifts 
toward cultivating bodily awareness, this is also a shift away from vision as the 
organising sense. As I have noted above, this is fundamentally a shift away from 
seeing verticality as an exemplification of `true humanness'. This is evident, for 
example, in Cohen's (1993) images of people `expressing organ patterns'. Each 
photo comes with a caption describing how the energy of that person is manifesting at 
that particular time. In image 7.6 below, neither of the men pictured is fully vertical 
but Cohen's interest is not directly in how they deviate from the plumb line. Instead, 
she focuses on the energy that she interprets as coming from their organs and what 
this indicates. The man on the left, for instance, has energy `emanating outward from 
his lungs, and inward through his heart', whereas the man on the right has energy 
`emanating outward from his heart and inward through his lungs' (1993: 42). 
Figure 7.6: 'Heart and Lungs' in Cohen, 1993: 42. 
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What is immediately striking about such inages and their captions is that despite the 
fact that the fact that they are visual, photographic, representations, the interpretations 
given to them are not visually apparent. In order to understand them, Cohen suggests 
that the reader `simply be present with each photo and resonate with the person 
revealed at that particular moment in time' (1993: 40). One can then either 
kinaesthetically identify with the person in the photograph by placing oneself in the 
same position and noting the organs `activated by this process, or one can use the 
visual clues Cohen provides to identify the expression of that person, then `embody 
those organs yourself and see if you end up in the same or a similar mind state' (40). 
How one would determine this is not made apparent. It is very clear that such images 
are a move away from both the vertical and the visual, privileging embodied sense 
and bodily awareness (through a particular understanding of the body and its systems) 
rather than information visually given. The cultural context of such images (the 
particularly masculine poses adopted by these figures) goes without comment; 
Cohen's interest is not in reading `body language' as social but in reading physiology 
as the biological truth about individuals, an issue I will develop in relation to Rose's 
(2000; 2001) theory of the `somatic individual' in the following chapter. 
This shift away from the visual is particularly relevant to dance. Cynthia Bull (1997) 
has written that ballet privileges the visual and `while attending to the feel and the 
flow of movement, emphasizes sight at the primary process of artistic conception, 
perception, and kinesthetic awareness' (1997: 272). She argues that the lines of the 
body become paramount. By contrast, the contemporary dance form contact 
improvisation privileges touch, leaving the spectator to `identify with the sensual, 
proprioceptive experiences of the dancers' (1997: 277). 
This difference is significant. Moreover, ballet is generally tied to the rise of 
modernity and the verticality of the spine, as I discussed in relation to posture in 
Chapter Two, with the torso relatively fixed and little movement occurring in the ribs 
or hips. Deviations from the vertical tend to take place in the legs or arms, although 
the upper back may sometimes tilt back to open the chest. The emphasis on 
verticality is also tied to the historical period in which ballet emerged as a dance form. 
New and postmodern dance forms, however, like contact improvisation, make much 
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greater use of the floor and of spinal contractions-in short, their work is not 
concerned with the vertical. 
Novack (1990; 1995) has noted the increased use of movement re-education 
techniques by dancers, as have Bolster and Dussault (2001). Amongst seven 
interviewees who were dancers, a number of uses for the techniques they had studied 
were listed, including warming up, choreography, injury treatment and prevention, 
and greater general body awareness. In this, it was the awareness of the body in 
space, not the establishment of the vertical, that was most desirable. One Feldenkrais 
teacher with a dance background, who also had significant experience with Alexander 
Technique, commented that there was `this huge potential in Feldenkrais for dancers, 
which is kind of different to the Alexander work. Because of this three- 
dimensionality in space' (Beth). Another Feldenkrais practitioner described her work 
with a contemporary dance company, and how much of the material she taught was 
adapted into choreography. 
Bolster and DussauIt, dance educators writing on the `wisdom of the senses', discuss 
proprioception and interoception as the senses which `monitor and guide our bodies 
from within' (2001: 92). Proprioception `allows me to organise my body in relation 
to gravity and monitor the shape or positioning of my movement through time' 
whereas interoception relies on sensory receptors located throughout the body; `while 
most of this input takes place outside of my conscious awareness, it leads me to 
recognise when I am hungry, thirsty, sick, injured' (2001: 93). They see 
proprioception and interoception as part of the kinaesthetic sense they seek to 
develop, which complements the privileging of visuality and will thereby `transform 
some of the detrimental dance practices, such as: imitating external models instead of 
knowing one's own body, contorting the body into imposed ideals or aesthetics, and 
denying injury and pain' (2001: 91). 
However, it is worth asking what happens to dance as a performing art when there is a 
shift toward kinaesthetic felt sense rather than the visuality of performance. What is 
the audience's involvement? To what extent can it engage with what occurs? For 
some audience members who are accustomed to being passive viewers of dance, new 
dance choreographies based on the principles of dancers' kinaesthetic awareness may 
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seem inaccessible. As Bull points out, the audience is invited to share the bodily 
experiences of the contact improvisers, to empathise through their own bodies rather 
than admiring the spectacle of dancing bodies. It requires the audience, if they are to 
engage at all, to do so in quite a different way. 
This can be challenging for audience members who are unused to having to engage 
with dance on this level. Even Sondra Fraleigh notes that `antiexpressive art risks 
being intensely private. By definition, denial dance must deny the audience, and 
Rainer' s manifesto ['No Manifesto' quoted in Chapter Two] indicates the truth of 
this. But we might well bear in mind the importance of the artist's implicit 
incorporation of the other' (Fraleigh, 1987: 127). It may also be beyond the reach of 
some audience members-as I have argued, bodily knowing is not intrinsically 
accessible to everyone, but is a culturally-shaped and acquired technique. Where 
dancers and choreographers overlook this, they risk isolating large segments of the 
potential audience. 
The vertical and the visual have been linked in dance practice and movement re- 
education, and the shift away from both in new and postmodern dance and in recent 
movement re-education forms such as Body-Mind Centering and later Feldenkrais 
work has significant implications. It is here that the development of body wisdom, 
through knowing one's body and working from the kinaesthetic felt sense, finds its 
fullest expression. When awareness and authenticity are emphasised over verticality 
as a goal of movement re-education, the body comes to have an internality that it was 
not initially seen to possess. Where the felt sense of the body is privileged over 
visuality, the focus moves inwards away from external representation. However, such 
internality is often naturalised, when in fact this way of seeing the body has emerged 
in quite specific historical and cultural conditions. Seeking bodies that are `wise', 
`aware', or `authentic' is also a technique of the self, and continues to be a way of 
regulating bodies, even if (as in the case of dancers who may be less likely to injure 
themselves by pushing beyond their limits) it is a healthier one. 
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Conclusion 
As I argued in the introduction to this thesis, it is useful to examine not whether the 
natural body objectively exists, but what use has been made of it. From the 
discussion above, it becomes apparent that within movement re-education, there is no 
reference back to a natural body which does not implicitly or explicitly rely on 
outdated theories of evolution and racist and racialist discourses. However, where a 
number of practitioners use movement re-education without the sense that their work 
is re-educating the body toward naturalness, it is equally apparent that such discourses 
are not necessary to the practice of movement re-education. In short, the justifications 
and explanations originally given to the work are not necessary for its continuation. 
The natural and the vertical have different relationships to body wisdom. As 
movement re-education has moved beyond the plumb line as a measure of ideal 
alignment, verticality as a goal of the work has receded, but naturalness has not. In 
dance, for instance, `natural bodies' began to be desirable in dance forms that did not 
emphasise verticality. A natural body can be determined through kinaesthetic senses, 
rather than objective appearance. The vertical body is not usually a wise body, 
because it is concerned with the look and not the feel of the body. The wise body 
may (and generally will) determine verticality to be its most natural alignment, but it 
also accepts deviations from this. 
However, the wise body is usually conceived to be a natural body, because its 
knowledge is innate, and it is seen as the result of reclaiming a natural state. Wise 
bodies are generally understood to be restored to nature. The relationship between 
naturalness and verticality is then severed, and with it, some, but not all, aspects of the 
evolutionary theory movement re-education has relied upon. Even if vertical posture 
is no longer understood as the most human characteristic, however, the theory of 
children and `savages' as pre-civilised models of the natural body, once lost but 
reclaimable through movement re-education, has persisted. Although practitioners 
seem to be increasingly identifying this heritage of ideas as problematic, it seems the 
natural is still an important part of the work of movement re-education. 
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The awkward relation between theory and practice in movement re-education 
becomes apparent here, however, because the discourses of some movement re- 
educators indicate the absence of the view that the natural is an ideal, pre-civilised 
state to be regained, while others see this as pivotal. In the next chapter, this 
relationship between theory and practice will be explored through a discussion of the 
rise of the somatic in relation to the embodied practices and discourses of movement 
re-education. 
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Chapter 8 
Movement Re-education and Somatic Subjectivity 
Introduction 
In the mid- 1970s, Feldenkrais practitioner Thomas Hanna developed a new practice 
which he called somatic education. He defined somatics as `the body perceived from 
within by first-person perception' (1995: 341). The magazine/journal Somatics, 
which he subsequently established, has included work on Feldenkrais, Rolfing, and 
Alexander Technique, among others. For some practitioners, the term `somatic 
education' has come to be broadly inclusive of any practices which integrate mind 
and body in bodywork or movement education (see for example Bolster and Dussault, 
2001). The term `somatic' is developing wide currency within this field. 
`Somatic' is also a term increasingly used by social sciertists to explain features of 
contemporary social life that are related to the body, albeit without quite the same 
meaning as Hanna's. For Thomas Csordas (2002), `somatic modes of attention' are 
ways of attending to and with one's body; for Nikolas Rose (Novas and Rose, 2000; 
Rose, 2001), `somatic individuality' is related to the way in which the construction of 
truth has become increasingly centred around the body; and Bryan Turner (1992) has 
argued that the regulation of bodies has become central to the structure of what he 
calls a `somatic society', represented through concerns such as 
The feminist movement, pensioners' lobbies, AIDS campaigns, pro- and anti- abortion 
cases, fertility and infertility programmes, institutions to store human organs, safe-sex 
campaigns, global sporting spectaculars, movements for preventative medicine, 
campaigns to control global tourist pornography, and various aspects of the Green 
Movement (1992: 13). 
This chapter will link movement re -education to these theories of somatic modes of 
attention and individuality, working from the embodied practices identified by 
Csordas to the discourses observed by Rose. I will show how by contrasting their 
very different analyses, we receive deeper insights into the rise of the somatic in 
contemporary culture. While Turner does not provide a broader framework for 
identifying and analysing the somatic society as such, I will conclude with a brief 
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discussion of how movement re-education fits into the somatic society. This chapter 
thus draws upon the theme of ethical self-formation (through the emergence of 
somatic individuality) discussed in Chapter Five, and that of embodied practice 
(through a return to the issue of somatic modes of attention) covered in Chapter Six. 
Unlike these chapters, it draws upon interview data to examine contemporary issues 
and practices in movement re-education. Interviews, as I have argued in Chapter 
Four, not only provide data on discourse but can also give insights into embodiment 
and the practice of movement re-education, through detailed descriptions of these 
practices. 
Somatic Awareness and Attention 
In Chapter Six, I discussed non-doing, means -whereby, and use of the self as key 
principles of Alexander Technique which fit into Csordas' (2002) theory of `somatic 
modes of attention' as ways of attending to and with the body. This theory bears 
revisiting in relation to the interview data, in order to examine how other techniques 
attend to the body/self. 
Participants were asked what they saw as the aims cr goals of the technique(s) they 
were involved with. As the discussion in the previous chapter about the move beyond 
the plumb line would indicate, only one practitioner raised the issue of body 
alignment as a goal, and it was clear that he did not see this as the only benefit of his 
technique (Rolfing). The goals of the techniques were a point where the interview 
data converged: virtually all participants spoke about increased somatic and bodily 
awareness as the primary aim of their work. We can say, then, that all movement re- 
education is a somatic mode of attention, and that it aims to cultivate bodily 
awareness. 
This awareness took different forms in different techniques, however. In Feldenkrais 
and Body-Mind Centering, the emphasis was on exploration, which was expected to 
lead to body awareness as an effect. In Alexander Technique and Pilates, on the other 
hand, body awareness was a much more direct goal, in part due to the emphasis on 
conscious control, discussed earlier. In this section, I will compare the practices 
discussed by participants with the goals they described, examining the mind/body 
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relationship and manner of attending to the body/self in each. Alexander Technique 
was discussed extensively in Chapter Six, so I will not repeat those arguments here, 
but will conclude with a discussion of how it compares with the techniques discussed 
below. 
Mates 
Pilates is perhaps the discipline which has changed most since its founder developed 
it. As Joseph Pilates did not set up a specific teacher training programme, a number 
of variations have emerged and there has been some contestation over whose lineage 
is most authentic. Pilates teachers and students I interviewed were more likely than 
those in other techniques to adopt more than one method of movement re-education or 
to use them interchangeably. The flexibility of the Pilates work and its ability to 
absorb other disciplines (often, as one educator noted, without acknowledging their 
source) has perhaps contributed somewhat to its popularity as a method, although its 
reputation for flattening the abdomen and making the body appear lean is another 
likely factor. It is certainly significantly better known and more popular than any of 
the other methods of movement re-education discussed here. 19 
Six interviewees had significant experience with Pilates, and of these three were 
qualified as teachers, although only one used it as her primary method. Three 
interviewees came specifically to discuss Pilates, while others were more interested in 
other techniques. All three Pilates students were also dancers, and had generally used 
it as part of their dance training. Those who were still using Pilates said that its goals 
included increased body awareness, using minimal effort to perform exercises, 
building flexibility and strength together, bringing attention to the muscles, and an 
internalised sense of one's own body. One practitioner who used both Pilates and 
Feldenkrais said that the Pilates helped her tell if one muscle group was particularly 
dominant in a client. Another practitioner, who took up Pilates to be able to give his 
19 The popularity of any method of movement re -education is extremely difficult to measure, but for 
example, the search engine Google produces over two million hits worldwide for Pilates, as opposed to 
roughly half that for Alexander Technique, slightly over 200 000 for Feldenkrais, 100 000 for Rolfing, 
and just over 12 000 for Body-Mind Centering. The overrepresentation of Pilates may be partly due to 
the fact that it consists of specific exercises which can be done at home with the help of books or 
videos and DVDs. Many of Feldenkrais' original Awareness Through Movem ent lessons were also 
recorded and could be distributed in this way, but his work has not reached the wide audience of 
Pilates. 
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Rol ling clients activities to take away and work on, felt that while Pilates looked for 
alignment, it was focussed less on process than on product. 
Pilates practitioners often spoke about being aware ofparts or particular muscles of 
the body, and `body awareness' seemed to refer to the awareness of segments of the 
body rather than an overall sense of alignment or `good use'. This awareness was 
internal rather than conforming to an external ideal. The practitioners interviewed 
were certainly not working explicitly toward flat stomachs or lean physiques as a 
primary goal, although they acknowledged that this might be the case for some non- 
dancers who attended their classes. The Rolfer who had trained in Pilates, for 
instance, suggested that too much attention was paid to fording one correct way of 
doing the work: `the people that I came into contact with in Pilates focussed on 
getting the Pilates right. Getting the abdominal engagement, getting the pelvic floor 
engagement, getting the feeling of the scapulae going down the back. And to me that 
gets very boring after a while' (James). 
There is more focus on the musculature in Pilates, and this and its ability to be taught 
in group classes make it more similar to traditional forms of exercise than other 
movement re-education techniques. Two practitioners specifically acknowledged that 
for some people, Pilates might be simply another form of exercise. A dancer who had 
used the Pilates machines extensively while injured felt that her dance background 
made her more aware of what Pilates was about, whereas Katja noted: 
I was watching some of the people who just come to the studio from outside, and 
they're not dancing. And there is a difference there, it's a different body 
experience... when you see someone who's not so used to doing their body they might 
just do the exercises that the Pilates instructor gave them, but they might forget about 
the posture. 
One Pilates instructor who used other practices extensively in her teaching felt that 
the `classical repertoire', the set of thirty-four original exercises devised by Pilates, 
was more challenging to teach because if it was presented incorrectly, the mind-body 
connection might be lost: 
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Laila: I guess for me in terms of teaching it's also a matter of speaking, and the 
language, because when you are teaching classical repertoire, and it's quite... you need 
to know where to cue the movement and the breathing and you need to know how the 
movement goes and flows, and then you are able to keep it interesting. Otherwise for 
me it becomes exercising. 
Descriptions of what was involved in doing Pilates varied. One movement educator 
who had studied Pilates extensively in the 1970s said that at that point, it involved 
flattening the spine and sucking in the abdomen, lengthening the back of the neck, and 
strengthening the inner thighs by squeezing the legs together. Very little breathing 
work was incorporated (Carol). She also noted the influence of other techniques, such 
as Feldenkrais and Bartinieff fundamentals (which in turn is partially influenced by 
the work of Rudolf Laban), on contemporary Pilates, perhaps bringing about some of 
the attention to breathwork which now exists in the discipline, as I discussed in 
Chapter Six. This educator felt that amongst many students she taught, there was a 
split between upper and lower body to which their Pilates training contributed. The 
two halves of the body did not seem to work synchronously. 
Laila, who had been teaching Pilates for a year at the time I interviewed her, 
described her classes as follows: 
I sort of find I don't have any sort of form. Sometimes we might start from the floor, 
sometimes we might start from standing. My Pilates isn't actually pure Pilates. In this 
term we did quite a lot of developmental movement, the Body-Mind Centering things. 
We were crawling on the floor doing these body connections like navel radiation and 
homolateral, contralateral connections. Because I think it's quite nice to introduce 
principles from different techniques and then melt those together. In my classes I think 
in first term we have done many things, we have done Astanga yoga.. . And then well, 
the basic traditional matwork and then partner exercises, different things with the 
partner like handstands with a partner, relaxation with a partner, stretching with a 
partner. 
This description underplays the traditional Pilates content of her classes, emphasising 
Carol's point that the discipline draws from many other fields as well. Laila taught 
both in a health club and in a dance studio, and said that how she presented the work 
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differed between those environments. Laila was a dancer herself and tried to involve 
movement in her classes wherever possible, feeling that too much attention was 
sometimes given to stabilizing activities in Pilates classes. She claimed that the 
Pilates method was constantly changing, with new principles such as awareness, 
relaxation, and stamina being added to the original principles, which were `breathing, 
concentration, alignment, precision, centring, and the floor and the freedom of the 
movement'. 
Both Katja and Emily, who had taken Pilates as part of their dance training, noted 
how much touch influenced their learning. Katja felt that the Pilates gave her more 
feedback than dance training, particularly because dance teachers were cautious about 
physically correcting her, whereas in Pilates this was not the case: `I'm helped out, 
I'm concretely touched, I'm told what to do and where to think and where my hips 
should be and I'm corrected much more than in dance'. This assisted her in aligning 
her body. Emily felt that the fact that Pilates takes place on the floor or on machines, 
disrupting normal upright posture, made it easier to focus on specific muscle groups 
and train them more `finely'. Although she had been confused by Pilates when she 
started learning it, after six weeks she found it became easier because she was able to 
tell when she had it correct. When I pressed her as to how she knew when the work 
was correct, Emily elaborated: 
I think part of it would be through correction and through the instructions, from being 
physically held or shown. I mean partly you've been watching someone, and I was 
already quite used to being able to copy someone physically...! find when I first started 
Pilates, if my teacher came and actually touched my hamstring, say, it was much easier 
to connect with it, if someone was actually physically touching it. If they say contract 
the part that I'm touching, you can do that much more easily than if they just say 
abstractly contract your hamstring. You don't know if it's right or not. And then I 
think it's the muscle memory, it's the experience of remembering when it was right and 
being able to repeat it. If you repeat the exercise five times that day and then the next 
day, I think you gradually, it comes to a point where you can feel that it's right, because 
now, I've done it so many times before and I can feel when it's wrong becaise it 
doesn't feel the same. 
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Pilates thus becomes part of the bodily hexis through repeated practice. The somatic 
mode of attention involved in Pilates involves focussing on particular muscle groups 
or parts of the body, aligning them in very specific ways with a definite sense of 
`right' and `wrong' positioning. While the method may lead to emotional experiences 
(Laila, for instance, discussed how her training brought about the release of both 
tension and tears, as well as dramatically changing her body), these are not the focus 
of the work The mind-body relationship is cultivated through attendance to breath, 
musculature, and alignment, but not for example to a specific `headneck-back 
relationship' as in Alexander or to organs or other `systems' of the body as in Body- 
Mind Centering. Pilates has also changed over time, becoming increasingly 
concerned with release and awareness of how one's body is feeling rather than 
pushing one to get through the movement at all costs. The emphasis on musculature 
means it develops strength, although it does so not through short concentric muscle 
contractions but through lifting, lengthening, and stretching, meaning it also develops 
flexibility. Practitioners of other disciplines of movement re-education however 
tended to be sceptical, seeing it not as education or re-education but as tending toward 
repetition without awareness of the whole body, a tendency which concerned some 
practitioners as well. 
Feldenkrais 
Three participants used Feldenkrais as their primary method of movement re- 
education. Two of these were practitioners, and one was a student who had done 
Awareness Through Movement work sporadically for three years, about twelve years 
prior to the interview. She became involved with it because a friend was undergoing 
training as a Feldenkrais practitioner and because she had suffered severe pain in her 
back, which had been significantly helped by the work. In addition to group classes, 
she also worked through tapes of Feldenkrais lessons, narrated by Feldenkrais 
himself, on her own, although even this was something she had not done for four or 
five years. 
These three participants listed the aims of Feldenkrais work as exploring one's own 
relationship to one's body and the environment, becoming aware of one's body and 
finding `new, more efficient ways of moving' (Carrie), keeping body and mind 
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healthy and muscles aligned by learning to observe minute movements in oneself 
(Dorothy), moving with greater ease and comfort and extending the range and 
possibilities for movement (Beth). Carrie and Beth, the two Feldenkrais practitioners, 
also explicitly described the work as emotional and life-changing, perhaps because of 
their more intensive involvement with it. As Beth expressed it, `I think when you 
really engage with this work deeply, it asks you to look at all parts of yourself. And 
not just how I move myself but how do I organise myself emotionally and in all these 
different ways'. For Dorothy, the work was very tiring, which she suggested was one 
reason sle no longer did it: `I just found it hard sometimes to bring that much 
attention to bear on that sort of detail. Sometimes that's a really hard thing to 
do.... And I suppose the whole idea is that if you do it enough your body starts to do it 
all without you consciously having to tell it to, or train it to. I'm not sure I ever got to 
that stage'. 
As described in Chapter Five, Feldenkrais consists of group lessons called 
`Awareness Through Movement' and individual lessons, referred to as `Functional 
Integration'. Carrie explained that her group sessions involved mainly floor work, 
with rolling, and exploring ways of getting up from the floor. She said that no 
physical cues were given as to how movement should be accomplished, so that pupils 
could `find their own pattern of movement which is intrinsic for their own nervous 
system, their own sense of movement'. 
Dorothy explained that the lessons she remembered most clearly were those that 
involved lying on the floor, because this was most relaxing for her back, although 
some lessons incorporated standing and walking, attending to the feet and thinking 
about where and in what way they made contact with the floor. 
The kinds of things I remember are lying on my back with my knees up, and making a 
sort of movement with one knee, letting that knee fall to the side really really slowly 
and letting the knee kind of go at its own pace and really notice whether you were 
forcing it down or whether it was just, you were just allowing it to move on its own. 
And then you'd be asked to make a slight movement of your hip and then observe how 
that movement was moving down to your legs. So you'd move your other knee and let 
the other knee fall. So very slow, sometimes small movements. And there's a lot of, I 
228 
remember being asked to sort of observe how my body was feeling before I started, and 
you tend to do things on one side and then on another. So you'd be asked to do 
something on one side and then you'd be asked how that side felt now, in relation to 
how it had felt before you did the movement, and how it felt in comparison to the other 
side. 
The floor also figured prominently in Beth's account of a lesson she had recently 
given. She liked to begin with a `test movement' which pupils could do at the 
beginning and end of the lesson to give them a concrete point of comparison. This 
might for example involve sitting on a chair, noting how one was sitting and how that 
felt, and then looking down between the legs and then out onto the horizon. 
Variations of this might then be explored, with the emphasis on how it felt to do each 
variation- for example, rolling the pelvis while looking down, or trying to move 
only the head and eyes while doing it. After this exploration, students were moved to 
the floor, where they were encouraged to note their contact with it: 
what does the space under their back feel like, you know, so this whole process of 
checking in with yourself. The lessons usually begin lying on the floor, and that's this 
point to really feel yourself, are both my shoulders on the floor, a scan. They then do 
lots of, I invite people to do lots of different movements. Okay, can you bend your 
knees, interlace your fingers behind your head, and then lift your head a few times. 
What does it feel like. And there are a number of variations that we then go through. 
We do that for thirty-five to forty minutes. We then come back to sitting, to where we 
were, and go back to that [test] movement. And people felt different, they feel certain 
differences. 
While beginning Feldenkrais practitioners can only teach Awareness Through 
Movement, once they have completed the training programme they may progress to 
doing individual sessions called Functional Integration. Somewhat like table work in 
Alexander Technique, FunctiDnal Integration takes place on specially-built tables, 
with minor adjustments made to the pupil's body. Carrie described these sessions as 
being in one sense very passive for the person being worked upon, although she felt 
that emotionally and intellectually much might still be happening for them. In 
contrast to Awareness Through Movement sessions, little is said, and communication 
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is primarily non-verbal, taking place through the hands. As in Alexander Technique, 
the hands of the practitioner must be skilled in order to transmit the work. 
Carrie: So you may hold their head, hold their shoulder. You may be trying to give 
them a sense of what relationship there is between those two things by sort of taking 
their weight, say they're very very stiff up here, you might kind of hold their scapula, 
hold their neck a bit, and almost with your hands you're saying can you feel what 
you're doing here, can you feel how you don't need to work this, but in a very very 
subtle, non-verbal way... Basically you're trying to sense their nervous system and how 
their mind and their emotion and everything works together. And you can feel that 
when you're touching them and moving them and stuff, you get a sense of that. 
In contrast to table work in Alexander Technique, the focus is not necessarily on the 
head-neck-back relationship, and more attention may be paid to the lower half of the 
body. The interest in the nervous system and stated attention to the emotional aspects 
also differentiate it. I attended one Functional Irtegration session with Beth in order 
to better understand the work. While adjustments in Alexander Technique are rarely 
large ones, Functional Integration seemed to make even more minute adjustments. 
Without being asked to think consciously about particular parts of my body, my 
awareness drifted somewhat, but at the end of the lesson I walked out feeling my 
centre of gravity had shifted to a point significantly lower in my body. I found myself 
quite literally walking differently, with more bend in my kne es. My upper back did 
not feel as elongated as it generally did after an Alexander lesson, but my lower body 
felt much changed. 
Alexander Technique does little with the floor, using mainly tables and chairs as 
props for the work, which tends to emphasise the straightness cultivated through the 
work. More attention is paid to flexion and horizontality in Feldenkrais work. The 
work also differs from Pilates, which, although it uses the floor, does so with a series 
of exercises in which there is a specific right and wrong way to perform them. In 
Feldenkrais, the emphasis is on attaining greater body awareness through exploration. 
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Rolfing 
Rolfing is often presented as the most radical of these techniques, in the sense that 
there are a set number of sessions to be completed (although clients sometimes return 
for `tune-up' sessions after the initial ten), and significant, demonstrable change is 
promised following them. While Rolfing was initially mostly `table work', more 
recently Rolfmg movement training, which requires extra study, has developed to add 
another dimension to the work. This movement re-education component is sometimes 
compared to Awareness Through Movement lessons, and indeed Meyers (2001) 
includes one of Feldenkrais' lessons in his Rolfing book, Anatomy Trains. 
Like all techniques, Rolfmg is more effective for some than others; while Alexander 
teacher Michael had one session and found it `like a deeper version of massage' 
which `freed stuff up a lot temporarily', Carol, a movement educabr with extensive 
experience in a variety of techniques, said that Rolfing had given her better results 
than anything else. Having finished ten sessions plus three extra `tune -up' sessions, 
she remarked: 
I'm hoping to go back every six weeks, because I became, well, addicted to it is a bit 
strong, but I'm desperate to feel it in my feet, on a regular basis. Desperate, you know, 
like where you can almost taste it, you just want to have that feeling again, just the way 
everything feels all the way up. And it's the only place I can get it. Nothing ever 
makes my feet feel like that. I've worked them myself in the bathtub, you know, with 
warm water and really spending time on them, and it doesn't even maintain in a way 
what he's done, what it feels like from him. 
One Rolfer, James, was the only practitioner to mention alignment as a goal of his 
work. However, he also qualified that the ten series of Rolfing sessions had been 
noted to lead to emotional changes, and commented, `I suppose this is what I'm more 
interested in than just alignment, because in taking someone through Rolling you see 
them change in alignment, but you know you're giving them something which is a lot 
bigger thanjust that'. Oliver described his work as `broadening potentiality', which 
had to do with both movement and perception, as well as something he linked with 
Feldenkrais and Body-Mind Centering: `that we're trying to get a person's nervous 
system to move to an ever more resilient place'. This involved taking clients out of 
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the physiological and emotional patterns most comfortable to them, and getting them 
to try out unfamiliar ones. 
Neither Rolfer clearly described the process of Rolfing itself, a commonality with Ida 
Rolf, whose books also avoided any description of the physical work of Rolfing. 
They did however describe some of the kinds of things they might do in a lesson. 
Oliver, for example, explained his work as involving both listening and talking, 
particularly in early sessions: 
I'm sort of dancing around and seeing okay, do we need to go to the table now because 
this person, or do we need to look at how they stand and bend, or have them look in the 
mirror, or do we need to go right away and talk about their posture? Where is their 
shoulder girdle? There's so many different ways of approaching... because of the 
nature of the Rolfing touch and the nature of the systemic support you're giving a 
person, very often, eighty plus percent of the time you begin to experience discharge in 
the sessions, you know, a little bit of trauma discharge, that's a whole topic which has 
to do with the resiliency of the nervous system... So often the middle sessions, four and 
five, sometimes session seven, a big part of them have to do with supporting and 
helping a person discharge trauma in a way that isn't actually reinforcing the trauma but 
helping them to come to a quieter place in their nervous system. 
One of the differences between Rolfing and other types of movement re-education, 
particularly Alexander Technique and Pilates, is the emotional component. While in 
the latter techniques, it is acknowledged that emotions may arise, they tend to be left 
to one side and are not the central focus of the work. This is part of the shift in 
posture toward the psychologisation of the body, mentioned earlier. The nervous 
system, too, takes a much more central role. Yet how Rolfing releases emotions is 
somewhat vague. James described two theories as to how Rolfing works. In work on 
the myofascia of the muscles, some Rolfers suggest that the myofascial tissue changes 
from a hard gelatinous state to a more liquid state with the application of friction, 
heat, or pressure. He explained that there were a number of key points in the body, 
such as behind the head of the fibula or the greater trochanter, where Rolfers could 
reach to affect the many muscles connected to them. `If you go in there and if there's 
stickage in the tissue, if it's a bit gluey, you have a window where you can go in and 
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unglue it by applying friction, and then the gunk will kind of become less resistant 
and more integrated into the muscles that connect to it'. A second theory, which he 
saw as related, involved the nervous system: 
So you do all these manipulations in a Rolfing session, someone gets up and walks out 
of the session and the nervous system is feeling the body in a different way, 
proprioceptively. So you can feel, oh yeah, I've got a bit of freedom and my foot's 
better on the ground now, or my shoulder feels further back, further forward, and the 
nervous system is saying to itself, oh, this actually feels more efficient. So I think I'll 
take this now. I think I'll take this one, and I won't go back to the bad habit. 
However, James stated that he felt that without working on the tissue directly in the 
way that Rolling does, the nervous system would be less likely to adapt. He further 
emphasised that the adaptation process did not need to be conscious. Although he 
sometimes advised clients to attend to particular parts of the body or particular aspects 
of their alignment, he felt that `even if the client was not open to that, the system 
would work on an unconscious or subconscious level, or subliminal level. It feels 
things without having to think about it'. 
This nervous system which `feels things without having to think about it' is precisely 
where body wisdom makes itself evident: the body (via the nervous system) 'knows', 
and `says to itself' that certain alignments feel more efficient. It adapts to these 
because it has been reeducated, and knows that they are better. It is perceived as 
seeking good alignment and efficiency. The fact that this apparently happens without 
conscious awareness indicates a kind of second subjectivity emerging, in which the 
nervous system takes on selfhood. `Body awareness' in the context of Rolfing does 
not necessarily mean being aware of one's body; rather, it means that one's body is 
itself becoming aware. There is not even necessarily a somatic mode of attention 
associated with being Rolfed, although there certainly is one involved in being a 
Rolfer. However, the client of Rolfmg can in fact be relatively closed to any 
suggestion of change or greater awareness--the nervous system apparently knows 
better. 
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Body-Mind Centering 
The nervous system in both Rolfmg and Feldenkrais plays a key role in the 
development of body wisdom and awareness. In Body-Mind Centering, however, the 
nervous system is just one in a number of systems whose development is critical to 
the awareness and wisdom of the body. Awareness resides in a number of systems, 
each of which has a `mind' of its own. As one practitioner explained, `the work talks 
about every part of the tissue having a mind quality in the first place, so that we are 
not actually creatures that are governed by our nervous system or by our brain. The 
brain is only referred to as an organ as well, and no one system has superiority over 
all the other systems' (Vivien). 
Body-Mind Centering is not extensively practised in the UK, and again I was only 
able to find two practitioners to interview. Where it is known at all, it is within the 
dance community, and both practitioners were also dancers. One other interviewee, 
Carol, had experience with the technique and in fact taught another method called 
Bartinieff Fundamentals, upon which some of BMC's developmental movement 
principles are based. The reasons for its lack of prominence here are likely to do with 
geography-it originated in America-and its being a relatively new discipline 
compared to the others, although one practitioner also suggested that people tended to 
suspect the work of being self-indulgent, a wariness she attributed to the British 
national character of being `formal and practical' and less interested in exploring 
feelings. 
Like Feldenkrais, Body-Mind Centering aims for awareness through exploration, but 
it posits that there are systems of the body with associated movement qualities, and 
that developmental movement patterns exist. Vivien described the work as aiming to 
be a `tool of empowerment', which would give clients `a way of discovering what 
they're good at, what they're strong at, what they're maybe neglecting, and that 
there's a chance to change. There's an option always to change, that anyone can be 
anything because the material is all there'. For Margrit, the work might aim at 
reorganising the body, assisting with overcoming injury or `blocked energies', 
including stored trauma. She commented, `psychotherapy goes from the brain to the 
body. But like BMC if there is stored problems it goes from the body onto the mind, 
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onto the brain. Like there's so much information stored in the tissue, that working 
with movement, working with touch, that you can loosen up a lot of stored tension'. 
Both practitioners emphasised that their sessions were tailored to individuals and that 
there was no set protocol about what might happen in them. Both worked with groups 
and with individuals, and there was no significant distinction between the types of 
work they might do in each context. Vivien said she usually began with a discussion 
about the work and what expectations and issues the client had. Generally the work 
involved touch, although this was not always the case: 
Most of the time you probably work with some hands-on, and that's important to make 
it clear that that can be at all times interrupted by the client if they're not comfortable 
with that or if that's unpleasant or they want to stop or there's feedback. And obviously 
movement can be part of that as well, depending on where you are and what it is you're 
doing. 
Margit also said she used touch quite a lot, often in order to lead into movement. She 
often used anatomy books to show clients what was going on in their bodies and to 
give them a sense of `experiential anatomy'. Visualisation of anatomy and body 
systems was a key component, and she felt it was useful for conscious awareness to 
be brought to this. This was one way of involving the mind in the work. Conscious 
awareness was not required at all times, however, although it might sometimes be 
helpful. Often, the work involved embodying the `mind' of a particular system, such 
as the skeletal, nervous, ligamentous, or fluid systems, using visualisation to imagine 
what qualities these systems had. This was intuitive and when I asked what kinds of 
minds various systems might have, she was unable to answer: `the mind of the 
skeletal system, is like, just belongs to the skeletal system. It's like the movement 
quality if you just move from the skeleton is kind of different and it has a certain 
mind. But I wouldn't know how to describe the mind. That's a really good question'. 
Describing the movement, however, was easier: 
Margrit: [It] can be very kind of loose movement, like all the joints are kind of, the 
bones are moving, almost random. Like everything is loose and like seeing the bones 
as being quite a dense part of the body and all the spaces in between, you can kind of 
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move them. In relation to a fluid movement which is more into a reach or going into 
space. Almost like with the skeleton there's no movement from A to B, and with the 
fluid there's almost a reach into space or you think about the organs, so it's like a lot of 
weight downwards. So there's a lot of density and the movement is much rounder, 
much more heavy and expanding. 
Clients are then expected to develop an intuitive or imaginative sense of what these 
systems might look like. This emphasises the exploratory nature of the work. 
However, knowledge of what a bodily system does and what its mind looks or feels 
like is not innate, but is suggested by the anatomy books and the practitioners 
themselves. Cohen's book Sensing, Feeling andAction suggests some of these, 
indicating for instance that the mind of the skeletal system provides structural 
organisation (1993: 3). Group sessions cf BMC work often involve the group being 
asked to move either through developmental stages or systems of the body. The 
metaphorical qualities of the body are made literal in this process, by being 
manifested in movement. For Carol, who sometimes used BMC principles in her 
work with groups of dance students, it was attractive because 
it brings me back to an animal feeling in my body, actually. And it makes that 
completely possible, and as soon as that's possible, I feel like my emotional life is 
available. Because if you get on your hands and knees, your head and your hands and 
mouth become what's leading you, rather than your head. ... you start to feel like you 
can be messy. And my students here, they'll do it, even though they're eighteen and 
incredibly self-conscious, and they'll stick their tongues out and be moving across the 
floor like lizards. I can say at least from my classes, they almost never feel oppressed 
or like I'm trying to shape or mould them into something that I have in my mind. 
There's the freedom to explore and I think that's better. 
As in Rolfmg, body awareness in Body. Mind Centering is the body's awareness of 
itself, although it may also at times be the conscious self s awareness of the body. 
Margrit suggested that clients could forget about the work when they left, `because 
it's a natural thing, it's something that is in their body, that happens in their body, or a 
connection that happens because they just realise, oh yeah, that's exactly what 
happened in the lesson or in the session. And that they shouldn't kind of, they're more 
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naturally aware of it than oh, I really have to think it'. Nature again is asserted, and 
the `naturally wise body' takes over. 
Body/Mind and Body/Self Relations 
The above descriptions of practices make it clear that even practitioners of these 
techniques are not always willing or able to explain what they do in physical terms. 
Often, the physical is taken for granted; it is something one `just knows'-or, as 
Brenda Farnell (1999) has put it in relation to dance practice, `it goes without 
saying-but not always'. As Csordas (2002) has pointed out, there is a condition of 
indeterminacy associated with all somatic modes of attention and experience, and this 
too affects the ability to articulate them. However, the descriptions above do point to 
certain patterns and points of difference in these techniques which together indicate 
the emergence of the concept of body wisdom within them. 
In Chapter Six, I suggested that in Alexander Technique, inhibition came to take on 
the function of awareness. I pointed to the fact that Alexander Technique seeks to 
develop conscious awareness and control over the body and its alignment, where for 
other techniques the nervous system may take over this role. This is most charly 
apparent in Rolfing, where much is done to the client without her or him having to do 
very much or bring much conscious awareness to it. Chapter Six also argued that 
Alexander Technique might develop an embodied consciousness, and that in doing so 
it could perhaps overcome dualism more successfully than later methods of 
movement re-education which posited the emergence of body wisdom. It is worth re- 
examining this claim here. 
While all these techniques strive to develop a kind of body awareness wit hin their 
clients, what body awareness means in each context is very different. In Alexander 
Technique, body awareness is conscious, and furthermore, becomes with practice an 
embodied consciousness. However, the predominance of consciousness links it with 
the mind; there is no separate consciousness for the body. In Pilates, body awareness 
refers to becoming aware of parts of the body or particular muscles and muscle 
groups; there is no intelligence in the body per se, only more or less intelligent use cf 
it. Conscious awareness is brought to bear not only on the parts of the body being 
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used, but is also engaged through the coordination of breath with movement. In both 
these methods, one's achievements are made visible-through comparisons in the 
mirror in Alexander Technique, and through the development of a particular physique 
in Pilates. Neither, however, has a sense that the body itself can know. This is not to 
say that a theory of body wisdom never asserts itself in these techniques, only that its 
marginal and that when it emerges, it is likely to have come from elsewhere. 20 
By contrast, in Feldenkrais, Rolfing, and Body-Mind Centering, the wise body is 
asserted. The body is psychologised, and emotional release becomes increasingly 
central rather than peripheral to the work. Body awareness becomes not awareness of 
what is happening in the body, but the body's awareness of itself. However, unlike in 
Alexander Technique, conscious control is not required. In Feldenkrais and Rolfing, 
the nervous system takes over from consciousness in directing awareness. This is not 
to say that the nervous system does not `learn' in Alexander Technique, but its 
learning is never seen to be sufficient; it is always end"gaining. In Rolfing, however, 
the nervous system is perceived to know which patterns are most efficient, and 
actively chooses these when presented with them. In Feldenkrais, the nervous system 
is also presented with opportunities-not verbally, in an appeal to consciousness and 
language, but kinaesthetically, through movement and touch. This is also the case in 
Body-Mind Centering, but in this technique, the entire body is divided into systems, 
each of which has a mind, or embodies certain qualities of one body/mind. It is 
interesting to note that these qualities tend to be emotional rather than intellectual 
ones, intellection being subordinate to body and `sensing, feeling, and action' in BMC 
work. 
What is the consequence of each of these understandings of the body/mind 
relationship for subjectivity and selfhood? Pilates tends to treat the body as 
something to be disciplined or educated, at least in its classical forms. More recently, 
there has been a shift toward `listening to the body' and taking its limitations into 
20 For example, in one lesson my Alexander teacher suggested that during menstruation, the body 
might need chocolate (and the magnesium it contains) so that a craving for chocolate might not always 
be unhealthy, but might rather have to do with the body recognising this need and seeking to fulfil it. 
While an example of body wisdom, it was a rather off-hand remark and not representative of Alexander 
Technique as a whole. Pilates teacher Laila, who incorporated many techniques into her classes, also 
seemed to hold a concept of body wisdom, even though it was not apparent in the classical repertoire of 
Pilates. 
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account. This implies a more equal partnership between consciousness and the body, 
rather than a relation of domination. However, it still appears to split mind from 
body; working in partnership does not imply merging the two into one, and selfhood 
still seems to be located in the conscious mind. Alexander Technique posits an 
embodied consciousness, developed through inhibition and conscious control, 
particularly of the head-neck-back relationship. A good head-neck-back relationship 
is referred to as `good use of the self and selfhood is thus located in the body. 
However, precognitive and habitual knowledge is not valued; as Barlow (1973) says, 
the wisdom of the body is an end-gaining wisdom and always requires conscious 
direction. Although there is a tension in consciousness and somatic control, 
Alexander Technique does appear to overcome mind-body dualism to some extent. 
The wise body attempts to overcome dualism by putting `mind' and selfhood into the 
body, developing the nervous and other systems. It re-values precognitive awareness, 
suggesting that the body can `know' even without consciousness. However, it takes a 
step beyond habitual and precognitive awareness of the kind MerleauPonty proposed 
and sees emotion as located literally in the body; locked into the myofascia of the 
muscles, as in Rolfing, or embodied in the skeleton, fat and fluid `systems' as in 
Body-Mind Centering. Emotional balance is then to be achieved through somatic 
work. It is interesting to note that none of the systems of the body developed in 
Body-Mind Centering include cognitive or mental processes, although certain 
emotional and physiological functions may be drawn to conscious attention. It is 
emotion, not consciousness, that becomes `the truth about ourselves', a somatic truth, 
inseparable from the body which manifests it. However, the emotional body always 
seems to be implicitly opposed to the conscious and rational mind, the traditional 
locus of selfhood. With the body as `true self, consciousness becomes a `false self', 
deceptive so long as detached from the wise and knowing body. What body wisdom 
does, then, is effectively to invert rather than erase dualism. The self is in the body; 
everything else, it might be said, is quite literally false consciousness. 
Thus, the somatic modes of attention associated with each technique of movement re- 
education are quite different, not only in terms of somatic practices but also in terms 
of the aspects of the self which do the attending. There is of course a material base to 
the body, and one dhes not physiologically have a different kind of nervous system 
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simply because one takes up Alexander Technique as opposed to Rolfing, for 
example. However, the two techniques have radically different interpretations of 
what the nervous system does, with significant consequences for one's interpretation 
of one's self and the conditions of one's selfhood, particularly in relation to where it 
resides. This relationship is further complicated in Body-Mind Centering, where it is 
not even simply the nervous system which `knows', but a variety of other systems as 
well. With the psychologisation of the body and posture from the mid-twentieth 
century onward, the body began to be seen as the source of emotional truth; in later 
techniques of movement re-education, this has been elevated to the point that the body 
begins to take on a selfhood of its own. 
Somatic Individuality 
Novas and Rose (2000) suggest that the medical work in genetics has become the new 
way of regulating individuals, with genetic screening becoming increasingly prevalent 
and the research of the Human Genome Project progressing. New genetics, they 
argue, is tied to contemporary practices of identity in which individuals are obliged to 
maximise their life chances and formulate strategies for living (2000: 487). Knowing 
that one suffers from an inheritable condition thus shapes the life choices made by 
individuals about marriage and having children, for instance. However, the 
redefinition of individuals in genetic terms does not simply affect those with 
hereditary medical conditions or the potential for them; rather, the authors claim that 
this is but one dimension of a wider shift toward `somatic individuality', `in which 
new and direct relations are established between body and self (2000: 487). These 
new relationships also reorganise experience in new ways, `inscribing an indelible 
genetic truth into the heart of corporeal existence' (2000: 488). 
The shift toward fording alignments that fit the self rather than approximating the 
plumb line is very much a part of Novas and Rose's notion of `somatic individuality'. 
It is not too much of a re-appropriation of their terminology to state that movement re- 
education is a form of somatic individuality; they argue, for instance, that 
recent developmarts in the life sciences, biomedicine and biotechnology are associated 
with a general `somaticization' of personhood in an array of practices and styles of 
thought, from techniques of bodily modification to the rise of corporealism in social 
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and feminist theory and philosophy. This is what we mean when we speak of `somatic 
individuality'. (Novas and Rose, 2000: 491) 
Movement re-education techniques are certainly forms of `bodily modification' and 
are addressed to the self through the body. As Rose sugge sts, `selfhood has become 
intrinsically somatic -ethical practices increasingly take the body as a key site for 
work on the self (2001: 18). Movement re-education is clearly an example of this, as 
the discussion in Chapter Five has shown. It is situated within a broader network of 
practices in which the body has become increasingly central. Rose points out that 
within the new ethics of the self, `even the natural has to be produced by a labour on 
the self-natural food, natural childbirth and the like. Exen choosing not to intervene 
in living processes becomes a kind of intervention' (2001: 19). As I concluded in the 
last chapter, this is certainly the case for movement re-education, in which training is 
undertaken often with the purpose of making the body more natural. 
Rose's work has tended to overemphasise the official discourses which shape the 
construction of truth. Equally interesting are the non-medical interventions which he 
mentions but does not discuss, part of a broader `enlarged will to health' which 
includes complementary therapies, self-help, dietary supplements and health food, 
private health care and health insurance (2001: 18). These too take a discursive role 
in shaping and moulding `truth', sometimes in conjunction with the biomedical and 
life sciences, and sometimes in opposition to it, as an examination of movement re- 
education's relationship to biomedicine will show. I want to take up the neglected 
portion of somatic individuality by proposing that movement re-education is also part 
of this re-envisioning which puts the corporeal at the heart of contemporary life. This 
can be seen, for example, in its relationship both to eugenics and to biomedicine. 
Chapter Five showed that there was a close link between ideas about the natural body 
and theories that humanity was degenerating and was in need of eugenical measures 
to correct this. Further, the idea that Western civilisation has caused natural ways of 
living to be corrupted is still prevalent amongst some of those involved in movement 
re-education, as Chapter Seven showed. The question then arises as to whether 
contemporary movement re-educators implicitly share the eugenic goals their 
founders set out. 
241 
Eugenical beliefs in movement re-education were based on the idea that humanity was 
physically degenerating, falling out of step with its intellectual development. The 
belief that contemporary society is moving too fast and that humanity is worse off 
than it once was is one still held by many practitioners and pupils of movement re- 
education. Roughly half of the participants in my study had a sense that humans were 
physically better off as hunter-gatherers and that contemporary society had taken 
them away from that. As one pupil of Alexander Technique described it, intellect had 
developed but physicality had not. In response to the illustration of the evolution and 
degeneration of man, he argued that `mentally, obviously, we're far more advanced 
there [latter part of the illustration] than there, but you would say around here [upright 
man in the middle of the illustration], this is where physically you used your body to 
the maximum.. . You 
had to be very aware of how you were, because it would be very 
base emotions, you were hungry, you were tired, that's about it'. A certain physical 
degeneration was thereby implied by his description. For another participant, a 
singing teacher who had studied Alexander Technique, the relationship was even 
more clear: 
Eva: I think we definitely have gone back, I think we've lost out on a lot by this second 
half of the journey. I don't necessarily think that we've gone back to being monkeys, or 
conducting ourselves like monkeys. 
Jeri: So what do you think we've lost out on? 
Eva: I think we've lost out on the connection to physicality. Because more and more all 
we do is in our brains, or in our vision, we live in a very visual time, everything is very 
flashy and quick and you'll see things in a TV production, you know, you... even being 
aware, I'm very aware that I read less and less, I write, like, it's very rare that I write for 
a long time with my hand. 'Cos I'll type. So I think we have lost a very organic um, 
sensation to our bodies. 
Eva's impression that vision and typing are not physical raise the question of where 
they take place, if not in the body. Her response was echoed by other participants 
who responded to the picture of the man slumped in front of his computer with 
comments about the disembodied nature of most contemporary work. While it is true 
that most office -based employment does not use the body in any strenuous way and 
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that hands and eyes are the body parts most employed in it, descriptions of such work 
as disembodied make an artificial divide between `body' -that is, what goes on 
below the head and excluding the hands- and mind, head, or brain. Such a division 
is peculiar, particularly in light of Merleau-Ponty's insight that touch-typing is a form 
of embodied knowledge (1962: 144) and that perception, including visual perception, 
is located in the body. This is not to say that office work employs the body in a 
healthy ways-the increasing prevalence of overuse and repetitive strain injuries does 
indicate that there is something problematic about it. However, the assumption that it 
is `disembodied' is suspect. 
While many particpants did not express views as strong as these, they did suggest 
that in contemporary society, something had gone awry, particularly in connection to 
physicality. Only three practitioners opposed the message of degeneration put 
forward in the illustration. Oliver, the Rolfer, felt that the illustration `says that the 
world is bad. That tools are bad, and that's a pity. Because all our tools are 
wonderful, amazing. It's just how locked in we are'. For Annette, an Alexander 
teacher who had worked extensively with City workers, the cyberspace in which some 
employees worked was `a very interesting development of human consciousness'. 
Nor did she see technology as necessarily leading people to lose their good use of 
themselves, despite having many pupils wih repetitive strain injuries from office 
work. She remembered an incident where `there was this guy standing outside 
Goodge Street station, I thought he'd gone mad at first. Because he had one of those 
little ear things, for mobiles, and he was just talking to himself. Quite loudly as well. 
I thought he was mad. What drew my attention to him was that he was standing 
beautifully'. While the mobile phone in this account has a strange function, making 
the man appear to be talking to himself, having a conversation in which one party is 
neither present nor signified (by the presence of the phone), it does not disrupt his 
good use. 
Despite the fact that many participants did believe some kind of degeneration was 
occurring, none mentioned eugenics nor expressed any desire to regulate the 
population through eugenical measures. Instead, they felt that the solution was an 
individual one, and studying movement re-education should be a personal 
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commitment. Obtaining a `natural body' or a `wise body' is not inherently linked to 
eugenics, as the discussions of the previous chapter demonstrated. 
Rose (2001) argues that with the rise of genetic theories of the self, we are not 
witnessing the re-emergence of eugenics, but rather a new form of risk management 
and ethical selfhood. Underlying eugenics was the desire to regulate populations, 
promoting their health and eliminating the weakest elements so that they could be 
competitive with other populations. Such a reading is consistent with Searle (1971) 
who writes that the `quest for national efficiency' of which eugenics was a part was a 
result of concerns that the British population was not comparing favourably with the 
German population, for instance. Rose asserts that this mode of thinking has fallen 
into disrepute (2001: 5) and has been replaced by the attempt to manage risk and in 
particular risky individuals. Current genetic thinking focuses on the individual body 
and not the social body (2001: 7). There is a parallel here with Yosifon and Steams' 
(1998) dscussion about the fate of good posture, discussed in Chapter Two, as part of 
the broader health promotional campaigns which often included so called `positive' 
eugenics. Medical practitioners and orthopaedic specialists today tend to treat poor 
posture as a matter of individual concern rather than something which requires 
broader social attention. While they are not engaged in managing risk in relation to 
posture, there has certainly been a shift in this field toward managing individuals 
rather than orchestrating change in the social body. The ergonomic measures that 
have been introduced in some workplaces to prevent repetitive strain injuries may be 
seen as a kind of risk management in this regard. 
For Rose, then, contemporary genetic practices are no longer eugenic, but are tied to 
the governance of risk and the emergence of somatic individuality. I would argue that 
movement re-education is similarly no longer eugenic, even when some of the 
discourses of degeneration have persisted. However, while they are clearly part of the 
emergence of somatic individuality, their link to risk management is more tenuous. 
As a form of health education, which was how many practitioners saw them, they 
were seen to prevent injury or poor use of the body/self, or more frequently to correct 
it where problems already existed. They form an ethics of the self, predominantly 
with the goal of developing body awareness or body wisdom which ultimately may be 
understood as managing the `risk' of ill-health. 
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Movement re-education is not a form of alternative health because it does not seek to 
replace biomedicine. Nor is it simply `complementary medicine'; while pupils were 
likely to link it to this field when asked if it was related, practitioners tended to 
distance themselves from it, seeing their work as complementary health education. 
One Alexander teacher explained that although there had been attempts to get the 
technique covered under the NHS, he felt that this was not desirable because it would 
mislead potential pupils: 
Robert: I think there's a problem with the NHS because the technique is open-ended 
and relatively, in terns of education it wouldn't be expensive but in terms of treatment, 
it would be regarded as expensive... until there actually is the health service offcring to 
patients the concept of health education, as part of the NHS, then it shouldn't be 
[covered] because otherwise it tends to get regarded as treatment. 
Being regarded as `treatment' was seen as problematic for many practitioners. James, 
for example, worried that Rolling would be associated with healing, when he felt that 
its primary goal was to align the body. Although he believed Rolling did heal people, 
this was a side effect of alignment rather than a goal in itself. For Hiroshi, a trained 
neurologist who no longer practised medicine, his association with it could be 
somewhat problematic: 
It's a very political issue. I'm very comfortable giving Alexander lessons as an 
Alexander teacher in an Alexander centre. But if I do it as a treatment for the patients in 
hospitals, probably I'd find it a little bit difficult to give lessons because my attitude is 
going to change and it's like I have to give, you know. I mean the people's relationship 
is going to be quite different. Especially if I say I'm a neurologist and giving the 
Alexander lessons. That is going to be quite difficult, nothing to do with myself I think, 
but the attitude of patients or the attitude of people who are coming to the lessons could 
be quite different. But it's still okay. rm not going to do something different at all, 
and they can still experience quite similar things, I think. For me, I'm interested in 
combining these disciplines but for me, I don't want to bother to persuade medics to use 
this technique, they're too much work, so I don't bother. 
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Most participants had mixed feelings about biomedicine. Those who had sought 
movement re-education because of health problems which had not been helped, such 
as violin players Saskia and Michael, or dancers Katja and Vivien, tended to be 
sceptical. Vivien, for example, said that she had developed horrendous nerve pain 
when given an epidural by a doctor to help with a back problem she was suffering. 
She found that with her Body-Mind Centering training, she was able to soothe the 
pain by focussing on the cerebral-spinal fluid, an aspect of the fluid system 
emphasised in BMC work. However, neither she nor any other practitioner claimed 
to be able to effect a cure. They believed the techniques might be able to help in 
some cases, but they saw their work as health education rather than as treatment. For 
William, who had been diagnosed with (and subsequently recovered from) cancer, the 
Alexander Technique principle of inhibition was useful in facing his diagnosis. Upon 
hearing it, he related that he was silent, unnerving the doctor terribly: 
But that was just Alexander in person, in the sense that I wanted to listen to what he had 
to say. I had enough thoughts about cancer and what was going to happen, I didn't 
want to play those to him or start distorting what he said to fit into some concept of my 
mind, I wanted to hear what he had to say. And this is not my original thought that 
Caine to mind, that was what happened as a result of years of Alexander training. I 
mean not in the sense of `doing an Alexander on him', this was just me meeting one 
crisis in my life in the way that I was ready to. 
Even in cases of serious illness, then, movement re-education could be helpful, but 
not in a curative sense. Indeed, among the few pieces of medical research on 
movement re-education is a study of Feldenkrais with Multiple Sclerosis patients 
(Johnson et al, 1999), which concluded that its most significant effects were on stress 
and anxiety levels. Most participants wished movement reeducation were taken 
more seriously by the medical profession, and many were frustrated by their own 
experiences of ailments and injuries which biomedicine had failed to treat. However, 
they did not propose movement re-education as a comprehensive solution but only as 
a complementary form of health education. 
It is interesting, too, to note that both Rolling and Feldenkrais employ much more 
scientific terminology than other methods, doubtless on the basis of the scientific 
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backgrounds of their founders. This appears to appeal to scientificity, giving the work 
a kind of medical legitimacy. This was relatively successful for Feldenkrais, whose 
book Body and Mature Behavior was apparently taken relatively seriously within the 
academic community. Despite this, neither of these techniques has achieved 
significant legitimation from biomedicine. 
Participants did not tend to subscribe to the more extreme beliefs in alternative health, 
where a form of body wisdom is used to justify claims that cancer and other serious 
illnesses are the result of emotional problems and blockages of energy (see, for 
example, the highly influential work of Louise Hay [1988]). Only one participant, 
Kevin, a pupil of Alexander Technique who was also heavily involved in biodynamic 
massarm, suggested that emotions were the entire cause of illness: `And I think that 
cancer is a classic example of that, where you put so much pressure on your body, so 
much pressure on shutting your emotions down and shutting everything out, that your 
body eventually goes on strike and starts committing suicide on a cellular level 
because you've choked the life out of it'. He went on to say that he did not believe 
genetic research would make any difference in curing cancer, because only emotional 
work on the self could result in permanent changes. 
Rose may be correct to say that genetics is becoming `the truth about ourselves', 
inscribing itself at the heart of existence, but it is clearly not at the heart of every 
existence. Those who live without genetic knowledge of themselves may still find 
somatic aspects of existence becoming increasingly central. There are also those who 
reject genetic knowledge entirely and hold fast to a different form of `truth', such as 
that of body wisdom, scientifically unproven but no less beguiling for that. In 
focusing only on scientific and medical knowledge as forms of truth, Rose overlooks 
sites where `truth' is constructed without reference to these. Movement re-education 
has largely either not sought, or has been unable to find, medical and scientific 
backing. However, this has not stopped practitioners and pupils from believing it to 
demonstrate somatic truths, often ones they feel biomedicine does not know or cannot 
see. 
Sharma (1992) is correct to separate Alexander Technique and similar movement re- 
education practices from complementary and alternative health more generally, 
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however. While there are certain similarities, such techniques are not comprehensive 
healing systems, nor do they claim to be. Coward (1989) is also somewhat mistaken 
in identifying practices such as Alexander Technique and Rolfing as part of a system 
of alternative health that challenges biomedical theories and practices. Most 
practitioners were quite open to biomedical approaches and desired that their work be 
more mainstream. They tended, however, to emphasise individual work on the self as 
the most desirable end. 
Coward does suggest that such practices are part of a broader shift toward individual 
responsibility, with new ideas about body and health emerging, something which 
Rose's concept of somatic individuality covers well. Practices of somatic 
individuality can include techniques that construct a truth of the body that stands 
somewhat outside of scientific and biomedical models. However, the concept is 
useful in explaining the shift that has occurred in movement re-education, away from 
eugenic notions of societal governance and toward individual governance through 
ethical self-practices. These practices may only be marginally related to managing 
risk, unlike other forms of somatic individuality such as the application of genetic 
knowledge, but they do constitute a form of ethics and a governance of the individual. 
Conclusion: The Somatic Society 
Bryan Turner has suggested that contemporary society may be described as somatic 
because the body is increasingly at the centre of social developments and regulations. 
He defines the somatic society as `a social system in which the body, as 
simultaneously constraint and resistance, is the principal field of political and cultural 
activity', suggesting that `the body provides the stuff of our ideological reflections on 
the nature of our unpredictable time' (1992: 12). 
In essence, the somatic society is a backdrop against which to set the workof both 
Csordas and Rose, dealing as they do with somatic practices and `modes of attention', 
and `somatic individuality'. Although Rose's discussion moves away from society to 
focus on the regulation of the individual within society, 'somatic individuality' still 
implicitly takes place within society and it is a broader social trend which he is 
chronicling. What the preceding discussions suggest is that very diverse approaches 
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to the body such as those of Csordas (who follows MerleauPonty) and Rose (who 
follows Foucault) may be united in topic in that both are working on aspects of 
somatic existence. Their analyses each flesh out a different aspect of the somatic 
society-one through embodied practice, the other through the analysis of discourse 
in its troadest sense. 
Movement re-education is also a practice of a somatic society. The concept of body 
wisdom is part of the emergence of the body as the source of truth, something body 
wisdom and genetics share as practices of the somatic individual. Body wisdom itself 
is a historically recent phenomenon, emerging only in movement re-education since 
the mid-twentieth century with the psychologisation of the body and posture. It is 
apparent in the practices of Feldenkrais and Rolfmg and receives its clearest 
articulation in Body-Mind Centering, but within Alexander Technique and classical 
Pilates repertoire, there is no sense of body wisdom as somatic truth. Rather, body 
wisdom is a concept linked to the development of the somatic society. This is not to 
say that the popularity of Alexander Technique and Pilates is unrelated to the 
emergence of a somatic society, only that these practices do not understand truth to be 
located in the body in the same manner. 
Turner observes that the somatic society is `crucially, perhaps critically, structured 
around regulating bodies' (1992: 13). As both the practices and the relationships to 
discourse detailed above indicate, movement re-education is also a way of regulating 
bodies. This regulation is not legal but ethical, taking the individual, not society, as 
its point of focus. Body awareness is its desired goal, either through an awareness of 
one's body, as in Pilates, or a wise body with its own awareness, as in Body-Mind 
Centering. Body awareness may lead to better health or simply increased flexibility 
and adaptability to new situations. In either case, it is a way in which people can be 
brought to regulate themselves, through acute attention to bodies and what they `say'. 
It is clear that movement re-education reflects the somatic society in which it has 
evolved. With the appearance of the concept of body wisdom, new ways of 
regulating the body/self within a somatic society emerge. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to show how it has become possible to think of bodies as wise 
and knowing, through an account which situates movement re-education in a socio - 
historical context, and a critical assessment of the ways that the discourses of 
movement re-education techniques are embodied by those who practice them. The 
research has been conducted using a range of methods, including a Foucauldian 
discourse analysis of the texts of movement re-education's founders and ethnographic 
work, which has included participant observation in Alexander Technique and 
interviews with practitioners and pupils of Alexander Technique, Pilates, Feldenkrais, 
Rolfing, and Body-Mind Centering. The purpose of employing these methods has 
been to reflect on the relationship between embodiment and discourse by providing an 
analysis of movement re-education which attends to its claim to be embodied whilst 
critically examining the discourses it employs. 
Movement re-education has received little attention as a serious topic for analysis, and 
what academic writing there has been on the subject has tended to be largely 
descriptive and treat it uncritically as a way of freeing the natural body (Fraleigh, 
2000; Green, 1999). In addition to addressing this neglected field, this thesis extends 
the analyses of sociology of the body, which have tended to be overly theoretical, by 
applying social theory to empirical research. Also, by applying embodied discourse 
to studying movement re-education, it has sought to synthesise a new methodology 
which accounts for both embodiment and discourse. 
As a result of these investigations, I have concluded that the wise body is not 
something one simply has or even is; it is something one becomes, through the 
process of re-educating the body. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, its historical 
roots can be foand in fields such as modem dance, American Delsartism, the 
Victorian concern with health and the popularity of non-allopathic forms of medicine, 
campaigns for good posture, social Darwinism, and `positive' eugenics. However, it 
was not until the middle of the twentieth century, as the concern with posture `fell' 
(Yosifon and Stearns, 1998) or more accurately, gave way to a psychologisation of 
the body (Vigarello, 2001) that body wisdom began to be articulated as such. 
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Anatomy and physiology in these techniques are not only psychologised but also 
mythologised, as the body comes to tell things and ultimately, in Body-Mind 
Centering for example, to possess `minds' of its own. This is not to say that there is a 
clear historical progression between forms of movement re-education such as 
Alexander Technique and Pilates and those that developed later; indeed, they still 
exist alongside more recent techniques and may in fact be more prevalent. They also 
share many historical and theoretical similarities, and Abxander Technique is not 
diametrically opposed to Body-Mind Centering, for example. However, the 
relationship between body, mind, and self is interpreted differently by each. 
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated how theories of embodiment and discourse can be 
developed into a methodology for researching movement re-education, and argued 
that this is necessary because an analysis of embodied practice provides a very 
different image of movement re-education than does an analysis of its discourses. By 
contrasting a Foucauldian approach to movement re-education as a form of ethical 
self-formation with a cultural phenomenology of its embodied practices as somatic 
modes of attention, it has become apparent that discourse, which is tied to movement 
re-education's theories, does not necessarily link to its embodiment and practice. This 
split between theory and practice becomes most clear where movement re-educators 
suggest that they are restoring a natural body through a particular way of training, a 
key contradiction in movement re-education which some contemporary practitioners 
are becoming aware of, as Chapter Seven indicated. 
Chapters 5 and 6 applied Foucauldian discourse analysis and MerleauPontyian 
cultural phenomenology to the texts of movement re-education's founders and data 
from participant observation in Alexander Technique respectively, in order to 
demonstrate that embodiment and discourse are very different and that researching 
one does not necessarily provide any sense of the other. Chapter Five showed how 
the founders conceived of their work in terms of its relationship to holism and the 
knowledge of oneself, the body/self as an ethical substance to be worked upon, nature, 
evolution, and the founders themselves as authorities on the `right' way to use the 
self, and the shift from body awareness to body wisdom as part of the telos of 
movement re-education. Chapter Six examined Alexander Technique lessons as an 
embodied practice in relation to Merleau-Ponty's conception of habit, Csordas' theory 
251 
of somatic modes of attention, and Bourdieu's notion of the habitus. It demonstrated 
how Alexander Technique sees habit as something to be overcome through conscious 
control, and indicated the concepts and practices it uses in doing this. It also indicated 
that by changing the way individuals use their bodies/selves, Alexander Technique 
seeks to change their habitus, which has mental and emotional consequences and not 
only physical ones. 
In Chapter Seven, I returned to the issue of the natural body raised in Chapter Five, 
which is a central issue in movement re-education as a discourse. This chapter 
showed that the discourses of naturalness and verticality have shifted since many of 
its founders were writing, and that the wise body is rarely a strictly upright one. 
Although many techniques initially emphasised verticality, the move away from the 
postural plumb line is characteristic of all contemporary movement re-education 
techniques, and practitioners do not describe their work as being either about posture 
or verticality. Instead, all techniques share the goal of bringing about body/self 
awareness, but they interpret this in different ways, emphasising either knowledge of 
one's body or the body's knowledge of itself. However, the discourses around 
naturalness have shifted less than those of verticality; while some movement re- 
educators interviewed made it clear that the natural body is a goal of their work, 
others invoked the `babes and savages' models of the natural body held by the 
founders and saw their techniques as restoring such a body. While this chapter 
focussed on changing discourses in movement re-education, it also attended to 
embodiment by examining how the physicality of the body had changed, arguing that 
the shift away from the vertical as a desired goal has been accompanied by a turn 
towards the proprioception and kinaesthetic awareness of the body. 
Chapter Eight brought embodied and discursive analyses into dialogue with one 
another in relation to the issue of the somatic in contemporary society. By examining 
the embodied practices of Pilates, Feldenkrais, Rolfmg and Body-Mind Centering as 
`somatic modes of attention' (Csordas, 2002) and contrasting this with Rose's (2000; 
2001) notion of `somatic individuality', wherein the body has become increasingly 
central to subjectivity, I showed that each of these analyses shows us a different but 
necessary aspect of movement re-education. Turner's (1992) suggestion that we are 
witnessing the emergence of a somatic society, in which bodies are key sites of 
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regulation, can be understood both in terms of how the body/self is interpreted 
discursively and in terms of the actual practices it undertakes. 
As an ongoing practice in which attention to the body, particularly the body as the 
source of truth, is central, movement re-education fits well with the emergence of a 
somatic society. Chapter Eight showed that it is always tied to a particular way of 
regulating bodies, not in terms of the population but as work on the self. Discovering 
body wisdom or developing body awareness does not simply free people to enjoy 
their `true selves' but always involves a constant cultivated attention to the body/self, 
as a way of shaping oneself in keeping with the truth of one's body/self and its 
`authenticity' or `naturalness'. No longer linked to eugenical ways of thinking, 
movement re-educators are still negotiating with theories of the natural as pre- 
civilised as part of the ethics of re-educating the body. Embodied analysis of 
movement re-education, however, shows that its practices are a way of training the 
body which has little relationship to the theories of the natural body put forward by 
many movement re-educators. 
Embodied practice may thus offer discourse a critique of itself. This is not unique to 
movemert re-education; in sociology, too, studying embodied practice can highlight 
the flaws and inconsistencies in discourse, and the ways in which it is negotiated. 
This may also point to some of the subtle shifts which occur in discourses through 
their embodiment. Discourse and embodiment may never entirely correspond. This 
is the reason that it is useful, even crucial, to study them in tension with one another. 
My main methodological argument has been that we do not need to choose between 
discourse and embodiment, or between the work of Foucault and that of Merleau- 
Ponty, as competing paradigms through which to understand bodies in social life. 
Nor should we try to smooth out the differences between these approaches, or claim 
that there are no weaknesses in them. As I showed in Chapter Three, Foucault does 
bracket out subjectivity in order to understand the conditions which make a certain 
kind of subjectivity possible, and as a result, his model of discourse is one that tends 
to act on the body rather than through or with the body. As I also demonstrated, 
Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, privileges embodied experience at the expense of 
its cultural situatedness. He acknowledges that embodiment is culturally shaped, but 
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does not provide the tools for amlysing this. It is only through the tension of using 
these approaches together that the weaknesses of each can be overcome. 
In addition to the methodology of embodied discourse, this thesis has offered other 
important insights for social scientific analysis. One of these is a critique of the social 
inscription model of the body which is often attributed to Foucault (1984). While 
Butler (1999) and Grosz (1994) have provided theoretical critiques of this model, 
through the comparison with movement re-education's theory of the pre-civilised 
body to be recovered, the weaknesses of such a model become fully apparent 
empirically, as I showed in Chapter Seven. Moreover, this study also serves to call 
into question the work of writers such as Bigwood (1991), who seek to `renaturalise' 
the body, by asking what use the natural body has served discursively, by 
demonstrating some of its more problematic manifestations in movement re- 
education, as the discussion in Chapter Seven regarding contemporary movement re- 
educators' conceptions of the natural body demonstrated. 
The body/mind relationship in movement re-education provides equally important 
insights for social science and social theory. There has been much discussion, 
particularly in writing on the body, about how to overcome Cartesian dualist 
tendencies in academic work. Through its various incarnations of `holism', 
movement re-education techniques provide possible ways to conceptualise the 
body/mind relationship which social science might choose to adopt or avoid. In 
Alexander Technique, for instance, the body-mind relationship involves conscious 
control over the body/self and specifically the head-neck-back relationship. Body 
awareness is developed through work on the self in standing, sitting, and doing table 
work. In some ways this is a less problematic formulation of the body/mind 
relationship than that of body wisdom, because it does not posit the body as a 
separate, `true' self. However, it may be taken to imply that bodies are subordinate to 
consciousness and always in need of conscious direction and control. Where 
conscious control becomes a bodily knowledge, with selfhood residing in the head 
neck back relationship, this implication may possibly be surmounted. In Body-Mind 
Centering, the body is divided into systems, each of which has a mind of its own. 
Exploring the minds of the systems may privilege body knowing over intellectual 
knowing; curiously, while the brain may be an organ and thus part of the organ 
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system, it is hardly recognised or mentioned. Theories of body wisdom that privilege 
bodily truth over intellectual knowing thus tend to invert traditional dualisms rather 
than overcoming them. However, it may be possible to develop a theory of the wise 
body which does not require recourse to the natural body or privilege body over mind. 
As MerleauPonty has pointed out, bodies can know with a precognitive awareness 
which is not `natural' but may be unconscious. This is reflected by those movement 
re-education practitioners such as James or Beth who do not see restoring the natural 
body as a goal of their work, but still refer to the body as in some way knowledgeable, 
as I discussed in Chapter Eight. 
Despite the possibilities this thesis offers, there are certain issues it has not been able 
to address. For instance, my initial conception of this research project involved 
studying body wisdom in all movement re-education techniques. However, through 
participant observation it became clear that although certain aspects of the wise body 
appeared in Alexander Technique, the technique's emphasis on conscious control 
precluded studying it as an exemplar of body wisdom per se. It became apparent 
through further research that body wisdom emerged only in later techniques. This 
was in fact usefii because it allowed a more precise history of the wise body to be 
developed, however, it does mean that my research has not simply addressed the 
`wise body' but the emergence of the wise body. It might be argued that in 
researching the wise body it would have been useful to undertake fieldwork in one of 
the techniques in which it does emerge. However, although I actively sought classes 
in Body-Mind Centering in order to make this comparison, the relatively minimal 
presence of this and other techniques promoting theories of body wisdom in the UK 
made such a project difficult. This limits some of the remarks that I can make about 
the wise body itself, and thus where this thesis can make its most useful contribution 
is in tracing the wise body's emergence and not its presence. 
Another issue which I have avoided is that of the efficacy of movement re-education. 
In part, I have adopted Csordas' (1994b) position that too much research has focused 
on whether non-scientific forms of healing work while little attention has been paid to 
how they work. By examining the practices of movement re-education and their 
relation to its theories, a different sense of efficacy arises, which privileges the 
processes of healing over its end result. As a sociologist my strength is in analysing 
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movement re-education as a fundamentally social practice, not in providing the kind 
of medical studies which might narrowly demonstrate the efficacy of particular 
practices and techniques in relation to one or more ailments. More attention needs to 
be given to the socio -historical context in which people use movement re-education 
and complementary and alternative health practices more generally. In any case, there 
are significant methodological debates in relation to whether controlled randomised 
trials, the standard biomedical method of demonstrating efficacy, are useful in relation 
to evaluating the effectiveness of complementary and alternative medicine more 
generally (Saks, 1994: 96). 
Studying movement re-education can provide insights into related fields such as 
dance, alternative health, and posture, all of which are rather under- researched in the 
social sciences. The strength of social scientific approaches is that they can address 
how these fields work and how they have come to articulate themselves in the way 
they do. The techniques studied here constitute a rich field providing significant 
possibilities for further research. For instance, research into the decline of posture as 
matter of biomedical concern would be particdarly useful, given the rise of repetitive 
strain injuries in recent years and the fact that guides to recovery tend to advise better 
posture without any discussion of what this might look or feel like (Quilter, 1998). 
Posture and body use have obviously not ceased to be important, as Vigarello's 
(2001) work demonstrates, and Yosifon and Stearns (1998) conclude that its neglect 
in contemporary biomedicine is particularly odd given the prevalence of health 
problems such as RSI and back pain which would seem to be at least partially 
posture-related (Yassi, 1997). Such a study could contrast how movement re- 
education approaches posture and body use with the ways that biomedicine has 
addressed it, opening a greater space for dialogue between them. It could also 
investigate whether the historical relationship between good posture campaigns and 
eugenics have been part of the reason for the decline of interest in posture concerns. 
This would also provide a broader context for movement re-education's original 
relationship to eugenics. 
The relationship between dance and movement re-education is one which requires 
further exploration, which I have not been able to devote space to here. As dancers 
increasingly adopt movement re-education as part of their training, it would be useful 
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to examine how they have used it, and its influence on performance, practice, health 
and injury treatment and prevention. This would provide a concrete sense of how 
movement re-education techniques are being employed in a particular fie ld and what 
work they do. It would give indications as to movement re-education's relation to 
health maintenance and injury prevention, and provide insights into the shift in dance 
away from external ideals toward internal and more individualised ways of regulating 
the body. 
Further, embodied discourse as a methodological and theoretical approach is one that 
is worth exploring in fields beyond movement reeducation. It would be useful to 
examine whether discursive and embodied analyses often provide divergent but 
complementary types of data, or whether in some fields discourse and embodiment 
`match' more than in others. Contrasting these sorts of analyses is an underused 
approach in body studies and in the social sciences more generally, and one which 
deserves more consideration. This thesis is merely a first step toward using embodied 
discourse as a methodology, and much further discussion on this topic would be 
useful. However, it is the fruitful nature of this kind of investigation which leads to 
the identification of the need for such work. 
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that far from being a practice of marginal 
importance, movement re-education has significant implications for theory and 
practice in sociology in terms of ways of conceptualising the body and its `nature' and 
sociality. By researching movement re-education with a methodology that takes both 
embodiment and discourse into account, new insights are produced into the 
interaction between these two paradigms, and a deeper analysis can occur. Studying 
movement re-education through embodied discourse provides useful insights into new 
ideas about the body and health, the emergence of the concept of body wisdom, and 
the ways in which such practices have become ways of governing subjectivity in a 
somatic society. 
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Appendix I 
Interview Guide 
How did you first get interested in/hear about this technique? 
How long did you/have you studied it? 
Have you studied any other forms of bodywork or movement re-education? 
Were they similar or different? 
Is this technique similar to anything else you've studied? 
Do you have any experience with performing arts or sport? 
Does this technique relate to that experience? How so/not? 
What do you know about how the technique itself got started? 
(Practitioners: how would you explain the goals of the technique's founder? ) 
What do you see as the aims of the technique? 
What will [aims of the technique] do? What benefits will this have? 
(Show image of `evolution of man' that ends with `man' slumped in front of 
computer, give context of seeing it on AT website): how do you interpret this image? 
Do you think it's relevant to this technique at all? 
Do you think there is such a thing as a `natural' posture/alignment? 
What might it be like? 
Why da we not have it? 
Do you think this differs for different people (across cultures) or is it the same 
for everyone? 
How do you think someone's background might affect their alignment? 
What do you do during a lesson in this technique? What kinds of things d) you 
practice? 
This technique is sometimes described as holistic. What does that mean to you? 
Do you think that it is holistic? How so? 
(Possible question on relation to Zen or yoga; similarities/differences. Might come 
under `similar to anything else studied' though). 
How do you think this technique relates to science and Western medicine? 
What was the gender balance in groups where you studied this technique? Do you 
think this was typical? (Why might this be? ) 
What about now? Has the technique `stuck'? Do you still practice any aspects of it? 
Practitioners: how has your experience of the technique changed over time? 
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Appendix II 
Sampling 
Snowball and quota sampling strategies such as the ones I used obviously do not 
produce a statistically random sample. The choices made throughout the study biased 
it toward London practitioners and those who were technologically literate enough to 
be contacted initially by e-mail. Of twenty-eight interviewees, sixteen were female 
and twelve were male, supporting the suggestion of many interviewees that the gender 
balance in these techniques was nearly half and half, with slightly more women than 
men. Participants were predominantly white European, including English, Scottish, 
Finnish, Danish, Swiss, and Dutch, and three were `Asian' in the broad sense (of 
Indian, Japanese, or Chinese ancestry). No participants were African, Caribbean, or 
Black British, which may be significant in terms of the racist evolutionary models 
these techniques often employed. 
The youngest interviewee was about twenty; the oldest seventy, with most in their 
thirties and forties. Taking into account that some people had experience with more 
than one discipline (in which case I spoke to them primarily about their favourite 
discipline or the one they had been most involved in), seventeen participants had 
experience with Alexander Technique, four with Feldenkrais, five with Pilates, three 
with Rolfmg, and three with Body-Mind Centering. Of these, sixteen were 
teacher/practitioners, twowere teacher-trainees, and ten were presently pupils of one 
or more techniques, or had been in the past. Length of training and experience ranged 
from three months in the case of one past Alexander pupil to thirty years in the case of 
one Alexander teacher. 
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Appendix III 
Glossary 
Cerebro-spinal fluid: The fluid that circulates around the brain and spinal cord; 
apparently has its own pulse which is separate from that of the heart. Part of the `fluid 
system' in Body-Mind Centering. 
Core stability. Refers to the development of specific abdominal muscles, particularly 
the psoas, which support posture. This is said to allow other muscles in the back and 
shoulders to release excess tension as they no longer need to do the work of postural 
support. 
Cranio (cranio -sacral therapy: A touch-based form of bodywork which works on 
the head and sacrum through gently manipulating the bones and cerebrospinal fluid. 
End-gaining: From Alexander Technique; a term used to refer to performing an 
action without consciously considering how to get there; thinking only of a desired 
end. 
Fascia, myofascia: envelopes of tissue around the muscles, which connect them to 
the joints. Ida Rolf believed that by working on the fascial envelopes rather than 
muscles themselves, one could make significant structural changes in the body. 
Head-neck-back relationship: The `primary control' in Alexander Technique; a 
particular alignment of the head, neck, and back in which the head goes `forward and 
up' and the back `lengthens and widens'. 
Latissmus dorsi (fats): shoulder adductor muscle which wraps from the back to the 
front of the body. 
Lordosis: a front-to-back spinal curve 
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Means-whereby: From Alexander Technique; opposed to end-gaining. Alexander 
encouraged pupils to consider the means -whereby a particular action was carried out 
by making the action conscious. 
Proprioception: A developed sense of body movement and positioning; a key sense 
to be developed in movement re-education, particularly Body-Mind Centering, where 
it is considered a `sixth sense', as important as hearing or sight. 
Psoas (iiiopsoas): a central postural muscle which connects the upper body with the 
lower body; attaches to the lumbar (lower) spine, goes through the pelvis and ends by 
attaching to the greater trochanter, or hip, bones. In movement re-education, this 
muscle is absolutely central to posture and core stability. 
Scoliosis: a spinal curve going from side to side 
Six-pack: the rectus abdominus muscle, that when developed forms a set of six 
bumps between the ribcage and pelvis. This is an external abdominal muscle. Often 
well-developed in athletes and bodybuilders and admired as a sign of fitness, a 
developed six-pack is usually derogated in movement re-education because it 
provides no postural support. 
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